

**CONSTANTINE XI DRAGAŠ
PALAEOLOGUS (1404–1453)**

THE LAST EMPEROR OF BYZANTIUM

Marios Philippides



Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus (1404–1453)

Constantine XI's last moments in life, as he stood before the walls of Constantinople in 1453, have bestowed a heroic status on him. This book produces a more balanced portrait of an intriguing individual: the last emperor of Constantinople. To be sure, the last of the Greek Caesars was a fascinating figure, not so much because he was a great statesman, as he was not, and not because of his military prowess, as he was neither a notable tactician nor a soldier of exceptional merit. This monarch may have formulated grandiose plans, but his hopes and ambitions were ultimately doomed because he failed to inspire his own subjects, who did not rally to his cause. Constantine lacked the skills to create, restore, or maintain harmony in his troubled realm. In addition, he was ineffective on the diplomatic front, as he proved unable to stimulate Latin Christendom to mount an expedition and come to the aid of southeastern Orthodox Europe. Yet in sharp contrast to his numerous shortcomings, his military defeats, and the various disappointments during his reign, posterity still fondly remembers the last Constantine.

Marios Philippides is Professor of Classics, Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA. He has authored numerous books and articles on the Palaeologan era and on the fall of Byzantium.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus (1404–1453)

The Last Emperor of Byzantium

Marios Philippides

First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2019 Marios Philippides

The right of Marios Philippides to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Philippides, Marios, 1950– author.

Title: Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus (1404–1453) : The Last Emperor of Byzantium / Marios Philippides.

Description: New York : Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018007936 | ISBN 9781138483224 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781351055420 (e-book)

Subjects: LCSH: Byzantine Empire—History—Constantine XI Dragases, 1448–1453. | Constantinus XI Dragases, Emperor of the East, –1453. | Istanbul (Turkey)—History—Siege, 1453.

Classification: LCC DF642 .P55 2019 | DDC 949.5/04092 [B]—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2018007936>

ISBN: 978-1-138-48322-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-351-05542-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

**Before me floats an image, man or shade,
Shade more than man, more image than a shade;
For Hades' bobbin bound in mummy-cloth
 May unwind the winding path;
A mouth that has no moisture and no breath
 Breathless mouths may summon;
 I hail the superhuman;
I call it death-in-life and life-in-death.**

W. B. Yeats, *Byzantium*, 1930



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xiii
1 Introduction: <i>Res dubiae</i>	1
1 <i>A romantic vision</i>	1
2 <i>The scholars</i>	4
3 <i>A playwright</i>	8
2 <i>Ex oriente lux: imperial impotence</i>	18
1 <i>The emperor's father and mother</i>	18
2 <i>The beggar emperor</i>	24
3 <i>The last imperial princes</i>	29
3 <i>Fortuna imperatrix mundi: the young Turks</i>	46
1 <i>Hope and survival</i>	46
2 <i>The green years</i>	48
3 <i>Education for a prince</i>	49
4 <i>The training fields</i>	53
5 <i>The changing of the guard</i>	58
6 <i>Return to reality</i>	62
4 <i>Nil sub sole novi: the Turkish offensive</i>	78
1 <i>Porte and court</i>	78
2 <i>The era of gunpowder</i>	79
3 <i>The troublemaker</i>	84
5 <i>Morea redivivus?: the prince's offensive</i>	106
1 <i>The boiling pot</i>	106
2 <i>The prince's bride</i>	108
3 <i>Victory at Patras</i>	112

4	<i>Assertion of authority</i>	115
5	<i>The new map</i>	120
6	<i>Ecce homines: emperor and regent</i>	134
1	<i>Southern intrigues</i>	134
2	<i>Northern intrigues</i>	137
3	<i>The emperor's regent</i>	141
4	<i>A guest from the east</i>	146
5	<i>Second thoughts</i>	151
7	<i>Dux bellorum: delusions of grandeur</i>	169
1	<i>Disgrace and inactivity</i>	169
2	<i>A state of siege</i>	171
3	<i>The warlord</i>	177
4	<i>The impregnable isle</i>	182
5	<i>Panic and horror</i>	187
8	<i>Animi cadunt: the end of an era</i>	206
1	<i>A scholar from the west</i>	206
2	<i>The revenge of the priests</i>	209
3	<i>The emperor-makers</i>	216
4	<i>Emperor without a crown</i>	221
9	<i>Dies irae: the crown of martyrdom</i>	237
1	<i>The emperor's diplomatic activities</i>	237
2	<i>Imperial finances</i>	240
3	<i>A bride for the emperor</i>	244
4	<i>The fortress of doom</i>	249
10	<i>De mortuis nihil nisi bonum: judgments</i>	270
1	<i>The emperor and the cardinal</i>	270
2	<i>The emperor and his allies</i>	274
3	<i>Heavenly wrath</i>	276
4	<i>Verdicts: the emperor under siege</i>	280
11	<i>Rex quondam rexque futurus: May 29, 1453</i>	303
1	<i>History and pseudo-history</i>	303
2	<i>Emperor and legend</i>	306
3	<i>The emperor's grave</i>	317
4	<i>Resurrection and triumph</i>	324
	<i>Bibliography</i>	346
	<i>Index</i>	383

Preface

The aim of this book is to produce a balanced portrait of an intriguing individual: the last emperor of Constantinople. To be sure, the last of the Greek Caesars was a fascinating figure, not so much because he was a great statesman, as he was not, and not because of his military prowess, as he was neither a notable tactician nor a soldier of exceptional merit. This monarch may have formulated grandiose plans, but his hopes and ambitions were ultimately doomed because he failed to inspire his own subjects, who did not rally to his cause. He lacked the skills to create, restore, or maintain harmony in a troubled realm. In addition, he was ineffective on the diplomatic front, as he proved unable to stimulate Latin Christendom to come to the aid of southeastern Orthodox Europe. In the fifteenth century, it was even rumored that this last emperor had been born under an unlucky star. Yet in sharp contrast to his numerous shortcomings, his military defeats, and the various disappointments during his reign, posterity still fondly remembers the last Constantine.

Simply put, Emperor Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus (1404–1453) refused to die. His idealized personality, his place in the last ruling dynasty, and the undocumented circumstances of his death provided fertile ground for the growth of a very powerful national myth, which drew its ultimate inspiration from ancient Mediterranean images and folk motifs: Constantine, it was believed, was not dead but sleeping. His eventual resurrection—awakening, it was widely prophesied, was destined to bring salvation to his former subjects who had been subjugated by a foreign conqueror. So, Constantine XI became the foundation stone of the Modern Greek nation, whose future liberation from the Ottoman overlord, was identified, to a large degree, with the last emperor's eventual revival. In the meantime, and until the wheel of mythology turned full circle, Constantine's death was strongly denied. The emperor in suspended animation became the soul of Greece. His second coming would herald the ascent of Hellas from the depths of Hades. Thus a historical emperor joined a heroic company of other semi-legendary figures who had preceded his march into the realm of myths, legends, and folktales similar to those of Arthur of Britain and of the supposed sister of Alexander the Great, who had drunk the water of immortality, had become a mermaid, and ever since endlessly roams the seas in search of news about her brother: his death she refuses to accept, as the Greeks of the late Middle Ages and of the subsequent period refused to accept the death of their last emperor. Of all the historical figures from antiquity

and the Middle Ages, Greek popular thought set apart Alexander the Great and Constantine XI to be assigned heroic dimensions; without doubt, they became memorable figures of ancient, medieval, and Modern Greek folklore.

The formulation and exponential growth of this potent myth, whose nucleus is ultimately based on the folktale motif of “the vanished monarch” is indeed inseparable from the highly romanticized portrait of the emperor. Thus in spite of the traditional, highly idealized and fictional portrait that has dominated the scene over the centuries, my main concern is historical reality and I have attempted to produce a balanced profile of Constantine XI’s career in mainland Greece and in Constantinople: I have tried to evaluate his role as despot, as regent, and as emperor, by assembling, translating, and synthesizing the information supplied by various eyewitness sources and by examining the contemporary and near-contemporary literature of the *quattrocento*, as scholars have gathered a great deal of the source material in the original languages. Large extracts have been edited and published in various learned journals over the centuries, but some accounts have been neglected and have never been translated, while others still remain inaccessible. In addition, some of the authors of these medieval narratives have experienced a fate akin to a *damnatio memoriae* and their texts have been overlooked. Accordingly, one of my objectives was to collect, quote, and translate relevant testimonies, including those that have been, for various reasons, neglected by modern scholarship (such as the evidence presented in the so-called *chronica breviora*); I have not translated the passages quoted in the footnotes, as they will be of interest to specialists.

I have also analyzed and evaluated numerous hypotheses and theories put forth by modern historians. I should indicate at the outset that I have frequently found myself in sharp disagreement with the prevailing scholarly opinion. As I struggled with the evidence, it became clear to me that Constantine’s portrait could be painted only after a fresh examination and a critical review of the historical record had been undertaken. This search for historical reality compelled me to depart from the quixotic aura that has enveloped the last Greek emperor. My scrutiny of the contemporary record compelled me to strip Constantine of the patriotic cloak, with which he was invested by nineteenth-century scholars, who, in some case, were guided by national aspirations and wishful thinking. Unlike his father, Constantine XI was not a writer and left behind neither a voluminous corpus of epistles nor any composition of literary merit to guide us in this path. We only possess a handful of documents, to which Constantine appended his signature as despot and as emperor without crown. Thus, I have been painfully aware of severe limitations in the record and of the numerous *lacunae* in our sources. It is for this reason that I have been obliged to resort to the occasional inference and to struggle with the surviving fragmentary evidence in order to make some sense out of events that, *prima facie*, seem unrelated and unconnected.

The fact that Constantine came at the end of a very long line of emperors has further prejudiced the views of numerous scholars who have found themselves unable to divorce the earlier career of Constantine from the events of the morning of May 29, 1453. Constantine’s disappearance and last ride into the realm of Legend on that day have erased a previously mediocre career and an undistinguished record;

his last moments in life, as he stood before the ancient walls of his city, elevated him into heroic status. If Constantine XI had been as mad as Nero, had committed atrocities comparable to those of Vlad III Dracula the Impaler (the prototype of our Dracula), and had matched the savagery of Stalin, posterity, I suspect, would have treated him with kindness, precisely because he was the last defender of fabled Constantinople. During the following centuries, from 1453 to our own era, this otherwise average emperor became a symbolic future avenger, embodying the hope and expectation of eventual liberation. Lost in this sea of praise, prophecy, millennialism, folklore, and national ambitions, the historian begins to pray for the skills of a shaman in his journey to catch a glimpse of the real Constantine. The emperor's personality remains elusive.

I should note that I have utilized the adjective "Byzantine" to refer to the Greeks of the Middle Ages, thus bowing to the tradition that dates back to the seventeenth century, when French antiquarians first coined the term. Gibbon's towering influence subsequently colored "Byzantine" with its familiar pejorative dimension. If language and religion were to count as criteria for ethnicity, "late Byzantine" is probably equivalent to what we understand nowadays by "Greek." After all, the language of the average Byzantine individual of the *quattrocento* did not differ radically from the spoken idiom of the nineteenth-century Kingdom of Greece; even nowadays the citizens of the modern Hellenic Republic could have conversed with Constantine's subjects in relative ease. Moreover, the religion of the vast majority of modern Greek-speakers is still Orthodox Christianity. Thus, while one may be charged with anachronism if one were to maintain that the Palaeologan coda of the Greek empire of the Middle Ages was the seminal form of the Modern Greek nation, I believe that it is neither anachronistic nor unnatural to employ the term "Greek" for the Christian Greek speakers of the *quattrocento* but I retained "Byzantine," as it is more familiar with historians of this period, as long as we recall that the term "Byzantine" was not used by the subjects of the Constantinopolitan emperor.

The present study has been written in the United States, in Athens, Greece, and in Istanbul, Turkey, over the course of the last twenty years. Because I have consulted collections of rare books scattered in numerous libraries, I have been compelled to use different editions of the same sources on occasion, but I have made every effort to correlate all editions and provide equivalent pagination (in brackets) of the passage in question. In case of major departures, I have fully quoted the variant text as given by different editors. Most of my research was conducted at the Gennadius Library of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens and at Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies in Washington, DC. Research materials were also acquired from other institutions, both in the United States and elsewhere, and I am deeply appreciative of the endless courtesies extended to me. Thanks are also due to the capable staff of the Interlibrary Loan division of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, for invaluable assistance over the decades.

Scholarly investigation constantly reminds us of our immense debt to past generations of scholars, who toiled in libraries and in archival collections to transform chaos into order by transcribing, editing, and publishing readable versions of texts

from faded manuscripts. One surely stands in awe before the Herculean labors of C. N. Sathas, P. A. Déthier, C. Hopf, N. Iorga, A. Paspates, E. Pears, and S. P. Lampros. Recent times have also produced giants and a phalanx of names comes to mind: R.-J. Loenertz, F. Babinger, F. Dölger, G. T. Dennis, D. J. Geanakoplos, H. Hunger, P. Schreiner, K. M. Setton, S. Vryonis, G. T. Zoras, John R. Melville-Jones, and J. W. Barker, among so many others. My extensive debt to all of them is indicated by the frequency with which their names appear in the notes.

It is with great pleasure that I acknowledge the generous assistance, support, and encouragement that I have received from various scholars at different stages of this project. Numerous scholars have answered my persistent inquiries, have discussed various aspects of my research with me, and have given me their kind support over the years in the course of various symposia and especially during the annual meetings of the Byzantine Studies Conference and during the annual Symposia at Dumbarton Oaks; one cannot think of a more enjoyable environment for the profitable exchange of scholarly ideas: Professor John W. Barker (whose magisterial study on Constantine's father, Manuel II Palaeologus, has been an endless source of inspiration); the Reverend George T. Dennis, S.J.[†], who generously and patiently answered my questions and persistent inquiries with regard to Manuel II's family and with regard to late medieval warfare, in general; Doctor George Contis for lending me his expertise on the coinage of the late Palaeologi; and Doctor Constantine G. Hatzidimitriou who supplied me with some material to which I had no access. I owe a debt to my former students, Professors Hilton Alers (who checked my translations of Catalan and Spanish texts), Michael Dixon, and Paul Kimball. My greatest debt goes to my close friend and collaborator, Professor Walter K. Hanak[†], who contributed generously of his time to read every word of earlier versions of my manuscript and to place its text under the microscope. He thus improved the narrative in various ways. I am grateful for his assistance with the Slavonic material, his fortitude in confronting my theories, his kindness, his wise advice, and his sharp observations and evaluation of the topography during our various surveys of the walls of Constantinople, as we threaded our way through dark streets and perilous neighborhoods. In addition, Professor John R. Melville-Jones most kindly read my final version of the manuscript and made innumerable suggestions and improvements to the text: *Maximas gratias, magister*.

I would be amiss if I did not acknowledge the assistance of Lady Lucy Higgins, *candidissimae imperialissimaeque canis Pechini*, whose melodious barking kept me on task. Above all, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Corinne Lynam Philippides, a true Philhellene, who has enthusiastically supported my scholarly interests for fifty years: χαῖρε ἄνασσα· ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς.

Marios Philippides
May 29, 2018

Abbreviations

<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>BB</i>	<i>Византийский Временник</i>
<i>BC111</i>	Anonymous, <i>The Barberini Codex 111</i>
<i>BS</i>	<i>Byzantinoslavica</i>
<i>BSEB</i>	<i>Byzantine Studies/Etudes byzantines</i>
<i>Byz</i>	<i>Byzantion</i>
<i>BZ</i>	<i>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>CBB 1, 2, 3</i>	<i>Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken [Chronica Byzantina Breviora]</i> Vol. 1: <i>Einleitung und Text</i> Vol. 2: <i>Historischer Kommentar</i> Vol. 3: <i>Teilübersetzungen, Addenda et Corrigenda, Indices</i>
<i>CC 1, 2</i>	A. Pertusi, ed. <i>La Caduta di Costantinopoli</i> Vol. 1: <i>Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei</i> Vol. 2: <i>L'Eco nel Mondo</i>
<i>CF</i>	J. Gill, <i>The Council of Florence</i>
<i>CFHB</i>	<i>Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae</i>
<i>CH</i>	<i>Church History</i>
<i>CMH</i>	<i>Cambridge Medieval History</i>
<i>CSHB</i>	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae</i>
<i>ΔΙΕΕ</i>	<i>Δελτίον τῆς Ἱστορικῆς καὶ Ἐθνολογικῆς Ἐταιρείας τῆς Ἑλλάδος</i>
<i>DGM 1, 2</i>	D. A. Zakythinos, <i>Le Despotat grec de Morée</i> Vol. 1: <i>Histoire politique</i> Vol. 2: <i>Vie et Institutions</i>
<i>DOP</i>	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</i>
<i>DOS</i>	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Studies</i>
<i>DOT</i>	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Texts</i>
<i>ΕΕΒΣ</i>	<i>Ἐπετηρὶς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν</i>
<i>EX</i>	Anonymous, <i>Ἐκθεσις Χρονική</i>
<i>EMA</i>	<i>Ἐπετηρὶς τοῦ Μεσαιωνικοῦ Ἀρχείου</i>
<i>EO</i>	<i>Echos d'Orient. Revue d'histoire, de géographie et de liturgie orientales</i>
<i>FC</i>	S. Runciman, <i>The Fall of Constantinople 1453</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>

<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>JöB</i>	<i>Jahrbuch des österreichischen Byzantinistik</i>
<i>JöBG</i>	<i>Jahrbuch des österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft</i> (from 1969: <i>Jahrbuch des österreichischen Byzantinistik</i>)
<i>LCB</i>	D. M. Nicol, <i>The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453</i>
<i>LMB</i>	J. V. A. Fine, <i>The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest</i> , vol. 2
<i>MCT</i>	F. Babinger, <i>Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time</i>
<i>MP</i>	J. W. Barker, <i>Manuel II Palaeologus (1395–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship</i>
<i>NE 1–6</i>	N. Iorga, <i>Notes et extraits pour servir à l'Histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle</i> , 6 vols.
<i>NH</i>	<i>Νέος Έλληνομνήμων</i>
<i>OCP</i>	<i>Orientalia Christiana Periodica</i>
<i>PkP 1–4</i>	S. P. Lampros, <i>Παλαιολογία και Πελοποννησιακά</i> , 4 vols.
<i>PG</i>	J.-P. Migne, ed. <i>Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series Graeca</i>
<i>PaL 1, 2</i>	K. M. Setton, <i>The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)</i> Vol. 1: <i>The Fourteenth Century</i> Vol. 2: <i>The Fifteenth Century</i>
<i>PLP</i>	E. Trapp, et al., edd., <i>Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologen- zeit</i> , 7 vols.
<i>RdD</i>	F. Thiriet, <i>Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie</i> , 3 vols.
<i>REB</i>	<i>Revue des études byzantines</i>
<i>RKOR</i>	F. Dölger and P. Wirth, edd., <i>Regesten der Kaiserkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565–1453 [= Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neuen Zeit]</i> , vol. 5: <i>Regesten von 1341–1453</i>
<i>SBN</i>	<i>Studi bizantini e neoellenici</i>
<i>SOC</i>	R. Schwoebel, <i>The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453–1517)</i>
<i>SFC</i>	M. Philippides and W. K. Hanak, <i>The Siege and Fall of Constanti- nople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies</i>
<i>ST</i>	<i>Studi e Testi</i>
<i>TiPN</i>	A. Pertusi, ed., <i>Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli</i>
<i>VeG</i>	A. T. Papadopoulos, <i>Versuch einer Genealogie der Palaiologen, 1259–1453</i>
<i>VMRS</i>	<i>Viator; Medieval and Renaissance Studies</i>
<i>ZRVI</i>	<i>Zbornik Radova Vizantijloškog Instituta, Srpska Akademija Nauka</i>

1 Introduction

Res dubiae

1 A romantic vision

Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus was the last Byzantine monarch to reign over Constantinople. Acclaimed emperor by his troops in southern Greece two months prior to his arrival in the capital, he was never formally crowned in Santa Sophia.¹ In legal terms the last emperor of medieval Greece was John VIII. Various authors noted the awkward situation of an emperor without a crown. Constantine's legitimate claim to the throne, however, was never questioned and his position was not challenged throughout his short reign.² By virtue of his lineage, at the end of a long line of emperors, Constantine was assured of a unique position in the history of medieval Hellenism. Furthermore, the end of his life is associated with the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks. Thus, Constantine came to be seen as the emperor who expired together with the Greek version of the Roman Empire. He vanished fighting against the Turkish janissaries in front of the ancient fortifications of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, when he crossed the border from history into legend. Throughout the Middle Ages Constantinople had boasted of her direct continuity with antiquity. To the annoyance of medieval Europe's kings, the Byzantine emperors had maintained the trappings and offices of their ancient Roman predecessors and had promoted the claim to be the only legitimate heirs of the Caesars.³

After the fall of Constantinople, the subjects of the Byzantine Caesars were reduced to the status of another religious minority under the Ottoman sultan. The conquest of Constantinople hastened the expansion of the Turks into the Balkan peninsula and into central Europe.⁴ The Greeks under the sultan survived a long period of subjugation in full expectation of a glorious future copiously predicted by their folklore.⁵ Generations of Greeks eagerly anticipated the resurrection of their nation, which, it had been prophesied time and again, would rise from its ashes. The Greeks, it predicted, were destined to recover their occupied capital, to lay the foundations of a modern version of their medieval empire, and to bring the Ottoman interlude to an end. Furthermore, this millennial *reconquista* would be initiated and implemented by none other than the last emperor of Constantinople, Constantine XI, who was expected to awaken from his long sleep, to quit his concealed underground chamber in the vicinity of the walls of Constantinople, and to lead his subjects onward to glory. Constantine had presided over the death

2 Introduction

of the ancient empire. He would become, it was foretold in millennial lore, the deliverer of the nation. He thus became identified with the eventual reconstitution of the grand old order.⁶ So Constantine XI refused to die, in spite of the events of May 29, 1453, and in spite of the cold facts of history, which declared that the last emperor had perished. The folklore of the ensuing centuries stubbornly declared that Constantine had not died but had been spirited away to a secret chamber by the Lord's angel. As a Greek counterpart to King Arthur in Avalon, Constantine was destined to return.

The creation of this myth turned Constantine XI into the most beloved of all the Byzantine emperors. All memory of past grandeur accumulated around the figure of "the sleeping emperor." Other emperors, who achieved a great deal more, were inevitably forgotten. Yet Constantine XI is still remembered and the average Greek readily recognizes his name. In life his achievements were mediocre, at best, or even minimal, at worst. Unlike his father, Emperor Manuel II, Constantine was not a gifted intellectual. Nothing of a literary nature by his hand, not even an epistle of a personal nature, has come down to us. His apparent lack of interest in literature contrasts sharply with the example of his learned father, who has left us a voluminous record of letters and literary compositions. Manuel had been a prolific author of literary works, even though his reign was accented by burdensome administrative demands and peregrinations worthy of Hercules. Unlike his brother John VIII, Constantine did not visit the west and did not witness the vibrant environment in Italy, promoted by Greek scholars who had fled the impending Turkish annexation. Constantine contributed nothing to the study of antiquity, to contemporary literature, and to the humanistic environment. He was not a Renaissance prince.

Constantine's activities extended over the administrations of his learned father and of his competent brother, John VIII, who belonged to the environment of the Renaissance.⁷ Early on in his career, Constantine became closely associated with John VIII. He fully supported his elder brother when the latter clashed with their aged father; his policies as uncrowned emperor remained faithful to John's policies.⁸ Constantine first came to prominence, when he served as his brother's regent, a task that he had to undertake once more in later years. On both occasions, he proved a capable and loyal follower who performed adequately in the emperor's absence.⁹

As lord and despot of the Morea, Constantine wore the soldier's cloak, but his sword did not prove very sharp.¹⁰ His military "exploits" have been greatly exaggerated by his contemporaries and by modern scholarship. It took a moderate *razzia* by the Ottoman army of Sultan Murad II to wipe out Constantine's famed "conquests." Constantine proved incapable of mounting a serious defense against a Turkish naval expedition when he found himself under siege in the island of Lemnos and was compelled to summon the Venetians to his aid.¹¹ Above all, he proved unable to save his capital from Mehmed II, the capable young sultan and brilliant strategist. Constantine's military ambitions, especially his plans for the Morea, may have been colored by a certain degree of romanticism, since he had hoped to realize his dream of establishing a unified southern and central Greece. He had also hoped to turn the Morea into a haven for his subjects, impregnable to Turkish raids. At that time courtiers had viewed him as the incarnation of Ares

and, in the fashion of the period, the court's intellectuals, humanists, lovers of Greek antiquity, and learned friends of the Palaeologan family had dubbed him a new Themistocles. Mistra, his capital in the Morea, was nostalgically compared to their idealized conception of classical Sparta and the Neo-Platonist philosopher of Mistra urged Constantine to become a new Lycurgus and resurrect the constitution of ancient Sparta, whose very ruins lay in the neighborhood. How much of this voluminous propaganda, wishful thinking, and escapism was taken seriously, or was even understood by Constantine and his average contemporaries is difficult to discern. The praises and flattering comparisons at court had been composed in the deliberately archaic and convoluted prose favored by the era's *literati*, which imitated the difficult linguistic idiom of the ancient Attic dialect and was far removed from the spoken language. While he remained in charge of the Morea, Constantine assumed the dimensions of a Messiah in the literature composed by various humanists close to him. His conquest of Patras and of the Latin fiefs in the Morea made a definite impression, as most of the peninsula came under Constantinopolitan rule. Yet his "unification" of southern Greece was deceptive and ephemeral. Before the ink of the accolades had dried, Constantine's appanage fell apart. His plans remained a dream that never came to fruition.

A lone voice of protest found expression in a poem penned in the spoken language. Its author moved in circles that had no apparent contacts with the intellectuals in the despot's court. And this poem was composed after Constantine's death: its lines daringly spoke of an atrocity, a massacre, that may have been committed by Constantine's troops but this voice in the wilderness spoke in the modern idiom and did not display the Atticism favored by the scholars.¹² Consequently, the intellectuals never took notice of it. Constantine, it may be concluded, was not a Hannibal. Constantine set objectives before him but was not a capable general and could not realize his goals through the military or through diplomatic means. He proved impotent. He neither established nor maintained a permanent control over his territorial gains. In the cold light of day, one may conclude, court sycophancy and wishful thinking produced a false image of Constantine, who was turned, *pietatis causa*, into an admirable general and a brilliant statesman after his demise, or in court propaganda while he was alive. Modern scholars have faithfully traced the footsteps of Constantine's admirers and they too are responsible for maintaining the fiction of Constantine's superior military skills. These are pious sentiments but do not reflect reality.

Constantine's subsequent reign as emperor without a crown proved frustrating. The endless bickering among his courtiers undoubtedly hindered his efforts. His diplomatic campaign to secure western help for the defense of his capital failed, his appeals fell on deaf ears, and he was left to fend for himself.¹³ His quest for a bride who would bring financial aid from abroad did not come to a conclusion.¹⁴ There was little that he could do to improve the ruined finances of his capital. He died owing a massive financial debt to Venice, his major ally.¹⁵ There was internal unrest as well: his subjects were hopelessly divided along religious lines.¹⁶ In this chaotic situation, facing a powerful external threat, the emperor could not achieve much and, given the seriousness of the circumstances that he encountered, one

4 Introduction

wonders whether any emperor could have successfully survived such a challenge. Constantine failed to inspire and could not impose his will. In his eagerness to appease, he managed to anger all factions, friend and foe, in his capital, who saw in him an emperor without a crown, without a treasury, without will, without resolve, without élan, without religion, and without allies. Truly Constantine XI stood alone on the ramparts of his city on that fateful morning of May 29, 1453.

One doubts whether the circumstances of the Levant would have allowed anyone to do better. Had he been an incomparable diplomat, had he found himself at the head of an energetic administration, and had he faced a less determined foe, Constantine, even then, might not have been able to achieve more than Serbia's George Branković, who managed to retain partial control over his territories by constantly appeasing the sultan.¹⁷ If Constantine had matched George's clever diplomacy, he might have gained some time for his unhappy city, at best. Eventually, the Turks would have absorbed Constantinople into their growing empire, precisely because the southeastern Balkans had been abandoned by Europe. The defeat of the crusaders at Varna and the subsequent disaster of Hunyadi's campaign had sealed their fate. Constantinople became doomed and Balkan independence evaporated.¹⁸

The last emperor of medieval Greece has been generally viewed as a romantic figure that put up a fierce struggle against the odds and against an implacable, cruel adversary. Abandoned by the west and awaiting the aid that never reached him, Constantine assumed the dimensions of a tragic hero. Aware of the bleakness of his situation, he valiantly refused to veer from the honorable path. Cast in the role of a sacrificial victim, Constantine was absolved of all blame and of incompetence and was thought to have been betrayed by his close associates. Indeed, charges of treachery and disloyalty surfaced after the drama had run its course. Various individuals, native Constantinopolitans and Italians, including members of the imperial administration, were thought to have betrayed Constantinople and her last guardian. Soon after the sack, Constantine's grand duke, Loukas Notaras, was accused of playing both sides. Gradually this charge of duplicity transformed itself into an accusation of treason. What circumstances Notaras' treason entailed, no one could say but the grand duke became the proverbial villain.¹⁹

2 The scholars

Posterity has been kind to Constantine. Some of his enemies expressed contempt and scorn for his policies and his religious views but others genuinely admired him and sought his canonization after his death, which, in their view, amounted to martyrdom, even though his policies had incurred the displeasure of both Orthodox and Catholics. His close friend and first "biographer," George Sphrantzes, viewed him as a hero and piously sang his praises at every available opportunity. In the end, the hagiography produced by Constantine's admirers prevailed and has influenced the judgment of later scholarship. Even Edward Gibbon found redeeming value for his "effeminate" Byzantine Greeks in the figure of their last monarch:²⁰ "The distress and fall of the last Constantine are more glorious than the long prosperity of the Byzantine Caesars." This is high praise and it comes from

an unexpected quarter, from someone who had consistently displayed loathing and contempt for this theocratic state of the Middle Ages.

Echoing Gibbon, in 1883, E. A. Vlasto assigned qualities of a Homeric hero to Constantine.²¹ In 1892 C. Mijatovich saw him as a patriot who did his utmost to protect and defend his charge:²² “The Emperor Constantine, simple, kind, brave and straightforward, had gained the sympathy and admiration of all who had witnessed his wonderful patience, forbearance, and untiring devotion to the public interests.” Mijatovich²³ supposes that “[t]he fate of the ancient Empire and of its last Emperor stirred the heart of the young conqueror [Mehmed II].” His concluding remarks praised Constantine: “The last Greek Emperor, the patriotic and brave Constantine [Palaeologus] Dragassas [Dragaš].” E. Pears²⁴ was also moved by Constantine’s sacrifice. According to his view,²⁵ Constantinople had “served as a bulwark against the invasion of Europe by Asiatic hordes”; her one thousand years of service²⁶ were “worthily represented in its last emperor.” Constantine, in Pears’ estimate,²⁷ “never wavered, never omitted any precaution to deserve victory, but fought heroically to the end and finally sacrificed his life for his people, his country and Christendom.” Pears concludes with the following memorable phrase adapted from an early medieval historian’s comment about a past emperor:²⁸ “His death was a fitting and honourable end of the Eastern Roman Empire.”

G. Schlumberger also painted Constantine XI in heroic colors, as a patriot who fell in the front ranks. He remarked that Constantine’s patriotism could have moved the most indifferent of observers.²⁹ S. Runciman echoed Pears’ tones and added more pathos to the figure of the last emperor, whom he described³⁰ as “the last Christian Emperor standing in the breach, abandoned by his Western allies, holding the infidel at bay till the numbers overpowered him and he died, with the Empire as his winding-sheet.” D. Stacton³¹ invoked the same image and concluded:³² “[a]s Theodora, the consort of Justinian, had said . . . the Empire would make an excellent winding sheet, and now, at last, it had.” A. E. Vacalopoulos³³ has argued that the last emperor was a capable, educated individual, and a visionary. Vacalopoulos’ Constantine is an enlightened monarch, who understood the importance of humanism and who endorsed, along with philosophers and lovers of antiquity, the values promoted by Hellenism, a term that had been carefully avoided by the pious Byzantines of the Middle Ages, as it evoked images of paganism. Under the last Palaeologi, Vacalopoulos argues, “Hellenism” was revived and acquired its modern significance:³⁴

We can only conclude that the presence of Constantine Palaeologus in the capital, his commanding stature, his love of Greek culture, his constancy with regard to policies both pursued and projected, all conspired to bring about a change in attitude towards the use of the term Hellenes, even to the extent that the leaders of the anti-Unionist party came generally to accept it.

This is a radical view and derives from Vacalopoulos’ more general theory that the Palaeologan coda belongs to the era of the Modern Greek nation and not to the Middle Ages, echoing Laonikos Khalkokondyles’ opinion that the Byzantines

6 Introduction

of the Middle Ages were Hellenes.³⁵ Moreover, Khalkokondyles pointed out the importance of the Greek language in the humanistic environment of his era and even predicted the resurgence of the Greek nation (without any reference to the legend of Constantine XI):³⁶

I have related these events in the Greek language because the Greek language can be found throughout the world and has been mixed with other [languages]; it currently enjoys great fame, which will be increased in the future, whenever a Greek king himself and his descendants establish a mighty kingdom, where the sons of the Greeks will assemble and establish a state, which would suit them the best . . . in accordance with their traditional customs.

Indeed, Khalkokondyles' views represent the humanistic notions of the early Renaissance. Refugee academics from Constantinople tried to revive the ancient term "Hellene" and were proud of their ancient Greek heritage, which, throughout the Middle Ages, had been viewed with a measure of scorn, disapproval, and suspicion by the Orthodox Church.³⁷ They were delighted with the cultural environment of Italy, which favored the revival of ancient Greek literature. It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that humanists remained a minority in late Byzantium.³⁸ As their exodus to the west accelerated at the approach of the conquest, the intellectual revival of Hellenism came to a thunderous end in the Balkans and was only reawakened in the nineteenth century, when the Greeks realized the advantages of their ancient Hellenic heritage and its enormous appeal in the Philhellenic movements of Europe and North America.³⁹

D. M. Nicol, in his general study of the Palaeologan era, observes that during the last battle Constantine XI threw away his imperial insignia and died as a common soldier.⁴⁰ In another monograph Nicol endorsed the image of the brave, tragic emperor and elaborated on his earlier remark:⁴¹ "He was killed fighting as a common soldier against the invincible might of an enemy who had, for a century and more, been steadily whittling away the measure of his inheritance." Nicol repeated the same view in another book⁴² and, alluding to Constantine's financial problems, added: "The last Christian Emperor of Constantinople died at the walls of his city still owing 17,163 hyperpyra to Venice." Nicol concludes his monograph on the life and legend of Constantine by repeating the fifteenth-century and sixteenth-century notion that Constantine XI had been an unhappy man.⁴³ "He had prayed that he might be killed rather than live to see the consequences. He was fortunate only in that his last prayer was answered." This last sentence comes as an anti-climax to Nicol's slim study. Perhaps more is involved than an answer to a mere prayer that may or may not have been voiced.⁴⁴ A more eloquent observation is found in Stacton:⁴⁵ "One cannot rise from eminence, and neither can one hide from it. It is better to die than be degraded."

The standard general histories of Byzantium produce similar pictures. A. A. Vasiliev remarked:⁴⁶ "Constantine made every possible effort adequately to meet his powerful adversary in the unequal struggle whose result, one may say, was foreordained" and praises Constantine's heroism:⁴⁷ "The Emperor fought

heroically as a simple soldier and fell in battle.” G. Ostrogorsky seconds Vasiliev’s sentiments and sees in Constantine an energetic individual, whose personal qualities surpassed those of numerous emperors of the Palaeologan dynasty:⁴⁸ “Neither the courage nor the statesmanlike energy of the last Emperor of Byzantium could save the Empire from certain destruction.” In addition, his Constantine XI is endowed⁴⁹ “with unquenchable resolution in battle,” which “set a magnificent example to his subjects.” A note of caution has been expressed by J. W. Barker, who realized the importance of equating the death of Constantine with the death of the medieval Greek state:⁵⁰ “Constantine XI has won a certain fame. But the glory of the gallant death of the last Palaeologus in the final drama of 1453 has elevated him perhaps beyond the merit of his otherwise rather moderate abilities.” This is probably the most restrained observation to emerge from a sea of praises and of hagiographic lore. Nevertheless, Barker’s Constantine possesses redeeming qualities and his gallantry receives praise.⁵¹ C. Head, who reproduces the traditional picture of the heroic Constantine, was not aware of this lone note of caution.⁵² Finally, A.-M. Talbot has judged him a pragmatist who “fought bravely” in the siege.⁵³

The vast majority of scholars formed a favorable opinion of a gallant Constantine XI through the prism of his last tragic and heroic moments in life, but this view represents an assumption; no eyewitnesses survived the last stand to describe the emperor’s conduct in his final moments. By extension, it has been generally concluded that the earlier part of Constantine’s life must be a mirror image of his assumed heroic death. Yet, it may be objected, the last moments of one’s life, no matter how selfless and heroic, may not be an accurate guide in forming an overview of one’s earlier career. No detailed scholarly portrait of Constantine has been able to break free from the tyranny imposed on the record by the emperor’s ultimate sacrifice. Constantine’s life extended over four decades prior to this event and should not be compressed into one significant moment. The monumental siege and its heroic dimensions have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention and have colored, in various degrees, all examinations of his previous career to such an extent that the occasional “biographies” often amount to versions of the siege of 1453.⁵⁴ Constantine’s earlier activities are reduced to the status of a footnote, a mere appendix to his sacrifice. The siege, fall, and sack are important, but their narratives have not been composed with the analytical perspective of a military historian who has taken into account genuine reports; often they include inauthentic details.⁵⁵ Constantine’s life entailed a great deal more than his short tenure as an emperor and the siege of the Greek capital. His earlier experiences, his formative years under Manuel II, his cooperation with his brother John VIII as a regent, his control over the despotate of the Morea, and his various, doomed attempts to establish his authority in southern and central Greece have either been neglected or have been only summarily noted by scholars, who have allowed their judgment of Constantine to be colored by his fall and disappearance before the walls of Constantinople in 1453. Scholars have embraced the folk imagery prevalent from the latter part of the *quattrocento* to the regeneration of the Greek nation in the nineteenth century.

8 Introduction

To cite the most recent example of this tendency, Nicol summarily and uncritically rushes through the early years of Constantine's career. He allocates twenty printed pages to the historical background and only fourteen to him as the despot of the Morea.⁵⁶ Constantine's formative years are overlooked, while his roles as regent, despot, and warlord receive cursory treatment. The remaining ninety-two pages of Nicol's monograph deal with Constantine's reign in Constantinople, with his death, and with the inevitable host of alleged descendants. The bulk of Nicol's study seems to have been inspired by Constantine's heroic death, by his disappearance, and by the aftermath of the fall. The events prior to Constantine's "enthronement" are mere background to the imperial gossip that seems to have attracted the attention of Nicol. By contrast, Vacalopoulos' picture deserves more attention, as his portrait of Constantine has some serious implications: the last emperor is a forerunner and advocate of modern Hellenism.⁵⁷ Vacalopoulos also treasures the heroic and compelling sacrifice of the last emperor; Constantine's death (and mythical resurrection) laid the foundation of the Modern Greek state. Accordingly, the last emperor becomes the ethnarch and founding hero of contemporary Hellas. Like Theseus in the literature and art of ancient Athens, Vacalopoulos' Constantine can do no wrong.

3 A playwright

A few words must be reserved for Nikos Kazantzakis, the giant of Modern Greek literature. Aware of the legend, to which he often alludes in his novels,⁵⁸ Kazantzakis made Constantine XI the protagonist⁵⁹ in *Constantine Palaeologus*, a play in the form of an ancient tragedy. In four acts, this work extends to one hundred printed pages. The emphasis is placed on the violent death of an era, on the plunge of a vibrant culture into insignificance, and on a divine promise for a future regeneration. The *dramatis personae* include, in addition to the martyr-emperor, Loukas Notaras, Anna Notaras (who in this play remains in Constantinople for the duration of the siege and becomes the lover of the Italian *condottiere* Giovanni Giustiniani, if only for a moment), Phrantzes [= Sphrantzes], various ecclesiastical personalities (including Cardinal Isidore and George Scholarius), and a mixed chorus of elders, monks, visionaries, and townspeople.

Kazantzakis turns the last emperor into a Christ-figure and a sacrificial victim.⁶⁰ The emperor assumes the sins of his people, who have scorned, betrayed, and cursed him.⁶¹ In Act II Constantine comments to Phrantzes [= Sphrantzes]:⁶²

I also think about it tonight and pluck courage; with my own free will I took up the cross of our nation on my shoulders; I am being crucified and I am going to my death with my eyes wide open; I do fear lightning (after all, I am human and I feel pain), but again I shake myself and freely do I follow my fate.

Internal and external enemies surround him. Alone in his majesty, he is urged by one of his barons⁶³ to destroy "the snake" before him; Constantine responds:⁶⁴ "Which snake? . . . The people? . . . The noblemen? . . . The Turks? . . . Fate? Wherever I set foot, there is a snake!"

The play reaches its climax with the transformation of Constantine into the Sleeping Emperor who is conducted by angels and the Virgin to a chamber located deep into the bowels of the earth. Kazantzakis' moving vision is narrated to the chorus by the mystical Orthodox Πυροβάτης/Firewalker, who finds himself inspired, *plenus deo*, in a beatific trance. He appears to be a direct Christian descendant of the Delphic Pythia. Firewalker first recounts how the chamber for Constantine is being made ready:⁶⁵

Do not hold me back! Let go! I see a cave; it is immense like Santa Sophia, opening below, deep into the foundations of our holy church. I hear an undying lullaby; thousands of mothers, you'd think, slowly rock their babies and put them to sleep in the dark bowels of the earth.

This spot, the emperor's rocky chamber, Kazantzakis identifies with "the heart of Greece."⁶⁶ The playwright then reinforces the assimilation of Constantine to a Hellenic Christ by evoking an image of the *pietà*:⁶⁷ "She is holding Constantine in Her outstretched arms! That is how She supported Her Son from the cross!" The chorus now begins the lamentation, in imitation of the chants sung on Good Friday over the tomb of the dead Christ. The emperor, whom they had cursed while he was alive, in death/sleep becomes "the beloved emperor."⁶⁸

Thus, Constantine is transformed into the personification of the sleeping nation:⁶⁹ "Why are you calling him, he cannot hear. By now he walks on the bank of the other world . . . Only his heart, like a living fountain, is still beating." The abbot is divinely inspired and foretells the resurrection of Constantine and of Hellas. He first assimilates the "death" of Constantine to the earlier descents of Greece into the underworld and then adds that Persephone too returned to the upper world after her stay in Hades:⁷⁰ "Before us lies the greatest secret of Greece: one thousand times she descended to Hades and one thousand times she was resurrected." The abbot concludes his vision with a millennial promise:⁷¹

Resurrection always emanates from the soil of Greece; a time will come, as God's wheel turns, and the celebrant will come back to the sunlight to finish the liturgy in the restored Santa Sophia. One spring, our emperor, who has been turned into stone, will rise from the sacred roots of the trees; with the Archangel's sword in his hand, he will ascend, redolent of sacrificial thyme!

The play concludes with two lines from a folk song⁷² that enjoyed immense popularity in the era of the Turkish domination and assisted in the promulgation of the legend, assuring generations of enslaved Greeks of the approaching salvation: "Be still, Madonna: no need for tears and lamentations; with the passage of the years, at the appropriate time, she [the city and/or the Church of Santa Sophia] will be ours again."

This play may not be the best work that has come forth from the pen of Kazantzakis; his tragedies, in general, challenge neither director nor actor and are seldom staged nowadays. Yet he has managed to evoke the atmosphere of a *fin de siècle*

and of a mystical experience promising delivery. This play is truly the last pious formulation of a powerful legend and of a potent myth that belongs to the literary environment of the nineteenth century.⁷³

What of the real Constantine? History, in his case, has been contaminated by a legend that has transformed an average emperor into a millennial savior. This image of national resurrection, with Constantine at the head of an army of Greeks destined to vanquish an Oriental foe, has nourished generations. It is true that people often display short memories and easily forget numerous dramatic, abrupt, or even shocking events. Why then did this last stand make such an indelible impression upon the Greeks, to whom it continues to remain as vivid as it was in 1453? The impact of this brief incident in the three millennia of recorded Greek history can still be evidenced, as it is still stamped with deeply felt emotion.

Was it because this event amounted to the greatest Turkish victory, one that made the Ottoman sultan the lord of Constantinople, a city that had stood for over one thousand years as the Queen of all cities? This may not be so, as the conquest of 1453 was only a beginning and the Turks were destined to enjoy more dramatic triumphs in the years to come. Was it perhaps because the human mind finds fascination with last stands in which one army and one leader are totally annihilated, like Leonidas at Thermopylae and George Armstrong Custer on the Last Stand Hill by the Little Big Horn? Was it because of the sharp contrast of Christian martyrs defending themselves against infidels, who wore colorful attire and carried exotic banners as in the tales of the Arabian Nights, when they deployed their terrifyingly monstrous cannons, the size of which had never been seen in Greek lands? Was it because of the disturbingly similar undertones of the primordial struggle between east and west, a conflict that had already been played out in antiquity with different results? Or was it because one side had been left, more or less, to fend for itself, with its leader assuming the dimensions of a tragic hero in a desperate, although doomed, effort to survive?

No matter what the answers are, for the Greeks under the Ottoman Turks, the last emperor of medieval Hellas refused to die. Sword in hand, he stands forever before the ancient fortification of Constantinople. Surrounded by hounds of Hell, he is awaiting an angel from Heaven to show him the way to his secret cave. There he will be turned into stone and will sleep until the time comes for the prophecy to be fulfilled, when Constantine XI will awaken, will receive his sword from the Archangel, and will rise to claim to his beloved city.

Notes

1 *Infra*, ch. 8, sec. 4.

2 Doukas, 34.2: ὁ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος (οὐπω γὰρ ἦν στεφθεῖς, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ στεφθῆναι ἔμελλε διὰ τὸ προρρηθέν, πλὴν βασιλέα ἐκάλουν Ῥωμαίων). The misconception of a crowned Constantine XI persists in scholarly literature: *A History of the Crusades 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. H. W. Hazard [gen. ed.: K. M. Setton] (Madison, 1975), p. 755 [Index: *s.v.*: Constantine XI Palaeologus (“Dragases”): “Byzantine emperor 1448 (crowned 1449)-1453.”

3 For the battle of titles (i.e., between Greek [i.e., Roman] Caesar and [Holy] Roman Emperor in Europe) throughout the Middle Ages, see K. Laysner, “The Tenth Century in

- Byzantine-Western Relationships,” in D. Baker, ed., *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages* (Edinburgh, 1973), pp. 29–63. For the Byzantines, Charlemagne was a mere “king of the Franks” and his *Reich* was just another version of the old German barbarian states but did not amount to an *imperium*. Latin Christendom tended to see, in the culture of medieval Hellas, nothing more than typical eastern *arrogantia*.
- 4 Cf., among others, H. A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Osmanlis up to the Death of Bayezid I, 1300–1403* (New York, 1916); P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938); M. F. Köprülü, *Les origines de l’empire ottoman* (Paris, 1947); H. Inalcik, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954): 103–129; L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York, 1958); and E. Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht – Die Osmanen (1330 bis 1481). Ein Beitrag zur Genesis des türkischen Feudalismus* (Berlin, 1966); in addition, cf. the older, standard works: J. von Hammer Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, 10 vols. (Pest, 1827–1835; repr.: 1963); N. Iorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, 5 vols. (Gotha, 1908–1913; repr.: 1963); and J. W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, 7 vols. (Hamburg, 1840; repr.: 1963).
- 5 For the folklore associated with Constantine XI, cf., among others, N. A. Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἰστορημένου Χρησιμολογίου τῆς Κρατικῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Βερολίνου (*Codex Graecus* fol. 62–297) καὶ τοῦ Θρύλου Μαρμαρωμένου Βασιλιᾶ,” *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher* 13 (1937): 203–244^{a–c}; and S. Emellos, *Θρυλούμενα γιὰ τὴν Ἄλωση καὶ τὴν Ἐθνικὴ Ἀποκατάσταση* (Athens, 1991). The monograph by D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans* (Cambridge, 1992), is, on the whole, disappointing; it is neither a detailed biography nor an adequate study of the significant folklore that surrounds the figure of the last emperor; for some of its limitations, see the book review by J. W. Barker, *Speculum* 69 (1994): 853, 854.
- 6 For the “pious” tendencies and romanticism of modern Greek historians, see V. Karamanolakes and P. Stathes, “Ἱστορίες γιὰ τὴν Ἄλωση στὸν Πρῶτο Αἰῶνα τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Βασιλείου,” in T. Kiousopoulou, ed., *1453: Ἡ Ἄλωση τῆς Κωνσταντινούπολης καὶ ἡ Μετάβαση ἀπὸ τοὺς Μεσαιωνικοὺς στους Νεώτερους Χρόνους* (Herakleion, 2007), pp. 227–259.
- 7 C. Head, *Imperial Twilight: The Palaiologos Dynasty and the Decline of Byzantium* (Chicago, 1977), has aptly entitled Chapter 18, which deals with John VIII, “The Renaissance Basileus,” and observes, p. 123: “John VIII was at the same time a Renaissance prince and a Byzantine basileus.”
- 8 That Constantine was a “hawk,” an active member of his brother’s aggressive war party, in the last years of Manuel’s reign, has not been noted in previous scholarship; cf. *infra*, ch. 3, sec. 5. I will attempt to demonstrate that Constantine’s close association with his brother John VIII dates back to the 1420s; it has been uncritically presumed that the age difference between the two brothers had prevented them from forming a close alliance, especially in the beginning of their careers; see, e.g., Head, *Imperial Twilight*, p. 145: “He [*sc.* Constantine] cannot have been close to his elder brother, the future John VIII, who was twelve years older than he; though in later years . . . the age difference mattered less.”
- 9 For Constantine’s two regencies, cf. *infra*, ch. 3, sec. 4, and ch. 6, sec. 3.
- 10 For my rather negative assessment of Constantine’s military talents, cf. *infra*, ch. 7.
- 11 See *infra*, ch. 7, sec. 2.
- 12 The evidence supplied by this anonymous source has been generally overlooked by modern scholars, who have followed and perpetuated the positive image of Constantine encountered in the court flattery of the *quattrocento*. This poem was published a number of times in the course of the nineteenth century, first edited and translated into German by A. Ellissen, *Analekten der mittel-und neugriechischen Literatur* [Part 3: *Anecdota Graecobarbara*] (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 107–249, under the title *Θρήνος τῆς*

12 Introduction

- Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* and was republished by W. Wagner, *Medieval Greek Texts, Being a Collection of the Earliest Compositions in Vulgar Greek, Prior to the Year 1500* (London, 1870), pp. 141–170; it found a third editor in É. Legrand, *Bibliothèque grecque vulgaire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1880; repr.: 1974), under the title *Ἀλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, pp. 169–202. Erroneously perhaps, some editors have attributed this poem to the pen of the Rhodian poet Emmanuel Georgillas (Limenites), as I will note in due course.
- 13 Cf., e.g., Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 33: “The help that never came, or came too late, was a melancholy theme of Constantine’s life”; and D. J. Geanakoplos, “Byzantium and the Crusades, 1353–1453,” in *A History of the Crusades 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Madison, 1975), p. 103: “Abandoned by western Europe and even by a part of his own people, Constantine fought bravely in the streets until his death.”
 - 14 *Infra*, ch. 9, sec. 3.
 - 15 D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 406.
 - 16 *Infra*, ch. 10, sec. 1, and ch. 11, sec. 1.
 - 17 For Serbia and the Turks, see, in general, P. E. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804* [A History of East Central Europe 5] (Seattle and London, 1977), pp. 28–30.
 - 18 O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest 1439–1596* (Rome, 1958); *idem*, “Angora, Florence, Varna, and the Fall of Constantinople,” in F. Dölger and H.-G. Beck, eds., *Akten de XL. Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongresses* (Munich, 1960), pp. 216–220; J. Held, *Hunyadi: Legend and Reality* [East European Monographs 178] (Boulder, 1985), p. 111; and Geanakoplos, “Byzantium and the Crusades,” p. 97.
 - 19 The hostility towards the grand duke has its origins in the literature produced by survivors; it continued in the sixteenth century and is occasionally encountered in the modern period; see e.g., the assessment and the polemical rhetoric of the Marxist historian I. Kordatos, *Τὰ Τελευταία Χρόνια τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Ἀυτοκρατορίας* (Athens, 1931), ch. 5. In addition, see M. Philippides, “Rumors of Treason: Intelligence Activities and Clandestine Operations in the Siege of 1453,” in M. Arslan and T. Kaçar, eds., *Byzantion ‘dan Constantinopolis ‘e Istanbul, Kuşatmaları* (İstanbul, 2017), pp. 403–444.
 - 20 *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, vol. 7 (London, 1902), p. 2348.
 - 21 A. Vlasto, *1453: Les Derniers Jours de Constantinople* (Paris, 1883), pp. 127, 128: “S’ensevelir sour les ruines de l’Empire était la plus belle fin que Constantin pût souhaiter, la seule qui fût digne d’un César grec, et son éternel honneur sera de l’avoir compris. Sa mort est certainement plus glorieuse que la longue prospérité de tous ses prédécesseurs.”
 - 22 C. Mijatovich, *Constantine Palaeologus (1448–1453) or the Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks* (Chicago, 1968; repr.: 1892), p. 194.
 - 23 *Ibid.*, p. 230.
 - 24 E. Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks* (New York, 1968; repr.: 1903), p. 356.
 - 25 *Ibid.*
 - 26 *Ibid.*
 - 27 *Ibid.*, p. 357.
 - 28 *Ibid.*; in a note, Pears paraphrases Procopius’ celebrated comment supposedly pronounced by Theodora, the consort of Justinian I, during a crisis: ὡς καλὸν ἐντάφιον ἢ βασιλεία ἐστί. In the sixteenth century Hierax, a Greek poet and a functionary in the Greek patriarchate of Ottoman Constantinople, used a similar phrase; cf. *Χρονικόν*, II. 685, 686 [C. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, vol. 1 (Venice, 1872; repr. 1972), p. 267]: πᾶσι δὲ τάφος γέγονε πατρὶς ἢ παμφιλτάτη / τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου κράτορος καὶ τῶν ἀρίστων πάντων.
 - 29 G. Schlumberger, *Le siège, la prise et el sac de Constantinople par les Turcs en 1453* (Paris, 1914); By far the best edition of Schlumberger’s work remains the Modern Greek translation-rendition (with corrections and notes) by S. P. Lampros, who enriched

- and improved the French monograph: *Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος καὶ ἡ Πολιορκία καὶ Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων τῷ 1453* (Athens, 1914; repr.: 1991). For Schlumberger's opinion of the last emperor, see, e.g., p. 357 (Lampros' translation): Ὁ θάνατος τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου ὑπῆρξε θάνατος ἥρωος, ἀγωνιζομένου καὶ πίπτοντος ἐν ἡγεσίᾳ τῶν πιστῶν αὐτοῦ. Ἡ δὲ πατριωτικὴ θλίψις τοῦ ἐπαγωγοῦ ἡγεμόνος θὰ ἦδύνατο νάποσπάσῃ τὰ δάκρυα καὶ τοῦ μάλιστ' ἀδιαφόρου.
- 30 *FC*, p. 191.
- 31 D. Stacton, *The World on the Last Day: The Sack of Constantinople by the Turks on May 29, 1453: Its Causes and Consequences* (London, 1965), also published in the United States under the pseudonym D. Dereksen with the title, *The Crescent and the Cross: The Fall of Byzantium, May 29, 1453* (New York, 1964).
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 236.
- 33 A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation: The Byzantine Period, 1204–1261*, trans. J. Moles (New Brunswick, 1970).
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 185.
- 35 Khalkokondyles 1.1.5 (pp. 6, 7, with a different translation): ἐς ὃ δὴ Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἀφικομένους . . . ἐπιτρέψαντας Ῥώμην τῷ μεγίστῳ αὐτῶν ἀρχιερεῖ [*sc.* the pope] καὶ διαβάντας ἐς Θράκην, ὑφουρουμένου ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ βασιλέως, αἱ Θράκης ἐπὶ χώραν, ἣτις ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐγγυτάτω ὄκηται, Βυζάντιον Ἑλληνίδα πόλιν μητρόπολιν σφῶν ἀποδεικνύοντας . . . Ἑλληνάς τε τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε Ῥωμαίους αὐτοῦ ἐπιμυγνύοντας, γλώτταν μὲν καὶ ἦθη διὰ τὸ πολλῶ πλέονας Ῥωμαίων Ἑλλήνας αὐτοῦ ἐπικρατεῖν διὰ τέλους φυλάττειν, τούνομα μέντοι μηκέτι κατὰ τὸ πάτριον καλουμένους ἀλλάξασθαι, καὶ τοὺς γε βασιλεῖς Βυζαντίου ἐπὶ τὸ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς Ῥωμαίων βασιλεῖς τε καὶ αὐτοκράτορας σεμνύνεσθαι ἀποκαλεῖν, Ἑλλήνων δὲ βασιλεῖς οὐκέτι ὀδοαμῆ ἀξιοῦν. My citations of this text are from the recent edition and first translation into English of this historian's narrative: A. Kaldellis, *The Histories: Laonikos Chalkokondyles*, 2 vols. [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 33 and 34] (Cambridge, MA and London, 2014).
- 36 Khalkokondyles 1.1.1 (pp. 2–4, with another translation): ὡς Ἑλληνικῆ φωνῆ ταῦτα διέξιμεν, ἐπεὶ ἦ γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων φωνῆ πολλαχῆ ἀνὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην διέσπαρται καὶ συχναῖς ἐγκαταμέμικται. καὶ κλέος μὲν αὐτῆ μέγα τὸ παραντίκα μείζον δὲ καὶ αὐθις, ὅποτε δὴ ἀνὰ βασιλείαν οὐ φαύλην Ἑλληνα τε αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐσόμενοι βασιλεῖς, ὃ δὴ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παῖδες ξυλληγομένοι κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔθιμα ὡς ἦδιστα μὲν σφίσι αὐτοῖς . . . πολιτεύοιντο.
- 37 On the ethnic consciousness of the late medieval Byzantines and the meaning of the term "Ἑλληνα" which in the Middle Ages was employed to indicate pagans or Muslims and was contrasted sharply with "Christian" or "Roman," see S. Vryonis, "Byzantine Cultural Self-Consciousness in the Fifteenth Century," in S. Ćurčić and D. Mouriki, eds., *The Twilight of Byzantium: Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire* (Princeton, 1991), pp. 5–15. In addition, see S. Vryonis, "Crises and Anxieties in Fifteenth Century Byzantium: The Reassertion of Old and the Emergence of New Cultural Forms," in R. Olson, ed., *Islamic and Middle Eastern Societies, a Festschrift in Honor of Professor Wadie Jwaideh* (Brattleboro, 1987), pp. 100–125. In general, see S. Runciman, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1970), ch. 3. Also see A. Kaldellis, *A New Herodotus: Laonikos Chalkokondyles on the Ottoman Empire, the Fall of Byzantium, and the Emergence of the West* [Supplement to the DOML 33–34] (Washington, DC, 2014), *passim*, esp. ch. 5.
- 38 Such is the position of *DGM* 2: 310. For the positive aspects of the minority's "renaissance," see D. M. Nicol, *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium* (Cambridge, 1979), esp. chapter II, and I. Ševčenko, "The Palaeologan Renaissance," in W. Treadgold, ed., *Renaissances before the Renaissance: Cultural Revivals of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Stanford, 1984), pp. 144–173.
- 39 W. St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (Oxford, 1972).

14 Introduction

- 40 LCB, p. 409.
- 41 D. M. Nicol, *The End of the Byzantine Empire* [Foundations of Medieval History] (London, 1979), p. 89.
- 42 *Idem*, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 404.
- 43 *Idem*, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 128.
- 44 In contrast to Nicol, Head, *Imperial Twilight*, p. 168, states that Constantine's worst fears were realized: "Mehmet concerned himself with seeking positive assurance that Constantine was dead and ordered a search for the body of the fallen emperor. . . . According to several sources, it was as Constantine had feared . . . they identified him. The body was beheaded."
- 45 Stacton, *The World on the Last Day*, p. 235.
- 46 A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire 324–1453*, vol. 2 (Madison, 1976), p. 647.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 652.
- 48 G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. J. Hussey (New Brunswick, 1969), p. 567.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 570.
- 50 *MP*, p. 393. The importance of the fall of Constantinople in the history of Europe and in the struggle between Christianity and Islam cannot be underestimated; in the past it was seen as a landmark in the history of mankind; see, e.g., Runciman's opening statement in the Preface of *FC*, p. xi: "In the days when historians were simple folk the Fall of Constantinople, 1453, was held to mark the close of the Middle Ages." For a modified expression, cf. Geanakoplos, "Byzantium and the Crusades," p. 103: "In the centuries-long duel between Christendom and Islam, the fall of Constantinople may in one sense be taken as marking the end of the great movement of the medieval crusades." J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 227, agrees: "It has rightly been seen as symbolic of the ending of the medieval era."
- 51 *MP*, p. 393; a similar assessment is encountered in *MP*, p. 402: "His [*sc.* Manuel II's] sons were a mixed brood. None of them was particularly gifted, and they varied in quality from the gallant Constantine to the worthless Demetrius."
- 52 Head, *Imperial Twilight*, chaps. 20 and 21, *passim*.
- 53 *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. A. Kazhdan et al., vol. 1 (New York and Oxford, 1991), p. 505 (*s.v.* "Constantine XI Palaiologos").
- 54 As it is clearly exemplified by the subtitle that Mijatovich assigned to his "biography:" Mijatovich, *Constantine Palaeologus (1448–1453) or the Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks*.
- 55 See the various observations and comments in *SFC*, *passim*. Numerous scholars have been led astray by the notorious forgeries of the sixteenth-century copyist Makarios Melissourgos-Melissenos, who elaborated Sphrantzes' authentic work, the *Chronicon Minus*, into the popular *Chronicon Maius*, one century after the death of Sphrantzes. The forger and his work continue to plague scholarship; thus, e.g., Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege*, pp. 218–227, is unaware of the forgery and bases his account on the siege of Constantinople on Melissourgos-Melissenos, under the erroneous impression that he is relying on an important, primary source. Cf., among others, J. B. Falier-Papadopoulos, "Phrantzès est-il réellement l'auteur de la grande chronique qui porte son nom?," *Bulletin de l'Institut Archéologique Bulgare* 19 (1935): 184–189; F. Dölger, "Ein literarischer und diplomatischer Fälscher des 16. Jahrhunderts: Metropolit Makarios von Monembasia," in *Otto Glaunig zum 60. Geburtstag, Festangabe aus Wissenschaft und Bibliothek* (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 25–36 [F. Dölger, *Byzantinische Diplomatie: 20 Aufsätze zum Urkundenwesen der Byzantiner* (Ettal, 1956), pp. 371–383]; R.-J. Loenertz, "Autour de Chronicon Maius attribué à Georges Phrantzès," in *Miscellanea G. Mercati* [ST 123] (Vatican City, 1946), pp. 273–311; N. B. Tomadakis, *Περὶ Ἀλώσεως τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (1453)* (Athens, 1953; repr.: 1993), pp. 137–166; V. Grecu, "Das Memoirenwerk des Georgios Sphrantzes," *Actes du XIII^e Congrès international d'études byzantines* 1 (1963): 327–341; V. Grecu, "Georgios Sphrantzes. Leben und Werk.

- Makarios Melissenos und sein Werk. Die Ausgaben,” *BS* 26 (1965): 62–73; I. K. Khasiotis, *Μακάριος, Θεόδωρος και Νικηφόρος οί Μελισσηνοί (Μελισσοῦργοί) (16ος-17ος Αί.)* (Thessalonica, 1966); M. Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople: Bishop Leonard and the Greek Accounts,” *GRBS* 22 (1981): 287–300; *idem*, “Σύγχρονες Έρευνες στὰ Κείμενα τοῦ Σφραντζή,” *Παρνασσός* 25 (1983): 94–99; *idem*, “An ‘Unknown’ Source for Book III of the *Chronicon Maius* by Pseudo-Sphrantzes,” *BSEB* 10 (1983): 174–183; *idem*, “Patriarchal Chronicles of the Sixteenth Century,” *GRBS* 25 (1984): 87–94; E. D. Dzhagatspanian, “Мировоззрение Византийского Историка XV В. Георгию Сфрандзи,” *Кавказ и Византия* 3 (1982): 45–63; *eadem*, “Некоторые Замечания по Поводу Австорства Большой Хроники Псевдо-Сфрандзи,” *ВВ* 43 (1982): 229, 230. In addition, cf. R. Maisano, “Il manoscritto Napoletano II. E. 25 e la storia della tradizione dello pseudo-Sfranze,” *Italoelleniká: Rivista di cultura greco-moderna* 2 (1989): 103–121; T. Ganchou, “Le Mésazon Démétrius Paléologue Cantacuzène a-t-il figuré parmi les défenseurs du siège de Constantinople (29 Mai 1453)?,” *REB* 52 (1994): 245–272, esp. pp. 245–258; *idem*, “Sur quelques erreurs relatives aux derniers défenseurs Grecs de Constantinople en 1453,” *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικόν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 25 (1995): 61–82; and G. Printzipas, “Οἱ Ἱστορικοὶ τῆς Ἀλώσεως,” in E. Chrysos, ed., *Ἡ Ἀλωση τῆς Πόλης* (Athens, 1994), pp. 63–99, esp. pp. 64–76. In addition, see the detailed discussion in *SFC*, ch. 3.
- 56 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, ch. 1: “The Dwindling Empire,” pp. 1–20; ch. 2: “Constantine: Despot at Mistra,” pp. 21–35.
- 57 *Supra*, nn. 34 and 35; this view contains a great deal of exaggeration and is, in the final analysis, hopelessly anachronistic.
- 58 Kazantzakis in his novel, *Ὁ Καπετὰν Μιχάλης (Ἐλευθερία ἢ Θάνατος)* (Athens, 1974) [English translation by J. Griffin, *Freedom or Death* (New York, 1956)] depicts a ceremony with a connection to Constantine Palaeologus, as has been noted by Stacton, *The World on the Last Day*, pp. 274, 275. In addition to the instance cited by Stacton, one should note the following passages in the same novel: 1. Greek edition, p. 223: Ξεχειλήσαν τὰ χαντάκια τῆς Πόλης αἷμα, μουσκάρι μποροῦσε νὰ κολυμπήσει καὶ ὁ αὐτοκράτορας ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος διάνεψε πάνω ἀπὸ τὸ δίσκο τὰ κόλλυβα ὅλοι τὸν εἶδαν, γεμάτος αἷματα, μέσα στοὺς καπνοὺς τὰ λιβάνια, καὶ χάθηκε ἀπὸ τὴν Ἱεραία Πύλη, and 2. Greek edition, p. 233: Ὁ κύρ Ἰδομενέας γύριζε, ὕστερα ἀπὸ τὸ μνημόσυνο . . . κι εἶχε τὸ νοῦ του . . . σὲ ἄλλους καιροὺς, σὲ ἄλλους τόπους, πέρα, ἀνάμεσα Εὐρώπης κι Ἀσίας, στὴν Πόλη. Μᾶς μῆνας, γλυκὸς ὁ πρωινὸς ὕπνος, οἱ κόρες τοῦ Φραντζῆ βαθιοκομοῦνταν ἀκόμα, κι ἡ Πόλη χάνουνταν. Καβαλάρης πολεμοῦσε ἀκόμα ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος στὴν Πύλη τοῦ Ρωμανοῦ, ξημερώματα τὸν ἔζωσαν αἱ Ἀγαρηνοί, φώναξε: “Δὲν ὑπάρχει ἕνας χριστιανὸς νὰ πάρει τὴν κεφαλή μου;” Τὰ μάτια τοῦ κύρ Ἰδομενεά βούρκωσαν, σκουντουφλοῦσε στὶς πέτρες, ἔχασε τὸ δρόμο. Similar sentiments pervade Kazantzakis’ novel *Ὁ Χριστὸς Ξανασταυρώνεται* (Athens, 1974) [English translation by J. Griffin, *The Greek Passion* (New York, 1953)].
- 59 *Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Παλαιολόγος*, in N. Kazantzakis, *Θέατρο: Τραγωδίες με Βυζαντινὰ Θέματα*, vol. 2 (Athens, *sine anno* [1970]), pp. 481–581; the editor, Helen Kazantzakis, does not number the lines of the play; accordingly, I have cited page numbers. Few of Kazantzakis’ tragedies on medieval subjects have been translated into English. In fact, few of his plays have found translators; among the notable exceptions, the following instances should be cited: *Christopher Columbus*, *Melissa Kouros*, trans. A. Gianakas Dellas (New York, 1969) and *Two Plays by Nikos Kazantzakis: Sodom and Gomorrah and Comedy, a Tragedy in One Act*, trans. K. Friar and P. Bien (Saint Paul, 1982).
- 60 *Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Παλαιολόγος*, e.g. pp. 507, 508: Α’ ΔΟΥΛΟΣ: Ὅχι, πολὺχρομένε μου ἀφέντη πατέρας εἶσουν σπλαχνικός, μὰ ἐμεῖς παιδιὰ καταραμένα / τώρα ποὺ πᾶμε νὰ μεταλάβουμε τρέμουμε ὀμπρὸς στὸ Ἅγιο Βῆμα / ἐγὼ μουν, Δέσποτα, κελάρης κι ἔκλεβα συχώρεσε με! / Β’ ΔΟΥΛΟΣ: Κι ἐγὼ σὲ κάρφωνα, βασιλιά μου, με τὰ ξόρκια, νὰ μὴ χαρεῖς ἀρσενικὸ παιδί ποτέ σου. / . . . / Γ’ ΔΟΥΛΟΣ: Κι ἐγὼ, σπιθῶνος μέσα στὸ Παλάτι σου, μάντευα τὰ / πάντα στὸν Ἠγούμενο τῆς Παναγιάς / συχώρεσέ με!

16 Introduction

61 *Ibid.*, p. 511.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 517: Ἐγὼ τὸ ἀνανογιέμαι ἀπόψε κι ἀντριεύω / με λεύτερη βουλή στὶς πλάτες μου τοῦ Γένους / ἐπῆρα τὸ σταυρὸ, σταυρώνουμαι καὶ πάω / με μάτια ὀλάνοιχτα στὸ θάνατο κι οτεύω / μὴν ἀστραπή, κορμί `μαι καὶ πονῶ, μὰ πάλι / τινάζουμαι καὶ λεύτερα ἀκλουθῶ τῆ μοίρα μου.

63 *Ibid.*

64 *Ibid.*, p. 575: Ποιὸ φίδι; . . . Τὸ λαό . . . τοὺς ἀρχόντους . . . τοὺς Τούρκους . . . τὴ Μοίρα . . . ὅπου πατήσω φίδι!

65 *Ibid.*, p. 576: Μὴ με κρατᾶτε, ἀφήστε με σπηλιά μεγάλη, / σὰν τὴν Ἁγιά Σοφία, θωρῶ ν' ἀνοίγει κάτω / βαθιά στῆς ἁγίας ἐκκλησιάς μας τὰ θεμέλια. / Κι ἀθάνατο νανουρητὸ γρικῶ, χιλιάδες / Μανάδες λές στὰ μαῦρα σωθικὰ τῆς γῆς / Κουνοῦν ἀργὰ καὶ νανουρίζουν τὰ μωρά τους. He goes on with his vision to mention details encountered in legend: The archangel, who assists in preparing the emperor's "sleeping" quarters; the holy chalice containing the water of immortality, and the angel's sword that will remain next to the sleeping emperor: ΠΥΡΟΒΑΤΗΣ: Ὡ τὸν ἀρχάγγελο θωρῶ στὴν καταπράσινη / σπηλιά νὰ προχωράει σιγά, χαμογελώντας / καὶ πίσω ὁ γέροντας μὲ τὸ ἅγιο δισκοπότηρο, / μὲς τὸ χαμόγελο τοῦ ἀγγέλου τυλιγμένος. / . . . / Σκύβουν κι οἱ δυὸ, μαζώνουν πολυτρίχια, / στρώνουν παχὺ κλινάρι δροσερό, στὸ ἀνάβρυσμα / τοῦ ἀθάνατου νεροῦ, κι ὁ Ἀρχάγγελος ξεζώνεται / τὸ μέγα ἀστραφετερὸ σπαθὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπιθώνει / μ' ἔγνοια πολλὴ στὸ σμαραγδένιο πλάι κλινάρι.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 578: ἡ καρδιά τῆς Ἑλλάδας.

67 *Ibid.*: Ἀπλωτὰ τὰ μπράτσα της καὶ σηκώνει τὸν Κωνσταντῖνο! / Ὅμοια σήκωνε καὶ τὸ Γιό της στὴν Ἀποκαθίλωση!

68 *Ibid.*, pp. 578: Ὡ βασιλιά μου ἀγαπημένε.

69 *Ibid.*, pp. 579: Τί τοῦ φονάζεις, δὲν ἀκούει τώρα πιά σῶχο περπατάει, στὸν ἄλλο κόσμο . . . Τρέχει μονάχα ἀκόμα, ζωντανὴ πηγὴ, ἡ καρδιά του!

70 *Ibid.*, pp. 579, 580: ἐτοῦτο ἐδῶ μπροστά μας / τὸ πιὸ μεγάλο μυστικὸ `ναί τῆς Ἑλλάδας / χίλιες φορὲς αὐτὴ κατέβηκε στὸν Ἄδη, / καὶ πάλι χίλιες ἀναστήθηκε.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 581: ἀνάσταση μυρίζει / παντοτινὰ τὸ χῶμα τῆς Ἑλλάδας θά `ρθει / καιρὸς, γυρίζει ἡ ρόδα τοῦ Θεοῦ, στὸν ἥλιο μας / ὁ λειτουργὸς νὰ ξαναβγεῖ, νὰ ζητελέψει / στὴ λυτρωμένη Ἁγία-Σοφία τὴ λειτουργία / καὶ ἀπὸ τὶς ἅγιες ρίζες τῶν δεντρῶν μὴν ἄνοιξη, / μὲ τὸ σπαθὶ τοῦ Ἀρχάγγελου στὸ χέρι, ὁ μέγας / μαρμαρωμένος βασιλιάς θ' ἀνηφορίσει, / μυρίζοντας θυμάρ!

72 Σώπασε, κυρα-Δέσποινά, μὴν κλαῖς καὶ μὴ δακρύζεις / πάλι μὲ χρόνους, μὲ καιροὺς, πάλι δικιὰ μας θά `ναί! For an analysis of this poem, which seems, contrary to popular belief, not to lament the sack of 1453, but the 1452 celebration of the union of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Constantinople (but predicts the recovery of Santa Sophia by the Orthodox from the Catholics and not from the Turks), see M. Philippides, "Tears of the Great Church: The Lamentation of Santa Sophia," *GRBS* 52 (2012): 714–737.

73 Kazantzakis has chosen one variant of the last line of the famous folk song in this play; the same line has been recorded elsewhere with minor variations and punctuation. Furthermore, a number of versions omit these last two lines altogether. For the entire text of this important folk poem, see *CC* 2: 396, 397 (with Italian translation). The Greek text is further printed (with an English prose translation) in C. A. Trypanis, *The Penguin Book of Greek Verse* (Harmondsworth, 1971), pp. 469, 470. Greek text and variants with English translation in Philippides, "Tears of the Great Church."

In general, see G. A. Megas, "La prise de Constantinople dans la poésie et la tradition populaires grecques," *Le Cinq-centième anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople [L'Hellenisme Contemporain]* (Athens, 1953), pp. 125–133; B. Knös, *L'Histoire de la Littérature Néo-Grecque. La période jusqu'en 1821* (Uppsala, 1962), pp. 161–164; T. Zoras, *Περὶ τὴν Ἀλωσιν τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Athens, 1959), pp. 299–305; M. Vitti, *Storia della letteratura neogreca* (Turin, 1971), ch. 3; M. Barbounes, "Τὸ Γεγονὸς τῆς Ἀλώσεως τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως στὸ Χῶρο τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Λαογραφίας," in E. Chrysos, ed., *Ἡ Ἀλωση τῆς Πόλης* (Athens, 1994), pp. 269–295; E. S. Papagianne,

Ὁ Θρήνος τῆς Ἁγίας Σοφίας, Θρόλος ἢ Πραγματικότητα; Βυζαντινὴ Πραγματικότητα καὶ Νεοελληνικὲς Ἑρμηνεῖες, vol. 3 (Athens, 1999); A. Polites, *Τὸ Δημοτικὸ Τραγούδι* (Herakleion, 2010), pp. 351–359; and A. Karanika, “Messengers, Angels, and Laments for the Fall of Constantinople,” in M. R. Bachvarova, D. Dutch, and A. Suter, eds., *The Fall of Cities in the Mediterranean: Commemoration in Literature, Folk-Song, and Liturgy* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 226–251. Numerous other plays dealing with the same theme, the last emperor of Constantinople and the siege of 1453, are cited by Puchner, “Τὸ Θέμα τῆς Ἀλωσης στὴν Εὐρωπαϊκὴ καὶ τὴ Νεοελληνικὴ Δραματολογία,” pp. 295–309. The play by Kazantzakis is allowed one paragraph (pp. 305, 306), within a wider context, as the author realizes that a more detailed study of this tragedy is warranted. Kazantzakis wrote this play in 1944, while the Nazi occupation of Greece was still a reality. The play was revised in 1949 and in 1951. Its text was further used as the libretto for Manolis Kalomoiris’ opera entitled *Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος*. The opera has fared better than the play: it was staged in Greece in 1962, 1966, and 1971, while the play was staged and performed only once by amateurs, the Drama Club of Athens College, in 1965. On Kazantzakis’ play, see A. Thylos, “Τὸ Θεατρικὸ Ἔργο τοῦ Νίκου Καζαντζάκη,” in *Μορφές καὶ Θέματα τοῦ Θεάτρου* (Athens, 1961), pp. 170–198, esp. pp. 189 ff.; T. Detorakis, “Ὁ Καζαντζάκης καὶ τὸ Βυζάντιο,” *Παλίμνηστον* 4 (1987): 183–198; and O. Omatos Saenz, “Constantino Paleólogo, personaje del teatro neohelénico,” in È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds., *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια ἀπο τὴν Ἀλωση*, vol. 2 (Granada, 2006), pp. 461–478.

2 *Ex oriente lux*

Imperial impotence

1 The emperor's father and mother

When Emperor John V Palaeologus died on February 16, 1391, the two rival claimants to John V's throne, Manuel II, the emperor's own son, and John VII, Manuel II's nephew, were attending Emir Bayezid I. In their status of vassals, the two Byzantine princes had already participated in a campaign waged by their Turkish suzerain throughout Anatolia against imperial territories.¹ After his supporters in the capital informed him of his father's death, Manuel departed in secret and made his entry into the capital before his rival John VII could do so himself. Bayezid summoned Manuel to rejoin his retinue. Manuel, as a loyal vassal, again accompanied his overlord throughout Asia Minor for a period of six months.² By January 1392 Manuel was granted leave to return to his capital. The new emperor was forty-two years old. At last, he found time to turn his attention to marriage. In February he married Helena, the daughter of the Serbian lord of Serres, Constantine Dejanović Dragaš, also a vassal of Bayezid.³ Manuel's bride was his junior by many years.⁴ Husband and wife were crowned emperor and empress of the Byzantine "empire" one day after their wedding, on February 11, 1392.⁵

These were times of trouble for the state, which native intellectuals viewed as a tired old man.⁶ Byzantine scholars were migrating to Italy in search of better circumstances offered by professorial university chairs in a flourishing humanistic environment that had rediscovered the culture and literature of ancient Greece. This emigration of scholars gained momentum with the passage of time, in direct proportion to the decline of the "empire" and to the rise of the Ottoman state.⁷ Nevertheless, jubilant crowds in Constantinople were impressed with the festivities surrounding Manuel's coronation.

This had been Manuel's second coronation. Up to the year 1392 his career had reflected the uncertainties of a dangerous era. Before his second accession of 1392, Manuel II had tried to revive Byzantine rule in Macedonia and in western Thrace, to reclaim territory in the Balkans, and to put Greece back on the map. These lofty ambitions had been formulated while he was serving as the despot of Thessalonica – the second major city left to the "empire" – and had brought him into conflict with the Turks and with their capable general, Hayr ad-Din, who had put to rest Manuel's dream of an imperial recovery of the Balkans. Subsequently,

Manuel incurred the wrath of his Ottoman overlord and the displeasure of his own father who had been careful to avoid any overt action that would give offense to the Turk. Manuel had been forced to embark upon a policy of reconciliation and appeasement of the emir.⁸ After Manuel had secured the throne for himself in 1392, he agreed to more concessions. The marriage and coronation must have come as a welcome relief.

Little is known about Helena and her Serbian family.⁹ Her father, Constantine Dejanović Dragaš, was the lord of a principality in Macedonia and a vassal of Bayezid. Constantine died in the battle of Rovine (May 17, 1395):¹⁰

And in the year 6903 [= A.D. 1395] Sultan Yıldırım Bayezid himself marched to the Danube against Mircea, the voivode of the Walachians. And he was defeated by the Walachians; Mircea and the Walachians decimated his army; he also captured his *hazine*, i.e., his treasury. He was pursued as far as the Danube. Then Marko, the *kral*, and Constantine, the lord of Zilygobon, were killed. Yıldırım Bayezid barely escaped with his life and with a few men.

The Byzantines knew very little about Constantine. In a later period the famous Neo-Platonist George Gemistus Plethon eulogized Constantine's daughter, Helena, and inserted a few words about her father in his text.¹¹ He too had few facts in his possession about Constantine:¹²

The father of our late queen was the lord of not inconsiderable territory in the vicinity of River Axios; as this river's waters are the finest and healthiest to drink, so he happened to be a most brave and most just man, who was most loyal to his friends.

Plethon supplies no details about Helena's family. He does offer, however, his own perception of the Serbs, whom he styles "Thracians." By adopting this term, the Neo-Platonist creates a respectable ancestry for the medieval Serbs, as "Thracian" had been used in ancient Greek literature to designate the Celtic inhabitants of this region. Plethon embraces the view, according to which the ancient Thracians contributed significantly to ancient Greek civilization. He endowed his contemporary Serbs with the reputed wisdom of the ancient Celts of Thrace, bringing the family of the Constantinopolitan queen within the sphere of the accepted civilized cultures by Byzantine intellectuals.¹³

Helena was much younger than Manuel. Her date of birth is not recorded but she survived her husband by a quarter of a century. Throughout her life she exercised considerable influence and her commanding presence was felt during the administration of three monarchs: her husband and her two sons, the last emperors of Constantinople. Helena was instrumental in securing a smooth transition in the succession, preventing civil wars.¹⁴ That most of her sons had admiration and respect for her is abundantly clear, and numerous incidents reported in the literary record illustrate her influential role in the affairs of the court. On his death bed Manuel II asked his son and successor, John VIII, to take his young chamberlain,

the future historian George Sphrantzes, in his retinue. John did so but, in time, Sphrantzes expressed the wish to leave John's circle and to enter Constantine's service. John refused to part with Sphrantzes and stated that this transfer would amount to an expression of irreverence for his late father's wishes. After John's mother, Helena, personally intervened, Sphrantzes' persistent request was finally granted.¹⁵ Years later in 1439, while he was in Florence, Emperor John VIII refused to appoint a patriarch to the vacant post in Constantinople, because, he stated, he wished to consult his mother,¹⁶ who was in the capital. No one found fault with John's argument and no ecclesiastic pressed the point, even though the urgent need for this appointment had been genuine.

After the conclusion of the union at Florence, while John VIII and his delegation were on their way back to Constantinople, the imperial party made a brief stop at the Venetian territory of Negroponte/Khalkis at Euboea, off the coast of central Greece, where they were informed that John's beloved (third) wife, Maria of Trebizond, was seriously ill:¹⁷ "We returned to Euboea [Negroponte/Khalkis] . . . and we stayed there fifteen days. There we heard that the empress was ill, near death." From Negroponte, the imperial ships proceeded to the island of Lemnos. At Kotzinos-Kokkinos of Lemnos the emperor's party received an additional message stating that John's wife had died. None of the courtiers had the courage to present the sad news to the emperor.¹⁸ All were worried in case John went into deep mourning and delayed their homeward journey.¹⁹ At their arrival in the port of Constantinople, on February 1, 1440, emperor and delegation were greeted by the regent Constantine XI and by the official representatives of Genoa and Venice. Once more courtiers, regent, and ambassadors failed to notify John VIII of the death of his wife. The sad task finally fell on Helena's shoulders. Evidently, neither ministers nor regent/brother could bring themselves to be the bearers of such ill tidings and the emperor's mother was forced to take this burden upon herself:²⁰

On the following day, which was the first of February of the third indiction . . . early in the morning Despot Constantine came with a galley, in the company of many noblemen, Genoese and Venetian, to welcome the emperor. Since it had earlier seemed best among those who had consulted each other not to say anything about the queen's death, they displayed no sadness at that time. . . . After they had finally gone into the imperial chambers . . . the event was announced to them . . . by their mother . . . the saintly lady . . . and they went into mourning.

Numerous testimonies make it clear that Helena took an active interest in ecclesiastical affairs and went so far as to oppose John's determination to bring about the union of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. There is every reason to believe that she remained a confirmed anti-unionist to the very end, even though she seems to have slightly modified her strong views during the last years of John VIII's reign,²¹ when she decided to support, or, at least, not actively oppose, the emperor's ratification of the union.²² Her anti-unionist sentiments and her conflict with the pro-unionist courtiers seem to be indicated in a letter of consolation,

on the occasion of her death, to Constantine XI by John Eugenicus,²³ who, like Plethon and Scholarius, also sang the praises of Helena and further commented on her religious zeal (and by extension politely reminded the emperor of his own unorthodox tendencies):²⁴

You should imitate her ancient zeal in piety. . . . Even if, in a later period, she was led astray at first by the bitter counsel of those who were not handling matters well, then she listened to the opinion of the few (among whom I was included) and became rather upset for some time, but she refused to hand over the Church of God to innovators.

John Eugenicus cites her adherence to Orthodoxy, even when her son John VIII held a different opinion:²⁵ “And with regard to her son and emperor [John VIII] . . . who deviated and allowed himself to follow this course [i.e., accepting Catholicism], she excised his name from the memorial prayer over the Orthodox, as she valued espousal of God more than natural affection.” Helena probably played a part in John’s decision to postpone the formal celebration of the union in the capital. She may have even encouraged the inactivity which followed his beloved wife’s death.²⁶

The proclamation of the union in Constantinople took place only after her death. It was John VIII’s successor, Constantine XI, who finally granted imperial compliance to the union’s terms. Helena had died before the formalities were sealed, before the emperor’s approval was granted, and before the celebration in Constantinople’s cathedral. Thus, Constantine did not have to face her disapproval or opposition to his policy of enforcing the union.²⁷ Yet he had occasion to miss his mother’s advice and lamented her death. While negotiations were being carried out for a marriage alliance, Constantine XI remarked in passing that he missed Helena’s insight and wisdom. Soon after her death, it became obvious that his courtiers could not offer anything that could match her reliable advice.²⁸ A number of years before her death, Helena took the veil, in accordance with the Byzantine custom,²⁹ but still managed to exercise considerable influence at court and was not cut off from secular affairs or ecclesiastical matters, in which she continued to display a lively interest. Moreover, the respect her sons displayed for her did not diminish with the passage of time.

Our sources give no information on the negotiations about this Greco-Serbian match of Helena Dragaš to Manuel II Palaeologus in 1392. It is only in a later period that certain historians (puzzled perhaps by this marriage between a Constantinopolitan emperor and a Serbian princess, which was not altogether unprecedented) began to search for possible motives for this imperial match. These later historians committed errors and made inaccurate assumptions. Historians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries lacked documents, simply drew their own conclusions, and incorrectly associated this match with events that belonged to a later period, as they wrongly assumed that this match was connected with an incident that took place in 1393, i.e., one year after the wedding.³⁰

On that occasion Bayezid summoned his European vassals to his Porte at Serres in order to adjudicate complaints. Among them were Manuel II (who, in a technical sense, was a *haracgüzar tekfur*, a prince who paid tribute to the emir), his brother Theodoros I of the Morea, and his father-in-law, Constantine Dejanović Dragaš. Manuel himself later implied, in his own writings, that Bayezid had been planning to murder some of his own vassals and that his prime target had been the Palaeologi.³¹ Later sources assert that the terrified Christian lords belatedly realized the seriousness of their predicament, secretly agreed to pull their resources together, and made ready to defect; this conspiracy, we are told in late sources, was sealed with the betrothal of Helena Dragaš to Manuel II.³²

Yet, as we have seen, this assembly took place well after the wedding. Furthermore, the events that followed the convention demonstrate neither cooperation nor concerted effort on the part of the “allies” against Bayezid; the supposed conspiracy may not be historical. An informal understanding among the vassals, however, may not be ruled out easily. In retrospect, the Christian lords were probably glad to escape with their lives from the camp of Bayezid; they would have had no opportunity to negotiate secret, detailed agreements while they were attending their overlord. In all probability, historians in the following century added their own inventions and embellishments, as they elaborated their accounts freely. These historians concluded that the assembly at Serres provided a suitable opportunity for negotiating this marriage and they worked from probability under a faulty chronological scheme. Perhaps the actual year in which these events had taken place had been forgotten by the time these stories were produced. By the middle of the fifteenth century the old gathering at Serres may have seemed a logical choice for the arrangement of the Greco-Serbian match, since both the Constantinopolitan emperor and the Serbian lord were known to have been present at that convention.³³

We have no details about the private life of the emperor and his queen. We do not even know whether Helena enjoyed cordial relations with her mother-in-law, Helena Kantakouzena, who served as Manuel’s regent in 1393. It has been surmised that two women were probably close, as in a later age, when Helena took the veil, she chose for herself the monastic name “Hypomone/Patience,” i.e., the very name that her mother-in-law had selected earlier, when she, too, had entered the cloister before her death.³⁴ Perhaps this is how Helena paid homage to Helena Kantakouzena long after the latter’s death.

One source supplies a short glimpse of Helena at the court: in 1424, while John VIII, the young co-emperor and son of Manuel II, was away in Hungary on state business, Sphrantzes interviewed a messenger who was seeking an audience with Manuel II. This envoy had been denied access to Manuel, and Sphrantzes felt the obligation to take his message not to the aged emperor but to the holy empress [Helena] and to her daughter-in-law, Sophia of Montferrat, the neglected second wife of John VIII. Sphrantzes demanded, surely in polite jest, a present, as he was the bearer of good news. A few days later he received his reward from the emperor himself.³⁵

A few days later the holy emperor [Manuel II] issued the following orders: ‘Give Sphrantzes the caftan, the dark-colored robe lined with fur; let him also have the wooden chest that he wants.’ . . . With his blessing, I kept in this chest all the valued and useful articles of our vain existence. The holy empress [Helena] issued further instructions to bring me a fine robe from Prousa.

In this passage, we are presented with a rare glimpse of the informality that existed between the reigning Palaeologi and their subordinates in the court. This incident indicates that Helena, in 1424, had the ear of Manuel, the incapacitated senior emperor. It was to Manuel that she brought the news and not to the youthful Constantine who, though nominally the regent, was away, amusing himself with hunting, his favorite pastime.³⁶ Furthermore, this incident suggests that Helena had a sense of humor, as she took Sphrantzes’ joke in good spirit. In this domestic scene (at least as it is painted by Sphrantzes’ pen) Helena seems to play the role of the dutiful mother-in-law, keeping her neglected daughter-in-law entertained in her company.

It is possible that one of Helena’s sons, Constantine, destined to be the last emperor of Constantinople, was especially attached to his mother, if one takes into consideration the fact that he customarily added her family name to his own dynastic cognomen of Palaeologus. He consistently called himself *Dragaš*, which in Greek dress assumed various forms.³⁷ Evidently, he was proud of his mother’s Serbian heritage and family, even though Helena herself had abandoned her father’s name and always signed her own in official documents as “Helena Palaeologina.”³⁸ That Constantine was the only son of Manuel to adopt Helena’s family name may perhaps indicate a strong bond between the last emperor of Constantinople and his mother, or, at the very least, it suggests the existence of considerable respect and general pride in her family and heritage.

Prior to his marriage to Helena, Manuel seems to have had his share of affairs and had acquired a number of illegitimate children.³⁹ One of his illegitimate daughters, Zampia [= Zabia, i.e., Manuel’s version for Isabella-Isabeau], became the wife of Hilario Doria, a Genoese whom Manuel had dispatched on sensitive diplomatic missions.⁴⁰ There were other children as well, but we know nothing about them or about their mother(s). We know even less about the physical appearance of Helena. One portrait has survived: the Louvre manuscript *Ivoires* A53, Apollo Hall, fol. 1^r. This masterpiece of imperial portraiture is the frontispiece to the famous manuscript containing the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Manuel’s friend and well-known humanist, Manuel Chrysoloras, personally delivered this *codex* to the Royal Abbey of St. Denys in 1408, perhaps as a memento of Manuel’s earlier visit to Paris. Manuel and his wife are depicted in full regalia under the protection of the Virgin. Three of their sons are also included and are identified by inscriptions as John (VIII), whose robes are identical to those of his father, indicating that he was already a crowned co-emperor,⁴¹ Theodoros (II) (with the caption “Porphyrogennetus [by God’s fortune?] Despot, his son”), and Andronikos. Helena is identified as⁴² “Helena, in Ch<rist> the G<od> faithful Augusta and Empress of the Romans [= Greeks], Palaeologina.” This is her only

surviving likeness.⁴³ The *Chronicon Vaticanum Graecum*, however, supplies a verbal description of her and, curiously enough, adds that she had one eye.⁴⁴ This seems unlikely, as no other source repeats this detail and no deformity is evident in her famous portrait at the Louvre. The same chronicle goes on to claim that she was “prudent by nature.” There are no negative references to Helena in the surviving literature from that period.

2 The beggar emperor

The first son of Manuel and Helena was born within one year after their wedding.⁴⁵ He received the name John and was destined to become the successor of Manuel II. His birthday is not clearly recorded in contemporary documents. Later historians speak of him as being “a young man” in the decade of 1415–1425, without specific references to his age.⁴⁶ A short chronicle, however, supplies the following data:⁴⁷ “On the eighteenth day of November, the day of the great martyr Sebastian, the most fortunate emperor and son of the emperor Lord Manuel was born.” No year is assigned to this entry and the feast of Saint Sebastian falls one month later, on December 18. Sphrantzes states that at the time of his death (on October 31, 1447, an obvious scribal error for 1448), John was fifty-six years old;⁴⁸ combined with the (adjusted) information supplied in the short chronicle, John’s birthday may be fixed as December 18, 1392.

The years following the wedding and the coronation ceremony of Manuel and Helena were not spent in bliss. Manuel faced an internal challenge, as his nephew and rival John VII still nourished ambitions to ascend the throne and had renewed his seditious activities. While a compromise had been agreed upon by uncle and nephew in 1393, the terms of which specified that Manuel would formally adopt John VII, thus making him his legal heir, and that John VII would adopt, in turn, Manuel’s son John VIII, thus assuring the prince’s claim to the succession as well, this arrangement was soon forgotten.⁴⁹

After the incident at Serres (1393/94) Manuel refused to attend his Turkish overlord in person, fearing for his own life.⁵⁰ And so Manuel’s policy of appeasement and extensive cooperation with Bayezid came to an end. Manuel had impeccably played the part of the loyal vassal but could no longer continue playing the role of a suppliant. Manuel retreated behind the walls of Constantinople while Bayezid gave vent to his anger by embarking on a campaign that brought him south into Greek territories, into Thessaly and into Boeotia. In late 1394 and early 1395 he unleashed his irregulars to conduct raids as far south as the Morea and the territories of Theodoros, the emperor’s brother.⁵¹ Theodoros I, Manuel’s brother, was forced to accompany Bayezid, as he had not been granted leave to depart from Serres. Evrenos Beg led Bayezid’s *razzia* into the Morea, as far south as Methone and Korone before a withdrawal was ordered. Manuel himself described Bayezid’s disposition after the incident at Serres, which prompted this destructive raid:⁵²

With such intentions, he passed through Macedonia, crossed Thessaly, and occupied Hellas. There he made camp and he wanted to spend time [there]

because he saw that the region had good pastures, possessed good hunting grounds, and provided abundantly for all the needs of his army. . . . He dispatched one of his executioners, who surpassed all others in savagery and cruelty; his name is Ömer. In addition to numerous other demands, he asked him [*sc.* Theodoros] to cede Argos.

It was on this occasion that the Turks secured Thessaly on a permanent basis.⁵³ Turahan, the Ottoman warlord, then established himself in Trikkala.⁵⁴ Such movements, combined with attacks upon Rascia/Serbia and Hungary, began to alarm the west and elicited lamentations from Pope Boniface IX, who instructed his priests to preach a crusade against the Turks.⁵⁵

At the same time Bayezid decided to bring Constantinople to her knees by means of a serious blockade, which lasted a number of years, caused a great deal of grief to the famished inhabitants,⁵⁶ and furnished incentive to numerous scholars to emigrate to the west. The emir, however, lacked machinery to overwhelm the fortifications, did not possess the means to cast and deploy powerful bombards, and proved powerless in front of the walls. Furthermore, as he had no fleet, Constantinople was provisioned by ship, since the sea-lanes from the Archipelago through the Dardanelles to the Golden Horn remained open to Venetian and Genoese vessels. Those were difficult years for the population.⁵⁷ The beginning and duration of the long siege are cited in a laconic note:⁵⁸ “Bayezid began his seven-year siege and blockade of Constantinople in the year 6903 [1394].” The encirclement was so intense that Manuel contemplated flight.⁵⁹ At this time the crusade of Nicopolis intervened and provided a respite.⁶⁰ Even though this western expedition had not been organized with the express purpose of rescuing Constantinople,⁶¹ one of its immediate effects was a relaxation of the blockade. The ensuing campaign culminated in the battle of Nicopolis and in the defeat of the Christian allies. Many fell on both sides. Immediately after the battle, a large number of western prisoners were massacred by Bayezid’s direct order.⁶²

Under the realization that Europe did not have the resources to mount another campaign against him, Bayezid tightened the noose around Constantinople.⁶³ It was shortly after Nicopolis that Manuel wrote a letter, whose concluding paragraph reveals the emperor’s utter despair.⁶⁴ The rout of the European armies had perhaps brought the emperor to the point of resignation, as at this time he seems to have gone so far as to propose the cession of Constantinople to Venice. The *Sapientes*, however, wisely declined his desperate offer. Once more in 1397 Timurtaş Beg and Yakub Pasha plundered the Morea.⁶⁵ The Turks razed Argos on June 3. Its population was forcibly transported as *sürgünler*, by an enforced policy of migration, to Asia Minor. The Turks advanced as far as the southern part of the peninsula and then pulled back to Thessaly. Manuel renewed his appeals for aid to the west. At long last, his diplomatic efforts seemed to bear some fruit, as, in 1399, Charles VI of France sent a small contingent to the Byzantine capital, led by Jean le Meingre, Maréchal Boucicaut.⁶⁶ Second in command was the valiant Jean de Chateaumorand,⁶⁷ in whose capable hands the defense of Constantinople would remain while

the French marshal and the Byzantine emperor embarked upon a long journey to western Europe in search of aid.⁶⁸

Boucicaut convinced Manuel II of the need to appeal personally for help to the mad king of France. The marshal successfully played the part of a mediator and brought about a temporary reconciliation between Manuel and his quarrelsome nephew, John VII.⁶⁹ It was then decided that John VII would remain as regent in Constantinople during Manuel's absence. The defense of the capital was squarely placed in the hands of Boucicaut's lieutenant, de Chateumorand, who was probably charged with the delicate mission of keeping a watchful eye over John VII's activities. On December 10, 1399, Manuel II left his capital on board a Venetian galley.⁷⁰

1. In the year 6908 [1399], eighth indiction, on December 4, Lord John [VII], the late emperor, and son of Emperor Andronikos, entered the City in peace after oaths had been sworn and agreements had been concluded.
2. On the tenth of the same December the emperor, Lord Manuel, boarded a Venetian galley and left for the lands of the Franks in order to win aid for the aforementioned Constantinople and the eastern regions.
3. The emperor was in dire straits; he took his queen and a number of his noblemen, together with their fortunes, and boarded the triremes; he left for the lands of the Franks <not> to bring about the union [of the Churches], but in order to win help for the City; he left behind as emperor his brother, Lord Andronikos [*sic*].

In February 1400, the imperial party landed at Venetian Methone in the Morea. Here Manuel entrusted his family to his brother, Theodoros I, the despot of the Morea. He also secured a pledge from the Venetian Senate that his brother and the other members of his family would be protected if and when they came under attack. That Manuel removed his family from Constantinople attests to the fact that the emperor did not trust his regent implicitly, in spite of their apparent reconciliation and of the presence of de Chateamorand's garrison. That Manuel further sought assurances and a pledge of safe conduct for his family and for the despot illustrates his lack of confidence in the survival of the "empire." He was fully aware of the danger that the Morea faced; it could be annexed any time Bayezid chose to turn his periodic raids into a full invasion.⁷¹ In one of his rare allusions to personal matters, Manuel would have us believe that Theodoros I was less than enthusiastic about his brother's departure for Europe:⁷²

My brother was affected by this, my journey I mean, and became even more depressed than previously; he likened the entire project to the state of becoming an orphan. The voyage by ship seemed long but my intended stay on the mainland even longer; besides, nothing definite, except prayers, could be said about the time of my return.

The members of the imperial family left in the Morea included the empress, Helena, and her first-born, Prince John VIII. The second son of Manuel and Helena, who must have also accompanied his parents to the Morea, was called Constantine. This prince should not be confused with Constantine XI, the last emperor, who was born after the return of Manuel from the west. This elder Constantine died by 1407. A third son, Theodoros II, was also born before Manuel's departure, but the exact date of his birth is not recorded. He too must have traveled with the imperial party to the Morea. Thus, Helena and the princes, John VIII, Constantine the elder, and Theodoros II (in addition, undoubtedly, to several illegitimate children) were entrusted to the care of Manuel's brother, Theodoros I. While the emperor was away, Helena gave birth in the Morea to another son of Manuel, who received the name Andronikos. From the Morea Manuel proceeded to Italy and to western Europe. His efforts to win aid would take him as far away as England. No other emperor of Constantinople had ever traveled so far since the days of Constantine the Great.

Manuel's extensive stay at the court of Charles VI in Paris, his visit to England, as well as his diplomatic contacts with Spain, Portugal, and distant Denmark brought him promises and evoked pity, but no substantial aid, military or financial, materialized.⁷³ Meanwhile Bayezid continued his blockade. The French garrison could not be expected to defend the capital indefinitely. A major campaign from the west was required and was promised but no one was in any hurry to come to Constantinople's aid. Eventually, it was a *deus ex oriente* who, in one sweeping battle, annihilated the Ottoman army and threw the emir's rising state into utter confusion. Timur-i-lenk ("Timur-the-lame," as his Persian foes contemptuously called him) became known to the west as Tamburlaine. He and his Mongol armies came to blows with Bayezid over certain vassals and disputed possession of regions in Anatolia.⁷⁴ Timur invaded Ottoman territory and initiated a reign of terror, committing numerous atrocities during this campaign. In particular, the cruel vengeance that he exacted upon Sebasteia was frequently noted in the literature of the period and the savagery of his Mongols became notorious. Even the Constantinopolitans were moved to pity over the fate of their Turkish enemies.⁷⁵ A short chronicle summarizes these events (August 10–26, 1400):⁷⁶

In the year 6908 [1400] Timur, the lord of the Persians and Scythians [Mongols] was informed of his [Bayezid's] activities and marched from his [city] called Samarkand; he came, attacked, and seized Sebasteia; in accordance with the law of war he massacred the local population. He then gathered the severed heads of his victims and erected three towers, inspiring great fear among all witnesses.

The climax of this campaign came two years later in July 1402, when the battle of Ankara was fought,⁷⁷ as noted in a short chronicle:⁷⁸ "In the year 6910, the tenth indiction, a great battle was fought at Ankara, in the province of the Galatians; Bayezid, the chief of the Ishmaelites [= Turks], was abandoned by all his nations and, on July 29, he was routed by Timur the chief of the Persians and the Scythians [= Mongols]." Another entry summarizes the entire campaign:⁷⁹

Ca. 6903 [1395], in June, the impious [lord] of the Turks, the aforementioned Bayezid, moved against him [the emperor]. And he pressed on with his operations for almost eight years until Timur Beg, the great satrap of the Persians came from the east and routed him. After he took him captive, he seized, plundered, and destroyed his possessions in Anatolia, during the month of August, the tenth indiction, while our pious emperor, Lord Manuel, was away in the lands of the west.

Thus began a period of confusion, known as the *interregnum* (*fetret devri*, in Turkish) or the “Times of Trouble”⁸⁰ for the Ottomans. Bayezid became a prisoner of the Mongols, spent the rest of his life in humiliating circumstances, and was compelled to endure a multitude of indignities and deliberate insults.⁸¹ On March 9, 1403, Bayezid died in captivity.⁸² His death is mentioned in a short chronicle:⁸³ “During Timur’s march, the most lawless Bayezid, <who was fiercer> than beasts, died like a dog. Thus, Constantinople was delivered from their lawless and most evil designs through the intercession of the Mother of God.”

Constantinople had been saved by the Mongol victory, which must have seemed a miraculous event to the besieged population. It is clear that in the months preceding Timur’s Anatolian campaign, Bayezid, encouraged by the failure of Manuel to secure any aid, had intensified his efforts to seize Constantinople. Faced with mounting Turkish pressure and having given up hope for salvation, John VII, Manuel’s regent, concluded (in consultation, no doubt, with his military commander de Chateaurand, with the nobility, and with the patriarch) that the capital could no longer hold out and that they had to come to terms with the emir. It is quite certain that a delegation was dispatched to Bayezid to offer the keys to the city. The planned capitulation is confirmed by a short chronicle:⁸⁴ “And the inhabitants of the City were famished; people fled. Some noblemen took the keys of the City and went to surrender the City to the sultan in Kotyaion.” Further confirmation is provided in the narrative of Clavijo.⁸⁵ The surrender of Constantinople was only prevented by the battle of Ankara and by the ensuing chaos in the Ottoman state. De Chateaurand then left Constantinople and personally brought the news of Bayezid’s disaster to Paris and to Manuel II. Upon receiving this welcome report, Manuel showed no hurry to return to the Levant. He slowly made his way to Italy and left Venice for the Morea in mid-April 1403, where he joined his wife and family. He reached his capital in June of 1403, after he took considerable time to settle a number of problems in southern Greece.

While Manuel was still away, John VII negotiated a treaty with Suleyman Çelebi, the first successor of Bayezid, in February 1403.⁸⁶ The conclusion of this treaty may have rekindled the old friction between Manuel II and his regent John VII. After he returned to his capital, Manuel failed to embrace the terms of the compromise that he had reached with his nephew prior to his departure. He may have even gone so far as to banish John VII to the island of Lemnos for a short period, precisely because of his key role in the negotiations with the Turks that resulted in the treaty. The formulation of the treaty’s clauses had been John’s work.

Manuel appears to have played no part in it. He only reluctantly ratified its terms after his return to Constantinople and seems to have been upset because he had had no hand in the negotiations.

In January 1403, the treaty was drawn up at Kallipolis. Its terms specified that Constantinople would discontinue its tribute to the Porte; the former vassal status of the emperor was canceled. Thessalonica, Mount Athos, the islands of the Northern Sporades (Skiathos, Skyros, and Skopelos), and a strip of land along the western coast of the Black Sea, as far as Mesembria, reverted to imperial rule. Suleyman himself became the vassal of the Byzantine emperor. The terms of this document were rather broad and included not only the capital but also the Hospitallers at Rhodes, the Genoese, and the islands of Naxos and Chios. This is one of the last successful treaties that were negotiated between Constantinople and the Turks. The irony of it is that it was formulated and accepted by John VII and not by Manuel II, who grudgingly approved the final version of this document.

The ensuing civil strife in the Ottoman realm liberated Constantinople from the vassal status that she had been forced to accept. Numerous contenders to the Ottoman throne sought the support of the Byzantine court and were willing to make concessions. Until the eventual enthronement of Mehmed I, Constantinople enjoyed a much-needed respite. Relying on his own meager resources, Manuel launched a brilliant offensive, which was necessarily restricted to diplomacy alone due to the lack of economic and military means. Manuel aimed for a reorganization of his realm in the interests of survival⁸⁷ and was playing for time. There was reason to be optimistic. After all, Constantinople had been delivered at the very moment that servitude had appeared inescapable, while both leadership and inhabitants had given up hope and had reconciled themselves to surrender.

3 The last imperial princes

The period 1403 to 1413 witnessed civil strife within the Turkish realm, and the births of a number of princes in the imperial dynasty are summarized by Sphrantzes, who conveys the rapid succession of events and the excitement that the court must have experienced.⁸⁸ For the court the most significant event was the death of John VII. He died in September 1408. It seems that John VII was also known for his piety; a sort of cult may have been attached to his grave:⁸⁹ “His [*sc.* Manuel’s] nephew handled everything with skill and devotion. After his return from Italy, the emperor assigned Thessalonica to him. He was extremely virtuous and his grave cures all sorts of illnesses nowadays.” Since his son had died before him, John VII left no heirs. After the death of his nephew, Manuel appointed a member of his immediate family to govern Thessalonica: Prince Andronikos. The death of his rival must have come as a relief, for all competition for the throne now ceased.

Sphrantzes mentions the birth of his friend and last emperor of Constantinople, Constantine XI:⁹⁰ “A son was born to our emperor on February 8 of the year <69>13 [1405], the second son to receive the name Constantine. He was destined to become emperor.” Thus, Constantine XI enters the scene. He was born at a time when the capital had escaped total subjugation and there was even reason to view

the future with a certain amount of optimism. Yet, even though the Mongol khan had annihilated the Ottoman emir, whose heirs were facing endless internecine wars, large numbers of Turks had penetrated the Balkans by then and had founded permanent settlements. While he was born at a time of relative optimism, this prince was destined to preside over the fall of the capital. Constantine's career would be otherwise devoted to the creation of an independent enclave in southern Greece and to the establishment of a Morea free of Latin influence and secure from Ottoman intervention.

Constantine's life was surrounded by disappointments, by debacles, by political and ecclesiastical disasters, and by court intrigue. His successes were ephemeral, at best, and he lived long enough to see his work crumble and vanish. His ambitious plan for an independent Morea, free of Latins and Turks, was neutralized by the successors of Bayezid again and again. It is no wonder that his contemporaries viewed Constantine as an "unlucky" person, born under an evil star.⁹¹ This perception became widespread after the loss of the capital. At the same time, his presumed valiant stand before the ancient ramparts of Constantinople and his "disappearance" later turned this emperor into a national hero. Constantine meant well and was a reasonably capable administrator, but he was neither a soldier nor a tactician of any merit and his efforts were constantly frustrated from within and from without. Ultimately, it took his very death, moments before the sack of his capital, to turn him into a quintessential hero and a martyr. His tragedy consists of his inability to accomplish much. He was unhappy in his private life also: his two wives died soon after the wedding ceremonies and Constantine left neither sons nor daughters to carry on his line. His corpse does not seem to have been securely identified or, if it was found, it was certainly mutilated. His remains were then cremated in a common pyre, in all probability. Yet he assured himself of a place in posterity and countless Greeks have revered his memory in the subsequent centuries.

The name that he received could have been in commemoration of his maternal grandfather, Constantine Dejanović Dragaš, or perhaps in memory of his dead brother, the elder prince by the same name. There is a possibility that Constantine was born after the death of his brother and namesake. The exact year of the elder prince's death is not recorded. Sphrantzes states that Constantine's older namesake, along with two of his sisters, died in Monemvasia sometime between 6912 and 6921, i.e., 1403–1413, probably victims of the plague that had periodically devastated the Morea. If this view is correct, since Constantine XI was probably born in February 1404, his brother could not have lived beyond 1403/04, which may thus be established as an extremely tentative *terminus ante quem*. Perhaps it should be observed that the emperors of the Palaeologan dynasty generally refrained from assigning the same name to two living princes; and this observation may support the view that Constantine XI was born, or at least baptized, after his brother's death.⁹²

Constantine XI's "bad luck" may thus be traced to his very name, since it may have been in commemoration of a brother who had died. With hindsight, after the fall of the capital, some superstitious individuals in Ottoman Constantinople

saw in this name a bad omen. Indeed, future generations and even contemporaries of Constantine XI, who had been fortunate to survive the sack, viewed the last emperor as “unlucky” in name,⁹³ under the principle *nomen omen*, a typical *vaticinium post eventum*. His name seemed to fulfill the terms of popular prophecies in circulation, declaring that Constantinople had been founded by a Constantine, the son of Helen, and was destined to fall during the reign of another Constantine, also the son of a Helen[a]. In the eyes of many individuals, this prophecy was realized on May 29, 1453.⁹⁴

The exact year of Constantine’s birth remains in doubt. Although Sphrantzes supplies a specific year, i.e., 1405,⁹⁵ this date is contradicted elsewhere in his own work:⁹⁶ “My late emperor, the martyr, lived for forty-nine years, three months, and twenty days. His reign lasted four years, four months, and twenty-four days.” Since Constantine died on May 29, 1453, this entry should yield a birthday in February 1404, one year earlier than the date supplied by the previous entry. Consequently, we are faced with a discrepancy. In general, numbers and dates seem to have suffered in the transmission of the *Minus* (while the derivative *Maius* cannot, and should not, be of any help, as it was compiled in the sixteenth century, when the dates of the original *Minus* may have been already corrupted). Thus, for instance, the *Minus* is off by a whole year on the death of John VIII.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the number of the defenders of Constantinople in 1453 seems to present us with another error:⁹⁸ Sphrantzes states that there were about two hundred foreigners in Constantinople, when it is almost certain that the true number is “two thousand.” This figure of “two hundred” has to be understood as a scribal mistake, since Sphrantzes, who conducted the last imperial census personally, would not have committed such a major error in numbering the available defenders.

One may surmise that the entry of Sphrantzes, citing the years, months, and days of Constantine’s life may be more reliable, precisely because it is so specific. A mistake can be made by a copyist of a manuscript, especially when a date is cited by means of a single numeral (as is the case, for instance, with the Giustiniani tomb inscription,⁹⁹ which apparently recorded the year of the warlord’s death as 1458 instead of 1453; the wrong year for the fall of Constantinople can also be found in numerous entries¹⁰⁰ of short chronicles). A corruption with regard to one’s age given in years, months, and days, is a different matter, especially since Constantine XI was well known and was revered as the last heroic emperor-martyr of Constantinople. As far as the first entry in the *Minus* is concerned, Sphrantzes may have miscalculated the year of Constantine’s birth as 1405; this mistake may have been due to a lapse in memory or, more likely, was the result of an arithmetical error in subtraction (assuming that this date actually existed in the autograph and that it is not the result of a later scribal corruption in the transmission of the manuscript). Alternatively, Sphrantzes himself may have committed this error. The text of the *Minus* also supplies the wrong year for the death of John VIII. There is no way of knowing precisely what Sphrantzes wrote in his autograph. However, there is a short chronicle, whose information is dependent on the text of the *Minus*. Three entries repeat, almost verbatim, the information we have encountered in

Sphrantzes' second passage; the short chronicles maintains that Constantine XI was forty-nine years old when he died:¹⁰¹

1. Version A: And our holy lord, an equal to the apostles, the martyr Lord Constantine the emperor, was killed. He had been emperor for 4 years, 3 months, and 24 days. He lived for 49 years, 3 months, and <2>1 days.
2. Version B: The late martyr, Lord Constantine Palaeologus: his life lasted 49 years, 10 months, and 15 days.
3. Version C: The martyr Lord Constantine Palaeologus was 49 years, 3 months, and <2>1 days old.

The entries of the short chronicle agree with Sphrantzes' second passage, as all state that Constantine was forty-nine years old when he died; the discrepancy comes in the specific number of months and days. It may then be supposed that this number, 49, was actually written in the autograph. By extension, the first entry in the *Minus*,¹⁰² which states that Constantine XI was born in 1405, must either be in error or the correct date was corrupted in the transmission. Even though the exact year of Constantine XI's birth will have to remain in doubt, it seems more likely that he was born in 1404 and not in 1405.¹⁰³ The second citation in Sphrantzes seems closer to the truth. How could he have made a mistake in stating his friend's precise age in years, months, and days?

Two more princes were born to Manuel and Helena: Demetrios, the *bête noire* of the Palaeologan family, and Thomas, the youngest. Andronikos, Theodoros II, John VIII, Constantine XI, Demetrios, and Thomas were all active in depressing circumstances. Andronikos and Theodoros II were perhaps the most fortunate of the lot, as their deaths preceded both the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the annexation of the Morea. Theodoros II ruled the Morea until Constantine XI took it over¹⁰⁴ and inherited his father's intellectual tastes; under him Mistra, the capital of the Morea, became a center of humanistic studies and attracted a large number of intellectuals.¹⁰⁵ Theodoros himself was a competent mathematician. He came to rule the Morea at a young age in 1407, after his uncle's death.¹⁰⁶ Andronikos was sickly; he succeeded John VII in Thessalonica. His main accomplishment was, in fact, the cession of Thessalonica to the Venetians in 1423.¹⁰⁷ He died on March 4, 1428, after he had assumed the habit and taken the monastic name "Akakios."¹⁰⁸

A traveler to Constantinople, Zosima the deacon, the last Russian to produce an account of his visit to the capital before 1453, had been a member of the escort of Lady Anna, the Russian first wife of John VIII; in his account of a second later visit he reports the names of the princes in the following order:¹⁰⁹

I was deemed worthy to see all this and to worship His [Christ's] Passion relics and His holy servants, when I had been there earlier as a member of the escort of the princess to the empire of the pious Greek emperor, Lord Manuel. He was old when he placed the crown of the Greek empire on his eldest son Kalojan ["Good John," i.e., John VIII]. Manuel had six sons: the

1st is Kalojan or John, the reigning emperor in Constantinople; the 2nd is Andronikos, the despot of the city of Thessalonica; the 3rd is Theodoros, the despot of the Morea; the 4th is Constantine, the despot of the Black Sea; the 5th is Demetrios, the despot of the Lemnian territory [= the island of Lemnos]; the 6th son, Thomas, was residing in his father's palace, as he still is.

The end of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the *quattrocento* provided some breathing room for the aging emperor and his aged "empire." After the battle of Ankara, Manuel found himself the momentary master. Various Ottoman princes contending for Bayezid's throne were courting him; he could assume the role of sultan-maker. A respite from trouble was then granted. Even so, storm clouds were accumulating. For the time being the remnants of the "empire" were in the eye of the storm. The worst was yet to come.

Notes

- 1 *MP*, p. 79; G. Kollias, "Ἡ Ἀνταρσία τοῦ Ἰωάννου Ζ' Παλαιολόγου ἐναντίον Ἰωάννου Ε' Παλαιολόγου (1390)," *Ἑλληνικά* 12 (1952), pp. 34–64, esp. p. 53, believes that Manuel was virtually a prisoner of the emir; *LCB*, pp. 310, 311. On John VII, see E. Zachariadou, "John VII (alias Andronicus) Palaeologus," *DOP* 31 (1977): 339–342 [= E. Zachariadou, *Romania and the Turks, c. 1300 – c. 1500* (London, 1985), Essay 9].
- 2 *MP*, pp. 87–99; *LCB*, pp. 310–312; G. T. Dennis, "Some Notes on the Correspondence of Manuel II Palaeologus," in *Actes du XIV^e Congrès international des Études byzantines*, vol. 2 (Bucharest, 1975), pp. 67–73 [= G. T. Dennis, *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London, 1982), Essay 10]; and *MP*, esp. pp. 422 ff.
- 3 On Constantine Dejanović (Dragaš), see J. Hadji-Vasiljević, *Dragaš i Konstantin Dejanovići* (Belgrade, 1902); G. Ostrogorsky, "Gospodin Konstantin Dragaš," *Zbornik Filozofskog Fakulteta Beogradskog Univerziteta* 7 (1963): 287–294; B. Ferjančić, *Despoti u Vizantiji Juznoslovenskim Zemljama* (Belgrade, 1960), p. 173, n. 97; I. A. Papadrianos, "The Marriage-Arrangement between Constantine Palaeologus and the Serbian Mara (1451)," *Balkan Studies* 6 (1965): 131, 132; G. C. Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium during the Reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331–1355) and his Successors* (Washington, DC, 1984), pp. 100–102; and *PLP* 3: no. 5746 (p. 72). Constantine's career is summarized in Khalkokondyles, 1.2.26 (pp. 128–131): . . . Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Ζάρκου, Δραγάσεως ἀδελφός, . . . ἐκεῖνον τελευτήσαντος τοῦ Ζάρκου ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἄριστος τὰ εἰς σύνεσιν τε καὶ πόλεμον, οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος τῶν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, καὶ πρὸς τε Ἀλβανούς καὶ Τριβαλλοὺς πολεμίους διαπολεμῶν χώραν τε αὐτῶ ὑπηγάγετο οὐ φαύλην, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ αὐτοῦ Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ κατέσχε τὴν χώραν καὶ ἐφοῖτα ἐς τὰς βασιλέως θύρας [= Porte]. . . A few short chronicles mention Constantine Dragaš; see, e.g., *CBB* 1: 72a.11 (p. 562).
- 4 D. Anastasijević, "Jedina vizantijska carica Srpkinja," *Brastvo* 30 (1959): 26–48; *MP*, pp. 99, 100, and n. 24; and *PLP* 9: no. 21366 (p. 69) [s.v. Παλαιολογίνα, Ἑλένη]. She survived her husband by a quarter of a century. A number of documents bearing Helena's signature survive: a chrysobull, which also names her father, two προστάγματα of Manuel II from December 10, 1399, and from October 8, 1406; cf. *RKOR*, no. 3257 (p. 83), no. 3279 (p. 86), and no. 3314 (p. 94), respectively. Helena, unlike her son Constantine XI, discarded her Serbian family name after she became the wife of Manuel II; see, e.g., the inscription on her seal: Ἑλένη, ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστῇ Αὐγούστα καὶ αὐτοκρατορίσα τῶν Ρωμαιοῦν, Παλαιολογίνα.

- 5 G. P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* [DOS 19] (Washington, DC, 1984), pp. 105–113, esp. pp. 109–111 for the Cyrillic text.
- 6 I. Ševčenko, “The Decline of Byzantium Seen through the Eyes of its Intellectuals,” *DOP* 15 (1961): 169–186 [= I. Ševčenko, *Society and Intellectual Life in Late Byzantium* (London, 1981), Essay 2]. In general, see J. Wortley, “The Literature of Catastrophe,” *BSEB* 4 (1977): 1–17.
- 7 D. J. Geanakoplos, *Greek Scholars in Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from Byzantium to Western Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 1962) [= *Byzantium and Renaissance* (Hamden, CT, 1972)]; *idem*, “Italian Renaissance Thought and Learning and the Role of the Byzantine Emigrè Scholars in Florence, Rome, and Venice: A Reassessment,” *Rivista di studi bizantini e slavi* 3 (1984): 129–157; *idem*, “La colonia greca di Venezia e il suo significato per il Rinascimento,” in A. Pertusi, ed., *Venezia e l’Oriente fra Tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento* [Civiltà Europea e Civiltà Veneziana, Aspetti e Problemi 4] (Venice, 1966), pp. 183–204; D. J. Geanakoplos, *Constantinople and the West* (Madison, 1989); D. A. Zakythinos, *Μεταβυζαντινά και Νέα Έλληνικά* (Athens, 1978), pp. 229–446; and K. S. Staikos, *Χάρτα της Έλληνικής Τυπογραφίας: Η Έκδοτική Δραστηριότητα των Έλλήνων και ή Συμβολή τους στην Πνευματική Αναγέννηση της Δύσης, 1: 15ος Αιώνας* (Athens, 1989).
- 8 For the early career of Manuel in Thessalonica, see *LCB*, pp. 292, 293; *MP*, pp. 35–46; and G. T. Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica, 1382–1387* [Orientalia Christiana Analecta 159] (Rome, 1960).
- 9 Anastasijević, “Jedina vizantijska carica Srpknja”; Hadji-Vasiljević, *Dragaš i Konstantin Dejanovići*; and Ostrogorsky, “Gospodin Konstantin Dragaš”; and *MP*, pp. 99, 100.
- 10 *CBB* 1: 72a.12 (p. 562): ἐπι ἔτους ςϞι' ὑπῆγεν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἡλητηρῆμ Παγαζήτης σουλτάνος εἰς τὸν Δούναβιν, εἰς τὸ Μίρτζα, βοηθόντα τῶν Βλάχων καὶ ἐνικήθη ὑπὸ τῶν Βλάχων καὶ τοῦ ἔκοψεν ὁ Μίρτζας μὲ τοὺς Βλάχους τὸ φουσατό, καὶ τοῦ ἐπῆρε τὸ χασνάβ, τουτέστιν τὸν βίον του, καὶ τὸν ἐδίωξεν ἕως τὸν Δούναβιν. καὶ τότε ἐσκοτώθη ὁ Μάρκος, ὁ κράλης, καὶ ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος, ὁ Ζιλυγόβου ἀφέντης. καὶ ὁ Ἡλητηρῆμ μόλις ἔγλυθεν μὲ ὀλίγους ἀνθρώπους.
- 11 I. Mamelakis, *Ὁ Γεώργιος Γεμιστὸς Πλήθων* (Athens, 1939); F. Masai, *Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra* (Paris, 1956); G. Papacostas, *George Gemistos-Plethon: A Study of His Philosophical Ideas and his Role as a Philosopher-Teacher* (New York, 1967); and C. M. Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes* (Oxford, 1986); in addition, see *PLP* 2: no. 3630 (pp. 159, 160) [s.v. Γεμιστός, Γεώργιος Πλήθων]. Plethon wrote his *Μονωδία* in honor of the dead empress. Analysis and discussion from the philosophical point of view in Woodhouse, pp. 309–313. Plethon’s enemy, eventual persecutor, as well as first patriarch under the Ottoman sultans, Gennadius II (George Scholarius) also wrote a consolation to Constantine XI on the occasion of Helena’s death: Greek text in L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, *Oeuvres Complètes de George Scholarios*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1928), pp. 262–270.
- 12 Greek text in *PkP* 3: 266–280. The same text (based on an inferior manuscript) is also in *PG* 160: cols. 951–958. This speech presents an interesting argument on suicide in relation to the immortality of the soul. It has never been translated into English in its entirety. For the extract in this text, see *PkP* 3: 270: τῆς ἄρτι μετῆλλαχίας τὸν βίον βασιλίδος πατῆρ ἦν χώρας τε ἄρχων οὐ φαύλης παρ’ Ἄξιόν ποταμόν, οὐ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν ποταμίων ὑδάτων τοῖς κρατίστοις καὶ ὑγειονοτάτοις πίνειν ἐστί, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἀνδρειοτάτοις καὶ δικαιοτάτοις τυγχάνων καὶ τὰ γε πρὸς τοὺς φίλους πιστοτάτοις.
- 13 *PkP* 3: 267: αὐτῆ τὸ μὲν γένος Θράττα ἦν οἱ δὲ Θράκες παλαιὸν τε γένος καὶ ἐν γενῶν τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἀριθμούμενον οὐχ ὅσον ἐντὸς Ἴστρου ἀπὸ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἕξ τ’ ἐπὶ Ἰταλίαν καθήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσον Ἴστρου πέραν τοῖς ἐπὶ τάδε ὁμόγλωττον ἕξ τε ἐπ’ ὠκεανόν τε τὸν ἐκεῖ νέμεται καὶ ἤπειρον σχεδόν τι τὴν αὐκίητον διὰ ψύχους. πολὺ δὲ κάκεινο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ἴστρου πολλῶ πλέον. καὶ μὲν δὴ οὐδὲ φαῦλον ἐκ παλαιοῦ ἔθνος, ἀλλ’ ἀνδρεῖον τε ἅμα καὶ τὰς δόξας οὐκ ἀμαθές.

- ὁ γοῶν τὰς ἐλευσινίας τελετὰς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασία καταστησάμενος Εὐμολπος ἀνήρ Θραξῆ ἦν καὶ τὸν γε τῶν Μουσῶν χορὸν Ἑλληγες παρὰ Θρακῶν λέγονται μεμαθηκότες τιμᾶν.
- 14 See *Minus*, 28.7, and 29.1. After the death of John VIII the situation in Constantinople was ripe for civil strife but τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἴσχυσαν ὀρισμῶ τῆς ἀγίας δέσποινας [= Helena] καὶ τῶν υἱῶν αὐτῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ ἀρχόντων βουλή καὶ γνώμη (*Minus*, 29.2).
- 15 *Minus*, 15.8.
- 16 See Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, citing Syropoulos, 10.8 and 10.26 (erroneously, as the actual passage is 10.24 in Laurent's edition): ὁ δὲ πάπας ἐμήνυσε πάλιν τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν ἵνα ποιήσης ἐνταῦθα πατριάρχην . . . καὶ τὰς ἀναβολὰς καὶ ὑπερθέσεις τοῦ βασιλέως ἀκούσαντες, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅτι μετὰ βουλῆς τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ τῆς δεσποίνης τῆς ἀγίας βούλεται ποιῆσαι τὴν ἐκλογὴν.
- 17 Syropoulos, 11.18: ἐπιστρέψαμεν εἰς τὴν Εὐβοίαν . . . καὶ ἰστάμεθα αὐθις ἐκεῖ ἡμέρας πεντεκαίδεκα. τότε ἠκούσαμεν ὅτι ἐνόσει ἡ δέσποινα τὰ πρὸς θάνατον.
- 18 Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 376, 377; and Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 177. For a document that refers to her, late in her life, while she was a nun, see S. P. Lampros, "Σιγίλλιον τοῦ Πατριάρχου Σωφρονίου περὶ τῆς Μονῆς Ταξιαρχῶν παρὰ τὸ Αἶγιον, καὶ τὸ Χωρίον Δημητροπούλου," *NH* 6 (1909): 289–298, esp. 289–294; as this document is a copy produced by the hand of John Santamaura, a known associate of the notorious elaborator-forgery of the *Maius*, Makarios Melissourgos-Melissenos, one may be justified in having reservations about its authenticity. On Santamaura, cf. H. Omont, "Le dernier des copistes grecs en Italie: Jean de Sainte-Maure (1572–1612)," *Revue des études grecques* 1 (1888): 177–191; M. Vogel and V. Garthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance* (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 193–198; C. G. Patrinelylis, "Ἑλληγες Κωδικογράφοι τῶν Χρόνων τῆς Ἀναγεννήσεως," *EMA* 8–9 (1958/59): 63–124, esp. 106, 107; and I. K. Khasiotis, "Ἐνα Ἰδιότυπο Εἰκονογραφημένο Κείμενο τοῦ Ἰωάννου Ἀγιομαύρα (1578)," *Ἑλληνικά* 19 (1966): 108–113.
- 19 Syropoulos, 11.20: ἐκεῖ ἠγγέλθη ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς δεσποίνης Μαρίας τῆς συμβίου τοῦ βασιλέως . . . ἔστειλαν δὲ πλοῖον ἐκ τῆς Πόλεως καὶ ἔγραψαν ἵνα εἰπωσι τῷ βασιλεῖ ἐκεῖσε περὶ τοῦ θανάτου τῆς δεσποίνης γενομένης δὲ βουλῆς, ἐνενόησαν ὅτι εἰ ἀκούσει τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα ὁ βασιλεὺς, λυπηθήσεται καὶ πενήσει ὑπὲρ τὰς πεντεκαίδεκα ἡμέρας καὶ τίς καταπέσει αὐτὸν ἐξελεῖθιν ἐντεῦθεν; καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ εὐρόντες δι' ἃ ἐφάνη βέλτιον ἵνα μηδαμῶς εἰπωσι τῷ βασιλεῖ περὶ τούτου, ἐφύλαξαν αὐτό.
- 20 Syropoulos, 11.23: τῆ δ' ἐπιούση, ἣτις ἦν πρώτη τοῦ φεβρουαρίου τῆς τρίτης ἰνδικτιῶνος . . . ἅμα πρῶτ' ἦλθεν ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος μετὰ κατέργου εἰς ὑπαντὴν τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ἕτεροι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν Γενουιτῶν καὶ τῶν Βενετικῶν καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔδοξε καλὸν τοῖς πρότερον βουλευσαμένοις, ἴν' εἰπωσι τῷ βασιλεῖ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου τῆς δεσποίνης, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τότε ἔδειξαν τι λυπηρὸν . . . ὅτε ἐντὸς τῶν βασιλικῶν κελλίων παρεγένοντο . . . τῆς μητρὸς . . . τῆς ἀγίας δεσποίνης ἀναγγελιάσας . . . τὸ συμβάν . . . ἐπένθησαν.
- 21 Helena seems to have sided with the anti-unionists after Florence and supported their refusal to pray jointly for pope, patriarch, and emperor in their services; see *CF*, p. 369.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 *PkP* 1: 56–61.
- 24 *Ibid.*: μιμοῦ τὸν ἀρχαῖον ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ἐκείνης ζῆλον . . . εἰ δέ τι νῦν ὕστερον παραβιβάσεισα καὶ πικραῖς συμβουλαῖς τῶν κακῶς οικονομούντων ὑπαχθεῖσα τοὺς ὀλίγους, μεθ' ὧν εἶην κἀγώ, μικρὸν τι παρελύπησε, τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ παραχωρήσεισα τοῖς καινοτόμοις οὐκ ἔστεργε.
- 25 *Ibid.*: καὶ ὡς ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τὸν υἱὸν καὶ βασιλέα, . . . παρεκκλίναντα καὶ τοιαῦτα παρακολουθεῖν ἀνεχόμενον, τοῦ μνημοσύνου τῶν ὀρθοδόξων ἐξέωσε, στοργῆς φυσικῆς τὴν ἀποδοχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ προτιμήσεισα.
- 26 See *infra*, ch. 7, sec. 1.

- 27 *Minus*, 30.3: τῆ κυ^η Μαρτίου μηνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους [1450] τέθηκεν ἡ ἐν μακαρία τῇ λήξει γενομένη αἰοιδίμος καὶ ἀγία δέσποινα, ἡ διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθεῖσα Ὑπομονὴ μοναχὴ καὶ ἐτάφη εἰς τὴν μονὴν τοῦ Παντοκράτορος πλησίον τοῦ αἰοιδίου βασιλέως καὶ ἀνδρὸς [= Manuel II] αὐτῆς.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 32.7: τίνα σὺν τῷ εὐβουλεύομην; ἡ κυρά μου ἡ δέσποινα καὶ μήτηρ ἀπέθανεν.
- 29 Exactly when Helena took the veil is not known; see *MP*, pp. 99, 100, and n. 24. The custom of taking monastic vows prior to death was prevalent: cf. *Minus*, 30.3 (Helena-Hypomone); 45.3 (George-Gregory); 46.9 (Demetrios-David); and 47.1 (Helena-Hypomone).
- 30 The earliest author to make this mistake seems to have been Khalkokondyles (2.26), whose narrative the forger of the *Mainus* has followed on this point, directly or indirectly. See Khalkokondyles, 1.2.26 (pp. 130, 131): οὗτος [sc. ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος] ἐγγυᾶται τὴν θυγατέρα τῶν Ἑλλήνων βασιλεῖ, ὥστε ἐμπεδοῦναι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὅσα συνέθεντο ἐς τὴν ἀπόστασιν.
- 31 Manuel himself discussed this incident in his *Επιτάφιος*, the funeral speech that he composed in honor of his brother, Theodoros I; this literary lamentation apparently was not available to Khalkokondyles; had he known of it, he would have avoided the error in chronology. A translation of the pertinent passages can be found in *MP*, pp. 114–116; the Greek text of this speech can be found in *PkP* 3: 11–119; the same speech has been edited and translated by J. Chrysostomides, *Manuel II Palaeologus: Funeral Oration on His Brother Theodore: Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes* (Thessalonica, 1985). On Theodoros I, see *PLP* 9: no. 21460 (pp. 88, 89). For the oral delivery of this speech, see the letter by Isidore to Manuel II, in W. Regel, *Analecta Byzantino-Russica* (St. Petersburg, 1891), pp. 65–69, esp. p. 67. This Isidore may be the same person who went on to become a cardinal in the Catholic Church and was the pope's legate in Constantinople in 1453; see *PLP* 4: no. 8300 (pp. 130, 131). For an important addition to our understanding of this speech and its historical implications, especially the chronology, see C. G. Patrinelis and D. Z. Sofianos, *Manuel Chrysoloras and His Discourse Addressed to the Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus Μανουὴλ Χρυσολοῦρᾶ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Αὐτοκράτορα Μανουὴλ Β' Παλαιολόγο* (Athens, 2001). The importance of this text had already been noted by C. G. Patrinelis, "An Unknown Discourse of Chrysoloras Addressed to Manuel II Palaeologus," *GRBS* 13 (1972): 497–502. Other sources for this incident include the Slavic Chronicle by Constantine the Philosopher; cf. partial German translation in M. Braun, *Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarevics* (The Hague, 1956); S. Stanojevic, "Die Biographie Stefan Lazarevics von Konstantin dem Philosophen als Geschichtsquelle," *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 18 (1896): 420; and R.-J. Loenertz, "Une erreur singulière de Laonic Chalcocondyle: Le prétendu second mariage de Jean V Paléologue," *REB* 15 (1957): 176–184. All vassals summoned by Bayezid to Serres faced numerous charges brought against them by their own subjects (see Anastasijević, "Jedina vizantijska carica Srpknja," pp. 28, 29); the Palaeologi had been charged by Paul Mamonas with the unjust appropriation of his territories in the Morea; see Loenertz, "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse," pp. 175, 176; and *DGM*, pp. 125 ff. Scholars have questioned that this gathering took place at Serres and have suggested Verroia instead; see, e.g., H. Inalcik, "The Ottoman Turks and the Crusaders, 1329–1451," in H. Hazard and N. Zacour, eds., *A History of the Crusades 6: The Impact of the Crusades on Europe* (Madison, 1989), p. 294; and S. W. Reinert, "Manuel II Palaeologos and his Müdderis," in S. Ćurčić and D. Mouriki, eds., *The Twilight of Byzantium: Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire* [Papers from the Colloquium held at Princeton University 8–9 May 1989] (Princeton, 1991), p. 47. Khalkokondyles, 1.2.27 (pp. 132, 133), further adds that Bayezid's original intention was to murder Manuel II, but Ali, the eunuch son of the general Hayr ad-Din, delayed the implementation of the plan long enough for the sultan to change his mind; see F. Taeschner and P. Wittek, "Die Vezirfamilie der Gandarlyzade (14/15. Jhdt.) und ihre Denkmäler," *Der Islam* 18 (1929): 60–115, esp.

- pp. 68 ff. Manuel in his *Ἐπιτάφιος* is explicit as to the emir's intentions, *PkP* 3: 54, 55: οὕτω τοιγαροῦν διακείμενος, βούλευμα δέχεται οὐκ ἔρῳ γε ὑπὸ τίνων, ἔστω δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δαίμονος, ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ἔφερεν ἀποκτείνει μὲν ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πᾶσαν οἰκίαν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ τοὺς τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἄρχοντας. On the genre of the *ἐπιτάφιος*, see Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur*, pp. 142–145.
- 32 The wedding of Manuel to Helena need not imply a formal alliance between Serbia and Constantinople. Manuel says nothing about a pact (or about marriage negotiations) in his speech. For an exploration of Manuel's own views on marriage, as expressed in his own writings, see S. W. Reinert, "Political Dimensions of Manuel II Palaiologos' 1392 Marriage and Coronation," in C. Sode and C. Tacács, eds., *Novum Millennium: Studies on Byzantine History and Culture Dedicated to Paul Speck, 19 December 1999* (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 291–303.
- 33 One may conclude that by the middle of the *quattrocento* the writings of Manuel II were not widely known and the early correspondence of Isidore had not been disseminated as of this time; clearly, Khalkokondyles failed to consult them in the compilation of his history.
- 34 *Minus*, 33.3.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 13.4: καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν ὀρίζει ὁ ἅγιος βασιλεὺς . . . δὸς πρὸς τὸν Σφραντζῆν τὸ καβάδι, τὸν μολυβὸν χαμουχᾶν, τὸν μετὰ βαρεοκοιλίας ἐνδεδυμένον καὶ ἄς ἔχη καὶ τὸ σεντοῦκιν, ὅπερ μοι ἐζήτησεν . . . καὶ εἶχον αὐτὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀγίας εὐχῆς ἐκείνου γεμάτον ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν χρησίμων καὶ τιμίων τοῦ βίου τούτου τοῦ ματαίου. ἡ δὲ ἀγία δέσποινα ὀρίζει καὶ φέρουσί με χαμουχᾶν καλὸν προὔσινον.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 13.3: ἀνεφερον ὅτι ζητῶ εὐεργεσίαν, ἐπεὶ χαριέντα μέλλει ἀναφέρειν, ἐκεῖσε καὶ τῆς ἀγίας δεσποίνης καθεζομένης καὶ τῆς νύμφης αὐτῆς, τοῦ δεσπότητος λείποντος εἰς τὸ κνηγίον.
- 37 E.g.: Δραγάσις, Δράγασις, Δραγάσης, Δράγασης, Δραγάτις, Δραγάτης, Δράγαζης, κτλ.
- 38 For her official signature, see *infra*, n. 42.
- 39 *MP*, Appendix 15, pp. 494–497. *VeG*, no. 84 (pp. 55, 56), lists only one "uneheliche" daughter, Isabella or Zabia (Zampia); on Isabella, see *PLP* 9: no. 21374 (p. 70).
- 40 Hilario Doria, as an intermediary between the pope and the emperor, assisted Manuel in his efforts to win aid for Constantinople in 1399; see *RKOR*, no. 3270 (p. 85); and *MP*, pp. 158, 159. On October 30, 1418, Doria witnessed the renewal of a treaty between Venice and Constantinople; in this document Manuel refers to him as his beloved son-in-law; cf. *RKOR*, no. 3373 (p. 105), and *MP*, p. 332, n. 61. Isabella and Doria's daughter eventually became a pawn in the court's diplomacy; see *EX*, 4: ὁ γὰρ βασιλεὺς κύρις Μανουὴλ ἔχων θυγατέρα ἐκ πορνείας ὀνόματι Ζαμπία Παλαιολογίνα δέδωκεν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸν Τόριαν τὴν θυγατέρα δὲ αὐτῆς πάλιν δέδωκεν τῷ σουλτάν Μουσταφᾷ εἰς γυναῖκα ὀνομάσαντες αὐτὴν Κυρὰν τῆς ἀνατολῆς κενῷ ὀνόματι. In later years Doria seems to have been attached to Demetrios Palaeologus; see *Minus*, 12.2; for discussion, see *MP*, p. 370, n. 125.
- 41 John VIII is portrayed with a *nimbus* and is designated βασιλεὺς in the caption; he must have been crowned co-emperor before the execution of the *codex* (about 1404); see I. Spatharakis, *The Portrait in Byzantine Illuminated Manuscripts* (Leiden, 1976), pp. 139–144, esp. p. 141, n. 167. For a color picture, see *Byzantium: Faith and Power*, fig. 2.5.
- 42 Ἐλένη ἐν Χ<ριστ>ῷ τῷ θε<ε>ῷ πιστῇ Αὐγόουστα καὶ Αὐτοκρατόρι<σ>α Ρωμαίων ἡ Παλαιολογίνα.
- 43 H. Omont, "Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs conservés dans la bibliothèque de Paris autres que la Bibliothèque Nationale," *Bulletin de la société de l'Île-de-France* 10 (1883): 118–125, esp. 124, no. 54. A black-and-white photograph of this miniature can be found in *MP*, p. 101; discussion in *MP*, Appendix 14, pp. 532, 533. Detailed analysis in Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, pp. 139–144; and J. Lowden, "The Luxury Book as Diplomatic Gift," in J. Shepard and S. Franklin, eds., *Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the 24th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies Cambridge 1990* (Aldershot,

- 1992), pp. 249–260, who disagrees with Spatharakis on certain points. The text of this *codex* dates back to the fourteenth century, while the miniature was executed sometime between 1403 and 1407. On the actual text, its copyist, and its date, see E. Lamberz, “Das Geschenk des Kaisers Manuel II. An das Kloster Saint-Denis und der ‘Metochitesschreiber’ Michael Klostomalles,” in B. Borkopp and T. Steppan, eds., *Λιθόστρωτον: Studien zur byzantinischen Kunst und Geschichte. Festschrift für Marcel Restle* (Stuttgart, 2000), pp. 155–165. The manuscript was brought to Paris by Manuel Chrysoloras, who wrote, on fol. 237^v, the following note (in his own orthography): τὸ παρὸν βιβλίον, ἀπεστάλη παρὰ τοῦ ὑψηλοτάτου βασιλέως καὶ ἢ αὐτοκράτορος ῥωμαίων κυροῦ μανουήλ τοῦ παλαιολόγου εἰς τὸ μοῖναστῆριον τοῦ ἁγίου Διονυσίου τοῦ ἐν παρυῶν τῆς φραγγίας ἢ γαλατίας ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κωνσταντινουπόλεως δι’ ἑμοῦ μανουήλ τοῦ χρυσολοῦρα, πεμῖ|φθέντος πρέσβεως παρὰ τοῦ εἰρημένου βασιλέως, ἔτη ἀπὸ κτίσεως ἢ κόσμου, ἐξάκτιχλίωστῶ ἔννεακοσιοστῶ ἑξκαιδεκάτῳ ἀπὸ σαρκώσεως δὲ ἢ τοῦ κυρίου χλίωστῶ τετρακοσιοστῶ ὀδόω. – ὅς τις εἰρημένος βασιλεὺς ἤλθε πρότερον εἰς τὸ Παρῦσιον πρὸ ἐτῶν τεσσάρων. A high-quality color photograph of this magnificent miniature appears in *Χεῖρ Ἀγγέλων: Ἐνας Ζωγράφος Εἰκόνων στὴ Βενετοκρατομένη Κρήτη*, ed. M. Vassilaki (Athens, 2010), Cat. No. 1 (p. 69). An imaginary portrait of Helena, in the company of Constantine XI, was executed by the Cretan miniaturist and painter George Klontzas, at the end of the sixteenth century; see A. D. Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας (1540 ci.-1608) καὶ αἱ Μικρογραφίαι τοῦ Κώδικος Αὐτοῦ* (Athens, 1977), pl. 180 (fol. 85^v); a detail of this miniature is further reproduced in Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, as pl. 13. Moreover, Klontzas also portrayed Helena lying in state in her funeral; see Paliouras, pl. 182 (fol. 85^v).
- 44 R.-J. Loenertz, ed., “Chronicon breve de Graecorum imperatoribus, ab anno 1342 ad annum 1453 e codice Vaticano graeco 162,” *EEBS* 28 (1958): 204, 205 [= *CBB* 1: 22.23 (p. 183)]: βασιλεύει κῦρ Μανουήλ ὁ Παλαιολόγος. οὗτος πολὺν χρόνον βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τέθνηκεν ἐτῶν ρε’ (!). οὗτος μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς κυρᾶς Ἑλένης τῆς Σέρβας, τῆς μονοφθάλμου, τῆς φύσει φρονίμου, γεννᾷ υἱοὺς ζ’: Ἰωάννην, Θεόδωρον, Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Δράγασιν, Δημήτριον, Θωμᾶν καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν λωβόν.
- 45 Most of the information supplied in our sources is confusing and confused. Doukas, 14.5, mentions that in 1399 John VIII was an infant. Ruy González de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlan: Estudio y edición de un manuscrito del siglo XV* [Nueva Colección de libros raros o curiosas 1], ed. F. López Estrada (Madrid, 1943) [English translation: G. Le Strange, *Clavijo: Embassy to Tamerlane, 1403–1406* (London, 1928), pp. 34, 35], who saw John VIII in 1403, seems to have underestimated his age. *VeG*, no. 90 (p. 59), states: “Er ist geboren um das Jahr 1394 – seine Eltern heirateten sich im Jahre 1393.” *VeG* thus seems to believe wrongly that the marriage of Manuel to Helena took place in 1393; the fact is that the wedding took place in 1392; J. Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus: A Character Study,” in *Silloge Bizantina’ in onore di S. G. Mercati* (Rome, 1957), pp. 152–170 [= J. Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964), p. 105, n. 1], claims that Lampros, *PkP* 3: λς’, estimates that John VIII was born as late as 1397; but Lampros makes no such statement in the publication cited. For an overview, see P. Schreiner, “Chronologische Untersuchungen zur Familie Kaiser Manuels II,” *BZ* 63 (1970): 288–290, who concludes that John VIII was born on December 18, 1392.
- 46 Doukas, 14.5: ἐλθὼν [sc. ὁ Μανουήλ] δὲ ἐν τοῖς παραλίοις τοῦ Πέλοπος ἀφῆκεν τὴν δέσποιναν σὺν τοῖς τέκνοις ἐκεῖ εἶχε γὰρ τὸν Ἰωάννην βρέφος καὶ τὸν Θεόδωρον νήπιον.
- 47 M. Gedeon, *Πατριαρχικοί Πίνακες: Εἰδήσεις Ἱστορικά Βιογραφικά περὶ τῶν Πατριαρχῶν Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἀπὸ Ἀνδρέου τοῦ Πρωτοκλήτου μέχρις Ἰωακείμ Γ’ τοῦ ἀπὸ Θεσσαλονίκης* (Constantinople, 1890), p. 382 [= *CBB* 1: 10.10 (p. 104)]: τῇ ιη^α τοῦ Νοεμβρίου μηνός, τοῦ ἁγίου μεγαλομάρτυρος Σεβαστιανοῦ, ἐγεννήθη ὁ εὐτυχέστατος βασιλεὺς καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κυροῦ Μανουήλ. Cf. *MP*, p. 104, n. 28.

- 48 *Minus*, 28.7. A short chronicle, however, dates the death of John VIII on November 1 and not on October 31; see *CBB* 1: 62.7 (p. 462): νοεμβρίω α΄, ἀπέθανεν βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης. Moreover, Sphrantzes (*Minus*, 28.7) states that John died αὐτοκρατορήσας χρόνους κγ΄ καὶ μῆνας γ΄ καὶ ἡμέρας ι΄. The anonymous chronicle agrees with a change on the number of days: βασιλεύσας χρόνους κγ΄, μῆνας γ΄, ἡμέρας ιβ΄. Another note, by the hand of Demetrios Laskaris Leontaris gives yet another date for the death of John VIII; see *CBB* 1: 98B.2 (pp. 646, 647): ἦν δὲ ὅτε ἀπέτισε τὸ χρεῶν τρέχον ἔτος .ςζανζ΄, ἰνδικτιῶνος ιβ΄, μηνὶ νοεμβρίῳ, ὥρα ι΄ τῆς ἡμέρας.
- 49 On these events, see J. W. Barker, “John VII in Genoa: A Problem in Byzantine Source Confusion,” *OCP* 28 (1962): 213–238, esp. 216–223, who casts doubt on the authenticity of the documents cited in *RKOR* under no. 3235 (p. 80) and no. 3236 (p. 80). Also see *MP*, p. 111.
- 50 Khalkokondyles, 1.2.27 (pp. 130–133); *BCIII*, 2.18. The *BCIII* maintains that Manuel II was warned by Ali, Bayezid’s official envoy to Constantinople, about the emir’s murderous intentions. Ali urged Manuel not to return to the Porte. The same chronicle attributes Bayezid’s subsequent campaign in Thessaly and the Morea to the fact that Manuel refused to attend his overlord in person.
- 51 *BCIII*, 2.19.
- 52 *PkP* 3: 56: οὕτω τοίνυν διαθέσεως ἔχων, διέρχεται μὲν Μακεδονίαν, διέρχεται δὲ Θετταλίαν, καταλαμβάνει δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα. αὐτοῦ δὲ αὖ στρατοπεδευσάμενος καὶ διατριῖναι βεβουλευμένος, ἄτε τὸν γῶρον εὐβοτον θεασάμενος, καὶ πρὸς θήραν ἀγαθόν, τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδεια τῶ στρατῶ παρέχειν ἀφθόνως δυνάμενον . . . πέμψας οὖν ἓνα δῆμιον, πολὺ παρενεγκότα τοὺς ἄλλους θηριωδία τε καὶ ὠμότητι Ὀμούρης τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῶ αἰτεῖ τὸ Ἄργος παρ’ αὐτοῦ [*sc.* Θεοδώρου] συνάμα πλείοσι ἄλλοις.
- 53 *LCB*, p. 317; and *DGM* 1: 155, 156.
- 54 D. M. Nicol, *Meteora: The Rock Monasteries of Thessaly* (London, 1963).
- 55 *PaL* 1: 342.
- 56 *MP*, Appendix X: “The Beginning and Duration of Bayazid’s Siege of Constantinople,” pp. 479–482; P. Gautier, “Action de graces de Démétrius Chrysoloras,” *REB* 19 (1961): 347, has demonstrated that the capital was already under siege by 1394; *FC*, pp. 39, 40, cites the year 1396 for the beginning of the siege; and D. Stacton, *The World on the Last Day: The Sack of Constantinople by the Turks May 29, 1453, Its Causes and Consequences* (London, 1965), p. 114, cites the year 1397 (after the battle of Nicopolis). *MP*, p. 481, concludes that the blockade began early in the summer of 1394. The period 1394–1402 for the duration of the blockade has been accepted by D. Bernicolas-Hatzopoulos, “Le premier siège de Constantinople par les Ottomans (1394–1402)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal, Montréal, 1980); *idem*, “The First Siege of Constantinople by the Ottomans (1394–1402) and Its Repercussions on the Civilian Population of the City,” *BSEB* 10 (1983): 39–51; and *idem*, *Πρώτη Πολιορκία τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἀπὸ τοὺς Ὀθωμανοῦς (1304–1402)* (Athens, *sine anno*).
- 57 *CBB* 1: 22.26 (p. 184): Παϊαζίτης ὁ σουλτάν, ὁ λεγόμενος Ἥλταρίμ, οἶον ἀστραπή, κυριεύσας καὶ πορθήσας κόσμους ἀπέκλεισε καὶ τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν χρόνους θ΄, ὡς γενέσθαι τὸ μουζούρι, τὸ σιτάρι, ἄσπρα ρ΄, καὶ οὐχ εὐρίσκετο. Another entry may be alluding to a skirmish outside (*CBB* 1: 70.8 [p. 544]): ἐπολέμησε τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν ὁ σουλτάν Παγιαζίτης . . . καὶ ἐχάλασεν ὅλα τὰ ἔξω κτίσματα, περιβόλια καὶ δένδρη.
- 58 *CBB* 1: 12.6 (p. 111): καὶ ἤρξατο ἔτει .ςζγ΄ τοῦ πολιορκεῖν καὶ μάχεσθαι τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν Παγιαζίτῃ χρόνους ἐπτά. For this siege, cf. *MP*, ch. 3; *LCB*, pp. 314, 315; Bernicolas-Hadjopoulos, “The First Siege”; and M. C. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia, 1992), pp. 110–113.
- 59 *RdD* 1: 851, 860, 868, and 892; *RKOR*, 3246a (p. 82), 3248 (p. 82); and O. Halecki, “Rome et Byzance au temps du Grand Schisme d’Occident,” *Collectanea Theologica*

- 18 (1937): 477–532, esp. 496, 497. On Manuel's plans to abandon his capital, see *MP*, pp. 124, 125.
- 60 On the crusade of Nicopolis and its effects on Constantinople, see A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938), pp. 435–462; *idem*, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934), esp. chs. 4–6; R. Rosetti, "Note on the Battle of Nicopolis," *The Slavonic Review* 15 (1936/37): 629–638; H. L. Savage, "Enguerrand de Coucy VII and the Campaign of Nicopolis," *Speculum* 14 (1939): 423–442; C. L. Tipton, "The English at Nicopolis," *Speculum* 37 (1962): 528–540; *PaL* 1: 341–369; *MP*, pp. 128–138; *LCB*, p. 319; D. J. Geanakoplos, "Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453," in H. W. Hazard, ed., *A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (gen. ed.: K. M. Setton) (Madison, 1975), ch. 3, esp. pp. 81–85; and the last three chapters of B. W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century* (New York, 1978). In the corpus of the short chronicles this campaign and battle receive one brief entry, *CBB* 3: 71a.9 (p. 159): ὄταν ἐτζάκισαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὸν Συμιχᾶμ κρᾶλην εἰς τὴν Νικόπολιν ἔτους ۷۳۸ḁ.
- 61 Contrary to what is often stated, that the objective of this campaign was to save Constantinople, *PaL* 1: 342 ff., and Geanakoplos, "Byzantium and the Crusades," pp. 81 ff., have demonstrated that the primary goal was the defense of the northern Balkans and of Hungary; the relief of Constantinople was a secondary goal of this campaign. See J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge, 1992), p. 217.
- 62 The slaughter of western prisoners is well documented: about 3,000 individuals were massacred. Years after the event Sigismund spoke of it in one of his letters; see *PaL* 1: 355–369. Bayezid's most notable prisoners were spared, on account of the high ransom that they would fetch.
- 63 *MP*, pp. 138–141; and *LCB*, p. 319.
- 64 Letter 31 in Dennis, *The Letters of Manuel II*, pp. 80–86 (also translated in *MP*, pp. 133–137). Sigismund, who escaped from the battlefield, reached Constantinople and conferred with Manuel. While in the capital, Sigismund wrote another important letter; for text and translation, see *MP*, Appendix 11, pp. 482–485.
- 65 *DGM* 1: pp. 156, 157; P. Topping, "The Morea, 1364–1460," *A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Madison, 1975), p. 159; and Loenertz, "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse," p. 155.
- 66 *PaL* 1: ch. 15; and *MP*, pp. 166 ff. A contemporary biography is included in the *Livre des faits du bon messire Jean le Maingre, dit Boucicaut, Maréchal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*, ed. J. Buchon, in J. de Froissart, *Les Chroniques*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1835), pp. xxx ff., and pp. 563–603. For a reconstruction of his suit of armor, see C. Rothero, *Medieval Military Dress 1066–1500* (Dorset, 1983), pl. 74. Boucicaut's force numbered up to twelve hundred men at arms and just about one thousand archers; see Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 111.
- 67 G. Schlumberger, "Jean de Chateaumorand, un de principaux héros française des arrières-croisades en Orient à la fin du XIV^e et à l'aurore du XV^e," in *Byzance et Croisades: Pages médiévales* (Paris, 1927), pp. 282–336; *MP*, pp. 200 ff.; and *PaL* 1: 337 ff.
- 68 The emperor's journey to the west has been studied in detail. See, among others, D. M. Nicol, "A Byzantine Emperor in England: Manuel II's Visit to London in 1400–1401," *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* 12 (1971): 104–225; *MP*, pp. 167–199; *FC*, p. 13 (with criticism in *MP*, p. 166, n. 75); D. S. Cirac Estopañan, *Bizancio y España. La Union, Manuel Paléologo y sus recuerdos en España* (Barcelona, 1953), pp. 52–66; G. Schlumberger, "Un Empereur de Byzance à Paris et à Londres," pp. 87–147; A. A. Vasiliev, "Путешествие Византийского Императора Мануила Палеолога по Западной Европе (1399–1403 г.)," *Журнал Министерства Народного Просвещения*, n.s. 39 (1912): 41–78, 260–304; and Berger de Xivrey, "Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue," *Mémoires de l'Institut de France: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* 19.1 (1853): 1–201.

- 69 *Livre des faits*, pp. xxxiii, xxxiv, 607; *MP*, pp. 200, 207, and 219 (with n. 28). Earlier John VII may have attempted to sell his rights to the throne of Constantinople to Charles VI of France; see *RKOR*: no. 3194 (p. 74); P. Wirth, “Zum Geschichtsbild Kaiser Johannes VII. Palaiologos,” *Byz* 35 (1965): 592–594; and *PLP* 9: no. 21480 (pp. 92, 93).
- 70 *CBB* 1: 35.4 (p. 285): ἐν ἔτει ζαη´, ἰνδικτιῶνος η´, μηνὶ δεκεμβρίῳ δ´, ἦλθεν ὁ μακαρίτης βασιλεὺς, ὁ κῦρ Ἰωάννης, ὁ υἱὸς κυροῦ Ἀνδρονικοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως, ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει εἰρηνικῶς προγεγονότων ὄρκων μετὰ συμφωνιῶν. *CBB* 1: 35.5 (p. 285): τῇ δεκάτῃ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς δεκεμβρίου ἐξῆλθεν ὁ βασιλεὺς κῦρ Μανουὴλ ἀναβάς εἰς τὰ κάτεργα τῶν Βενετικῶν καὶ ἀπεδήμησεν εἰς τὴν Φραγγίαν ἕνεκεν βοηθείας τῆς εἰρημένης Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ τῶν ἀνατολικῶν μερῶν. *CBB* 1: 22.27 (p. 184): ὁ οὖν βασιλεὺς ἀπορήσας, λαβὼν τὴν δέσποιναν καὶ μέρος τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμβάς εἰς τριήρας ἐπὶ Φραγγίαν ἐπορεύθη <μη> τοῦ ἐνωθῆναι, μόνον βοηθῆναι τὴν Πόλιν, καταλείψας τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν Πόλιν βασιλεύειν, τὸν κῦρ Ἀνδρόνικον [*sic*]. On these entries see S. P. Lampros, “Χρονικὸν Σημείωμα περὶ Ἰωάννου Ζ´ καὶ Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγου,” *NH* 6 (1909): 483–485. John VII may have also been known as Andronikos; see Zachariadou, “John VII (alias Andronicus) Palaeologus.” It has been argued that John VII had a son who was also called Andronikos; see G. T. Dennis, “An Unknown Byzantine Emperor, Andronicus V Palaeologus (1400–1407?),” *JōBG* 9 (1960): 157–187 [= *Byzantium*, Essay 2].
- 71 *RKOR*: 3279 (p. 86); *RdD* 2: 978 (p. 10); and *NE* 1: 96–99.
- 72 *Ἐπιτάριος*, *PkP* 3: 68, 69: ὁ δ´ οὖν ἀδελφὸς κὰν τούτῳ πολὺ βληθείς, τῷ μεταβῆναι με λέγω, ἠθύμει μᾶλλον ἢ πρόσθεν ἦν γὰρ ἄντικρυς αὐτῷ ὡσπερ ὄρφανία τὸ πρᾶγμα. μακρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ ἀπόπλους, μακροτέρα δὲ πολλῶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἡπειρον ἀποδημία, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἦν ἐν ἀδήλω τὸ καθ´ ἡμᾶς, ὡς καὶ τὸ μετὰ μακρὸν τε χρόνον ἐπανελθεῖν εὐκτόν γε δῆπουθεν εἶναι.
- 73 Manuel II seems to have come to this realization by the fall of 1401, as it is reflected his own correspondence; cf. *MP*, p. 189–191; and Dennis, *The Letters of Manuel II*, Letter 42 (pp. 110–112). For Manuel’s efforts to keep the west interested in the plight of his realm through the distribution of sacred relics, cf. *RKOR*: 3290 (p. 89); D. S. Cirac Estopañan, “Ein Chrysobullos des Kaiser Manuel II. Palaiologos für den Gegenpapst Benedikt XIII. vom 20 Juni 1402,” *BZ* 44 (1951): 89–93; and G. T. Dennis, “Official Documents of Manuel II Palaeologus,” *Byz* 41 (1971): nos. 11 and 12 [= *Byzantium*, Essay 9].
- 74 On Timur-i-lenk and Bayezid, cf. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, esp. pp. 243–254; Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, ch. 7; G. Roloff, “Die Schlacht bei Angora,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 161 (1940): 244–262. On the Mongols, in general, see R. Grousset, *L’Empire de steppes: Attila, Gengis Khan, Tamerlan* (Paris, 1939), esp. pp. 528–533; D. Morgan, *The Mongols* (London, 1987); M.-M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La Campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)* (rev. ed.: London, 1977); H. Hookham, *Tamburlaine the Conqueror* (London, 1962); and B. F. Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* [Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization] (Cambridge, 1989). Eastern and Greek sources are listed in *MP*, p. 216, n. 20, and in *PaL* 1: 376.
- 75 Khalkokondyles’ narrative indicates that the loss of Sebasteia and the execution of Bayezid’s son were a major source of grief, 1.3.47 (pp. 240, 241): Παῖταζήτης δὲ ὡς ἐπῆθετο ἕκαστα μετ’ οὐ πολὺ, ἅτε διῆ ἡ πόλις ἀλοῦσα διεφθάρη, καὶ ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ μετ’ οὐ πολὺ ἤγγελλτο τελευτῆσαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Τεμήρεω, ξυμφορὰ τε ἐχρήτο ὡς μάλιστα καὶ ἐν πένθει ἦν. διαβάς τε γὰρ διῆ ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὡς βοσκόν τινα ἐωράκει ἀλλοῦντα, λέγεται διῆ εἰπεῖν, ἐπιδηλώσαντα τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἦν, “αὐλεὶ διῆ ὠδὴν, οὔτε Σεβάστειαν ἀπάλεσεν, οὔτε παῖδα.” Doukas, only records the fall of Sebasteia, 15.5: ἦν γὰρ τῷ προλαβόντι χρόνῳ λαβὼν τὴν τῆς Καππαδοκίας Μεγάλην Σεβάστειαν. This city was taken by storm in August 1400; see Hookham, *Tamburlaine the Conqueror*, pp. 220, 221. The Ottoman relief column, under the orders of Suleyman Çelebi, arrived too late to offer any assistance.

- 76 *CBB* 1: 12.7 (p. 111): τῷ δὲ ζαζ' ἔτει ἀναμαθῶν τὰ ἐκείνου Ταμύρης ὁ Περσῶν ἀρχηγὸς ἐξελθὼν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τόπου Σεμαρχάνιν καλούμενον, ἐλθὼν ἐπιπεσῶν παρέλαβε τὴν Σεβάστειαν νόμῳ πολέμου σφάξας τὸν ἐκεῖσε λαόν. ἐν ᾧ τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ἐκεῖσε ἀποτιμηθέντων συνάξας ἔκτισεν πύργους τρεῖς, φόβον μέγαν ποιήσας ἅπασιν τοῖς θεωροῦσι. *CBB* 1: 22.29 (p. 184), has conflated the Timur's earlier conquest of Sebasteia and the battle of Ankara, with wrong dates: ἐλθὼν δὲ ὁ Περσαρχηγὸς μετὰ δυνάμειος συνάπτει πόλεμον μετὰ τοῦ Παγιαζήτου καὶ νικᾷ αὐτὸν ἐν Σεβάστεια τῇ μεγάλῃ καὶ λαμβάνει τὸν Παϊαζήτην ζῶντα καὶ λαμβάνει τὴν Ἀνατολὴν καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζει αὐτὴν ἐν ἔτει ζαδ', ἰνδικτιῶνος δ', μηνὶ δεκεμβρίῳ ζ', ἡμέρᾳ παρασκευῇ.
- 77 S. J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (Cambridge, 1976), p. 35; he also supplies (p. 307) Turkish scholarship on this subject. The battle was fought on July 27/28, 1402, the Mongol "Year of the Horse," and lasted fourteen hours. The most readable account of it is provided in Hookham, *Tamburlaine the Conqueror*, ch. 14. Also see K.-P. Matschke, *Die Schlacht bei Ankara und das Schicksal von Byzanz; Studien zur spätbyzantinischen Geschichte zwischen 1492 und 1422* (Weimar, 1981).
- 78 *CBB* 1: 12.10 (p. 111): τῷ δὲ ἔτει ζαί' ἔτει, ἰνδικτιῶνος ι', πολέμου συγκροτηθέντος μεγάλου ἐν τῇ Ἀγκύρᾳ τῇ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐπαρχίᾳ, μισθηθεὶς ὑπὸ παντός ἔθνους αὐτοῦ Παγιαζήτ' ὁ τῶν Ἰσμηλιτῶν ἀρχηγὸς καὶ ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ἐν μηνὶ ἰουλίῳ κζ' κατεκυριεύθη ὑπὸ Ταμίρη τοῦ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Σκυθῶν ἀρχηγοῦ.
- 79 *CBB* 1: 7.25 (p. 70): κατὰ δὲ τὸ ζαγ' ἔτος, μηνὶ ἰουνίῳ, ἐκίνησε κατ' αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀσεβῆς τῶν Τούρκων, ὁ προρρηθεὶς Παγιαζίτης, μάχην βαρυτάτην, ἣν καὶ ἐκράτησεν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπὶ χρόνοις ἡγῆιστα ἡ' ἔως ἐλθὼν ὁ Τεμίρπεης ἐξ ἀνατολῶν, Περσῶν σατράπης μέγας, ἐτροπώσατο αὐτόν, λαβὼν αἰχμάλωτον καὶ πάντα τὸν ἐν Ἀνατολῇ τόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ λεηλατήσας καὶ ἐρημώσας, μηνὶ αὐγούστῳ, ἰνδικτιῶνος ι', ἀποδημοῦντος ἐν τοῖς τῆς Δύσεως μέρεσι τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς βασιλέως κυροῦ Μανουήλ. Numerous entries in short chronicles: *CBB* 1: 29.4 (p. 214); 36.11 (p. 292); 38.5 (p. 304); 42.3 (p. 321); 49.10 (p. 352); 53.9 (p. 380); 54.9 (p. 389); 69.60 (p. 538); 75.1 (p. 570); 94A.2 (p. 630); 95.1 (p. 634); and 114.2 (p. 683). *CBB* 1: 49.10 (p. 352), bears the evident stamp of an eyewitness, who must have seen survivors and refugees pouring into Constantinople: ἐν ἔτει ζαί' μηνὶ ἰουλίῳ κη' ἡμέρᾳ ζ' ἐνίκησεν ὁ Τουμουρλὰς τὸν ἀμηνᾶν κατὰ κράτος καὶ εἶλεν αὐτοῦ τὰς πόλεις καὶ χώρας καὶ λεηλάτησεν αὐτάς, ὅτε καὶ ἐγὼ ὁ Διονύσιος εὐρέθην τηνικαῦτα ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει, καὶ εἶδον θέαμα ξένον, ὅπως ἅπαν γένος καὶ ἔθνος καὶ γλῶσσα ἔθρασεν φυγὰς ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει. τότε γάρ καὶ γέγονεν σεισμός ἐκεῖσε μέγας, καὶ κεραυνὸς ἔπεσεν ἐν τῇ ἱερᾷ μονῇ τῆς Περιβλέπτου, καὶ ἔκαυσεν ἐκεῖ εἰκόνας καὶ ποδέας καὶ ἄλλα τινά, καὶ ἐκ τῶν μοναχῶν περικεφαλαίας ἦγον καμηλαῦχα. *CBB* 1: 72a.13 (p. 562), is under the wrong impression that Bayezid was executed immediately after the battle of Ankara: καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Μηρχᾶν μπέης τὸν ἐπίασεν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸν ἔσφαξεν εἰς τὸν λαϊμὸν ὡσπερ κριάριον. For accounts by some historians, see Doukas, 93.1–105.15; Khalkokondyles, 1.3.55–61 (pp. 152–161); and *BCIII*, 2.26–37.
- 80 So aptly termed in *MP*, ch. 4. This period lasted fourteen years, 1399 (the initial campaign of Timur) until 1413 (the ascension of Mehmed I). Cf. *MP*, ch. 4; Shaw, *Empire of the Gazis*, pp. 35 ff.; and D. J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413* [The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage 38] (Leiden and Boston, 2007).
- 81 *BCIII*, 2.33: Bayezid is repeatedly ridiculed in the camp; 2.34: Bayezid is forced to witness the degradation of his beloved wife, Despoina, the daughter of his Serbian vassal, Stephen Lazarević; chained near Timur's table, he is struck with bones; 2.37: his neck is bound with a golden chain; and he is used as a stool for Timur to mount his horse. All these tales had spread by the second quarter of the sixteenth century and had received elaboration; see Spandugnino, pp. 147, 148. On the actual situation, see Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 182, 183, and 256. A great deal of Bayezid's "passion" belongs to romance and to the realm of legends, which enjoyed great popularity in Europe and culminated in an Elizabethan play, *Tamburlaine the*

- Great* by Christopher Marlowe and in an opera composed by Antonio Vivaldi. For the historical nucleus, see Hookham, chs. 14 and 15. The captive Bayezid summoned before Timur is the subject of a detailed miniature of a 1522 manuscript of the *Zafar-nama* by Sharaf al-din Yazdi; a color photograph of this miniature is provided, as the frontispiece, in Hookham. For the aftermath of the battle, see *LCB*, pp. 329, 330.
- 82 Bayezid died at Ak Şehir on March 9, 1403. His death may have been caused by apoplexy (Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 259) but suicide cannot be ruled out (*LCB*, p. 329). At least that is the story that Spandugino had heard, p. 148: *Et vedendo Ildrim Baiasit la maglie in tanto opprobrio et vergogna, dolendosi della perversa fortuna, et volendosi amazzar se stesso, et non travondo coltello o altro expediente, percosse tanto con la testa in quella gabbia che era di ferro che amazzò miserabilmente*. It remains a fact, however, that Timur sent his most competent physicians, including his own personal doctor, to attend the captive emir (Hookham, *Tamburlaine the Conqueror*, p. 273). Bayezid's remains were buried at Prousa with all honors. In addition, see *BCIII*, 2, n. 47. The subsequent campaign of Timur after Ankara is treated in *CBB* 1: 12.11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, 11e, and 11f. (pp. 112, 113). Years later Syropoulos recalled that Bayezid's death had been predicted by portents, 11.20: *κατὰ γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ μαθίου καὶ τοῦ ιουνίου ἐφαινόοντο δύο ἄστρα, ὀλίγον ἀλλήλων διστάμενα καὶ καπνὸν ἀποπέμποντα, τὸ μὲν μείζον καὶ πλείονα καπνὸν ἐκπέμπον, τὸ δὲ ἦττον καὶ ἦττον καπνὸν ἀποπέμπον ἀνεμνησκόμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου ἄστρου τοῦ καπνίζοντος ἐπὶ πλείστον πρὸ τῆς ἀλώσεως καὶ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Παγιαζίτου ἀμηνᾶ ὅπως προεδήλωσε τὸν θάνατον ἐκείνου, καὶ ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ταῦτα δηλωτικὰ εἰσι θανάτων εὐγενῶν*. As Syropoulos eventually concluded, the two "smoking stars" or comets were predicting the death of John VIII's beloved wife, Maria of Trebizond.
- 83 *CBB* 1: 12.11 (p. 113): ἐκέισε οὖν ὀδεύοντος Ταμύρη ἀπέπνευξεν ὡς κύων ὁ ἀνομώτατος καὶ θηρίων <αἰγιώτερος> Παγιαζήτ λυτρωθεῖσα ἡ Κωνσταντινούπολις τῆς παρανόμου καὶ κακίστης ἐπινοίας αὐτῶν, τῇ πρεσβείᾳ τῆς θεομήτορος. Also see *CBB* 1: 33.73 (p. 257); 34.54 (p. 281); 53.11 (p. 380); 54.10 (p. 389); and 97.1 (p. 639).
- 84 *CBB* 1: 22.28 (p. 184): οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Πόλει λιμοκτονηθέντες, ὁ λαὸς ἔφυγεν, ἔλαβον δὲ τὰς κλεῖδας τῆς Πόλεως τινὲς τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ ἐπορεύοντο ἐν τῷ Κοτυαεῖῳ πρὸς τὸν σουλτάνον – τοῦ παραδοθῆναι τὴν Πόλιν. The initial negotiations for the surrender may have begun as early as the summer of 1401; see *RKOR*: 3195 (p. 74); *MP*, pp. 200 ff., and p. 207 with n. 14.
- 85 Clavijo, p. 52.
- 86 *MP*, pp. 218–238; *LCB*, p. 335; and *PaL* 1: 377, 378. The Latin-Italian text of this treaty can be found in G. T. Dennis, "The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403," *OCP* 33 (1967): 72–88 [= *Byzantium*, Essay 6]. On Suleyman and his brothers, see E. Zachariadou, "Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili and the Ottoman Chronicles," *Der Islam* 60 (1982): 268–290; and D. J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid, passim* (with some departures from Zachariadou's views), who also discusses the treaty, pp. 51–58.
- 87 *MP*, ch. 4.
- 88 *Minus*, 3. An examination of the period from Ottoman chronicles and testimonies is provided in Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*.
- 89 *EX*, 2: ἦν δ' ὁ ἀνεμῖός αὐτοῦ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπιτηδεϊότατος καὶ εὐλαβής, ὃν καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἐπανελθεῖν βασιλέα ἐξ Ἰταλίας δέδωκεν αὐτῷ τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην ἣν γὰρ ἄκρος τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὡς καὶ ὁ τάφος αὐτοῦ νῦν ἰᾶται ἀσθeneίας παντοίας.
- 90 *Minus*, 2.2: καὶ τῷ ιγ^ο ἔτει μηνὶ Φεβρουαρίου η^η ἐγεννήθη αὐτῷ καὶ δεῦτερος Κωνσταντῖνος, ὃς ἐγενόνη καὶ βασιλεύς.
- 91 That Constantine XI was born under an unlucky star finds clear expression in an anonymous *Lamentation/Θρήνος* over the fall of Constantinople in É. Legrand, ed., *Bibliothèque grecque vulgaire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1880), pp. 46–51 (p. 112): ὃ Κωνσταντῖνε βασιλεῦ, κακὸν ρίζκὸν ὀποῦχες, / καὶ τύχην πάνυ βλαβερὴν, μοῖραν ἀτυχεστάτην, / καὶ σκοτεινὴν καὶ δολερὴν, ἀστραποκατέμην. / Νᾶχεν ἀστράψῃ ὁ οὐρανός, νᾶχε καὶ ἡ ὥρα, / ὅταν ἐσὺ βασιλευσας, ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν, / ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς ἐφάνηκεν ἡ δολερὴ σου τύχη. On editions of this poem, cf. *supra*, ch. 1 n. 12.

- 92 *Minus*, 3.1: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου υἱοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου τοῦ βασιλέως κύρ Μανουήλ, Κωνσταντίνου τὸν θάνατον ἐν τῇ Μονεμβασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ δύο θυγατέρων αὐτοῦ. Also cf. *VeG*, 84 (p. 55): “Aus dieser Ehe entsprossen . . . noch zwei Töchter und als ersten Sohn. Konstantinos, die aber alle im Kindesalter gestorben zu sein scheinen.” What the children of Manuel were doing in the Morea at this time is not known. It is possible that they had accompanied their father to the despotate in 1408. The emperor had traveled to the Morea after the death of his brother, Theodoros I; at this time, he composed his long *Ἐπιτάφιος* (*LCB*, p. 340). It is conceivable that his family had come with him and that Constantine the elder died at this time. Alternatively, it is possible that the imperial family had visited the Morea earlier, although we do not hear of such a journey in our sources. In 1408, it could be argued, the women and children of the imperial family had been sent for safety to the stronghold of Monemvasia. In the crowded conditions in this city the plague would have continued unabated and Constantine could have been one of its early victims.
- 93 This observation rings loudly time and again in the anonymous lamentation: Ὡ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, κακὸν ῥίζικὸν ὀποῦχες (cf. *supra*, n. 91). Comparable are the sentiments of Kritoboulos, who also passes a similar verdict on Constantine XI, 1.72.3: οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ κηδεμών, δυστυχῆς μέντοι γε παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ, κὰν τῷ τέλει δὲ δυστυχέστατος.
- 94 His name, of course, was taken as an omen that the empire would come to an end; see the opinion expressed in Nestor-Iskander’s narrative, 77 (pp. 86, 87): И тако диаговѣрный царь Ко[н]стянтинь за церкви божіа и за православную вѣру. . . и збытсья реченное: Ко[н]стянтиномъ създася и паки Ко[н]стянтиномъ и скончася. Cardinal Isidore, an eyewitness to the siege, who knew Constantine XI personally, also speaks of the same prophecy, see *CC* 1: 60: *quae* [*sc. Constantinopolis*] *sicut ab ipso Constantino, Elenae filio, fuit tunc fundata, ita nunc ab isto altero Constantino, alterius Elenae filio, miserabiliter est amissa*. This prophecy must have been in Klontzas’ mind when he depicted Constantine the Great and his mother next to Constantine XI and his mother in front of Constantinople in the miniature mentioned *supra*, nn. 41–43.
- 95 *Minus*, 2.2.
- 96 *Ibid.*, 35.10: ἦν δὲ ἡ πᾶσα ζωὴ αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ μακαρίτου βασιλέως καὶ μάρτυρος χρόνοι μθ’ καὶ μῆνες γ’ καὶ ἡμέραι κ’, ὧν ἦν βασιλεὺς χρόνους δ’, μῆνας δ’, καὶ ἡμέρας κδ’.
- 97 *Ibid.*, 28.7: καὶ τῇ λα^α τοῦ Ὀκτωβρίου μηνὸς τοῦ ν^ο^{ου} ἔτους ἀπέθανεν καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης ὑπάρχων νς’ καὶ μηνῶν ι’ καὶ ἡμερῶν ιε’. καὶ ἐτάρη τῇ α^α Νοεμβρίου εἰς τὴν μονὴν τοῦ Παντοκράτορος, αὐτοκρατορήσας χρόνους κγ’ καὶ μῆνας γ’ καὶ ἡμέρας ι’.
- 98 *Ibid.*, 35.6: ἐχούσης τῆς πόλεως, τῆς τοσαύτης εἰς μέγεθος, ἀνδρας πρὸς ἀντιπαράταξιν δψογ’ ἄνευ τῶν ξένων ὄντων σ^ο^{ων} ἢ μικρὸν τι πρὸς.
- 99 *Infra*, ch. 11, n. 54.
- 100 See, e.g., *CBB* 1: 9.54 (p. 100); 51.17 (p. 369); 63.8 (p. 474); 69.5 (p. 529); and 74.3 (p. 568).
- 101 *CBB* 1: Version A: 34.21 (p. 271): καὶ ἐσκοτώθη ὁ ἅγιος ἡμῶν αὐθέντης καὶ ἰσαπόστολος μάρτυς κύρ Κωνσταντίνος βασιλεὺς ὁ Παλαιολόγος. εἶχεν δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν χρόνους δ’, μῆνας γ’, ἡμέρας κδ’ ἢ δὲ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ χρόνους μθ’, μῆνας γ’, ἡμέρας <κ>α’. Version B: 34.2 (p. 272): ὁ μακαρίτης καὶ μάρτυρας κύρ Κωνσταντίνος ὁ Παλαιολόγος τὸν χρόνον τῆς ζωῆς αὐτοῦ μθ’, μῆνας ι’, ἡμέρας ιε’. Version C: 34.21 (p. 272): καὶ μάρτυς κύρ Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος ἦν μθ’ χρόνων, μηνῶν γ, ἡμερῶν <κ>α’.
- 102 *Minus*, 2.2.
- 103 S. P. Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρόλοις,” *NH* 4 (1907): 27, n. 1, accepts February 9, 1404; so does *VeG*, 95 (p. 62): “Er ist geboren am 9. Februar, 1404,” citing Pseudo-Sphrantzes and Lampros as evidence. Loenertz, “Une erreur singulière,” p. 182, accepts February 8, 1405 and is followed by *MP*, p. 495 and by Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, p. 143, n. 174. It becomes a matter of personal preference, as one may choose either of the two dates cited by the same source, since there is no other evidence. Head, *Imperial Twilight*, p. 145, leaves this matter

- vague but does seem to follow the old, although unreliable, work of C. Mijatovich, *Constantine Palaeologus: The Last Emperor of the Greeks 1448–1453: The Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks* (Chicago, 1968; repr.: 1892), which is generally inaccurate with regard to the family of Manuel II (see, e.g., valid criticism in *MP*, p. 495). Indirectly, however, in one passage, p. 145, Head seems to accept 1404 as the true date, as she states that John VIII was Constantine XI's senior by twelve years; since she accepts 1392 as the year of John VIII's birth (p. 105), she consequently assumes Constantine XI's year of birth to be 1404. Ultimately this date can be decided on no objective grounds. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 2, supplies the dogmatic date of 1405, without discussion.
- 104 According to Sphrantzes (*Minus*, 28.5), he died at Selybria in June of 1448; *VeG*, 91 (p. 60), states that he was one of the victims claimed by the plague. Also see *DGM* 1: 216 ff.
- 105 On the despotate of the Morea and its renaissance under Theodoros II (*PLP* 9: no. 21459 [p. 88]), cf. *DGM* 1: 165–204; S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980); *idem*, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1970); Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*; A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, pp. 126–135; and D. M. Nicol, *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium: The Birkbeck Lectures* (Cambridge, 1979), *passim*.
- 106 On the death of Theodoros I, cf. *VeG*, 85 (p. 56). Cf. the amusing, although highly inaccurate, version of these events supplied by the *BCIII*, 5.7.
- 107 Thessalonica was ceded to the Venetians and was not “sold,” despite the numerous assertions of various Greek chronicles and accounts. On Thessalonica under the imperial authority and under the Venetians, see J. R. Melville-Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Venetian Documents* [Archivio del Litorale Adriatico VII] (Padua, 2002).
- 108 *Minus*, 16.8.
- 109 Cyrillic text and another translation in Majeska, *Russian Travelers*, pp. 190–193. Majeska's n. 77 should be corrected: Demetrios did not flee to Italy after the conquest of the Morea by the Turks; he became a vassal of the sultan and died in Adrianople, not in Italy. Majeska has obviously confused Demetrios and his brother Thomas; it was the latter who fled to the west after the Turkish conquest of the Morea. Demetrios spent the last years of his life in Adrianople, as a dependent of the sultan; also cf. *VeG*, 93 (p. 61).

3 *Fortuna imperatrix mundi*

The young Turks

1 Hope and survival

The Mongol *deus ex machina* eliminated the threat posed by Bayezid, and the Constantinopolitans enjoyed a measure of stability, while the defeated emir's successors were too weak to create problems.¹ During the "Times of Trouble" contenders for the Ottoman throne eagerly courted Manuel's support and had to rely on the emperor's good will. Manuel then made a decision to fortify the Morea. Perhaps his visits to the peninsula before and after his journey to the west had convinced him that a secure base of operations had to be created. Even though the Morea had felt the wrath of the enemy in numerous raids, no permanent settlements had been created. The southern peninsula enjoyed the advantage of being distant from Adrianople. The emperor probably envisioned the Morea as a solid base from which a joint Greco-Latin offensive could be mounted against the Ottomans in the Balkans. That may have been one of the goals of Manuel's grand strategy, but reality was to dictate different terms and the Palaeologan family was eventually forced to reject all notions of cooperation with the Latins of the Morea. The aging Manuel formulated a policy that was accentuated by consolidation and reorganization.

One of the main pillars of Manuel's policy of centralization was the appointment of members of his immediate family to key positions: to the city of Thessalonica and to the lordship of Mistra. In 1407 Manuel's brother, Theodoros I, the despot of the Morea, died at Mistra:² "And the despot, who had been born-in-the purple, died on June 24, in the year 6915 [1407]." Venetian documents³ make it clear that Theodoros I, who had been ill for some time, died sometime between May and July of 1407. Earlier Manuel had sent his young son, Theodoros (II), to serve as an aide to his uncle, Theodoros I. A later author misinterprets Manuel's policy of centralization and develops his own simplistic interpretation of the causes of the fall of Constantinople, which he attributes to Manuel's policy of "dividing the empire":⁴

At this time the Roman Empire was in good condition. They say that the emperor had many sons, among whom he divided his realm, which thus passed into the control of many hands; had it not been apportioned, the empire would have been in good order, without civil wars. Because it had been divided, internal squabbles and quarrels arose among the heirs. He had six sons who became impoverished.

Many individuals of the diaspora must have shared his sentiments, as we encounter similar views in a sixteenth-century work by the Greco-Italian Spandugino.⁵

Manuel's son may have been sent to the Morea as early as 1405⁶ to be brought up under the tutelage of his uncle:⁷ "The emperor . . . sent his son Theodoros [II] to his brother Theodoros [I], who had been born-in-the purple, in order to make him, his son, the successor in the Peloponnesus [= Morea]. He received his brother's son, cared for him, and, when he died, he left him his lordship." Thus by 1407 Manuel had already completed the formulation of his policy and had embarked upon his mission of placing members of his immediate family into key positions, regardless of the age of the individuals involved.

A fictional letter within a satire speaks of Manuel's trip to the Morea, where he supervised the renovation of the fortifications of the Hexamilion at the Isthmus of Corinth and then examines Manuel's struggle against the local barons, whom he compelled to contribute funds and labor for the maintenance and defense of the Hexamilion and to accept Constantinople's control over the peninsula.⁸ Manuel also began negotiations with the *Serenissima*.⁹ On December 8, 1407, the Venetian senate considered the emperor's proposal to fortify the Hexamilion, the six-mile land stretch at the Isthmus of Corinth and block the only land route into the Morea. This Maginot line of the *quattrocento* provided, in theory at least, a much-applauded solution to Ottoman *razzias* into southern Greece. The *Serenissima* agreed to Manuel's terms as to the escort that he had requested for his journey to southern Greece. Manuel visited the Morea in the summer of 1408.¹⁰ This occasion seems to have been conflated in our sources with Manuel's extensive later tour, when he did supervise the renovation of the fortifications at the Hexamilion and waged a punitive campaign against the local barons.

In 1408 the emperor reviewed the situation in the Morea, paid attention to its restless barons, and demanded pledges of loyalty. Khalkokondyles brings into his narrative details that belong to Manuel's later visit.¹¹ The statement that Manuel placed under arrest the local barons clearly indicates that Khalkokondyles has confused this trip with Manuel's extensive stay of 1415. An excursion to the Isthmus of Corinth for surveying the terrain and inspecting the state of the existing walls for the future erection of the Hexamilion fortifications would not be out of order during the present trip, as seven years later Manuel carried out this project with extreme haste.

In September of 1408 John VII, Manuel's ex-regent and former rival for the throne of Constantinople, died in Thessalonica:¹² "In the year 6917 [1408], the second indiction, September 10, Emperor John passed away at Thessalonica; he was the son of Lord Andronikos and had received the monastic name Ioasaph." A member of the Leontaris family, who was keeping a diary centering on births and deaths of his own relatives, also took notice of this event:¹³ "In the year 6917 [1408], the first indiction, Anna Laskarina Leontarina, my daughter, was born, on November 21 . . . a Monday, after the death of our memorable emperor, who had taken monastic vows and had received the monastic name Joseph." Sphrantzes is very brief:¹⁴ "Our Emperor, Lord John [VII], passed away in Thessalonica. His uncle, our holy emperor Manuel, traveled to Thessalonica and appointed as its despot his son Andronikos."

Manuel hastened to Thessalonica and placed his third son, Andronikos, in charge. Thus, the sequence of events that had already taken place in the Morea was repeated in Macedonia. Given the very young age of Andronikos, this prince, like his brother in the Morea, must have been placed in charge only nominally. His appointment was intended to assert imperial authority. The actual administration of Thessalonica remained in the capable hands of John VII's associate, Demetrios Laskaris Leontaris, who continued to wield considerable power during the minority of the prince and was destined in the future to become a valuable member of the Constantinopolitan court.¹⁵ Thus Andronikos, like Theodoros II, came to rule as a surrogate for his father. The death of the despot of the Morea and the death of the troublesome John VII in Thessalonica enabled Manuel to realize his objectives. The remnants of his "empire" seemed to come under the direct control of Constantinople.

2 The green years

By 1409 Manuel was back in the capital.¹⁶ One year later Musa eliminated his brother Suleyman, by courting the support of *gazi* elements, of raiders (*akıncı*) who received no regular pay but counted on plunder, and of *uc begleri* (the frontier lords of Rumeli), and advocated a return to the aggressive policies of Bayezid.¹⁷ Musa's ascension receives one mention in the corpus of the short chronicles.¹⁸ Once more Constantinople became the target of Turkish raiders, who also made threatening moves towards Thessalonica, Selybria, and Mesembria.¹⁹ The emperor sought protection behind Constantinople's fortifications. Doukas²⁰ speaks of skirmishes before the walls. Minor engagements were fought in their vicinity. In one of those encounters a member of John VIII's retinue perished: John Notaras, who had been in charge of the prince's table.²¹ He was the brother of Loukas Notaras, who was destined to hold a key position in the administration of Constantine XI. Loukas' father was Nikolaos Notaras, a respected member of Manuel's government.²² After a Homeric struggle over the slain man, the Constantinopolitans were able to recover most of the corpse, but the Turks carried away John's head and Musa later sold it to Nikolaos Notaras for an enormous amount.²³

The court then released Orhan, the son of Emir Suleyman, who had been left as a hostage in Constantinople; he was eliminated by Musa in 1412.²⁴ Manuel's diplomats incited Mehmed I, yet another son of Bayezid in Anatolia, to lay claim to the European territories and oppose Musa.²⁵ After a number of setbacks for Mehmed, a final battle was fought between the two brothers on July 15, 1413. Musa was captured and killed.²⁶ Mehmed I professed friendship and repudiated the aggressive policies of his predecessor, but Anatolia and Rumeli came under the control of a single master.²⁷ For the time being Mehmed I was aware of his debt to Manuel, displayed gratitude, and formally accepted the imperial court's claim over the regions that had been ceded to Constantinople by the treaty of Kallipolis in 1403, and professed filial devotion for the emperor.²⁸

Such were the formative years of Manuel's sons. These must have been exciting times for the princes. As far as they could tell, the court pulled all strings and

sounded the tune to which the numerous rivals for the Ottoman throne danced. Musa's assault had failed and Mehmed I, the sole survivor, had gone out of his way to display gratitude. It is perhaps no accident that John VIII tried to revive the same policy early on in his reign, when he attempted to divide Rumeli and Anatolia by supporting a pretender as the sultan of Rumeli, hoping to bring about the partition of the Ottoman realm. Impressions formed at this period undoubtedly played their part, perhaps unconsciously, during the next decade of the *quattrocento*, when a younger generation of princes, headed by John VIII, became strong enough to push Manuel out of office over a major disagreement in foreign policy. John VIII then tried to put into operation a version of the policy that had proved effective during the *interregnum*.

The princes had been born after the years of Manuel's struggle, after he had been humiliated by Hayr ad-Din; they had not witnessed the punishment of their father, who had been compelled to appear as a suppliant at the Porte and become a loyal vassal obliged to accompany his overlord in his campaigns. They had not seen, or had been too young to remember, the desperate situation in Constantinople during the blockade by Bayezid. What they could vividly recall was the endless procession of Turkish princes seeking imperial aid. The dependence of the Turks on the court must have made a deep impression on the younger generation of princes. After all, it was with Byzantine help that Mehmed had ascended the Ottoman throne; and for a long time the sultan remained the appreciative friend of the emperor.

3 Education for a prince

Manuel carefully edited out of his correspondence references to personal matters but he was an accomplished scholar, who would not have neglected the education of his children. Letter 27 refers to the appointment of a tutor.²⁹ Manuel speaks well of a Theodoros Kaukadenos, who had impressed the emperor with a literary composition that he had presented orally, in accordance with the contemporary custom,³⁰ "within a small but not undistinguished . . . auditorium." The emperor seems to have rewarded Kaukadenos with an appointment as tutor to two unnamed sons and to one daughter:³¹

Now our hope will be fulfilled if you set yourself to supervise the instruction of the two youths. I am certain that you will regard this as equitable and, at the same time, beneficial to them as well as to my daughter. This should not be a difficult task, I believe, if you set your mind to it.

The position of this letter in the corpus of Manuel's epistolography suggests a date of composition ca. 1395.

Manuel neglects to name his two sons to be tutored by Kaukadenos. The identity of the daughter remains unknown. One illegitimate daughter of Manuel is known by name: Isabella-Isabeau-Zampia (or Zabia), who married Hilario Doria, a Genoese convert to Orthodoxy, and an agent of Manuel.³² Without doubt, Zampia is not

the daughter mentioned in this letter; since she had already married Doria in 1392, she would be too old in 1395 to be in need of an education. Manuel had at least two other daughters, who died in the same year as the elder Constantine. It is possible that one of them was the intended pupil of Kaukadenos.

In all probability, Kaukadenos was intended as a pedagogue/*magister*, a tutor in charge of the early stages of education, for John VIII and Theodoros II. It is also possible that Constantine the elder, who died in childhood, and Andronikos were his intended pupils. Constantine XI, Demetrios, and Thomas can be excluded, as they were born at a later period and do not seem to have been placed under the care of Kaukadenos. In fact, we do know one tutor to Manuel's youngest son, Prince Thomas: Sphrantzes' father:³³ "On account of this misfortune, my father and I did not accompany Prince Thomas to the Morea, to whose service we had been appointed by the prince's father, our holy emperor – my father as tutor to Lord Thomas and I as his page and personal attendant." Sphrantzes informs us that his uncle had been a tutor of Constantine XI:³⁴ "Lord Constantine and I had great rapport with each other, which God approved, as my father's brother was his tutor and his sons were his friends, companions, and servants; I was among them."

Thus, the older generation of princes, John VIII, Theodoros II, and perhaps even Andronikos and Constantine the elder, had been entrusted to Theodoros Kaukadenos, while the younger generation, Constantine XI, Thomas, and perhaps Demetrios, were taught the rudiments of education by members of the Sphrantzes' family. Given the age of their pupils, these tutors could not have been more than "elementary" teachers, paving the way for the "grammatician-rhetor" who usually took charge of the next stage, "middle and higher" education. Sphrantzes uses the term "tatas" to indicate the position of his father and uncle; this term does not carry any of the connotations usually associated with formal teachers or even with an instructor of a school; on the contrary, this word, with its syllabic repetition, seems to have its origins in the talk of very young children.³⁵ Echoes of it are still detected in conversational Greek, which uses the feminine term "dada" to designate a governess of pre-school age children. Similar is the case with the fifteenth-century Turkish term "lala."³⁶

Doukas states that John VIII attended school with other members of his social class and was introduced to classical scholarship.³⁷ Manuel was a learned individual and commanded a sound knowledge of antiquity and of classical and Hellenistic literature.³⁸ He even composed literary works intended for his son's edification. John VIII could not have understood his father's elaborate, archaic style unless he had been trained thoroughly in ancient Greek and had become extremely familiar with the Attic and Hellenistic idioms.³⁹ A few other clues in our sources slightly complement this picture. John VIII seems to have been at home with Homer, as he accurately quoted lines from this text during his stay in Italy in 1438/39.⁴⁰ Besides, it is known that he had brought manuscripts of Greek authors with him on this trip. At least one Italian humanist was delighted with the emperor's portable library:⁴¹ "We saw that the emperor had in his possession numerous manuscripts worthy of mention."

It is sometimes stated that John wrote poems but there is no verification of this statement in authentic texts.⁴² In a panegyric in honor of Manuel II and of John VIII,

composed by Isidore (the future cardinal and heroic defender of Constantinople in 1453),⁴³ we are told that John VIII had been taught by his own father and that he was at home with Plato and Aristotle, whose works he read daily. Other unspecified teachers are also praised and are likened to Cheiron, the centaur of Greek mythology and mentor of heroes, and to Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles. Such comparisons seem to be a literary *topos* and probably amount to no more than court sycophancy. The education of John VIII is treated in ideal terms. Isidore claims that Manuel filled his son's soul with wisdom and conducted the future emperor through the principles of statesmanship. Then we are told that the young man found pleasure in riding spirited horses and in hunting, valuable skills for a ruler and for a warlord. Isidore praises John's military training, his familiarity with the tactics of the "phalanx," and his skill in naval matters. He declares that John had also acquired legal expertise and received good instruction in poetry, grammar, and history, taught to him by eminent instructors selected by Manuel. The prince was further trained in theology and ethics. Are we perhaps facing an ideal picture and Isidore states what should be done with the education of a Renaissance prince?

We know even less about the education and upbringing of Constantine XI. In his eulogy Kritoboulos compares Constantine XI to celebrated heroes from antiquity and claims that the prince could hold his ground in the company of scholars; but such comments may be stock praise for a dead hero:⁴⁴ "Emperor Constantine died fighting, in the way I described; he was wise and moderate in his private life and extremely virtuous and brave; his understanding can be compared to that of highly educated men." From the negative point of view, Kritoboulos' comment may be taken to suggest that Constantine was as good as an educated person, even though he had not been famous for his scholarship. Does it mean that Kritoboulos was not impressed by Constantine's education and that he concealed his feelings in elusive praise? George Scholarius (Patriarch Gennadius II in Sultan Mehmed II's Ottoman capital) also paid tribute to Constantine's education before the two of them clashed over the question of church union. Scholarius praised the prince's learning in two separate passages but his statements are rather vague.⁴⁵ We may be facing court flattery again.

John Dokeianos,⁴⁶ a scholar active in Mistra, wrote an *Encomium* of Constantine XI (on the occasion of his accession to the throne of Constantinople, in all likelihood). In it he praised the emperor's education and his skills in hunting, horsemanship, and military drill. Dokeianos addressed Constantine directly:⁴⁷

What can I say about your education? . . . Your tutors and teachers were wiser and more thoughtful than any centaur or Phoenix; moreover, experience itself provided important, noble, and useful lessons. From the beginning you subordinated everything to rational thought and with measure you judged all actions and thoughts; consequently, you had the benefits of a double education: on the one hand, you improved your strategic skills through horsemanship, hunting, and drill; on the other hand, you became familiar with the deeds and victories of old through reading long histories and through hearing lectures. . . . You cleverly learned the lessons and precepts of your great father.

Are we facing formulaic praise for a prince, who, in accordance with classical models, with contemporary standards, and with the dictates of the timeless *locus communis*, is supposed to possess *mentem sanam in corpore sano*, something that a humanist like Dokeianos would appreciate or even invent in order to exaggerate his praise for the prince? A careful observer may perhaps detect a mild tone of disappointment in the humanist's tone. Like Kritoboulos, Dokeianos has nothing to say about Constantine's scholarly achievements. Instead, he states that Constantine learned a great deal from experience. Does Dokeianos regard Constantine as a man who has learned a great deal "by doing things"? Or is one to assume that Dokeianos' statement about the prince's wisdom acquired through experience is meant to compensate for some lack in his formal education? If Dokeianos knew that Constantine's education had been lacking, he could not have written more than this hint, as his speech was a panegyric, in which only statements of praise belong. Perhaps one may conclude that Constantine was less intellectually inclined than John VIII or Theodoros II, who was an accomplished scholar; John VIII quoted from Homer at least once. Nothing comparable exists for Constantine XI. Is Dokeianos backing up Kritoboulos' carefully worded sentences?

Dokeianos' *encomium* is a typical example of late medieval rhetoric. Along with his fellow scholars in this period, Dokeianos proudly exhibits his knowledge of classical antiquity and writes in a style and idiom that would be at home in classical Athens, in the Hellenistic period, or even in the second sophistic (depending on his ancient model); his language, nevertheless, would have been incomprehensible to the average Greek speaker of the *quattrocento*. Within its bottomless sea of rhetorical obscurity, absurd grammatical structures, and clever turns of phrase that would have amused Demosthenes, some facts can be salvaged. At the end of his speech Dokeianos employs the phrase "king of kings,"⁴⁸ which is surely an echo of the abbreviated legend on the Palaeologan coat of arms,⁴⁹ commonly understood as an acronym standing for "king of kings reigning over kings." This speech was dedicated to Constantine and was probably pronounced in his presence; one can hardly guess how much of it Constantine could have understood while it was pronounced or when he read it, if he ever did.⁵⁰

Despite Dokeianos' praise for Constantine's horsemanship and skill in military drill, Constantine was not a brilliant tactician and his combat skills displayed no genius whatsoever. He may have been a competent soldier, at best, but he was not an inspired strategist. During the siege of 1453, the defense was squarely in the hands of the Genoese warlord Giovanni Guglielmo Giustiniani Longo. The emperor had been content to leave matters to the discretion of his capable lieutenant. We hear very little in our sources about Constantine's ability as a fighter. Did he actively participate in the defense of his city or was he merely present in the crucial area in order to inspire confidence to his troops?⁵¹ Before the last battle of May 29 we know of no engagement during the long siege of 1453 in which the emperor played an active part. It is only in the final hours of the assault, as he is about to pass into the mists of legend, that Constantine is portrayed as an actual combatant.

Years before this siege, Constantine conducted the siege of Patras in the Morea. He took part in a skirmish, during which he lost his mount. Without the armed

intervention of Sphrantzes, a diplomat and not a soldier, Constantine would have been killed or would have been taken prisoner. This incident suggests either lack of skill or certainly the absence of a careful plan, of self-control, and of strategy on the part of the prince, as Constantine seems to have been drawn into this skirmish and to have allowed himself to be surrounded by the enemy⁵² by means of a ruse that was as old and as primitive as Hannibal's ploys against a naive Roman army. With regard to hunting, however, we have plenty of evidence to indicate that it was, in fact, the prince's passion. It was also the favorite recreational activity of his brother, John, which created dismay among his hosts and his compatriots in Italy.⁵³ Sphrantzes' narrative demonstrates that Constantine XI spent a great deal of his time hunting.⁵⁴

We know very little about the private lives of the young princes and their circle. We are told by Sphrantzes⁵⁵ that he and his cousins were Constantine's companions, friends, and attendants. Sphrantzes was also Thomas' official page.⁵⁶ In addition, we know that John Notaras was in charge of John VIII's imperial table before the Turks killed him during the siege of Constantinople by Musa.⁵⁷ Another companion was a son of Bayezid who had had been left in Constantinople. Sphrantzes⁵⁸ only tells us that a son of Bayezid, named Iousouphes (Yusuf, presumably), came to Constantinople and eventually converted to Christianity. He was then given the Christian name "Demetrios." Sphrantzes adds that Yusuf-Demetrios then died during an outbreak of the plague, which also claimed the life of one of Manuel's young sons called Michael. Doukas places these events in the period 1403–1410 and is not specific as to the exact year of Yusuf's death (whose name he neglects to mention). Yusuf conceived, in the course of his education, the burning desire to convert to Christianity and was allowed to do so only prior to his death, specifically through the efforts of his friend John VIII. Doukas adds that this Ottoman prince fell victim to the plague. The chances are that Sphrantzes' Yusuf-Demetrios and Doukas' unnamed son of Bayezid are the same person. If so, then this Ottoman *çelebi* was a close companion of John VIII. Both went to school together.⁵⁹ Doukas' narrative, however, seems to place the death of this Ottoman prince ca. 1417, while Sphrantzes' narrative specifically states a *terminus ante quem* of 1410.

4 The training fields

The year following the ascension of Mehmed I saw the first wedding of John VIII and his first appointment as regent of Manuel II. Three years earlier Anna, the daughter of the grand prince of Moscow, Vasilii I Dmitrijevich, had been betrothed to the prince.⁶⁰ She had been too young at the time of her betrothal to travel to Constantinople. The precarious position of the city may have been an additional consideration in the postponement of her arrival. She arrived in 1414.⁶¹ She was an eleven-year-old bride while John VIII, her husband, was her senior by at least nine years.⁶² Russia, in this period, seems to have been interested in breaking away from the Byzantine sphere of influence. Ca. 1395 Vasilii had excluded the name of the emperor from the liturgy and had pointed out, in an outspoken letter, the reality of imperial impotence. The patriarch of Constantinople, Antonios, promptly rebuked

Vasilii and fired off a reply, in which he produced one of the last expressions of the theoretical ecumenical *imperium* of the Byzantine state.⁶³ Vasilii acquiesced, perhaps⁶⁴ because in the former vassal states of medieval Greece the prestige of the patriarch was rising in comparison to that of the emperor, and the Orthodox Church still commanded respect, even though the political propaganda of the old empire was breathing its last. The Russians may even have extended some financial assistance to Constantinople during the blockade by Bayezid I.⁶⁵ It was perhaps with such ideas that Manuel sought the marriage between his son to Anna, in order to revive the old relations. Soon after the wedding, on July 25, 1414, Manuel left Constantinople for a tour of his dominions.⁶⁶ John became the official head of the government in the capital. Manuel sailed to the island of Thasos to assert his authority and to bring it under his jurisdiction, where he became entangled in siege warfare that lasted three months.⁶⁷ In September of 1414 he moved on to Thessalonica,⁶⁸ where he reviewed the administration of his son Andronikos and took care of matters involving the monks of Mount Athos.⁶⁹

Next Manuel turned to the most important part of this trip and to a project that was dear to him. He traveled to the Morea and added his name to innumerable predecessors who had also tried to fortify the six-mile stretch of the Isthmus of Corinth, the Hexamilion.⁷⁰ Most of the work carried out by Manuel consisted of reconditioning the existing ruins of the wall that had been erected by Justinian I. Work began on April 8. Within a month, 153 towers had been refurbished. Remains of Manuel's project are still visible in the area southeast of the modern Corinth Canal.⁷¹ During the renovation, according to Sphrantzes, who also emphasizes the haste with which this defensive line was brought to completion, an inscription dating from the reign of Justinian I was discovered.⁷²

The length of the walls measured 3800 yards; the walls were topped by 153 towers. During the construction, a stone was unearthed with the following inscription: "May the Light born from the Light, the true God from the true God, watch over our Emperor Justinian, his faithful servant Victorinus, and all the inhabitants of Greece, who live through God's grace."⁷³

Manuel announced the completion of his project to the Venetians, but he did not receive a response until almost a month later when Venice promised cooperation. Soon thereafter she even authorized her generals in the Morea to assist in the defense of the Hexamilion against the Turks. The *Serenissima* declined, however, to contribute funds towards the future maintenance of the fortifications and felt threatened by Manuel's activities in the peninsula.⁷⁴ More disappointing than the Venetian response must have been was the resistance that Manuel encountered among his own subjects, as many abandoned imperial lands and fled to the Venetian territories in order to avoid duty on the walls.⁷⁵

The barons of the Morea did not espouse Manuel's scheme. Perhaps they viewed the wall as an indication that their autonomy was about to be curtailed. It is even possible that they saw the wall as a device to place them under the direct control of the emperor. Consequently, Manuel was faced with a virtual rebellion.

The peripatetic old emperor had to campaign in person in order to put down the insurrection. Throughout the summer of 1415 he fought against the rebels, destroyed their strongholds, and shipped the most vocal dissidents to Constantinople in order to keep an eye on them and on their activities. The following testimony⁷⁶ survives:

There is an Isthmus to the peninsula, which has provided protection and has prevented the enemy from inflicting damage. . . . But time wiped out all traces of the wall. . . . Even though such a task seemed impossible and impractical to all, the emperor considered the matter carefully and quickly applied himself to the task; he came to the area and began construction. It was proper that the inhabitants would promise to do their best to assist him . . . yet they attempted to put a stop to the emperor's wonderful designs; at first, they did so in secret; at the end, they plainly showed their hostile intentions; some of them fled and sought safety in their strongholds; others assisted the rebels. The noble man put everything aside and decided to campaign against them, as if they were an actual enemy. Some he compelled through his orders to do the right thing. Acting in the role of an adviser or good teacher he was able to win some of them easily and honorably; some he attracted with benefactions; some with hope; and others with fear. And so it came to pass.

A panegyric by Isidore also refers to this campaign:⁷⁷

He came to the island of Thasos, besieged it, and restored Roman [= Byzantine] rule; then he occupied the metropolis of the Thessalians [= Thessalonica]. After he put its affairs in order, he went to the Peloponnesus [= Morea]. He landed at Kenkhreai and entered Corinth; then he erected a wall across the entire Isthmus of the Peloponnesus [= Morea], completing it at a faster rate than anyone would have thought possible. . . . He took over the entire Peloponnesus [= Morea] and sent into exile some of those who were inclined towards usurpation; he assigned it to one of his sons who was destined to become the next emperor.

A text of the early seventeenth century alludes to these events in one paragraph and further adds that the Moreot rebels had good reason to be alarmed because Manuel enjoyed Mehmed I's friendship:⁷⁸

Once he had strengthened it [the Hexamilion], he placed his brother the despot in charge of the Morea and its protection. He charged the inhabitants of the Morea with the care and protection of the wall through the revenues that they would receive from the lords of the Morea. But the latter were opposed to this and expressed unwillingness to pay. So he seized them with the intention of transporting them to the City to be tortured. When they saw this turn of events, they unwillingly agreed, especially since the emperor was a good friend of Sultan Mehmed.

The same incidents are reported in an entry of a short chronicle.⁷⁹ It was not before March 1416 that the emperor was able to return to Constantinople.⁸⁰ During his absence, John VIII was able to steer the ship of state. Apparently, his administration was competent and no scandals were reported. The Venetians took notice of the prince's new status in their correspondence.⁸¹ Manuel must have been pleased with the performance of his son during his absence, as in the fall of 1416 he dispatched him to the Morea⁸² in order to strengthen the position of Theodoros II. John directed the concluding stages of his father's campaign and maintained a watch over the Latins.

John proceeded to the Morea by land. He made a stop at Thessalonica, now ruled by his younger brother Andronikos. During his stay, he became involved with another pretender to the Ottoman throne, Mustafa, who had appeared one year earlier⁸³ with his ally Juneid of Smyrna.⁸⁴ Backed by Mircea of Walachia, Mustafa made an attempt to proclaim himself Ottoman ruler of Rumeli. The Porte refused to acknowledge Mustafa's claim and regarded him as a pretender. Mustafa failed to win popular support. After his campaign to take over Rumeli collapsed, Mustafa and Juneid fled to Thessalonica. Mehmed demanded the surrender of the pretender from Demetrios Leontaris, the senior administrator in the city, who referred this thorny matter to Constantinople, while Mehmed remained in the vicinity of Thessalonica, seeking a swift resolution.⁸⁵ Manuel wisely decided not to hand over this individual and Mehmed I agreed to pay for his rival's expenses while the latter remained in imperial custody.⁸⁶ Mustafa was sent to the island of Lemnos,⁸⁷ while Juneid was confined to the monastery of Pammakaristos in Constantinople.

John's part is emphasized in the panegyric composed by Isidore.⁸⁸

The brother of the lord of the barbarians [= the Turks] fled to the city and spread confusion and considerable destruction throughout their realm. . . . Their lord threatened to seize the city if the citizens refused to give up the refugee to be punished; by contrast, he played the part of the suppliant and begged for asylum. Our most divine emperor . . . without delay delivered the citizens from their troubles and sent the refugee safely to the island of Lemnos.

It is possible that Mustafa accompanied John to the Morea. Sphrantzes states⁸⁹ that Mustafa first went to Lemnos and then to the Morea. Eventually Mustafa must have been conducted to Lemnos, as he was there when John VIII decided to utilize him in order to challenge Murad II.⁹⁰

In the year 25 [1416] the emperor Lord John left for the Morea in the fall; at this time, as he was passing through Thessalonica, he took with him Mustafa, the false brother of Bayezid, who was being pursued by his supposed brother Mehmed. First he sent him to Lemnos and then to Mistra.

From Thessalonica John proceeded to the Morea and, with the cooperation of Theodoros II, began a military campaign against the Latins. During Manuel's previous visit, Centurione Zaccaria, the Latin prince of Achaea, had accepted

the Byzantine emperor as his overlord. After John arrived, hostilities broke out between John and Centurione. Within one year John seized Androusa, the main city of Messenia, and pursued Centurione into Elis, where he had sought safety within the walls of Glarentza. The brothers made threatening moves toward Patras, to which Venetian reinforcements hastened from Negroponte.⁹¹ John's campaign is discussed in Isidore's panegyric:⁹²

He was resolved; he made preparations; and he assembled his forces. In less than a month he occupied all of Messenia, which has as many as thirty forts and cities. . . . He also seized some cities in Elis. . . . Then after some time and after a rather long siege the beautiful city of the Achaeans surrendered; it is located in the Gulf of Krisa in Achaea.

The Venetians became alarmed and dispatched a stream of complaints to the brothers and to Manuel.⁹³ The campaign in the Morea was part of the strategy that John had discussed with his father. Manuel had succeeded in bringing under his control the native magnates during his previous campaign. Now it was the turn of the Latin lords to come under fire. Venice had failed to contribute to the Hexamilion fortifications.⁹⁴ The responsibility of defending the peninsula had effectively passed into the hands of the Palaeologi. Manuel may have concluded that the existence of independent Latin principalities could no longer be tolerated. In the face of Venetian reluctance to contribute to the defense, John's task was to bring as much territory as possible under the authority of the despot, his brother, and, by extension, under Constantinople. The Latins of the Morea had granted shelter or aid to the local rebels during Manuel's previous campaign. John's activities may have been partly intended, or justified, as retaliation and as a punitive operation.

Thus, the policy of bringing the entire peninsula under imperial authority by force of arms was put into operation and was destined to continue throughout the last years of Constantinople's independent existence. Manuel must have approved the activities of John in the Morea. The Venetians, uneasy with John's aggressive policies, directed the bulk of their complaints to Manuel.⁹⁵ John's activities in the peninsula⁹⁶ created concern and anxiety to the *Serenissima*.⁹⁷ Moreover, John's campaign compelled numerous serfs in the Morea to defect to the Venetians, as he demanded their services at the Hexamilion.⁹⁸

Finally, John arranged a truce with Centurione and left the Morea. Sphrantzes' narrative suggests that John returned to Constantinople in 1418 and that Thomas was then sent to the peninsula to replace John and to gain some actual experience.⁹⁹ In the meantime John's Russian wife, Anna, died.¹⁰⁰ She had been one of the victims of the plague, which spread as far as the Morea.¹⁰¹ Doukas adds that Anna's death was mourned greatly.¹⁰² A short chronicle¹⁰³ supplies the wrong date for the event. Why John abandoned his campaign and returned is not known but the death of his young wife may have brought him back.¹⁰⁴ Sphrantzes states that the replacement of John by Thomas had already been decided before the outbreak of the plague and adds that he and his father were making preparations to accompany Thomas to the Morea, when the plague struck and killed his brother-in-law and his

own sister:¹⁰⁵ “On account of this misfortune, my father and I did not accompany Prince Thomas to the Morea . . . we had been preparing for this voyage and my elder brother was already in the Morea with the emperor.” This statement suggests that the court had already made plans to replace John and orders had been issued to Thomas’ retinue to prepare for the journey before the death of Anna. It is possible that some form of a rotation system had been devised for the princes to succeed one another and keep the Latins at bay in the Morea. Sphrantzes informs us that Anna was buried in the Convent of Lips.¹⁰⁶

The court then initiated diplomatic efforts to locate another bride for John VIII and a consort for Theodoros II. Manuel directed his diplomatic agents to the west, attempting to forge bonds with powerful families. If Manuel could count on sympathy in Europe through marriage connections, his vision of an independent Morea might even be realized, even though the Latin lords of the peninsula were his projected victims. Manuel’s envoy to the west, Nicholas Eudaimonioannes, entered into negotiations with Pope Martin V, who expressed personal interest in his quest and personally supervised the matches.¹⁰⁷ By 1420 an agreement had been reached: John VIII was going to marry Sophia of Montferrat, a distant relative of the Palaeologi, who had been the child widow of a Sforza count in Pavia, whose maternal grandmother had been a daughter of the king of France. Cleopa Malatesta was selected to become Theodoros’ consort. Cleopa, the daughter of Malatesta dei Malatesti, the lord of Pesaro and Fano, was a member of the ruling family of Rimini. Cleopa seems to have been personally selected by the pope, her own relative and a member of the Colonna family. She was also well connected in Venice. Thus, both brides were eminently qualified for the princes of Greece.¹⁰⁸ John’s wedding took place in Santa Sophia on January 19, 1421; on this occasion John was crowned emperor one more time. The wedding and coronation were accompanied by jubilant celebrations:¹⁰⁹ “The ceremony provided an occasion for a great festival of festivals.” The festivities are recorded in the short chronicles.¹¹⁰

5 The changing of the guard

John VIII became co-emperor with his aged father Manuel in 1421. His rise coincided with a growing factionalism,¹¹¹ which eventually forced Manuel to abdicate. At this time, the young emperor was contemplating an offensive against the Turks. His father was more cautious and was less eager to embrace this approach. In this late stage of his life Manuel was careful not to alienate Mehmed I and had managed to preserve cordial relations.¹¹² John and members of his generation, however, were ready to go on the warpath and even proposed to seize the sultan in order to fabricate a crisis at the Porte. Until this time Manuel had placed trust in his designated heir. This favorable opinion he may have modified at this time, when John felt strong enough to challenge his father’s foreign policy. Manuel expressed his strong disapproval of his co-emperor’s intentions to his own trusted servants:¹¹³

My son the emperor is fitted to be an emperor, but not at the present moment. For he has great visions and plans but ones that were needed in the good old

days of our ancestors. Today, as our affairs consume our attention, the empire needs not an emperor but an administrator. And I fear that his ideas and actions will bring about the downfall of our house. . . . I saw the results of his actions, and what he expected to accomplish with Mustafa, which brought us into some danger.

The position of this entry in Sphrantzes' narrative and the reference to John's policy with regard to Mustafa suggest that these comments were uttered after the abdication of Manuel. It may well be that Sphrantzes has colored the aged emperor's speech with his own hindsight. Yet this conversation accurately describes the situation and perhaps reflects Manuel's maturity and wisdom.

The first signs of trouble came late in the winter of 1420 or early in the spring of 1421. Sphrantzes reports an incident that illustrates the last recorded act of friendly cooperation between a Byzantine emperor and an Ottoman sultan. According to Sphrantzes,¹¹⁴ Mehmed I intended to cross the straits of Asia Minor to Khrysopolis/Skoutari in order to march on to Nikomedeia. Sphrantzes implies that the real purpose of this trip was connected with the sultan's secret preparations to launch an attack upon Constantinople, as spies at the Porte indicated that Mehmed had hostile intentions.¹¹⁵

In the year [69]28 Sultan Mehmed, also known as Kyritzes [= *Çelebi*], came to cross from the suburbs of the City to Asia Minor. Before his arrival we were secretly informed by certain of his attendants that he was planning to secure his position in the east and that his goal after his return was to attack the City.

Noblemen and clergymen urged Manuel to highjack the cortege and snatch Mehmed I, while the Turks were passing through the neighborhood.¹¹⁶ Sphrantzes does not name these courtiers but states that Manuel resisted their suggestion strongly and refused to violate his "oaths" to the Ottoman sovereign.¹¹⁷

Sphrantzes' makes it clear that to this group of noblemen and clergymen, which advocated action, we must add the princes, Manuel's sons:¹¹⁸

For this reason the emperor did not send any of his sons to welcome the impious man [Mehmed I]. Instead he dispatched the excellent nobleman Demetrios Leontaris, Isaakios Asan [Asen], and our *protostrator* Manuel Kantakouzenos, with a retinue of nobles and soldiers bearing gifts.

Manuel was reluctant to send any of his sons to escort Mehmed precisely because he feared that they would disregard his instructions and would proceed with their own plans to abduct the sultan. So he turned to his old henchman, Leontaris, who had had dealings with Mehmed in the past, when Mustafa the pretender had sought asylum at Thessalonica. Manuel decided to keep his sons under his own supervision. At Diplokionion Manuel and his sons, still under close scrutiny no doubt, met Mehmed I and amiably escorted him to Asia Minor, in a show of cooperation and mutual respect. Manuel personally made certain that no embarrassing incidents occurred while the sultan passed through Byzantine territory.

In the same passage Sphrantzes uses the plural form “sons.” Obviously, the co-emperor, John VIII, had the support of some of his brothers. Since Leontaris was in the capital and seems to have been permanently attached to the court, Prince Andronikos must have been in Thessalonica. Theodoros II was in the Morea. Thomas was probably too young to participate in such important intrigues (or perhaps he was still in the Morea), while Demetrios with his pro-Turkish sympathies would be unlikely to become involved in a plot designed to abduct the Ottoman sovereign. By elimination, the “sons” mentioned by Sphrantzes must be John VIII and Constantine, who was either fifteen or sixteen at the time, old enough to idolize his brother. The two princes are not mentioned directly by name because Sphrantzes did not approve of their plan.

Thus, we may conclude, Constantine had joined forces with his brother and become a partisan of John VIII’s war faction. Constantine continued to serve John VIII loyally throughout the latter’s reign and became John’s regent on two occasions; he further extended his brother’s policies in the Morea during his tenure as despot. Furthermore, Constantine was equally aggressive towards the Turks. His reign as emperor of Constantinople was marked by the logical continuation of his brother’s policies. Constantine was a loyal follower of his older brother, whom he must have admired. John VIII favored Constantine and intended him to be his heir, in spite of his position in the succession and of the resentment felt by the other brothers. Perhaps the close bonds between John and Constantine reached all the way to their youth and to this period, when the two princes allied themselves and decided to oppose their aged father.¹¹⁹

Mehmed I was received politely and was conducted with due ceremony to Asia Minor. Shortly thereafter, however, Manuel’s prestige seems to have suffered a blow; it came as a direct consequence of this incident and of his insistence to remain true to his oaths. Sphrantzes relates that the intelligence pointing to Mehmed’s hostile intentions became public.¹²⁰ Perhaps it was leaked by members sympathetic to the war faction or by the co-emperor himself in an attempt to strengthen his position. By the time the dust settled, Manuel found his reputation at a low ebb, as the war party scored points over his determination to treat the sultan honorably:¹²¹ “A few days later, Mehmed’s secret ambition to conquer our City was revealed. Thus great anxiety, deliberations, and councils ensued. Our holy emperor [Manuel] incurred much blame from those who advised him to seize Mehmed.”

Meanwhile, Theodoros II renewed his attacks upon the Latin dominions in the Morea and continued the work that his brother had started. Although his primary target was again Centurione, the prince of Achaea, Theodoros also raided Venetian territories and plundered a number of villages in the vicinity of Methone/Modon. His activities alarmed the *Serenissima* once more, and the *Sapientes* prepared another long list of grievances to be forwarded to Constantinople. Venice began to feel considerable anxiety and seems to have lost all confidence in the Palaeologan administration of the Morea.¹²²

In the capital John VIII pursued his advantage won by the incident of 1420/21. Convinced of the necessity to maintain good relations with the Porte, Manuel dispatched Demetrios Leontaris to Adrianople in order to pacify Mehmed I, who by

now had heard, through his own agents, of the rift between the two emperors and had probably realized how close he had come to becoming a prisoner of John. Leontaris' instructions were¹²³ "to sound out the sultan's future intentions . . . and to remind him of the friendship and respect they had shown to him through the gifts that Mehmed had received from Leontaris during his passage to Asia." Leontaris was promised a formal audience. Then Mehmed I suddenly died but his death was concealed by his courtiers until his son, Murad II, was placed on the throne. The Turks went so far as to keep a watchful eye over all roads leading to Constantinople and prevent Leontaris' messengers from bringing the news to the capital. Finally, one of his men got through by a roundabout route, via Mesembria and then by ship.¹²⁴

The acrimony between the young princes and the aged emperor was rekindled and brought about drastic changes, as the war faction won the upper hand. Manuel insisted on maintaining peace and on keeping faith with Mehmed I's successor. Other young men joined the chorus of the war faction proposing a more ambitious course of action.¹²⁵ John and his associates were resolved to make use of their "guest," the pretender Mustafa, in order to bring about a civil war in the Ottoman realm and initiate a new version of the *interregnum*. Their plan had its merits but Manuel believed that it was risky and that it would backfire.¹²⁶

Immediately new cares, deliberations, and meetings followed to decide whether to maintain a friendship with his son, Murad, and accept him as lord, as was demanded by the sworn treaty, or whether to bring Mustafa . . . and make him sultan in the west and give Anatolia to Murad. Our holy emperor was in favor of the first alternative, which he thought just for many reasons; but his son and Demetrios Kantakouzenos supported the second option.

Perhaps John and his young associates lacked the necessary experience required to calculate the magnitude of the disaster that their policy would invite in the event of failure. In addition, they were too young and too impatient to listen to a seasoned voice.

Echoes of this situation are found even in works of a later period; an anonymous author of the early seventeenth century re-creates a scene, in which he puts forth arguments that Manuel could have used to support his policy:¹²⁷

The father of the emperor, an old man by now, argued with his son, the emperor, at length: "Unjust is the violation of our treaty with Sultan Murad. What if . . . he is victorious? We will be involved in battles and danger." But the words of the aged emperor failed to convince and the young emperor's arguments prevailed.

The anonymous author was of the opinion that Murad II's wrath was justified and that John's plan was anachronistic, perhaps even romantic; he agrees with Manuel's estimation of his impetuous son.¹²⁸

Such a thing that the wise Romans [= Greeks] were contemplating should have been done in the past, when Timur was fighting against Bayezid and

had captured Bayezid and had also destroyed his army. . . . Certainly not now, when they [the Turks] had become mighty and Sultan Murad had become king. You turned him into a foe. There had been so many brave extremely intelligent emperors. What am I to say when I see that these later emperors were responsible for the loss of the greatest empire, for the loss of so many individuals, and for the loss of so many countries and Christians?

This time Manuel lost the battle. John's policy prevailed and the older emperor transferred all power to his belligerent son:¹²⁹

Finally, our holy emperor yielded, transferred authority to his son, and said: "Do as you wish; my son, I am an old man, ill, and close to death. I have handed over the empire and its affairs to you. Deal with them as you please."

It was probably indignation over Manuel's insistence to remain true to his "oaths" that won support for the war faction at this point. One may go a step further and speculate that Manuel tendered his resignation not because of advanced age or ill health (after all, his death did not occur before 1425) but precisely because it was his last-ditch effort to change the attitude of the war faction. It is not inconceivable that he intended his resignation only as a gesture and that he fully expected an outcry of protests urging him to remain on the throne. If so, then he had miscalculated; he was not implored to stay on. Thus, John VIII assumed full power and his reign as sole emperor began, with Manuel active, but officially in the background.

6 Return to reality

John VIII summoned Mustafa and offered his support in exchange for the restoration of Kallipolis to the crown. Kallipolis had been the first city that the Turks had seized in Europe in the fourteenth century.¹³⁰ Its recovery would be a symbolic victory of immense emotional value. Demetrios Leontaris, the senior member of the diplomatic corps, was dispatched to the island of Lemnos, Mustafa's residence.¹³¹ According to a later testimony, the journey was not easy:¹³²

Due to adverse weather conditions, the men, whom the Romans [= Greeks] had appointed to bring him [Mustafa] back, could not pass through the straits of Kallipolis. . . . In their discussions, the noblemen promised to install him as the sultan of the west, in Rumeli; he pledged, in turn, the restoration of Kallipolis, which had been seized by the Turks long ago.

John traveled to the Chersonese to assist the pretender. The city accepted Mustafa's claim but its inhabitants struck a deal with the pretender, which pointedly excluded Constantinople. Although Mustafa had promised Kallipolis, he was slow to abide by the terms of the agreement and finally refused altogether:¹³³ "All Turks believe that Kallipolis belongs to us; moreover, our faith forbids us to surrender this city to you." This was the first sign of trouble. John must have realized that his policy was

not proceeding smoothly. The anonymous author claims that Mustafa renewed his pledge to restore Kallipolis when he was about to face his rival, Murad, in battle and was in need of imperial allies:¹³⁴ “Then Mustafa dispatched messengers to the emperor in the City, asking him to remain true to his word and grant the pledged aid; he said that, after he won Rumeli and Anatolia and defeated . . . Murad, he would grant Kallipolis and all further requests.”

In the meantime, Murad’s envoys from Anatolia also came to the capital, seeking support:¹³⁵ “Murad from the east, through his emissaries, was asking for aid and made many promises.” Murad invoked the pledge that Manuel had made to his father Mehmed I:¹³⁶ “As soon as Murad heard of their activities, he sent messengers to the emperor, asking him not to violate his pledge to his father, Sultan Mehmed.” Khalkokondyles elaborates:¹³⁷

Envoys from Murad also came to the emperor of Byzantium, seeking the throne for their lord, and promised to grant all their wishes. The Hellenes detained the embassies for some time and finally dismissed Murad’s envoys, as they chose to support and embrace Mustafa, with whom they concluded a treaty with all due forms.

Soon afterwards, Mustafa was able to defeat Murad’s *Beglerbeg* of Rumeli and take control of all territories in Europe:¹³⁸

About the beginning of the winter of the same year, Bayezid – a trusted agent who had served as *beglerbeg*, as vizier under Murad’s father, and as governor of Ankara – crossed the Upper Straits and entered Europe. Apparently, his mission was to keep the west under Murad’s authority, if possible. Mustafa left Kallipolis in order to deal with him; he intercepted Bayezid near Adrianople and executed him. Thus, Mustafa became the sole ruler of the west.

In January of 1422 Genoese vessels transported Mustafa and his forces to Anatolia; there Mustafa proved unable to defeat Murad:¹³⁹ “Then Mustafa returned to Kallipolis again, crossed over to Asia Minor in the same year, and moved against his nephew Murad, who was in Brusa. Mustafa, however, suffered a defeat and returned to Europe.” The *Barberini Chronicle* provides some interesting details on Mustafa’s campaign in Asia Minor and on the occasion of his defeat by Murad: Mustafa was deserted by his troops on the eve of the upcoming battle because of a false rumor that had been fabricated and circulated by the Porte, declaring that Constantinople had changed sides and had thrown its support behind Murad.¹⁴⁰ Manuel and the older generation still wielded considerable influence and perhaps had not given up their efforts to support Murad’s claim. The fact that Mustafa had failed to restore Kallipolis perhaps helped to revive Manuel’s position. Even though Manuel had formally abdicated, the battle for the formulation of foreign policy had not ended.

Early the next morning Murad’s troops invaded Mustafa’s camp that had been abandoned by the pretender’s soldiers. Mustafa himself fled to his European

territories but was pursued, was apprehended, and was then executed. Khalkokondyles adds that Mustafa was deserted by his troops, because they were under the fearful impression that the court (which had supposedly switched sides) would block the straits, denying them their only avenue to safety. The same author adds another comment, unmatched by any surviving source:¹⁴¹

Once the Hellenes had made the decision to ally themselves with Mustafa, they manned their ships and sailed to the Hellespont. The emperor of Byzantium, however, proceeded to Proikonesos and became absorbed in an affair, as he had fallen in love with a woman, the daughter of a priest. For this reason, he was not able to come in time and prevent Murad from crossing into Europe.

The substance of this gossip should not be overlooked. John VIII had no affection for his Latin wife, Sophia of Montferrat. He evidently loathed her and went to great lengths to avoid even a chance meeting with her inside the imperial residence, as Doukas relates; he only tolerated her presence out of respect for his father, who had arranged this match.¹⁴² Thus an extra-marital affair would not be out of the question at this time. Yet it remains doubtful whether John would have allowed an affair of the heart to interfere with his plans to patrol the straits. After all, if he did not wish to supervise the operation personally, he could have delegated it to a subordinate. Murad crossed the straits without imperial permission or opposition on board Genoese vessels.¹⁴³ This, in the final analysis, may be the real reason why John and his troops failed to interfere. Trouble or confrontation with the Genoese had to be avoided. Indeed, the occasional transportation of the Turkish troops was a lucrative source of revenue for the Genoese, who controlled the suburb of Pera. Mustafa was then eliminated¹⁴⁴ and Murad emerged as the surviving victor.

The war faction had badly miscalculated. Had Manuel's advice been followed, Murad II would have ascended the throne without trouble. He survived the challenge but had been opposed by the court. Murad became a bitter enemy and the war party had gained nothing. Kallipolis remained in Ottoman hands while Constantinople had to face a formidable foe. Such is the conclusion that scholars have reached in relation to this incident in the early reign of John VIII, following an old tradition that reaches back to Sphrantzes, Khalkokondyles, and the anonymous author of the derivative *Barberini Chronicle*.

In defense of John VIII, Constantine, and Demetrios Kantakouzenos, the known leaders of the war faction, one may cite the youth of the princes, their lack of experience in the conduct of foreign policy, and the years of Byzantine revival during the *interregnum*, an era of optimism in the formative years of this generation. There were numerous advantages to their aggressive policy supported by logic and not just by impetuosity. Mehmed I may well have been contemplating an attack upon Constantinople during the last months of his life (or, at least, so it had been rumored). There is nothing unreasonable in the view that by 1420 Mehmed I had finished the reorganization of his realm and was at last ready to launch an offensive against the tired "empire" of Byzantium. Had Manuel's advice prevailed and had the court supported Murad in the struggle for the throne, there would still

be no guarantee that Mehmed's successor would have pursued peaceful relations with Constantinople.¹⁴⁵

In theory, the policy of the war faction was sound. Had it succeeded and had the Ottoman realm been divided between two sovereigns based on Anatolia and Rumeli, respectively, Constantinople would have faced an easier task in the upcoming years, as it would have had to deal solely with the sultan of Rumeli, deprived of Anatolia's resources. Yet instead of becoming heroes, the leaders of the war faction in the capital ended up with a crisis. The gamble had failed to pay off. Consequently, John VIII and his associates lost this round and would have to suffer the direct consequences of their actions, as Murad II took the initiative, eliminated his rival, rejected all advances made by the court, and completed his preparations to attack Constantinople, threatening to bring the millennial state to its end, once and for all.

Notes

- 1 *LCB*, p. 341; S. J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 37 ff.; and *MP*, pp. 282–289. For the Balkans after Ankara, cf. *LMB*, pp. 499, 500; and D. J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413* [The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage 38] (Leiden and Boston, 2007).
- 2 *CBB* 1: 33.22 (p. 246): καὶ ἀπέθανεν ὁ δεσπότης ὁ πορφυρογέννητος ἰουνιῶ κδ', ἐν ἔτει ς'ηιε'.
- 3 *RdD* 2: 1269, 1282; *MP*, p. 272, n. 126; A. Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* (Athens, 1913), p. 29; R.-J. Loenertz, "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse au XIV^e siècle," *REB* 1 (1943): 156; *DGM* 1: 164, 165; *LCB*, p. 338; *DGM* 1: 165, n. 1; and G. Millet, "Portraits byzantins," *Revue de l'art chrétien* 41 (1911): 447–449.
- 4 *Ibid.*: καὶ τότε ἐσπεκότενε καλὰ ἢ βασιλεία τῶν Ῥωμαίων. καὶ λέγουσι ὅτι ὁ βασιλέας ἔκαμε πολλοὺς υἱοὺς καὶ ἐμέρασε τὴν βασιλείαν του καὶ ἐδιάβη εἰς πολλὰ χέρια, ὅπου, ἂ δὲν τὴν ἤθελε μεράσει, ἐσπεκότενε καλὰ καὶ ὠμονοιασμένοι. διατί, ἀπῆτις τοὺς ἐμέρασε, ἦρθασι εἰσὲ ἀλληλομαχία καὶ ἐμαλώνασι ἀνάμεσόν τους, ὅπου εἶχε ἔξι υἱοὺς καὶ ἐφτωχίηνασι.
- 5 Spandugnano, p. 148: *et questo Emanuel Paleologo havendo sette figlioli, divise lo stato dello impero in sette parte, dando la sua portione a cadauno; laqual cosa permisse Iddio per li peccati nostri, acciochè nascesse le dimisioni che nacque tra loro fratelli, che fu causa della ruina de noi altri et di tutta la christianità.*
- 6 *MP*, p. 272, n. 128.
- 7 Khalkokondyles, 1.4.48 (pp. 340, 341): τὸν δὲ Θεόδωρον τούτου παῖδα ὄντα βασιλεύς . . . ἐπετόμφει παρ' ἀδελφῶν αὐτοῦ Θεόδωρον τὸν πορφυρογέννητον ἐφ' ᾧ διάδοχόν τε τὸν παῖδα καταλιπεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ. καὶ ὡς ἐδέξατο τούτον ἀδελφοῦ τε παῖδα καὶ ἐπιτηδείου, εἶχε τε παρ' ἑαυτῶ, καὶ ὡς ἐτελεύτα, κατέλιπεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶ.
- 8 *Mazaris' Journey to Hades* [Arethusa Monographs 5] (Buffalo, 1975), text with English translation and notes; the letter: pp. 76–89.
- 9 *MP*, p. 273; for documents, cf. *RdD* 2: 1290; and *RKOR*: 3318 (pp. 95, 96).
- 10 *RdD* 2: 1291 (with *MP*, p. 275, n. 131).
- 11 Khalkokondyles, 1.460 (pp. 356–359): ἐς τοῦτον δὲ ἀφικόμενος ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Ἐμμανουῆλος ὁ Βυζαντιοῦ βασιλεὺς τὸν τε παῖδα καθίστη ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν βεβαιότερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶ ἀδελφῶ ἤδη τετελευκότη λόγον ἐπικήδειον ἐξετραγῶδει διεξιῶν ἐπὶ τῶ τάφῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀπολοφυρόμενός τε ἅμα τὸν ἐπιτηδεῖον ἀδελφόν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μεταπεμπόμενος τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἐς Ἴσθμόν τόν τε Ἴσθμόν εἰτείχησε καὶ φυλακὴν

- καταστησάμενος αὐτοῦ ἀπὴι ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ Βυζαντίου, ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίων ἄρχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ.
- 12 *CBB* 1, 9.46 (p. 98): ἔτει ςζιζ', ἰνδικτιῶνος β', σεπτεμβρίῳ ι', ἐκοιμήθη βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην, κυροῦ Ἀνδρονίκου υἱός, σχηματιστεῖς Ἰώασαφ.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 98A.1 (p. 643): ἐν ἔτει ςζαιε', ἰνδικτιῶνος α', ἐγεννήθη Ἄννα Λασκαρίνα Λεονταρίνα, ἡ ἑμὴ θυγάτηρ, ἐν μηνὶ νοεμβρίῳ κα' . . . ἡμέρα δευτέρα, μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ αὐοιδίου βασιλέως τοῦ διὰ τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθέντος Ἰωσήφ μοναχοῦ.
- 14 *Minus*, 3: τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἰωάννου εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην καὶ τῆς ἐλεύσεως ἐκεῖ τοῦ ἀγίου βασιλέως κυροῦ Μανουὴλ καὶ θείου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ δεσπότης κὺρ Ἀνδρονίκου εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην ἀποκαταστάσεως.
- 15 On Demetrios Laskaris Leontaris, see *PLP* 6: no. 14676 (p. 162). Leontaris was still in Thessalonica as late as 1416 *MP*, p. 279, n. 139). He was eventually recalled to the capital, but his presence there is not attested earlier than the fall of 1418.
- 16 *MP*, p. 280.
- 17 J. H. Kramers, "Musa Çelebi," in *Enzyklopädie des Islam*, vol. 3 (Leiden-Leipzig, 1928–1936), p. 799.
- 18 *CBB* 1: 72a.14 (p. 562): καὶ τότε ἐκάθισεν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, Μουσῆ σουλτάνος, καὶ ἔγινεν βασιλεὺς εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 29.7 (p. 215): ἐν ἔτει ςζιθ' ἠπλάλησεν ὁ Μουσῆς τὸν τόπον τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ἀπέκλεισε καὶ τὴν Μεσημβρίαν.
- 20 Doukas, 19.9: αὐτὸς [Musa] πήσας τὰς σκηνὰς τῆ μὲν γνώμη θαρρῶν ἦν, ὅτι γενήσεται ταύτης [Constantinople] κύριος, τῆ δὲ πράξει καὶ τῆ λοιπῇ δυνάμει μακρόθεν ἦν ἐστώς, πλὴν καθ' ἡμέραν οὐκ ἐπαύετο πολεμῶν καὶ πολεμιζόμενος παρὰ τῶν Πολιτῶν ἐξερχόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Πολῖται συνεπλέκοντο τοῖς Τούρκοις καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕνα Ῥωμαῖον τρεῖς ἔπιπτον Τούρκοι.
- 21 *Ibid.*: ἔλαβον οὖν ἐν πολέμῳ οἱ Τούρκοι ἕνα τῶν ἐνδόξων τὸν ἐπὶ τραπέζης Ἰωάννου τοῦ χρηματίσαντος βασιλέως, τοῦ βασιλέως Μανουὴλ υἱοῦ, ὃν καὶ ἀπέταμον αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι μαθόντες τὸ γεγονός ἐξεπόρτησαν καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ πολέμου καὶ κραυγῆς ἔφερον τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ οἱ Τούρκοι τῷ Μουσῆ ἐκόμισαν. On John Notaras and his death, see Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*, p. 169.
- 22 Doukas, 19.9: τότε Νικόλαος Νοταρᾶς, πατὴρ τοῦ τεθνηκότος, διερμηνευτῆς ὢν τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ Μανουὴλ, πλουσίος ὢν σφόδρα, ἐξαγοράσας διὰ πολλῶν κεντηναρίων τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔθαψε σὺν τῷ σώματι, μέγα πένθος ποιήσας Ῥωμαῖοις ὁ νέος ἐκεῖνος. On this family, cf. K.-P. Matschke, "The Notaras Family and Its Italian Connections," *DOP* 49 (1995) [*Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries*]: 59–72; and *idem*, "Personengeschichte, Familiengeschichte, Sozialgeschichte. Die Notaras im späten Byzanz," in L. Balleto, ed., *Oriente e occidente tra Medioevo et età moderna. Studi in onore di Geo Pistarino* (Geneva, 1997), pp. 787–812. Nikolaos Notaras held the titles of οἰκεῖος, καβαλλάριος, and διερμηνευτῆς. He had also acquired Venetian and Genoese citizenship (in 1390 and 1397, respectively). On Nikolaos, see C. Maltezou, *Ἄννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταρᾶ: Μιὰ Τραγικὴ Μορφή ἀνάμεσα στὸν Βυζαντινὸ καὶ τὸν Νέο Ἑλληνικὸ Κόσμο* [Βιβλιοθήκη Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν Βενετίας 23] (Venice, 2004), pp. 10, 11. On this family see, with caution, as there are errors, S. A. Koutibas, *Οἱ Νοταράδες στὴν Ὑπηρεσία τοῦ Ἑθνους* (Athens, 1968).
- 23 Doukas, 19.9 (text quoted *supra*, n. 22).
- 24 *Minus*, 3: καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ μέρη τῆς Λαρίσσου ἐκτυφλώσεως Ὁρχάνη, τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Μουλσουμάνου. On Orhan, see Kastritsis, *The sons of Bayezid*, pp. 169, 170.
- 25 Shaw, *Empire of the Gazis* 1, pp. 37 ff.; *MP*, pp. 258 ff.; *LCB*, pp. 341 ff.; and *LMB*, p. 504. Also see Doukas, 19.10.
- 26 *CBB* 1: 97.3 (p. 639), and 91.7 (p. 623), simply record the year of his death; *CBB* 1: 72a.18, (p. 563), supplies more information: ἔτους <ςζκαα> ἐσηκῶθη ὁ Στέφανος ὁ δεσπότης καὶ ὁ Κυρίτζης σουλτάνος [Mehmed Çelebi] καὶ ὑπῆγεν καταπάνω τοῦ

- Μουσή σουλτάνου και τὸν ἐνίκησαν καὶ ἔκοψαν τὴν κεφαλὴν του εἰς τὸν κάμπον τοῦ Τζαμουρλί, καὶ ἐπαρέλαβεν τὴν βασιλείαν ὁ σουλτὰν Κυρίτζης [= Çelebi], ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ. Also cf. *LMB*, pp. 505–509. Details in Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*, ch. 5.
- 27 *MP*, pp. 287–289; P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1958), pp. 48–51; *idem*, “De la défaite d’Ankara à la prise de Constantinople (une demi-siècle d’histoire ottomane),” *Revue des études islamiques* 12 (1938), 1–34; Shaw, *Empire of the Gazis* 1, pp. 41 ff.; and *LMB*, pp. 508, 509.
- 28 Doukas, 20.1: ὁ δὲ Μαχουμέτ . . . λέγων “ὑπάγετε, εἴπατε τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ὅτι βοηθεία Θεοῦ καὶ συνεργεία τοῦ ἐμοῦ πατρὸς καὶ βασιλέως ἐξωσάμην τὴν δύναμιν τὴν πατρικὴν. ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν δὲ εἰμι καὶ ἔσομαι ὑπήκοος αὐτῷ ὡς υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα οὐκ εἰμι γὰρ ἀγνώμων οὐδ’ ἀχάριστος ὀφθῆσομαι. κελευέτω μοι τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ, ἐγὼ δὲ μετὰ χαρᾶς ὅτι πλείστης ἔχω τοῦ δουλεύειν αὐτῷ.
- 29 Greek text (with English translation) in Dennis, *The Letters of Manuel II*, pp. 70, 71, who also summarizes in the introduction (pp. xlvii, xlvi) the very little that is known about Kaukadenos. Cf. *PLP* 5: no. 11561 (p. 163).
- 30 Dennis, *The Letters of Manuel II*, pp. 70, 71: ἐν μικρῷ μὲν οὐ φαύλῳ δ<έ> . . . θεάτρῳ.
- 31 *Ibid.*: ὅπως δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐκβήσεται, τοῦτο δ’ ἔσται ἦν τοῖν νέοις σαυτὸν σωφρονιστὴν ἐπιστήσας. ὁ δίκαιον εἶποις ἄν, εὐ οἶδα, καὶ ἅμα γε συνοῖσον κἀκείνοις τε καὶ τῇ θυγατρὶ καὶ οὐ χαλεπὸν οἶμαι πράξει ἐάν ἢ βουλομένη σοι. Another tutor for John VIII, who looked after him in the Morea while Manuel was away in Europe, was Theodoros Antiokhites (*PLP* 1: no. 1037 [p. 97]).
- 32 *MP*, p. 368, n. 120.
- 33 *Minus*, 5.1: ὅπερ ἦν καὶ αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ ἐλθεῖν τὸν γεννήσαντα με εἰς τὸν Μορέαν μετὰ τοῦ αὐθεντοπούλου κὺρ Θωμᾶ εἰς τάξις τατὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐμοῦ μετ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐπιτραπεζίου καὶ κελλιώτου αὐτοῦ, ὡς ὠρίσθημεν παρὰ τοῦ ἀγίου βασιλέως, τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ῥηθέντου αὐθεντοπούλου.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 15.5: μετὰ τοῦ δεσπότη κυροῦ Κωνσταντίνου εἶχον ἀγάπην καὶ πληροφορίαν, ἦν ὁ θεὸς ἀπεδέχετο, ὅτι τοῦ πατρὸς μου ἀδελφὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ τατὰς καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ του συνανάτροφοι καὶ φίλοι καὶ δοῦλοι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐγὼ μετ’ αὐτῶν.
- 35 Byzantine education is discussed in P. Koukoules, *Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμὸς*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1948), pp. 137 ff., who points out the correct meaning of the word τατὰς.
- 36 N. Moschopoulos, “Le siège et la prise de Constantinople selon les sources Turques,” in *Le Cinq-Centième Anniversaire de la Prise de Constantinople [L’Hellenisme Contemporain]* (Athens, 1953), p. 26, n. 6.
- 37 Doukas mentions that a young member of the Ottoman family in Prince John VIII’s retinue received education with John, 20.4: ὁ δ’ ἄλλος ἠράσθη παιδείας Ἑλληνικῆς ἔτι συνὸν τοῦ βασιλέως υἱῷ Ἰωάννῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ σχολείῳ ἐρχόμενος ἐμύετο γράμμασιν καὶ ἐδιδάσκετο.
- 38 *MP*, ch. 7. A long list of the known works authored by Manuel II is compiled in L. Petit, “Manuel II Paléologue,” in *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1927), cols. 1925–1932.
- 39 *Praecepta educationis regia* was influenced heavily by Greek orators. Manuel wrote another work also intended for his son, *Orationes ethico-politicae*, in which he discusses the moral standards expected by a prince. The texts of both works: *PG* 156: 313–384 and 385–557, respectively. Also, see *MP*, pp. 344, 345, n. 84.
- 40 So it is claimed in the so-called *Acta Graeca* of the Council of Florence; see *Quae supersunt actorum graecorum Concilii Florentini*, ed. J. Gill (Rome, 1953), p. 106.
- 41 *Vidimus apud imperatorem pleraque graeca volumina digna memoriae*, as quoted in J. Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus. A Character Study,” in *Silloque bizantina in onore di Silvio Giuseppe Mercati* [SBN 9] (Rome, 1957), p. 153 [= J. Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964), p. 105]. On the books that John VIII brought to Italy, see R. S. Nelson, “The Italian Appreciation and Appropriation of Illuminated Byzantine Manuscripts, ca. 1200–1450,” *DOP* 39 (1995) [*Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries*], pp. 209–237, esp. pp. 225–233.

- 42 Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus,” p. 105, who supports this statement by quoting the *Maius*; as this passage is not duplicated in the authentic *Minus*, it cannot be trusted. The word “poems” that appears in the *Maius* is absent in the *Minus*. Cf. criticism in *MP*, p. 383, n. 160.
- 43 *PkP* 3: 168–173.
- 44 Kritoboulos, 1.72.21: θνήσκει δὲ καὶ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος αὐτός, ἦρτο ἔφην, μαχόμενος, σώφρων μὲν καὶ μέτριος ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν βίῳ γενόμενος, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐς ἄκρον ἐπιμελεημένος, συνेतὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἄγων πεπαιδευμένων.
- 45 *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*, vol. 7, pp. 1–3, and vol. 4, pp. 463 ff. C. M. Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 39, 87, claims that Constantine was interested in philosophy; there is no solid evidence for this statement, even though Constantine was a patron of Pletion.
- 46 Dokeianos was a copyist of ancient manuscripts. Cf. *PkP* 1: μδ’ – μστ’; a partial list of the titles of the manuscripts in his possession survives (*PkP* 1: 1: 254). For the archaic tendencies in his style, see the brief remarks in M. Philippides, “Herodian 2.4.1 and Pertinax,” *CW* 77 (1984): 295–297. On Dokeianos as humanist, cf. S. P. Lampros, “Αἱ Βιβλιοθήκαι Ἰωάννου Μαρμαρᾶ καὶ Ἰωάννου Δοκείανου καὶ Ἀνώνυμος Ἀναγραφή Βιβλίων,” *NH* 1 (1904): 295–312; and *PLP* 3: no. 35577 (p. 57).
- 47 Ἰωάννου Δοκείανου Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὸν Βασιλέα Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον, *PkP* 1: 226, 227: οἶα δ’ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν καὶ τὰ τῆς παιδείας; . . . οἱ τε γὰρ σοὶ παιδαγωγοὶ καὶ διδάσκαλοι Κενταύρου παντὸς καὶ Φοίνικος νουνεχέστεροι καὶ σοφώτεροι, τάς τέ σοι σπουδαίας διατριβάς καὶ ζυναυλίας γενναιοτέρας καὶ λυσιτελεστέρας ἢ πείρα παρέστησε. καὶ ὡς ἀρχῆθέν σοι πάντα ὑποτέκταται τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἅπασαν πρᾶξιν καὶ βουλήν ὑφ’ ἡγεμονίᾳ τούτῳ ρυθμίζειν ἔκρινες, οὕτω καὶ διπλαῖς ἐπιχαιρεῖν παιδεύσεις, καὶ πάντα σοι καιρὸν ταύτας σχολάζειν κατὰ λόγον ἡγοῦ, τῇ μὲν ἵππασίᾳ καὶ θηρευτικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ γυμνασίοις πρὸς ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πολέμων ἀλκὴν ἐπαλείφουσι, τῇ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν καὶ ἐξέτασιν ἔργων καὶ τροπαίων τῶν παλαιῶν ταῖς μακρᾶς ἱστορίας καὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων ἀκρόασιν χρώμενος . . . τάς γὰρ τοῦ μεγάλου πατρὸς διδασκαλίας καὶ παραίνεσεις εὐφυῶς πάνυ καταμαθών. Text in *PkP* 1: 221–231.
- 48 *PkP* 1: 231: δαψιλῶς παράσχοι Χριστὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων καὶ βασιλείαν σοι δωρησόμενος μετὰ τῆς οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπίγειον (my emphasis).
- 49 Βασιλεὺς Βασιλέων Βασιλευόν Βασιλευόντων [or Βασιλεῦσι]. Professor Melville-Jones has suggested to me that Dokeianos may be ascribing a Jesus-like quality to Constantine, as orators were often fond of making this allusion to emperors.
- 50 Cf. *MP*, p. 424, on the prevailing style of the period: “Obscure and unusual tricks of Classical style are seized upon and used to absurd extremes. Logical syntax is distorted almost beyond recognition, and word order beyond all reason. Infinitives are used recklessly in place of participles. . . . Key words are deliberately omitted. . . . Grammar and vocabulary become pawns in a learned game, in which the one expert vies with the other to achieve a nirvana of esoteric enigma.” Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 38, dismisses this ἐγκώμιον as “almost wholly rhetorical bombast.”
- 51 Constantine XI’s active participation in the siege of 1453 has even come under question and certain scholars consider his participation in the defense minimal, at best; see M. Balard, “Constantinople vue par les témoins du siege de 1453,” in C. Mango and G. Dagron, eds., *Constantinople and its Hinterland* (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 169–177. See *infra*, ch. 11, sec. 2.
- 52 *Minus*, 17.8–10.
- 53 See, e.g., Sygrououlos, 6.3: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐζήτην δοθῆναι αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ πάπα ἵππους πρὸς ἵππασίαν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων. μετὰ δὲ παρέλευσιν οὖν μηνῶν καὶ μετὰ πολλὰς ἀπαιτήσεις ἔστειλεν αὐτῷ περιπίδια ἑνδεκα, μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν προτέρημα ἵππου ἔχοντα. καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἦν ἀρμόδιον τῷ βασιλεῖ, ἐτυχε δ’ ἐγγύς τότε ἐλθῶν ὁ Γουδέλης τῆς Ρωσίας ἐξονήσατο ὁ βασιλεὺς ἵππον ἕνα ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὗ ἐπιβαίνον τοῖς κυνηγεσίαις ἐσχόλαζε τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς τοῦ Γουδέλη ἵππους ἐπρίατο ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Δημήτριος εὐρῶν δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς μοναστήριον ἀπέχον τῆς Φεραρίας ὡσεὶ μίλια ἕξ,

- κατόκησεν ἐν αὐτῷ μετ' ὀλίγων ἀρχόντων καὶ στρατιωτῶν καὶ γιαντιζάρων, τοὺς πλείους ἐν τῇ Φεραρίᾳ, καὶ αἰεὶ τῇ θήρᾳ ἐνασχολεῖτο, μηδένα λόγον ποιούμενος περὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν.
- 54 The primary sources are gathered and discussed in P. Koukoules, “Κυνηγετικά ἐκ τῆς Ἐποχῆς τῶν Κομνηνῶν καὶ τῶν Παλαιολόγων,” *ΕΕΒΣ* 9 (1932): 3–33. As has been acutely observed, this pastime of John VIII is used in the narrative of Syropoulos in such a way as to suggest that the emperor neglected the business at hand; see the concluding remarks of Syropoulos, quoted *supra*, n. 53, for instance. Also see Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus,” p. 113. Constantine XI also enjoyed the chase. Sphrantzes has preserved numerous instances in which Constantine XI is portrayed as participating in this favorite sport of his; see, e.g., *Minus*, 13.2 and 31.8 (which states that Constantine XI was away from the capital, hunting boar).
- 55 *Minus*, 15.5.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 5.1.
- 57 *Supra*, sec. 2.
- 58 *Minus*, 3. Cf. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*, p. 41.
- 59 Doukas, 20.4.
- 60 According to Russian chronicles, the betrothal had been arranged by 1410/11; see E. von Muralt, *Essai de chronographie byzantine, 1057–1453* (St. Petersburg, 1871; repr.: 1966) 2: 793, n. 5. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 232, is under the wrong impression that Anna married John VIII in the last years of Bayezid’s reign; cf. *MP*, p. 153, n. 45; and S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), p. 276.
- 61 *MP*, p. 345, n. 86.
- 62 Anna was not crowned, because, Doukas states, she was too young, 20.3: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Μανουὴλ ἐν ἀδείᾳ ὦν καὶ μὴ ἔχων τὸν παρεμποδίζοντα, ἠβουλήθη γάμον ποιῆσαι τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννῃ καὶ στεῖλας εἰς τὸν ῥήγα Ῥωσίας, ἠγάγετο νόμφην τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἀρμόσας ταύτην, μετακαλέσας τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς Ἄνναν, οὐκ ἠβουλήθη στέψαι τότε εἰς βασιλέα, ἦν γὰρ ἡ κόρη τὸ ἐνδέκατον ἄγουσα ἔτος.
- 63 The letter of Vasilii has not survived. Its contents can be reconstructed from the patriarch’s reply; see E. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana*, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1860), no. 447 (pp. 188–192); partial translation and discussion of the patriarch’s argument in *MP*, pp. 105–111; D. Stacton, *The World on the Last Day: The Sack of Constantinople by the Turks, May 29, 1453: Its Causes and Consequences* (London, 1965), pp. 113, 114; W. V. Medlin, *Moscow and East Rome, a Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Muscovite Russia* [Études d’histoire économique, politique et social 1] (Geneva, 1952), pp. 69–71; P. Charanis, “Coronation and Its Constitutional Significance in the Later Roman Empire,” *Byz* 15 (1940/41): 64, 65; A. A. Vasiliev, “Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium?,” *Speculum* 7 (1932): 358, 359; and G. Ostrogorsky, “The Byzantine Empire and the Hierarchical World-Order,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 35 (1956): 1–14, esp. 9; partial translation of the letter: E. Barker, *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 194–196.
- 64 *MP*, p. 110.
- 65 See *RKOR*: 3268 (p. 85); A. A. Vasiliev, “Путешествие Византийского Императора Мануила Палеолога по Западной Европе (1399–1403 г.),” *Журнал Министертства Народнога Просвещения*, n.s. 39 (1912): 47–49; and *MP*, p. 153, n. 45.
- 66 For the wrong chronology in Sphrantzes, see R.-J. Loenertz, “Épitre de Manuel Paléologue aux moines David et Damien, 1416,” in *Silloge bizantina in onore di Silvio Giuseppe Mercati* [SBN 9] (Rome, 1957), pp. 294–296. Mazaris’ satire presents an account of Manuel’s journey and activities. Also cf. *MP*, p. 298.
- 67 Sphrantzes’ chronology is faulty, 4.1: τὸν δὲ Ἰούλιον μῆνα τοῦ κα^ο ἔτους ἐξελθὼν ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον Θάσον ὁ ἅγιος βασιλεὺς κύρ Μανουὴλ καὶ

- ἀπῆρην αὐτὴν τὸν Σεπτέμβριον τοῦ κβ^{οῦ} ἔτους. Mazaris supplies the details, 177 (80): κατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τῆ στασιασάσῃ πολυυμνήτῳ Θάσῳ, κάκεισε τρεῖς μῆνας ἐνδιατρίψας ὕφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐποιήσατο πᾶσαν μετὰ δυνάμεώς τε καρτερῶς καὶ πετροβόλον μηχανημάτων. Manuel campaigned against Giorgio Gattilusio, the bastard son of the Genoese lord of Lesbos; cf. *MP*, p. 299; and W. Miller, "The Gattilusij of Lesbos (1355–1462)," *BZ* 22 (1913): 406–447 [= *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge, 1921), pp. 313–352]. Mompherratos, *Oi Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 35, and *DGM* 1: 167, are under the impression that Manuel was campaigning against Aeneas Rhaoul and Vranas, two local barons of Thasos; criticism in *MP*, p. 300, n. 11.
- 68 *Minus*, 4.1: εἶτ' ἀπ' ἐκεῖ ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην. Mazaris, 177 (80): εἶτα μέχρι καὶ Θεσσαλονίκης τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐλθόντος καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖσε πάντ' εὐθὺς καὶ ὡς εἰκὸς διαθεμένου. Manuel remained in Thessalonica from September 1414 until March 1415. It was at this time that he entertained several delegations from Mount Athos. Among the latter were probably the monks David and Damian, whom he befriended and to whom he addressed his letter 68 [= Dennis, *The Letters of Manuel II*, pp. 206–218]. Also cf. Loenertz, "Épître de Manuel Paléologue."
- 69 For the activities of Manuel and Mount Athos, see P. Lemerle, "Autour d'un prostagma inédit de Manuel II. L'aulè de Sire Gui à Thessalonique," *Silloge bizantina 'in onore di Silvio Giuseppe Mercati* [SBN 9] (Rome, 1957), pp. 271–286. Official documents: *RKOR*: 3211 (p. 78), 3340 (p. 99), 3342 (pp. 99, 100), 3343 (p. 100), 3344 (p. 100), and 3346 (p. 101).
- 70 *DGM* 1: 169 considers this project "un de plus brillants succès de la politique de Manuel en Morée." A more realistic view in M. C. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia, 1992), pp. 116, 117: "Manuel would have scored high with the Hexamilion. But the dreadful record of this fortification, which the Turks seem to have breached whenever they pleased, lends a certain pathetic irony to Dionysios Zakynthinos' claim that the Hexamilion was 'one of the more brilliant successes of Manuel's Morean policy.'" In addition, cf. *MP*, pp. 310–316; S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), p. 67; and Topping, "The Morea, 1364–1460," p. 162. See J. W. Barker, "On the Chronology of the Activities of Manuel II Palaeologus in the Morea in 1415," *BZ* 55 (1962): 39–55.
- 71 For discussion concerning the various walls, cf. S. P. Lampros, "Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἴσθμου τῆς Κορίνθου κατὰ τοὺς Μέσους Αἰῶνας," *NH* 2 (1905): 435–489; J. R. Wiseman, "A Trans-Isthmian Fortification Wall," *Hesperia* 32 (1963): 248–275; E. W. Bodnar, "The Isthmian Fortifications in Oracular Prophecy," *AJA* 64 (1960): 165–171; R. L. Hohlfelder, "Trans-Isthmian Walls in the Age of Justinian," *GRBS* 18 (1977): 173–179; T. E. Gregory, "The Late Roman Wall at Corinth," *Archaeology* 35 (1982): 14–21; P. A. Clement, "The Date of the Hexamilion," in *Studies in Memory of Basil Laourdas* (Thessalonica, 1975), pp. 157–164; and M. S. Kordosis, *Συμβολὴ στὴν Ἱστορία καὶ Τοπογραφία τῆς Περιοχῆς Κορίνθου στοὺς Μέσους Χρόνους* [Βιβλιοθήκη Ἱστορικῶν Μελετῶν 159] (Athens, 1981). For the Hexamilion from the archaeological perspective, see T. E. Gregory, *The Hexamilion and the Fortress [Isthmia 5]* (Athens and Princeton, 1993).
- 72 *Minus*, 4.2. Sphrantzes' information (see next note) is duplicated verbatim (with correct chronology) in two entries: *CBB* 1: 35.5 (p. 286), and 40.1 (p. 314). Cf. Barker, "On the Chronology of the Activities of Manuel II," 39–55, who has further rejected the hypotheses of G. Schirò, "Manuele II Palaeologo incorona Carlo Tocco despota di Gianina," *Byz* 29/30 (1959/60): 209–230, and has confirmed the chronology established by Loenertz, "Épître de Manuel Paléologue;" and *DGM* 1:169; and *PaL* 2: 5. Entries in short chronicles: *CBB* 1: 22.24 (p. 183), 32.33 (p. 234), 33.26 (p. 246), and 36.13 (p. 292). Doukas, 20.8, also has conflated Manuel's earlier trip with the present campaign, without mentioning the Hexamilion: ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπάρας ἀπὸ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως σὺν τριήρεσι πλείσταις κατῆλθεν ἕως Πελοπόννησον καὶ τὸν πρίγκιπα Ἀχαΐας ὑποτάξας καὶ ἐτέρους ἀπογόνους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ναύαρρας καταγομένους ὑποχειρίους λαβὼν, ἀνήκεν εἰς Κωνσταντινούπολιν, καταλιπὼν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Θεόδωρον δεσπότην πάσης Πελοποννήσου. The inscription [*JG* IV: 204; also included in N. A. Bees, *Die*

- griechisch-christlichen Inschriften des Peloponnes* (Athens, 1941), no. 1, 1–4] is also cited in a Paris manuscript, *Codex 1278*, fol. 172 with faulty grammar and curious spelling. In 1883 the inscription, currently in the Corinth Museum, was rediscovered and was removed for storage; Gregory, *The Hexamilion*, pp. 12–14, in Plate 1a, supplies a black-and-white photograph of it. The inscription seems to postdate 548 (the year of Theodora's death), since the empress is not mentioned. See S. P. Lampros, “Σημειώματα περί Αρχαίων Ἑλληνικῶν Ἐπιγραφῶν ἐν Μεσαιωνικοῖς Κώδιξι καὶ Χειρογράφοις Συλλογαῖς Ἑσπερίων Λογίων,” *NH* 1 (1904): 257–279, esp. 268 ff., who notes that other authors of the time, such as Isidore, mentioned the discovery of inscriptions at the Hexamilion, indicating an interest in epigraphy among intellectuals. Most sources (with scholarship and commentary) on the *quattrocento* Hexamilion are assembled in Gregory, *The Hexamilion*, ch. 3: “The Testimonia,” pp. 11–27.
- 73 *Minus*, 4.2: ἐνὶ τῷ μῆκος οὐργιῆς γω΄. ἀνέστησε δὲ πύργους ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ρηγ΄. εὐρέθησαν καὶ γράμματα ἐν μαρμάρῳ λέγοντα οὕτως φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, φυλάξῃ τὸν αὐτοκράτορα Ἰουστινιανὸν καὶ τὸν πιστὸν αὐτοῦ δοῦλον Βικτωρίνον καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οἰκοῦντας τοὺς ἐκ θεοῦ ζῶντας.
- 74 *RKOR*: 3351 (p. 102), 3352 (p. 102), and 3354 (pp. 102, 103); for evidence missing in *RKOR*, cf. *MP*, p. 315, n. 26; *DGM* 1:168, 169; and W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant, a History of Frankish Greece* (London, 1908; repr.: 1964), p. 377.
- 75 Historical evidence is embedded in Mazaris’ *Διάλογος Νεκρικός*, in Manuel’s letter addressed to two monks (*supra*, n. 66), and in a speech by Chrysoloras, whose Greek text is published in *PkP* 3: 222–245, esp. pp. 242, 243; also see *DGM* 1: 174. Mazaris provides his own views on the ethnic make-up of the Morea and illustrates the Constantinopolitan prejudice towards native Moreots. On the nobles of the Morea and on the general question of what constituted “nobility” in the Palaeologan period, see A. E. Laiou, “The Byzantine Aristocracy in the Palaeologan period: A Story of Arrested Development,” *VMRS* 4 (1973): 131–151. The insurrection is treated in *MP*, pp. 316, 317.
- 76 Chrysoloras, *PkP* 3: 242, 243: Ἰσθμὸς ἦν τῇ νήσῳ . . . φρουρῶν αὐτὴν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους κωλύων τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ βλάβης καὶ τηρῶν αὐτὴν αὐτοῖς ἄμαχον ὃ χρόνος λύσιν ἐπέθηκε τοιαύτην, ὡς μὴδὲ λείψανον αὐτοῦ φαίνεσθαι . . . τοσοῦτον ἔργον ἀδύνατον ἅπασιν ἐνομιζέτο καὶ ἀνεπιχείρητον εἶναι παντὶ. ὁ βουλευσάμενος εἰς ἑαυτὸν αὐτοκράτωρ ἅμα τῷ ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἔσπευδεν ἀνῦσαι τὸ βούλευμα, καὶ παραγενόμενος τῶν ἔργων ἐφάπτεται καὶ τοὺς οἰκοῦντας δέον ὁμολογεῖν αὐτῷ χάριτας ὃ τι πλείστας καὶ προσάγειν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος εὐπορή . . . οἱ δὲ τάναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις βουλεύονται καὶ κωλύειν ἀρχὴν ἐπεχειροῦν ἀρίστης τὸν ἡγεμόνα βουλής, πρῶτον μὲν λάθρα καὶ βουλευόμενοι καὶ δρώντες ὅσον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔργου φθοράν, καὶ τέλος πολέμοιο τῷ κρατοῦντι φανερῶς γίνονται, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν φυγῇ τὰ φρούρια κατασχόντες, οἱ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθισταμένοις συνέτρεχον. ὁ δὲ γενναῖος, πάντα θέμενος ἐν δευτέρῳ, πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς πολεμίους βουλεύεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν ἂ χρηὶ πράττειν ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος ὑψηγῆται, τοῖς δ’ ὡς σύμβουλος ἢ διδάσκαλος ἀγαθὸς παραγγέλει, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν εὐεργεσίας αὐτοῖς ὑπισχεγῆται, ποτὲ δὲ τούτοις ἀπειλεῖ κάκιστα, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν ἐλπίδι, τοὺς δὲ φόβῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐλκύσει ῥαδίως καὶ γενναῖος ἤδη πάντα ποιήσειεν. ὁ δὲ καὶ γέγονε.
- 77 *PkP* 3: 165, 166: παρὰ τὴν νῆσον γίνεταί Θάσον, καὶ πολιορκήσας ταύτην, τῇ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπανέσσωσε ἡγεμονία, καὶ Θετταλῶν εὐθύς καταλαμβάνει τὴν μητρόπολιν. καὶ ταύτην εὐ διαθεῖς ἀνὰ τὴν Πέλοπος ἤκεν εὐθύς, καί, Κεγχρεαῖς προσορμίσας καὶ Κορινθου ἐπιβὰς τειγίζει Πελοποννήσου πάντα τὸν ἰσθμὸν . . . θάττον ἤπερ ῥόντο πάντες . . . καὶ τὴν Πέλοπος καταστησάμενος πᾶσαν, τυραννίδος ἐπειλημμένους ἐξεῶλον τινας, ταύτην ἐπιτρέπει τῷ μετὰ βασιλέα τελοῦντι τὸν νόον.
- 78 *BCIII*, 5.2: καί, ὡσάν τὸν ἐδυνάμωσε, ἔβαλε τὸν ἀδελφὸ τοῦ τὸν δεσπότη νὰ ὀρίξη τὸν Μορέα καὶ νὰ τόνε φυλάη. καὶ ἔβαλε τοὺς Μοραῖτες νὰ ἔχουνε ἔγνωια καὶ νὰ τόνε φυλάουσι, καὶ νὰ τοὺς πληρώνουσι οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ Μορέως. ἀμμη αὐτοὶ ἐναντιήθησαν καὶ δὲν ἠθέλωνε νὰ πληράνουσι. καὶ τότε τοὺς ἔπασε νὰ τοὺς πάγη εἰς τὴν Πόλι νὰ τοὺς παιδέγη. καί, ὡς εἶδανε αὐτά, ἐστέρξανε καὶ στανίους, διατὶ εἶχε πολλὴ ἀγάπη ὁ βασιλεὺ μὲ τὸν σουλτὰν Μεχεμέτη.

- 79 *CBB* 1: 33.27 (p. 249): και ἐπίασε τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς Μωραΐτες, ἰουλλίω τε΄.
- 80 *MP*, p. 318; and *LCB*, p. 344. The *Minus*, 4.3, also reports his return: και τῷ κδ^ο ἔτει μηνὶ Μαρτίῳ ἐπανέστρεψεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν.
- 81 *RdD* 2: 1583 describes John as *illustrissimus* (with the emendation suggested in *MP*, p. 314, n. 23).
- 82 *Minus*, 4.4: και τῷ κε^ο ἔτει ἀπῆλθε εἰς τὸν Μορέαν ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης ἐν ὄρα φθινοπώρου. John’s campaign is overlooked by the short chronicles. The chronology of his activities is established in M. T. Laskaris, “John VIII Palaeologus in Thessalonica during the Siege of 1416,” *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης* 6 (1952): 340–344.
- 83 *MP*, pp. 340–342. Mustafa may, or may not, have been a true son of Bayezid. Doukas seems to believe that Mustafa was indeed the son of Bayezid; see, e.g., 22.2: κάκεϊ διάγων [Mehmed I] ἦλθε μῆνυμα, πῶς ὁ ὕστατος τῶν ἀδελφῶν αὐτοῦ, Μουσταφᾶς ὀνομαζόμενος, υἱὸς τοῦ προρρηθέντος Παγιαζήτ, ἦν ἐν τῇ Βλαχίᾳ διάγων. It was in 1415 that Timur’s successor, Shahrukh, released Mustafa (whom the Porte propaganda styled *düzme*, “the pretender”); see Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*, pp. 2, 3; Mustafa’s struggle was probably connected with a social upheaval under the Islamic mystic Şeyh Bedreddin; see *ibid.*, pp. 16–18 and 160–164.
- 84 On Juneid (Cüneyd), see J. H. Mordtmann, “Djunaid,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* 1 (Leiden and Boston, 1986): cols. 1063, 1064; G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica* 2 (Berlin, 1958), p. 313; E. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice, 1983), pp. 83–89; A. Nimet (Kurat), *Die türkische Prosopographie bei Laonikos Chalkokandyles* (Hamburg, 1933), pp. 45, 46; and Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*, pp. 49, 50, 183, 184.
- 85 See Laskaris, “John VIII Palaeologus in Thessalonica.”
- 86 *MP*, p. 342. Mehmed I agreed to pay 300,000 aspers annually for his rival’s maintenance.
- 87 *RKOR*: 3361. For a reconstruction of these events (accepted by *MP*, p. 343, n. 83), see N. Iorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 1 (Gotha, 1900), p. 374.
- 88 *PkP* 3: 173, 174: τοῦ γὰρ ἡγεμόνος τῶν βαρβάρων ἀδελφὸς προσφυγῶν τῇ πόλει ταραχὴν και ζημίαν οὐκ ὀλίγην ἀνά πᾶσαν ἔσπειρε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνου . . . τοῦ . . . ἄρχοντος . . . τὴν πόλιν ἐκείνην ἀρπάσειν ἀπειλούντος, εἰ μὴ ἐκδοτοὶ οἱ πολῖται τὸν αὐτόμολον και πρὸς τιμωρίαν δοῖεν αὐτῷ, ὁ θεϊότατος . . . βασιλεὺς τοῖς . . . πολίταις ἔλυσεν εὐθὺς ἐκείνοις τὰ δεινὰ και τὸν προσφυγόντα τῇ πόλει σὼν ἐκείθεν ἐκβαλὼν παρὰ τὴν νῆσον στέλλει Λήμνον.
- 89 *Minus*, 4.4. The *BCIII*, 5.5, claims that Mustafa was sent to Μυτιλήνη. This is probably a copyist’s error. The Italian name for Lemnos at this time was “Stalimene” (a corruption of the phrase στή Λήμνο, no doubt) and a change from “Stalimene” to “Mytilene” cannot be ruled out.
- 90 *Minus*, 4.4: και τῷ κε^ο ἔτει ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὸν Μορέαν ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης ἐν ὄρα τοῦ φθινοπώρου ἐν ᾧ δὴ καιρῷ, εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην διερχόμενος, τὸν πλαστὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Παϊαζήτου ἐκείνον τὸν Μουσταφᾶν ἀπῆρε διωκόμενον παρὰ τοῦ τάχα ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Μεχεμέτι και εἰς τὴν Λήμνον ἀπέστειλε, μετέπειτα δὲ εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν.
- 91 Cf., among others, *DGM* 1: 181 ff.; *MP*, p. 346; Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολογοὶ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, pp. 40–48; Topping, “The Morea, 1364–1460,” pp. 162, 163; and *PaL* 2: 10–12.
- 92 *PkP* 3: 174, 175: τοῦτο βαλόμενος εἰς νοῦν και καλῶς συναερακῶς και τὰς δυνάμεις συναθροίσας, τὴν Μεσσηνίαν οὐδὲ ὄλου μηνὸς ἐντὸς παρεστήσατο πᾶσαν, φρούρια και πόλεις ἔχουσαν ἐγγύς που τριάκοντα . . . ἐάλωσαν δὲ και αὐτῷ τινες τῶν Ἡλείων πόλεις . . . εἰς δὲ μετὰ χρόνον και πολλὴν τὴν πολιορκίαν πόλις καλὴ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν καλῷ τῆς Ἀχαΐδος παρὰ τῷ Κρισαίῳ κειμένη κόλπω.
- 93 *PaL* 2: 10, 11.
- 94 *Ibid.*, p. 11, n. 27, and *DGM* 1: 168, 169.
- 95 *MP*, pp. 346, 347, and accompanying notes.

- 96 The sources consist mainly of the panegyric by Isidore, of a chronicle from Cephalonia (cf. Schirò, “Manuele II Palaeologos”), and of diplomatic material from Venice.
- 97 *Pal* 2: 10–12.
- 98 *Ibid.*, p. 11, n. 28.
- 99 *Minus*, 6.1: και εις τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ κς^{ου} ἔτους ἐστάλη και εις τὸν Μορέαν παρὰ τοῦ ἁγίου βασιλέως και πατρὸς αὐτοῦ και ὁ αὐθεντόπουλος κύρ Θωμάς ἐν ᾧ δὴ χρόνῳ ἐπανεστρεψεν εις τὴν Πόλιν και ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης. Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 48; *DGM* 1: 184; and *MP*, pp. 347, 348, and n. 92.
- 100 *Minus*, 5.2: τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θανατικοῦ γενομένου περὶ τὸ ἔαρ και θέρος εις τὴν Πόλιν, ἐν μηνὶ Αὐγούστῳ ἀπέθανε και ἡ δέσποινα κυρὰ Ἄννα ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥωσίας λοιμῶδει νόσῳ και ἐτάφη ἐν τῇ τοῦ Λιβὸς μονῆ.
- 101 The (bubonic?) plague is mentioned in *CBB* 1: 28 (p. 247), which counts it as the eighth outbreak: ἔτους ζακς' ἐγένονεν τὸ ὄγδοον θανατικόν.
- 102 Doukas, 20.3: περαιουμένων δὲ τριῶν ἐτῶν [since the wedding of John and Anna] και λοιμικῆς νόσου καταλαβούσης τῇ Πόλει και πολὺ πλῆθος λαοῦ διὰ τοῦ βομβῶνος τεθηγκότος, ἐτελεύτησε και ἡ βασιλις Ἄννα, μέγα πένθος καταλιπούσα τοῖς Πολίταις.
- 103 *CBB* 1: 97.4 (p. 639).
- 104 *DGM* 1: 184.
- 105 *Minus*, 5.1: ὄπερ ἦν και αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ ἐλθεῖν τὸν γεννησάντᾳ με εις τὸν Μορέαν μετὰ τοῦ αὐθεντοπούλου κύρ Θωμᾶ . . . και ἐμοῦ . . . και ἡτομαζόμεθα, και ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἐμοῦ πρῶτος ἀδελφὸς ἦν εις τὸν Μορέαν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.
- 106 *Ibid.*, 5.2.
- 107 Pope Martin V (elected in 1418) had been impressed by Manuel's project of fortifying the Hexamilion and granted indulgences to all Latins who assisted in the erection of the fortifications and to those who helped with its maintenance. See Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 68; also see *idem*, “The Marriages,” pp. 276, 277; on the match negotiations, see *MP*, pp. 347, 348.
- 108 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 69; and *DGM* 1:188–190.
- 109 *Minus*, 6.2: ἐν ἧ δὲ στέψει ἐγγέγονει ὄντως ἐορτῶν ἐορτῆ και πανηγύρις πανηγύρεων.
- 110 *CBB* 1: 22.31 (p. 185), supplies a contaminated chronology; *CBB* 1: 100.6 (p. 652) supplies details: ἐστέρθη δὲ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννης ὁ Παλαιολόγος ἐν τῷ ναῶ τῆς ἁγίας Σοφίας ὑπὸ τοῦ πατριάρχου Ἰωσήφ, ἐν ἔτει ζακθ', ἰνδικτικῶνος ἰδ', ἡμέρα κυριακῆ τοῦ Ἀσώτου. The *Minus*, 6.2, presents confusion and states that the wedding took place on January 19, 1419. The actual date is established in F. Dölger, “Die Krönung Johannes' VIII. zum Mitkaiser,” *BZ* 36 (1936): 318, 319. *CBB* 1: 9.48 (98): ζακθ', 6929 (*anno mundi*, i.e., A.D. 1421).
- 111 *MP*, p. 350.
- 112 *Ibid.*, pp. 343, 350.
- 113 *Minus*, 23.7: ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ υἱὸς μου ἐνὶ μὲν ἀρμοδίως βασιλεῖ, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος δὲ καιροῦ. βλέπει γὰρ και φρονεῖ μεγάλα και τοιαῦτα, οἷα οἱ καιροὶ ἐχρηζον τῆς εὐημερίας τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν ἄμη σήμερον, ὡσάν παρακολουθοῦσιν εις ἡμᾶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ βασιλέα θέλει ἡ ἡμῶν ἀρχή, ἀλλ' οἰκονόμον και φοβοῦμαι, μήποτε ἐκ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων και ἐπιχειρημάτων αὐτοῦ γένηται χαλασμός τοῦ ὄσπιτιου τούτου . . . προεῖδον γὰρ και τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτοῦ και τὰ ἐδόξαζε κατορθῶσαι με τὸν Μουσταφᾶν, εις τί κίνδυνον μᾶς ἔφερεν.
- 114 *Minus*, 7.1, 2, 3. The chronology is established in *MP*, pp. 351, 352. For the faulty chronology of Sphrantzes, cf. Dölger, “Die Krönung Johannes' VIII.,” and *RKOR*: 3384 (p. 107). The incident, it has been concluded, took place in the late winter of 1420 or early spring of 1421 (*MP*, p. 352, n. 99).
- 115 *Minus*, 7.1: και τῷ κη^ο ἔτει ἦλθεν ὁ ἀμηρὰς ὁ και Κυρίτζης και Μεχεμέτης, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως περάσῃ εις τὴν Ανατολήν και προμαθόντες ὡς ἐν μυστηρίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκείνου, ὅτι ὑπάγει, ἵνα τὰ τῆς Ανατολῆς διορθῶσῃ, και, ὡσάν ἐπιστρέψη, ἔχει σκοπὸν και μελέτην ἐλθεῖν κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως.

116 *Ibid.*, 7.1.

117 It has been suggested that these “oaths” refer to a treaty that Manuel and Mehmed may have concluded one year earlier (*RKOR*: 3383 [p. 107]). *MP*, p. 353, n. 99, demonstrates that the “oaths” refer to the original pact between Manuel and Mehmed, which dated back to 1413.

118 *Minus*, 7.2: διὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ τινα τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ ἔστειλεν εἰς συνάντησιν αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ ἄσεβοῦς, ἀλλὰ μόνους τὸν ἄριστον ἄνδρα Δημήτριον τὸν Λεοντάρην, Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἀσάνην καὶ Μανουὴλ πρωτοστράτορα τὸν Καντακουζηνὸν μετὰ πολλῶν ἀρχοντοπούλων καὶ στρατιωτῶν καὶ δώρων. The importance of this passage in connection with Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos is noted by Ganchou, “Le mésazon Démétrius Paléologue Cantacuzène,” p. 245, who also notes the scarcity of material on the *protostrator*, an elusive personality, at best: “Le protostrator Manuel Cantacuzène, haut dignitaire byzantin du 15e siècle, ne nous est connu que par les Mémoires de Georges Sphrantzès. Hors son témoignage aucune autre source, documents officiels, épigraphiques, littéraires, n’en a conservé la trace.”

119 G. Walter, *La Ruine de Byzance, 1204–1453* (Paris, 1958), p. 308, demonstrates that the war faction was made up of members of the younger generation of the court and attributes their aggressive tendencies to the fact that Byzantium had experienced a break from the direct threat it had earlier felt. In spite of the opinion expressed in *MP*, p. 351, n. 98, Walter’s position seems reasonable and there is no reason to discard it offhand.

120 *Minus*, 8.1.

121 *Ibid.*: καὶ ἡμέραι παρήλθον, ἰδοὺ ἀπὸ τούτου τὸ κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως ἀπεκαλύφθη μυστήριον καὶ θροῦς μέγας ἐγένετο καὶ βουλή καὶ μελέτη καὶ πολλοὺς ἐλέγχους ὁ ἄγιος ἔλαβε βασιλεὺς παρὰ τῶν βουλευόντων, ἵνα πείσῃ αὐτόν.

122 *DGM* 1:191–196; the campaign lasted until 1423, when the Turahan’s invasion put a stop to it.

123 *Minus*, 7.4: ἵνα περὶ τῶν προμελετωμένων μάθῃ . . . καὶ ἐκείνον ἐλέγξῃ διὰ τῆς καλῆς ἀγάπης καὶ τιμῆς, ἧς πρὸς ἐκείνον ἐπεδείξαντο, καὶ διὰ τοῦ περάματος καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀποκρισίου, τοῦ προσώπου λέγω καὶ τῶν δώρων, ὧν προσεκόμιζεν. Cf. *MP*, pp. 353, 354.

124 *Minus*, 8.1., 2: ἐκείνος [Mehmed I] δὲ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀπέθανεν. καὶ τὸν μὲν Λεοντάρην τὸ τυχὸν οὐκ ἐποίησαν, ἀλλ’ ἦν εἰς τὴν κατοῦναν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τάχα θαυμάζον πῶς οὐδὲν παρακαλεῖται αὐτὸν ὁ αὐθέντης, ἵνα καὶ τὰ τῆς δουλείας αὐτοῦ ἀκούσῃ. τούτου μαθόντος τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατ’ αὐτὴν δὲ σχεδὸν τὴν ὥραν, ἐπειδὴ τὰς στρατὰς ἔκλεισαν κρυφίως τὰς φερούσας εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, καὶ πολλοὺς γραμματοκομιστὰς ἀποστείλας ὁ Λεοντάρης, οὐδὲν τοὺς ἀφήκαν νὰ διέλθουν . . . μόλις οὖν ποτὲ δι’ ἄλλης ὁδοῦ τῆς εἰς Μεσέμβριαν ἀπαγούσης, στείλας ὁ Λεοντάρης ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκεῖ διὰ θαλάσσης ἐλθόντος ἔφερε γραφὴν, ὅτι ὁ ἄμηνος ἀπέθανεν. Mehmed I died of apoplexy in Adrianople on May 4, 1421. See Doukas, 22.8: ὁ γὰρ Μαχουμέτ ἐν κунηγίῳ ἰπτεῦον καὶ υἱὸς ἐξερχομένου ἐκ τοῦ δρυμῶνος καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ δόρυ κινῶν κατὰ τοῦ θηρίου, πίπτει τοῦ ἵππου ἐπιληψία κεκρατημένης ἡμίξερος. ἄρτανες δ’ αὐτὸν ἦγαγον ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ, ἦν γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῆς Ἀδριανουῦ θηρεύων. μετακαλεσάμενοι οὖν τοὺς δοκιμωτάτους τῶν ἱατρῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐγγυὺς καὶ τοὺς πόρρω, ἀνεβοήθουν αὐτὸν τάχα . . . τῇ δὲ ἐπιούσῃ πάλιν ἐπιληψίας εἰσπεσούσης καὶ φωνὴν καὶ γλώτταν κωλυθεὶς ἐσπέρας ἤδη καταλαβούσης ἀπέδωκεν τὸ χρεῶν ἐπὶ τῆς στρωμνῆς αὐτοῦ. It sounds as if the sultan had suffered a series of massive strokes. Discussion of the date of his death in *MP*, p. 355, n. 101. A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), Tables 15 and 25, places the death of Mehmed I on May 26. For the epigraphic evidence from Mehmed’s tomb, see F. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur frühosmanischen Epigraphik und Archäologie,” *Der Islam* 30 (1932): 109–186, esp. 147, 148. Mehmed’s death is also mentioned briefly in *CBB* 1: 93.9 (p. 623), and 97.5 (p. 639); *CBB* 1: 72.22 (p. 564), is more detailed: εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἀπέθανεν ὁ σουλτάν Κυρίτζης [= *Çelebi*, i.e., Mehmed I] καὶ ἔγινεν βασιλεὺς ὁ σουλτάν Μωράτης, ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ. On Mehmed’s death, cf. S. Kougeas,

- “Notizbuch eines Beamten der Metropolis im Thessalonike aus dem Anfang des XV. Jahrhunderts,” *BZ* 23 (1914–1919): 151, 152. For an assessment of Mehmed’s reign, see Shaw, *Empire of the Gazis*, pp. 41 ff.
- 125 *Minus*, 8.3: καὶ ἰδοὺ ἔπεσον εἰς ἑτέραν φροντίδα καὶ βουλὴν καὶ μελέτην, πότερον νὰ ἔχωσι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν Μουράτην ἀγάπην καὶ νὰ παραχωρήσωσι εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐθέντην, ὡς καὶ τὰ ὀρκωμωτικά αὐτῶν διελάμβανον, ἢ νὰ φέρωσι τὸν Μουσταφᾶν . . . καὶ ποιήσωσι αὐτὸν αὐθέντην εἰς τὴν Δύσιν καὶ ὁ Μουράτης ἔνι εἰς τὴν Ἀνατολὴν αὐθέντης. τοῦ μὲν ἀγίου βασιλέως καὶ πατρὸς τὸ πρῶτον βουλευομένου καὶ κρίνοντος δίκαιον ἐκ πολλῶν αἰτιῶν, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ Καντακουζηνοῦ Δημητρίου, ὅτι νὰ ποιήσουν τὸ δεύτερον.
- 126 *Ibid.*
- 127 *BCIII*, 6.3: καὶ ὁ πατέρας τοῦ βασιλέως, ὁ γέροντας, ἔλεγε τοῦ υἱοῦ του τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅτι: “δὲν εἶναι δίκαιο νὰ χαλάσωμε τὴν ἀγάπην ὅπου ἔχομε μὲ τὸν σουλτᾶν Μουράτη, μήπως . . . καὶ νικήσῃ ὁ σουλτᾶν Μουράτης καὶ θέλωμε ἔχει μάχες καὶ κίνδυνα” . . . ἀμμή τὰ λόγια τοῦ γέροντος βασιλέως δὲν ἐπίστανε, μόνο τοῦ νέου.
- 128 *Ibid.*, 6.2: καὶ ἐτοῦτα τὰ πράματα, ὅπου ἐκαταπίαστηκαν οἱ φρόνιμοι Ρωμαῖοι, ἔκαμνε χρεια νὰ τὰ κάμουνε πρωτότερα, ὅταν ἐπολέμησε ὁ Ταμερλάνος μὲ τὸν σουλτᾶν Μπαγιαζίτη καὶ ἐπῆρε τὸν σουλτᾶν Μπαγιαζίτη καὶ ἐχάλασε καὶ τὸ φουσσᾶτο του . . . καὶ ὄχι τώρα, ὅπου ἐδυναμώσανε καὶ ἔγινε βασιλέας ὁ σουλτᾶν Μουράτης καὶ τὸν ἐκάμετε ἐχθρό. καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπεράσανε τόσοι βασιλεῖς Ρωμαῖοι φρονιμώτατοι καὶ ἀνδρειωμένοι ἀμμή τί νὰ πῶ, ὅπου αὐτοὶ οἱ ὕστεροι βασιλεῖς ἦτανε ἡ ἀφορμὴ καὶ ἐχάθη τόσοσ λαὸς καὶ τόσοσ χώρες καὶ τόσοσ χριστιανοί.
- 129 *Minus*, 8.3: μόλις δὲ ποτε οἰοεὶ ὡς κατὰ παραχώρησιν δέδωκεν ἐξουσίαν ὁ ἅγιος βασιλεὺς τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ “ὡς θέλεις, ἐπειτῶν, ποιήσον ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰμί, υἱέ μου καὶ γέρον καὶ ἀσθενής καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ θανάτου, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν καὶ τὰ αὐτῆς δέδοκα πρὸς σέ καὶ ποιήσον, ὡς θέλεις.” Cf. *MP*, p. 356, n. 102.
- 130 E. A. Zachariadou, “The Conquest of Adrianople by the Turks,” *Studi Veneziani* 12 (1970): 211–217.
- 131 *Minus*, 9.1, states that Mustafa was brought back from the Morea: μετὰ κατέργου ἀπελθόντος εἰς τὴν Καλλιπόλιν τοῦ βασιλέως κύρ Ἰωάννου, ἀμῆρᾶν τὸν Μουσταφᾶν φέρον ἀπὸ τοῦ Μορέως αὐθέντην ἐξεβάλεν εἰς τὴν Δύσιν. Cf. *MP*, pp. 342, 343, and n. 83. That Demetrios Laskaris [= Leontaris] was dispatched to escort Mustafa from the island of Lemnos is stated explicitly in Doukas, 23.7: τότε οὖν χρείας κατεπειγούσης τριήρεις δέκα, ὡς χρῆ, ἐκ τῆς Κωνσταντίνου τῷ Δημητρίῳ τῷ Λάσκαρι παραδοὺς παρέπεμψεν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λήμνῳ προστάξας αὐτὸν λαβεῖν τὸν ἐξόριστον Μουσταφᾶν . . . καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν . . . ἐν Χερρόνησῳ σὺν τῇ δυνάμει τῶν τριήρεων.
- 132 *BCIII*, 6.1: ἀπὸ ἐναντίῳ καιρὸ . . . ὡσᾶν ἐμύλησανε οἱ ἄρχοντες, τοῦ ἐτάξανε ὅτι νὰ γενῆ βασιλέας εἰς τὴν Δύσι, ἔς τὴν Ρούμελη. καὶ οὕτως ἔστειραν μὲ τοιοῦτο, ὅτι νὰ τούζε δώσῃ τὴν Καλλιπόλι ὀπίσω, ὅπου τὴν εἶχανε παρμένη οἱ Τοῦρκοι πρωτότερα πολὺν καιρὸ.
- 133 *Minus*, 9.1: πάντες οἱ Τοῦρκοι λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν ἡ Καλλιπόλις ἔνι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἢμπορεῖ νὰ τὴν δώσωμεν.
- 134 *BCIII*, 6.1: τότε ἔστειλε ὁ Μουσταφᾶς μαντατοφόρους εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, ἐς τὸν βασιλέα, παρακαλῶντας τον ὅτι νὰ σταθῆ εἰς τὸν λόγον του ὅπου τοῦ ἔταξε, ὅτι νὰ τοῦ βοηθήσῃ καί, ὅταν νικήσῃ τὴν Ἀνατολὴ καὶ τὴν Δύσι καὶ νικήσῃ . . . τὸν Μουράτη, τότε νὰ τοῦ χαρίσῃ τὴν Καλλιπόλι καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο γυρένῃ. Doukas, 24.2, asserts that Laskaris/Leontaris assisted Mustafa in the siege-blockade of Kallipolis. The *Minus*, 9.1 (text quoted *supra*, n. 131) states, perhaps erroneously, that John went to bring Mustafa.
- 135 *Minus*, 9.1: πολλὰ τοῦ Μουράτη ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀνατολὴν δι’ ἀποκρισιῶν δεομένου καὶ τάσσοντος. Also cf. *BCIII*, 6.4. Mustafa’s refusal to hand over Kallipolis is related at length in Doukas, 34.12.
- 136 *BCIII*, 6.5: τότε, ὡς ἔμαθε ὁ Μουράτης αὐτά, ἔστειλε μαντατοφόρους εἰς τὸν βασιλέα, ὅτι νὰ μὴ κάμουνε ὄζω ἀπὸ κείνο ὅπου ἐτάξανε τοῦ σουλτᾶν Μεχεμέτη τοῦ πατρὸς του.

- 137 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.6 (pp. 372, 373): παρήσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀμουράτεω παρὰ βασιλέα Βυζαντίου ἀφικόμενοι, χρηματίζοντες καὶ οὗτοι ἐπὶ σφίσι γενέσθαι βασιλέα, καὶ ὑπισχνούμενοι δώσειν, ὃ τι ἂν βούλοιντο. οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἀνεβάλλοντο μὲν ἐπὶ χρόνον τινὰ τὰς πρεσβείας, τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀμουράτεω ἀπεπέμψαντο πρεσβείαν, τὰ δὲ Μουσταφᾶ ἐλόμενοι πράγματα προσιέντο τε καὶ ἐπέσχον, ὥστε αὐτοῖς σπένδεσθαι κατὰ πᾶν δεδογμένον αὐτοῖς.
- 138 *Minus*, 9.2: περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ χειμῶνος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους περάσαντος τοῦ Παῖαζήτη ἀπὸ τὸ ἐπάνω Στενὸν εἰς τὴν Δύσιν, ἀνδρὸς χρησίμου, μπεηλαρμπεὶ καὶ βιζίρου ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Μουράτη καὶ τὴν Ἄγκυραν ἔχοντος κεφαλατικίον, εἰς τὸ ἂν δυνηθῆ νὰ κρατήσῃ εἰς τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ Μουράτη τὴν Δύσιν δηλονότι. καὶ τοῦ Μουσταφᾶ πάλιν ἐπελθόντος ἀπὸ τὴν Καλλίπολιν εἰς τὸ νὰ κυριεύσῃ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀδριανούπολιν ἐπίσεν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸν Παῖαζήτην καὶ τὸν ἐσκότωσε καὶ τὴν εἰς τὴν Δύσιν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν ἐκυριεύσεν. The same information is encountered in Khalkokondyles, 2.5.5 (pp. 370, 371).
- 139 *Minus*, 9.3: καὶ πάλιν ἐπιστρέψας ὁ Μουσταφᾶς εἰς τὴν Καλλίπολιν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτει ἐπέραςεν εἰς τὴν Ἀνατολὴν κατὰ τοῦ ἀνεψιοῦ αὐτοῦ Μουράτη εἰς τὴν Προῦσαν εὑρισκομένου· καὶ ἡττηθεὶς ἐπανεστρεψεν εἰς τὴν Δύσιν. Also cf. Doukas, 25.9, 10; and *MP*, p. 359. After the fall of Constantinople, the Genoese sought better terms for their colony of Pera by reminding Mehmed II of this valuable service that they had performed for his father. On March 11, 1454, the duke of Genoa and the *Signoria* instructed their envoys to remind the Porte of the event: “1454, 11 marzo. Istruzioni della Signoria di Genova a Luciano Spinola e Baldassare Maruffo, che si spediscono ambasciatori a Maometto,” *Atti della Società di Storia Patria* 13.2 (1877): 264, 265: *Et ut de multis pauca exempla referantur, cum tempore illustrissimi patris sui Mostafas multas terras Gr<a>ecie in rebellionem concitasset, nec pater eius facultatem haberet ex Turchia in Gr<a>eciam cum exercitu transportaretur; quod prom<p>tissime ianuenses fecerunt. Ipse quoque tantam de ianuensibus fidem concepit, ut se ipsum et exercitum ac totum Statum suum in eorum manibus posuerit; quod fuit certissimum argumentum amicici<a>e et ver<a>e benivolent<a>ie. Transivit igitur in Gr<a>eciam, et intra paucos dies victor fuit.*
- 140 *BCIII*, 6.6,7; its source seems to be Khalkokondyles, 1.5.7 (pp. 372–374).
- 141 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.8 (pp. 374, 375): Ἕλληνες μέντοι, ὡς ἐλόμενοι Μουσταφᾶν σφίσι σύμμαχον εἶναι, ἐπλήρωσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἀπέπλεον ἐπὶ Ἑλλήσποντον. βασιλεὺς δὲ αὐτὸς Βυζαντίου ἐν Προικονήσῳ γενόμενος ἐσχόλαζέ τε περὶ γυναικὸς ἔρωτα, ἧς ἔρωθ ἐτύγγανε, ἣν γὰρ ἱερέως θυγάτηρ, καὶ οὐκ ἐν δέοντι παραγένετο, ὥστε διακωλύσα Ἀμουράτην ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀφικέσθαι.
- 142 Doukas, 20.6: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης ἦν μὴ στέργων τὴν σύνοικον [Sophia of Montferrat] ἡ κόρη γὰρ τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ μάλα εὐάρμοστος τράχηλος εὐειδής, θριζὺ ὑποξανθίζουσα καὶ τοὺς πλοκάμους ὡς ρύακας χρυσαυγίζοντας μέχρι τῶν ἀστραγάλων κατάρφρομένους ἔχουσα, ὦμους πλατεῖς καὶ βραχίονας καὶ στέρνα καὶ χεῖρα ἐμμέτρος καὶ δακτύλους κρυσταλοειδεῖς καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν ἡλικίαν τοῦ σώματος ἀνωρρέπη καὶ πολὺ εἰς τὸ ὀρθον ἰσταμένη ὄψις δὲ καὶ χεῖλη καὶ ῥινὸς κατάστασις καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ὀφρῶν σύνθεσις ἀειδεσάτη παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος χυδαῖον εἶπεν· “ἀφ’ ἐμπρὸς τεσσαρακοστὴ καὶ ὀπισθεν πάσχα.” τοιαύτην οὖν ἰδὼν ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης οὐκ ἐμίγη ταύτην, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν σύγκοιτος ταύτης ἐγένετο· διὸ καὶ μονάζουσα ἦν ἐνὶ τῶν κοιτῶνων τοῦ παλατιοῦ. ἰδὼν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἠβουλήθη πέμψαι ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ ἐν τοῖς πατρὸς δόμοις καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, τοῦ βασιλέως Μανουήλ, στοργὴν ἐκωλύετο.
- 143 Details in the report of the Venetian *bailo*; see *NE* 2: 316, 317.
- 144 Doukas, 27.1–7; Khalkokondyles, 1.5.9 (pp. 376, 377), also speaks of the pretender’s apprehension and execution: ὁ μὲν Μουσταφᾶς . . . ἐσώζετο ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος τοῦ Γάνου οὕτω καλούμενον. ὁ δὲ ὡς ἐδίοκε, καὶ ἐπισχών, πάντα ζητῶν οὐκ ἀνίει, σαηνεύσας τε τὸν χῶρον αὐτοῦ, ἧ ἔδοκει καὶ ἡδὴ ὑποψίαν παρεῖχεν ἐνταυθὶ κρύπτεσθαι, εὗρεν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ θάμνῳ τινὶ κεκρυμμένον, καὶ ζωγρήσας ἀγχόνῃ τε τὸν λαίμον αὐτοῦ ἐχρήσατο.

ἔτελεύτησε δὲ Μουσταφᾶς βασιλεύσας ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ἔτη τρία. *CBB* 1: 53.12 (p. 381):
ἐχάθηγ ὁ Μουστάνης [*sic*] ἔτους ςʹλʹ.

- 145 *LMB*, p. 536: “one should not exaggerate the importance of Byzantium’s misfired policy; for we can be sure that even if the empire had greeted Murad II with timbrels and dancing, sooner or later the Ottomans would have resumed their offensive against its territory.”

4 *Nil sub sole novi*

The Turkish offensive

1 Porte and court

Murad II wasted no time. The court attempted to enter into negotiations, but the sultan rejected all overtures and intensified his preparations to besiege Constantinople. The court persisted and an embassy was authorized to blame the alleged schemes of a vizier who had, in the meantime, died. Murad imprisoned the ambassadors, who, according to Doukas,¹ were Palaeologus Lakhanas² and Markos Iagaris;³ they were released after Murad had mobilized his forces. Doukas implies that this embassy took place sometime late in, or soon after, April of 1422.⁴ Sphrantzes indicates that a second diplomatic delegation was dispatched:⁵

On June 8 of the same year [1422], Murad dispatched Mihal-oğlu to blockade our City. On June 15 Mihal's lord, Murad, came and took command of the siege operations. He brought with him our ambassadors in chains: Demetrios Kantakouzenos, Matthaïos Laskaris, and Angelos Philommates, the scholar. They had been sent earlier to him to arrange a treaty of friendship.

It seems that envoys were sent on two separate occasions. The June mission fared no better and its emissaries were also placed in custody. Unlike Lakhanas and Iagaris (who had apparently been released before the mobilization of the Turkish army), Kantakouzenos,⁶ Laskaris, and Philommates were compelled to accompany Murad on his march and were released in view of the capital's fortifications.

Sphrantzes' information finds support in a statement of John Kananos, the eyewitness narrator of the siege of 1422.⁷ Kananos reports that the emperor's ambassadors (whom Kananos neglects to name) accompanied Murad in chains. One may conclude that he is referring to Philommates, Kantakouzenos, and Laskaris:⁸

He [Murad] had with him, at that time, the emperor's envoys in chains, whose presence he himself had requested in order to discuss peace and friendship. Like a cruel barbarian and an inhuman individual, he had condemned them to prison in iron chains. He accorded the innocent men a treatment reserved for the guilty and he had threatened them with death, finding pretexts. . . . He said: "Because the Romans [= Greeks] treated me shamelessly, I have imprisoned them."

Kananos is wrong to suppose that Murad had invited the ambassadors. He uses this image of the pathetic captives to underscore the inhumanity of the enemy.

Doukas further informs us that a last-minute attempt was made by Manuel himself. Manuel employed the services of a trusted agent, Theologos Korax,⁹ a man fluent in Turkish. Korax had earlier been assigned a position in the imperial diplomatic corps because of his linguistic skills as an interpreter. His command of the Turkish language had enabled him to form good relations with officials at the Porte. Manuel seems to have found Korax useful,¹⁰ as he made himself indispensable.

Manuel, who had earlier transferred all power to his son, seems to have recovered from his professed weakness and ill health and to have taken the initiative to renew diplomatic relations after the beginning of the siege. Murad must have been aware of Manuel's opposition to the aggressive policies of John VIII. Plausibly this was a demonstration by the aged emperor that the peace party was still alive. Perhaps it was meant as an indication that Manuel was back, firmly in control at the helm, with the "hawks" discredited. Be that as it may, Manuel had not given up all authority but was still attempting to reach a compromise and to score a victory for his peace faction. All overtures to the Porte had to come from the aged emperor who had opposed, from the beginning, the daring plans of his son and his supporters.¹¹ In any case, it was all in vain. The sultan had no desire to come to any accommodation. The mission of Korax also failed to achieve the intended effect.¹²

2 The era of gunpowder

In the siege of 1422 the fortifications sustained damage, as the Turks used gunpowder for the first time and deployed artillery on a large scale, but failed to demolish any critical sections. Khalkokondyles uses the present siege as an opportunity to insert a learned digression on the origins of gunpowder and on the invention, manufacture, and use of firearms, which, he thought, had originated in Germany.¹³ Already in Europe the bombard had made its presence felt. Under siege, Maastricht, for instance, received an average of thirty bombard projectiles per day. Six years after the siege of Constantinople by Murad II, the English fired, in one day, 124 projectiles (some weighing as much as 116 pounds) into Orleans.¹⁴ But in 1422 the bark of the cannon was worse than its bite. Murad's artillery was not powerful enough to demolish the formidable walls, especially the Great Wall; the outer line of fortifications felt the brunt, where some towers collapsed and extensive emergency repairs had to be carried out.¹⁵ Khalkokondyles remarked¹⁶ that the Ottoman artillery was not powerful: "He bombarded the wall with artillery and made attempts but he did not demolish it."

The arrival of the Ottoman vanguard is noted in a short chronicle:¹⁷ "In the year 6930, the fifteenth indiction, on June 10, a Wednesday, in the fourth hour after midday, Mihal Beg brought his troops before Constantinople." Khalkokondyles provides details:¹⁸

Soon thereafter he marched against Byzantium and against the Hellenes. He sent ahead Mihaloğlu [= Mihal-oğlu] his *prytanis* [vizier] and general

[*Beglerbeg*] of Europe. He took the entire army of Europe and overran the territory of Byzantium [Constantinople]. Then marched Murad, the son of Mehmed, with the new troops [janissaries], the Porte, and all those who follow the king [sultan] in all his expeditions. He came with the troops from Asia and made camp, stretching from sea to sea.

Ten days after the vanguard's arrival Murad came and assumed command:¹⁹ "On the 20th of the same month, a Saturday, Sultan Murad Beg also came, in the sixth hour after midday." Kananos is vague as to the actual date of Murad's arrival and states²⁰ that "the marshal, sultan, and emir-despot of all of them arrived." Sphrantzes reports²¹ that he arrived on June 15. Khalkokondyles supplies no date.²²

The siege is treated by historians, who were not eyewitnesses to the event (such as Doukas²³ and Khalkokondyles²⁴), by a number of entries in short chronicles,²⁵ by Sphrantzes,²⁶ and by John Kananos,²⁷ whose narrative serves as our main source for it.²⁸ In addition to these sources, a brief passage embedded in the text of a panegyric in honor of Manuel II and John VIII survives, complements the other accounts, and supplies information on an incident that is not mentioned elsewhere; it indicates that there was friction within the Ottoman camp, as it reports a defecation. Clothing his language in ancient Greek prose, its author concludes by utilizing an artificial chronology from the ancient Athenian calendar but his scheme is hopeless, as he is clearly not familiar with the actual lunar calendar of ancient Athens:²⁹

He gathered innumerable troops from everywhere. We were ignorant of this fact; at harvest time, he launched his terrible attack upon our greatest city and waged the most difficult war ever recorded. There had been numerous terrible wars in the past, but this one has to be singled out. At first, they devastated all the environs of the City. Aware of the enemy's intention and of his meticulous preparation, the townspeople were not surprised. Then he assembled siege towers and ordered numerous assaults upon the walls. At first both sides bombarded each other. Then they launched an attack and approached with their ladders. Day and night did he apply force. During the assaults, there were so many arrows that the sun was obscured. The area around the city was surrounded by the enemy's multitudes. Encircled, we were at a loss; after all, we lacked necessities. . . . Some of the environs they plundered; others they occupied. In the midst of these events, the lord of the Scythians [= Mongols] with fifty soldiers, escaped, as he was not a willing ally of our enemy. Without delay he revealed his plans and his entire strength. This was a clear sign that the situation was not hopeless and that the enemy would not have his way. In any case, he continued his operations and made plans to conquer our city. He attacked with siege towers and sent his troops, armed with ladders, to ascend and storm the walls. He even undermined the foundations of the walls with tunnels. But his troubles were in vain. . . . The enemy carried out this siege in the months of Poseideon, Gamelion, Anthesterion, and Elaphebolion. On the fifth day of the last month he put an end to the fighting. The enemy army

began its evacuation. He left behind about one thousand of his best troops . . . and departed in shame. . . . From the bottom of her heart, the City sang a hymn of thanks to the Mother of God, the Word, because it was She who delivered her from the onslaught of the barbarians.

The general assault³⁰ seems to have been launched on August 24. During the preceding weeks Murad's soldiers had been inspired by the preaching of a holy man in the camp.³¹ Conversely, the morale of the defenders had reached its nadir. The most detailed description of the final assault is given in Kananos' narrative; evidently, he was a participant in the defense.³²

They were carrying every instrument of war; they attacked the walls; they placed ladders; they climbed onto the fortifications; they penetrated the towers. There was no one to stop them, since all Romans [= Greeks] had been seized by the greatest fear and cowardice. Who felt no terror at that time? What ears can bear such tidings? What eyes can suffer such a sight? In one instant countless arrows, i.e., *sagittae*, were released and fell upon the Romans [= Greeks], upon the city walls, and upon the interior parts. The sky was darkened; the light of the sun disappeared. Fear and cowardice took hold of us and we remained hidden for a while. We did not retreat very far but took a position behind the defenses. When the Turks saw that the walls were deserted, they concluded that all the men had left. So, they launched their general attack with the greatest courage. Some used ladders to enter our fortifications; others used hooks and *falcae*. Some used stakes to break through towers and poles to break through our defenses. Others went so far as to set the gates of the Outer Wall on fire. The impious [= Turks] performed every bold and daring deed.

Kananos and the author of the panegyric agree that the capital lacked basic necessities.³³

Each man used whatever weapons he could find; some had no weapons at all. While some carried swords and spears, others had none of them and bound, with ropes, their dinner tables and barrel lids to use in the place of shields. Some did not even have those when they went to battle; and yet they fought boldly and valiantly with stones, as if they were protected by full armor, in possession of all sorts of weapons.

Non-combatants had to be pressed into duty and women were recruited and played a crucial part to deflect the major assault. The defense of Constantinople in 1422 was truly in the hands of the ill-equipped inhabitants. Kananos describes the despair that took hold of the defenders prior to the general assault.³⁴

Seeing the Turkish preparations for battle and war, the multitude of countless races, the valor of the Tatars and Turks, and their former deeds (i.e., the Turks had put to death the Romans [= Greeks] in the ditches and others in front of

the gates), the Romans [= Greeks] lost heart and the majority began to look for ways to flee. What a bitter hour it was! What unbearable sorrow! Who remained steadfast that day? Who felt no fear at that hour, when he saw the Romans [= Greeks] become cowards, while the Muslims plucked up courage? Who remained unaffected? Was there such a brave man who felt no apprehension? It was not fear of death, of course, since this is a condition that exists naturally. It was apprehension that the great city would be captured; that our people would be enslaved; that women would suffer indignities; that wise men would be treated shamelessly; that infants would be circumcised; that churches would be lost; that the holy icons would become objects of derision; and that Santa Sophia would become a place to sing hymns in honor of Muhammad and an abode of demons.

Kananos cites a miraculous change of heart that took place during the general assault and attributes a great part of the victory to the women of Constantinople who managed to inspire their relatives and husbands and restrained their instincts to flee.³⁵

It was not only the soldiers and those experienced in warfare who performed such deeds; the foremost citizens, the magnates of the region, the experts, the common people, the priests, the orders of the monks, the high priests, and the holiest individuals played their part, in addition to the men from the countryside who proved their bravery and valor when they became contemptuous of wounds, blows, or death. Indeed, many women turned themselves into bold men during the most horrible hour of battle. They did not seek places to hide; nor did they act like cowardly women. On the contrary, they even came to the outer fortifications during the hard hour of battle. Some lifted rocks to the Roman [= Greek] warriors, whom they encouraged and inspired to fight on. Some transported eggs and bandages and tended the wounded. Some brought water and wine for those who were burning with thirst from the toil in war. Others prevented their own brothers, sons, and husbands from abandoning the fortifications and flee, became soldiers and admonished one another accordingly . . . some were wounded by arrows.

In spite of inadequate armament, inadequate resources, inadequate preparation, and inadequate manpower, the defenders forced the enemy back. In bewilderment, the unexpected victory was attributed to divine intervention. Kananos was convinced that a miracle had occurred and so was the author of the panegyric. Even the prosaic Sphrantzes seems to hint that a miracle had been performed:³⁶ “He [Murad] departed from the City empty-handed, with God’s help.” The memory of this miracle lingered. A legend was created and was even heard by the Castilian Pero Tafur, who visited Constantinople in 1437–1438.³⁷ Tafur relates a yarn, which combined the “miracle” and historical circumstances of 1422 with other ancient tales:³⁸

They say that the Turk [Murad II] came and greatly oppressed the city . . . and as the Grand Turk went on with his attempt, they told him that they had seen a man riding a horse on the wall and he then asked a Greek captive what

this marvel was which they saw every night, an armed horseman riding on the fortifications. He said: “Lord: so the Greeks say: when Constantine built his church, he used many people as his laborers and one day the master-builder ordered a child who was there to guard the implements; he did as he was told. A very handsome man on a horse appeared to him and said: ‘ . . . Go without fear and I promise you that I will guard the church and the city until you return.’ The child did so; the child did not return at all, because he feared punishment; and so the horseman remained in accordance with the promise that he had made. And they say that he was an angel.”

Tafur wrote this account long after his visit and after the fall of 1453. He concludes this passage with a comment on 1453:³⁹ “Yet it can be said now that the child has come back and that the angel has left his post, for the city has been captured and is under occupation; but back then the Turk departed.” Echoes of the same legend are encountered in an anonymous lamentation on the fall of Constantinople in 1453:⁴⁰

The decorations of Santa Sophia, the consecrated covers of the all-holy altar, the all-holy vessels, where did they end up? Was the angel watching, as he had been instructed to do, the one who long ago had promised the young man by saying: “I will not leave before you return.” The young man has returned; the angel has departed.

Twenty-six years after Murad’s siege, in the reign of Constantine XI, George Scholarius, the leader of the anti-unionists, recalled this “miracle” of 1422 and he insisted that God could perform the same miracle once more, if the faithful repented and turned away from the Latin Church. Scholarius’ defense program would save Constantinople through divine intervention. In a letter to the emperor he recalls the events of 1422 and then puts forth his defense “plan”: all-night vigils, chanting, and the burning of incense.⁴¹

In 1422 the city was invested and its environs were raided by the Turkish vanguard. After the arrival of Murad II skirmishes were fought. At some point during the siege one of Murad’s minor allies deserted and offered intelligence information but this minor defection would not have made much of a difference in the grand strategy of the Porte. A general assault then was ordered, was launched, and was repelled, at which point Murad lifted the siege. The defenders were convinced that a divine miracle had taken place. Kananos suggests that the Turks also accepted the miraculous intervention.⁴² One may not be justified in speculating that in the beginning of the general assault the defenders pulled back on purpose, under a pre-planned maneuver and then rallied their forces at key points in a counter-attack, yet a strategy must have been in place. We have no definite information on this important point and we do not know what formal defense plans had been approved by the high command. Kananos asserts that the cowardly defenders suddenly became brave and repelled the assault. He does not imply that their timidity had been feigned in accordance with a pre-arranged plan. Kananos was not a member of the high command and would not have been privy to any of its designs.

Because of age, illness, and infirmity, Manuel could not supervise the defense. John VIII must be seen as the nucleus of the defense, as it is reported by Kananos. He seems to have seen the young emperor at his station in the most dangerous spot of the perimeter.⁴³ Kananos informs us that John put on his armor, mounted his horse, and made the sector around the Gate of Saint Romanus his post, which would also be defended by his brother and successor, Constantine XI, thirty-one years later. The same passage indicates that the defense in 1422 was concentrated on the outer wall, as Kananos states that the women of Constantinople had to reach the outer wall to bring provisions. Kananos⁴⁴ states that John “mounted his horse in full armor as he ought, came out of the Gate of Saint Romanus, and made his stand there in the vicinity of the Gate.” This sector from the Gate of Saint Romanus to the *Pempton* was the most vulnerable spot in the defense, as it would still be in 1453. Here the greatest amount of damage was sustained and an old tower collapsed:⁴⁵

After that very big cannon had been fired seventy times, it struck the rotten tower; this event did not harm the Romans [= Greeks] at all and the Turks reaped no benefit. This place, moat and tower, was near Santa Kyriake, half-way between Saint Romanus and the Kharsia [Adrianople/Edirne] Gate, and closer than either of the two places to the river called Lycus.

Doukas devotes a few sentences to the actual hostilities⁴⁶ and focuses his narrative on Manuel, who placed his trust in a diplomatic offensive. Doukas attributes the delivery of the city to Manuel’s activities, which created a threat to Murad II within the Ottoman realm. Murad was forced to go to war against another pretender and did not try to take Constantinople by siege again. Perhaps his decision to give up the direct and immediate conquest of the capital and to turn his attention to Greece was partly dictated by the unexpectedly strong resistance that he had encountered before the walls in 1422. Following Doukas, modern scholars⁴⁷ have generally chosen to focus solely on Manuel’s diplomatic offensive, and have overlooked the part that the young emperor played in the actual operations. John’s brother Constantine XI must have witnessed the defense efforts. His activities during the siege are not mentioned by any source. He may have been an interested observer or an officer with a minor military assignment. He was probably attached to the high command and to his brother’s headquarters. This occasion must have provided the young Constantine with his first taste of combat, with his first occasion to observe Ottoman troops, and with his first experience in military action.

3 The troublemaker

After Murad’s withdrawal, the court dispatched another embassy, which was again dismissed by the sultan; the diplomatic service turned to another rival once more:⁴⁸

After these events, after no results emerged from their attempts to secure a treaty, the Hellenes turned to Mustafa, the son of Mehmed; he happened to

reside with Karaman. They dispatched ambassadors and summoned the young man to Byzantium; he was about thirteen years old.

Overtures to Mustafa's staff had been established earlier, before the mobilization of Murad II's army. Murad lifted the siege on September 6 and on September 30 Mustafa arrived in Constantinople.⁴⁹ Twenty-four days do not allow a sufficient interval for negotiations and preparations for a state visit. A combined reading of Sphrantzes and Doukas establishes that the potential of Mustafa had been under consideration for some time and was not a sudden revelation or afterthought.

Mustafa was granted an audience:⁵⁰ "On September 30 young Mustafa, Murad's brother, entered the City and reached the imperial gardens. On the following day, October 1, he appeared to pay his respects to the emperors." On the same day Manuel suffered a paralyzing stroke:⁵¹ "On this day, after lunch, our holy emperor suffered a stroke; he had been visited by the Turks from Anatolia, who had come with young Mustafa; they thought that he resembled Muhammad, the founder of their faith." Negotiations could not be completed. The Ottoman prince toured the city, made an excursion into Selybria, and then returned to Anatolia. While Mustafa was still in Constantinople, he invited Murad's subjects to join him and promised to double salaries. Then he crossed to Anatolia in the company of John VIII and they jointly besieged Hieron.⁵²

After his arrival in Byzantium, the young man sent word to the Turks, making many promises; he pledged to double the salary that each man received from Murad. Some Turks deserted to the young man's side but not many. The young man crossed to Asia and, in the company of the emperor of the Hellenes [John VIII], he seized, after a siege, the place called Hieron. During his advance through Asia he won over the Asiatic Turks because he was the king's son.

Constantinople supplied Mustafa with a military force:⁵³ "The Constantinopolitans sent him [Mustafa] across the straits to Anatolia with soldiers and a bodyguard; all submitted to him. From his base at Prousa he seized the countryside and the cities of almost the whole of Anatolia." Mustafa proceeded to the interior of Asia Minor, where met his fate, betrayed by "Aliazes," his own cupbearer.⁵⁴

Here the cupbearer, Aliazes by name . . . made a pact with Murad to betray the young man to him. He did as he pledged; in order to hand over the young man, he dispatched a messenger to inform on the young man's whereabouts. The young man reached Nicaea, which surrendered to him; he made it his residence and dispatched messengers to summon the magnates of Asia. As it was already winter, he was prevented from advancing farther into Asia. Murad was informed by Aliazes, the *sarabdar* [cupbearer], of the young man's sojourn in the city. He took about six thousand men from the Porte, reached the Hellespont in haste, and marched straight into Bithynia. Suddenly he fell upon the city and in this way, he captured the young man there, who had been

betrayed by Aliazes . . . Murad captured him and executed him by the noose, in accordance with their custom.

A later source states that Mustafa wedded a granddaughter of Manuel:⁵⁵

Mustafa fled and came to the City. The Constantinopolitans received him as if he were a great prize and they gave him the daughter of Doria, a nobleman from Genoa, to be his wife. The emperor, Lord Manuel, had an illegitimate daughter called Zampia Palaiologina, whom he had given to Doria; it was her daughter whom they gave to Sultan Mustafa to be his wife and they called her “Lady of Anatolia,” an empty title.

Thus, the beginning of 1423 must have given reason for hope. Murad had been repelled from the walls of the capital and the young emperor had joined forces with yet another rival for the Ottoman throne. Constantinople had prevailed in the siege and then challenged Murad with its inexhaustible supply of contenders for the Ottoman throne. To top it all, the two emperors, senior and junior, seemed reconciled and presented a unified foreign policy since the beginning of the siege. The rift may have disappeared.

The court still faced internal trouble. Demetrios, one of Manuel’s younger sons (well under the age of twenty at this time), began to flex his muscles. The present occasion seems to have been his first bid for power. It is possible that he received encouragement from Murad’s agents in the city. Murad may have decided to pay back the court by encouraging a pretender to the Byzantine throne. Later in his career Demetrios espoused pro-Turkish and anti-western attitudes and seems to have enjoyed close ties with Sultan Murad, in sharp contrast to his elder brothers, whose policies leaned toward the west. Throughout his career Demetrios received support from the Porte, which used him as a pawn against John VIII and against Constantine XI. Eventually, Demetrios would be the only son of Manuel II to end his life as a dependent of the Porte.

The exact circumstances that precipitated this rift within the imperial family remain obscure. Sphrantzes writes in tactful terms:⁵⁶ “In the summer of the same year Prince Demetrios, Hilario Doria, and George Izaoul fled . . . and went to Galata [Pera] in order to go over to the Turks; but they did not defect and went to Hungary instead.” The key verb “fled” indicates strife. A short chronicle provides the date of the event:⁵⁷

1. On July 4 of the same indiction the prince Lord Demetrios went to Galata in the company of Hilario Doria.
2. On the seventh of the same month, the same indiction, the same prince Lord Demetrios went to Hungary on board a galley.

The reasonable suggestion has been made⁵⁸ that Hilario Doria may have been alienated when and if his daughter by Zampia had been given to the Ottoman prince. Syropoulos supplies a lucid version of the events:⁵⁹

As the situation had become aggravated because of the war, the despot, Lord Demetrios, felt compelled, during the second year of the war, to flee to Galata [Pera] together with Doria, the emperor's son-in-law. His father and mother sent him a message to return but he proved unwilling; instead, he wished to go to the king of the Germans. Reluctantly they agreed and assigned to him Lord Matthaïos Asen and Doria, as well as some other noblemen and he left for Hungary by way of Asprokastron in September of the second indiction.

Syropoulos does not say whether Demetrios received any support or encouragement from the Porte. We can assume that Doria definitely played a part in this incident, as he is cited by name. Somehow, Demetrios' "plot" was detected and he was then forced to seek refuge in Pera-Galata, where Doria, another disaffected element, had Genoese connections. Negotiations failed and Manuel decided to accede to the request of his rebellious son. He appointed Demetrios' associate, Doria, to become an official member of his son's retinue, in the hope of placating both individuals. Another close associate of Demetrios, Matthaïos Asen, also accompanied the two men. It appears that the elements of a faction had gathered around Demetrios.

In the future, Constantine and Demetrios remained at odds with each other. Constantine seems to have been especially close to his older brother, John VIII, who must have detected potential in Constantine by this time. Within two months after the incident involving Demetrios, John departed for Italy and Hungary and placed Constantine in charge:⁶⁰ "On November 15, 6932, our emperor Lord John began his journey to Italy and Hungary. He made his brother, Lord Constantine, despot and left him in the City in his place." Demetrios fled to Pera in the summer of the same year, i.e., a few months before John's trip. It is clear that this journey must have been in the works for some time and John's intention of raising Constantine to the post of regent was not a hasty decision. The emperor had to guard himself against Demetrios.⁶¹

Meanwhile Murad II turned his attention toward Greece, alarmed by the campaigns of Theodoros at Mistra.⁶² Venice also expressed concern over the activities of the despot and entertained the possibility of annexing the entire Morea, taking care to secure and strengthen its possessions in the peninsula by acquiring the citadels of Gris and Port-de-Jonc. In April of 1422 the doge of Venice authorized one of his subordinates to look into the damage had been wrought by Theodoros II. On April 22, 1422, the Venetian Dolfin Venier was sent to the Morea, charged with a mission to pacify Centurione and was further authorized to explore a Veneto-Albanian alliance. The *Sapientes* sought concessions from all parties in order to prevent an Ottoman annexation. Theodoros seems to have agreed to a one-year truce by late February, hoping to form an anti-Turkish league.⁶³ Furthermore, Venice continued to show signs of a willingness to share control of the Morea.⁶⁴

Murad put a swift end to all these aspirations. Late in the spring of 1423 Murad's general Turahan stormed the fortifications of the Hexamilion, eight years after their restoration. Manuel's vision of an impregnable Morea was left in ruins. Reality demonstrated the impractical nature of this early Maginot line:⁶⁵ "In the month

of May of the same year Turahan destroyed the fortifications at the Hexamilion in the Morea and killed many Albanians.” A short chronicle dates the fall on May 22.⁶⁶ “In the year 6931, on May 22, Turahan the Turk came with a large army to the Hexamilion and he seized and destroyed it.” Syropoulos takes this opportunity to criticize, with sarcasm, the pope’s efforts to contribute to the maintenance of the wall.⁶⁷

His Beatitude [*sc.* the pope] took the greatest care of the Hexamilion; it did as much good as the shadow of an ass. His Beatitude composed a letter which absolved the sins of all those who volunteered to guard the Hexamilion. Those, for whom the indulgence was intended, preferred to stay home, snoring and keeping up with their habitual, sinful life-style than to be forgiven and guard the Hexamilion. Consequently, they went on snoring at home. The descendants of Hagar [= Turks], however, seized the wall, destroyed the Mysians [= Albanians], and plundered the territories of the Romans [= Greeks] and of the local Latins.

Khalkokondyles suggests that the local forces failed to resist the incursion of the Turks and that the only light opposition came from the Moreot Albanians.⁶⁸

The Albanians of the Peloponnesus [= Morea] gathered in the inland region called Davia, elected their own general, and made plans to secede from the Hellenes in order to destroy the army of Turahan. When he discovered that the Albanians had gathered to offer battle, Turahan arranged his troops in battle order, as he knew that he would not be able to elude them. The Albanians also deployed their forces and marched. Before it came to hand to hand combat, they turned to flight and did not even wait to fight the Turks.

A number of Albanians were put to the sword at Davia – Tavia on June 5.⁶⁹ “Then he [Turahan] moved on to Lacedaemon, then to Leontari, and then to Tavia, where they put the Albanians to the sword on June 5.” His troops penetrated deeply and ravaged as far south as the environs of Mistra.⁷⁰

Murad II applied pressure, as part of his grand strategy, on Thessalonica, now governed by Prince Andronikos, whose health had been deteriorating.⁷¹ No help could come from Constantinople or from the Morea. The city was then offered to the Venetians, virtually without conditions. Only a hope was expressed that its privileges and traditions be respected.⁷² Similarly, the islands of Corfu (1387/87), of Mykonos, and of Tenos (1392), and Nauplia in the Morea (1389) had been transferred to Venice. Andronikos had been paying tribute to the Turks since 1415.⁷³

By the sixteenth century this transfer seemed far-fetched. The tale that the city was “sold” for cash by Andronikos came into existence and was perpetuated mainly by the popularity of Pseudo-Sphrantzes’ forgery; some modern scholars remain under the impression that Thessalonica had been sold.⁷⁴ Typical of later chronicles are the sentiments that are expressed in the following text:⁷⁵

This Andronikos fell ill with elephantiasis. He decided, together with the people of his own age, to sell the city, when they told him: “Your father gave you this city as your inheritance, as he had done with your other brothers; sell it, take the florins, and go to a monastery.” So he did and sold this famous and renowned city to the Venetians for fifty thousand florins. After he received the florins, some he wasted in a sorry manner and others he gave to his intimate friends; he then took what was left and went to one of the monasteries at the Holy Mountain, where he died.

Another late chronicle spins this yarn:⁷⁶ “The hopes of the Romans [= Greeks] had been frustrated, as Luck was pushing matters from worse to worst. And the emperor’s brother [*sic*] sold Salonica to the Venetians for 50,000 florins, since he was unable to hold it.” The same tale is repeated in a short chronicle:⁷⁷ “And this invalid [Andronikos] sold Thessalonica to the Venetians for 20,000 Venetian florins and departed from there.” If any money changed hands, it went to the Orthodox archbishop of Thessalonica, who was the recipient of a “gift” from the Venetians for his services in the transfer of power: fifty ducats were set aside by the Venetians to buy presents for the bishop on July 16, 1424.⁷⁸ The Venetians debated the proposal of taking over Thessalonica in the beginning of July; Santo Venier and Niccolò Giorgi (Zorzi) were appointed *provveditori* to take over Thessalonica on July 27, 1423, and arrived in September, while Thessalonica was already under siege. The Venetian fleet relieved the city and transported provisions.⁷⁹ Thus in 1423 the second major city of the “empire” was permanently lost.

Pressured by the Ottoman threat, John VIII decided to launch a direct personal appeal in various European courts, following the example of his father. As war was raging between England and France, a royal visit in western Europe was out of the question. John VIII directed his diplomatic offensive towards Italy and Hungary. On November 15, 1423, John VIII set out, elevating his brother Constantine XI to the rank of despot and appointing him his regent.⁸⁰ This was the first time that the young Constantine was assigned a position of authority:⁸¹ “On November 15 of the year <69>32 our emperor Lord John began his journey to Italy and Hungary. He made his brother, the prince Lord Constantine, despot and left him in the City in his place.”

John spent time in Venice,⁸² Milan, and Mantua.⁸³ In the summer of 1424 he reached Hungary, where he conferred with Sigismund.⁸⁴ There was much talk about a Christian offensive but very little action ensued.⁸⁵ Sigismund urged John to accept union with the Church of Rome.⁸⁶ It is doubtful that the young emperor could have achieved more and he was probably aware of the limitations of his mission. Manuel would not have failed to brief his son on his own experiences and on his long, futile search for aid that had taken him as far away as London.

Yet there were minor successes. Although the stated purpose of this trip was to secure western support, the emperor’s visit must have applied, however indirectly, pressure on Murad to return to the negotiating table. If this had been, the original, although unadvertised, goal of John’s journey, then his mission succeeded. The sultan was probably concerned about the close ties that were being forged

between Constantinople and Venice. The transfer of power in Thessalonica may have seemed ominous to him. In the future Murad's anxiety over a western crusade to the east assumed the dimensions of an obsession.⁸⁷ Perhaps the tacit, modest goal of John was to create the impression that sooner or later the sultan would confront a united Christendom and an invasion from Europe. A realistic individual, like Manuel, would have predicted that an expedition would not be mounted, if indeed the main goal of John had been to stir up another crusade. Manuel had realized that crusades were becoming unfashionable. Nevertheless, the sultan suddenly showed willingness to entertain proposals of peace. While he was still in Italy in March of 1424, John eagerly awaited news from the east, in connection, no doubt, with the upcoming peace treaty⁸⁸ negotiated during his absence. Only after this treaty was secured did John feel free to press on to confer with Sigismund. By then, according to the present interpretation, the journey had already produced results, since Murad resumed diplomatic contacts, concluded a peace treaty, and became reasonable in his dealings with the court.

While John was away, Constantine remained nominally in charge of Constantinople, with Manuel active in court.⁸⁹ Manuel's wife, Helena Dragaš, also maintained a high profile and had even played a part in the incident involving Demetrios. Thus, Constantine's regency was probably meant as a defense mechanism for John VIII: if Manuel died (the worst-case scenario), then Constantine would assume power in the name of his brother and would guard the throne for him until his return, thus preventing unrest or an outbreak of civil strife. Constantine's appointment was intended as a preventive measure to foil any attempt to usurp the throne in the event of Manuel's death. We know very little about Constantine's regency. No records of official acts under his name have survived. Any official business would have come to Manuel's attention and to his staff.⁹⁰ Constantine was only nominally in charge. The main achievement during his regency was the conclusion of the treaty with the Porte. Sphrantzes was one of the envoys dispatched to the Porte to negotiate the terms of the treaty⁹¹ and to keep the court informed about the progress of negotiations. Nothing is said here about informing Constantine.⁹² In October of 1424, Sphrantzes interviewed an emissary of John VIII,⁹³ who requested an audience with Manuel and not with Constantine, who, in any case, was away hunting.⁹⁴

Sphrantzes does not mention the terms of the treaty, which was concluded on February 22. A short chronicle provides a different date:⁹⁵ "On February 20 of the same indiction, a Sunday, Emir Murad Beg concluded a sworn peace treaty with our lords and emperors." Doukas names Loukas Notaras as the sole ambassador and adds that he was the chief minister of the emperor.⁹⁶ He also cites the terms of the treaty. Doukas fails to report, however, John's journey to Italy and Hungary and ascribes the negotiations and conclusion of the treaty to the personal efforts of the young emperor. He reports that the treaty required John to give up all claim to citadels and towns by the Black Sea, with the exception of those that had managed to resist Murad successfully, such as Mesembria and Derkoi; John also pledged to pay an annual tribute.⁹⁷ These territories by the shores of the Black Sea had been ceded by the treaty of Kallipolis, during the early reign of Suleyman, in the wake of

the Mongol invasion and the battle of Ankara.⁹⁸ Thus the Ottoman Turks reclaimed their former territories and Constantinople was obliged to pay tribute to the Porte. The advances that had been gained by Manuel's nephew and rival, John VII, in the terms of the treaty of Kallipolis went up in smoke.⁹⁹ For the imperial court it was a sort of Pyrrhic victory. The capital had been saved as a tributary of the Porte but, more importantly, relations with the sultan had been established. If the sultan harbored fears about western intervention in the Balkans, the voyage of John VIII may have subtly played on them. Thus, it may be argued, Constantinople gained something in this round because it forced the sultan to return to the negotiating table. The irony is that by compelling Murad to change tactics Constantinople assured itself of ultimate defeat. If Constantinople appeared to emerge victorious from a number of skirmishes, it was, nevertheless, destined to lose the war.

The context and the spirit of the present policy, which had probably utilized John VIII's trip to the west in order to force Murad to accept negotiations, are illustrated in a celebrated passage of Sphrantzes' narrative. This chronicler points out that, in his own estimation, John VIII made an enormous blunder when he agreed to participate in the Council of Florence, which actually declared the end of the schism and united the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. According to Sphrantzes, this religious policy (which had evidently been initiated much earlier, probably in 1423/24) had a sting only so long as the union was used as a threat against the Turks and as an incentive for the Latins, without actually bringing it to its logical conclusion. If, in fact, religious union between east and west were agreed upon, the hands of the Turks would be forced, as there would be no room for compromise in the face of a united Christendom. Then the Turks would have no other alternative but swift mobilization; the incentive to tolerate a weak but independent Greece would be removed. The advantage of this policy, from the Turkish point of view, was that the sooner Constantinople was annexed, the sooner all talk about imminent crusades to relieve her would dissipate. Moreover, Sphrantzes would have us believe that Manuel was aware of such implications and warned John VIII, even if the latter ignored this prophetic voice of doom:¹⁰⁰

Listen now to the true account, as I call on the very truth to be my witness. Our memorable emperor [Manuel] had spoken in my presence the following words concerning the synod to his son Lord John, our emperor, when they were by themselves: "... as far as this synod is concerned, continue to study and plan it, especially when you need to frighten the impious [= Turks]. But do not bring it about."

Sphrantzes interjects this comment in connection with his notes on the Council of Florence. Thus, it is a flashback to Manuel's reign. We have no way of knowing exactly when this conversation took place. Yet the general period before or soon after John's journey to Italy and Hungary must be indicated. This passage can be adduced as evidence that the objective of John's mission was to produce a threat to the sultan by suggesting religious unity among the Christians and a subsequent crusade to dislodge the Turks from the Balkans. The implicit threat in this message

brought results in 1423/24. After religious union was finally proclaimed in the Council of Florence, there was nothing further to be gained by treaties, from the Ottoman point of view. A crusade must have seemed inevitable. Indeed, it materialized and culminated in the battle of Varna and in the subsequent campaign of Kosovo. Thus, as Sphrantzes concludes, Constantinople signed its own doom by accepting union with Rome. The terms of the present treaty between Murad and Constantinople, to which Constantine XI apparently contributed nothing, can be considered as the last achievement of Manuel II and his capable staff. He did not have long to live.

In the fall of 1424 John dispatched a messenger, a foreigner, we are told,¹⁰¹ to the capital to announce his return and to request transportation. Vessels were then sent to meet him near the Danube and transported him home. He was back by the end of October of 1424.¹⁰² John's envoy must have arrived in the beginning of September. The emperor's return is well documented in the short chronicles. According to one entry,¹⁰³ two galleys went to pick him up: "On September 13, the third indiction, of the year 6933, two galleys departed for Asprokastron in order to bring back our holy emperor and master, Lord John." Another entry in the same chronicle¹⁰⁴ adds that John reached Constantinople on November 1. Sphrantzes and the chronicle differ as to the exact date. There is very little difference between the end of October and November 1, however. John VIII seems to have made a stop at Mesembria, late in October, according to a short chronicle:¹⁰⁵ "In the year 6963, the third indiction, the emperor, Lord John, came with two galleys from Asprokastron to Mesembria; October 20, a Friday."

The rest of the year seems to have passed quietly. It is evident that, due to Manuel's infirmity, greater responsibility must have fallen on John's shoulders. Manuel must have known that the end was not far away. Shortly before his death he composed his will, appointed executors,¹⁰⁶ and communicated instructions to his sons.¹⁰⁷ In accordance with the custom, he took monastic vows before his death,¹⁰⁸ which occurred towards the end of July of 1425. He was buried in the Monastery of the Pantokrator.¹⁰⁹

On July 25 of the same year, our memorable and pious holy emperor Lord Manuel passed away in a saintly departure; two days earlier he had become a monk of godly habit and received the monastic name Matthaïos. On the same day, he was entombed in the beautiful and revered Monastery of the Pantokrator amidst lamentations; his funeral was attended by the largest crowd ever assembled. At the time of his death, Lord Manuel was seventy-seven years and twenty-five days old.

Manuel had been one of the most capable emperors.¹¹⁰ The Constantinopolitans mourned his death and attended the funeral of their beloved late emperor in throngs. The site of Manuel's tomb may have become the center of a cult. A short chronicle states that his tomb was adorned with decorations transported from the Morea in 1435, probably in commemoration of the *decennalia* of his death:¹¹¹ "Around the month of June of the year 6943, his son, the despot of the Morea, Lord

Theodoros [II], sent something finely wrought with gold: the *stelae* for his father, the emperor, and for his lady mother, which they set up near the emperor's grave."

The eulogy of Manuel was composed and pronounced by John Bessarion, the future cardinal of the Catholic Church and famous humanist of the Italian Renaissance.¹¹² He praised the dead emperor's intellect, his administrative skills, his rhetorical talent, and his immense erudition. In one paragraph towards the end of his speech, Bessarion summarized Manuel's talents:¹¹³

So admirable were his erudition and intellect that he prevailed over his enemies without recourse to arms! So great was his experience in war, greater than his opponents, that won him not only cities in the Peloponnesus [Morea] but a considerable part of Thessaly also. He was a soldier, a general, and a good councilor, exhibiting an affinity with Thucydides and Xenophon . . . as Homer put it, "he was a good king, a mighty warrior, and an excellent orator." Homer's poetic image is now reality.

So, the "empire" was left in the hands of John VIII, who had already acquired considerable experience under the guidance of his father. He now placed Constantine in charge of the citadels of Mesembria and Ankhialos on the shores of the Black Sea, still in imperial control but also in danger of falling to the sultan at any time.¹¹⁴ Perhaps John VIII's stop at Mesembria, when he was on his way back from Hungary, had something to do with the installation of Constantine as its lord. In the Morea Theodoros had been expanding his territories to the detriment of the local Latin principalities. Turahan may have put a damper on the situation temporarily but, after he withdrew from the peninsula, Theodoros revived his hopes. Thomas, the youngest brother, was with Theodoros at Mistra. Demetrios, perhaps by design as a punishment for his annoying behavior after the siege, was not given a formal command. And so, the last Palaeologi continued to exhibit a lively interest in the Morea, which became their focal point in the strategy of the next decade. The eyes of Constantinople turned to southern Greece.

Notes

- 1 Doukas, 28.2: και θέλων ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸ πικρὸν μεταβάλλειν πάλιν εἰς γλυκὸν στέλλει πρὸς τὸν Μωράτ ἀποκρισιαρίου Παλαιολόγον τὸν Λαχανῶν καὶ Μάρκον Ἰάγαριν, ἀνδρας εὐγενεῖς καὶ συνετούς, τοῦ παραστήσει διὰ λόγων πιθανῶν ὅτι τὰ συμβάντα τῷ Μωράτ οὐκ ἦν αἰτία ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀλλ' ὁ Παγιαζήτ ὁ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐπίτροπος [= vizier].
- 2 On Lakhanas/Lakhynas, cf. *VeG*: 169 (p. 89), and *PLP* 9: no. 21502 (p. 100). Lakhanas had previously visited the Porte while Constantinople was supporting Mustafa. His appearance would only have added insult to injury. On this earlier embassy, cf. *RKOR*: 3388 (p. 108); and Doukas, 23.4: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Μανουήλ . . . στέλλει πρὸς αὐτὸν [Μωράτ] πρέσβεις τὸν Παλαιολόγον Λαχυνήν . . . ὡς δῆθεν παραμυθόμενος καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ εἰσόδια συγχαιρόμενος.
- 3 On Markos Iagaris, cf. *VeG*: 185 (p. 94); *PLP* 4: no. 7811 (p. 78); and R. Guiland, "Études sur l'histoire administrative de l'empire byzantin. Le stratopedarque et le grand stratopedarque," *BZ* 46 (1953): 63–90, esp. p. 84. On this embassy, see *RKOR*: 3391 (p. 108).

- 4 On the date of this embassy, cf. *MP*, p. 360, n. 108; *RKOR*: 3390 (p. 108) and 3391 (p. 108); and the next note.
- 5 *Minus*, 10.1: καὶ τῇ η^η τοῦ Ἰουνίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἔστειλε καὶ ἀπέκλεισε τὴν Πόλιν διὰ τοῦ Μιχαλάμπη καὶ τῇ ιε^η τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἦλθε καὶ ὁ Μουράτης καὶ αὐθέντης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπολιόρκει τὴν πόλιν, φέρων μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δεσμίους τοὺς ἀποκρισιarioύς, οὓς προαπέστειλαν εἰς ἐκεῖνον διὰ κατάστασιν ἀγάπης Δημήτριον τὸν Καντακουζηνὸν καὶ Ματθαῖον τὸν Λάσκαριν καὶ τὸν γραμματικὸν Ἄγγελον τὸν Φιλομμάτην. *RKOR*: 3390 (p. 108) and 3391 (p. 108) supplies a different chronology: the embassy mentioned by Sphrantzes preceded the mission described by Doukas. I believe that the reverse order is true. Doukas, 28.2, states that the court's envoys were released before the sultan marched to Constantinople: ὁ δὲ Μωρὰτ τοὺς ῥηθέντας ἀποκρισιarioύς [Λαχανᾶν/Λαχυνᾶν, Ἰαγάρην] μῆτε ἰδεῖν μῆτε ἀκοῦσαι θελήσας, περιορίσας αὐτοὺς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἕως τοῦ ἀπαρτίσαι δυνήθει τὰ πρὸς χρεῖαν αὐτῷ πολεμικὰ κατὰ τῆς πόλεως, τότε ἀπέλυσεν. Sphrantzes and Kananos both report that “envoys” were released in the beginning of the siege. Thus, these individuals, who were released at a later date, cannot be identified with Doukas' ambassadors, Lakhanas and Iagaris, who had been released earlier, before the Ottoman army had been mobilized. The embassy reported by Sphrantzes must have gone to the Porte after the release of Lakhanas and Iagaris but before Murad moved against Constantinople. For further discussion of this matter, cf. *MP*, p. 360, n. 108.
- 6 Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos was an influential supporter of John's war faction. The fact that he was a member of the “hawks” would have been known to Murad II, who may have also considered his presence irritating or even insulting. On this personality, see D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) (ca. 1100–1469)* [DOS 11] (Washington, DC, 1968), no. 75 (pp. 192–195).
- 7 The Greek text of this account can be found in the CSHB *corpus* (the volume containing the *Maius* by Pseudo-Sphrantzes: Bonn, 1838) [= *PG* 156: 61–81]. For Italian translations, see E. Pinto, ed., *L'assedio di Costantinopoli* (Messina, 1977) and M. E. Colonna, “Sulla Διήγησις di Giovanni Cananos,” *Università di Napoli, Annali della Facoltà di lettere e filosofie* 7 (1957): 151–166. English translations in M. H. Purdie, *An Account by John Cananos of the Siege of Constantinople in 1442* (M.A. thesis, the University of Western Australia, Perth, 2009); and A. M. Cuomo, *Ioannis Canani de Constantino-politana obsidione relatio: A Critical Edition, with English Translation, Introduction, and Notes of John Kananos' Account of the Siege of Constantinople in 1442* (Boston and Berlin, 2016). My citations of Kananos are from the Bonn Corpus, as the latest edition of Cuomo reproduces the unfamiliar punctuation of the manuscript.
- 8 Kananos, 465: εἶχε καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ τότε σιδηροδεσμομένους τοὺς ἀποκρισιarioύς τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅποιους αὐτὸς ἠτήσατο μᾶλλον ἵνα πέμψη περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ἀγάπης. αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς βάρβαρος ὠμὸς καὶ ἀπάνθρωπος σίδηρα καὶ φυλακὰς αὐτοὺς κατεδίκασε, καὶ τοὺς ἀναιτίους ὡς ὑπαιτίους ἠεῖλει εἰς θάνατον, προβαλλόμενος δὲ τάχα καὶ αἰτίαν . . . ἔλεγε γὰρ διότι με οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀναισχύντως συνέτυχον, διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὺς εἰς φυλακὴν κατεδίκασα.
- 9 On the earlier career of Korax, cf. Doukas, 22.7; *MP*, p. 360, n. 108, and p. 363, n. 111; and *PLP* 6: no. 13160 (p. 14).
- 10 Doukas, 22.7: συγχάζων [Θεολόγος Κόραξ] μετὰ τινος τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ ἐγένετο καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ Μανουὴλ γνῶριμος.
- 11 *RKOR*, 3392 (109), dates this mission of Korax in “juni 15/ aug.,” citing Doukas, 28.3, as a source. It was probably in the early stages of the siege, i.e., in June, that this embassy was dispatched. I offer the following chronological reconstruction of this series of missions to the Porte:
1. The embassy cited by Doukas, whose members (Lakhanas and Iagaris) were imprisoned and released before the march to Constantinople began;
 2. The embassy reported by Sphrantzes, whose members (Kantakouzenos, Laskaris, Philommates) were imprisoned and brought to Constantinople to be released after the beginning of the siege;
 3. The embassy of Korax, reported by Doukas.

- 12 Doukas, 28.3, states that Manuel sent Korax on the present mission in order to remove him from Constantinople and thus save his life from the mob, which considered him a traitor. In spite of Manuel's efforts to save him, Korax eventually died a horrible death, after his return from the mission, in the hands of the Cretan palace guards, who treated him with exceptional savagery; see Doukas, 28.4: τότε οἱ Κρηῖται σύραντες αὐτὸν [Θεολόγον Κόρακα] διὰ τῆς λεωφόρου ἕως τῆς πύλης τῆς βασιλικῆς, ἐκεῖ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξορύττουσιν ἀνηλεῶς καὶ ἀπανθρώπως οὕτω γὰρ ἐξεγλυψαν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ ὡς μηδὲ τύπον φαίνεσθαι βλεφάρων ἢ δέρματος. βαλόντες τοίνυν ἐν τῆς φυλακῆς ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἀπέθανεν, τὴν δὲ οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ δημεύσαντες ἐνέπρησαν πολὺν θησαυρὸν γέμουσαν. The fact that Murad felt sorry for this man's fate further suggested that Korax had been guilty; cf. Doukas, 28.4: ὁ Μουράτ οὖν ἀκούσας τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Θεολόγου, καὶ τίς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ φόνου, ἐθυμώθη καὶ ἐλυπήθη.
- 13 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.15–17 (pp. 382–385).
- 14 P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 200–207. The role of siege engines and cannons is discussed in J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 241–296. For Turkish weapons and artillery, see A. Williams, "Ottoman Military Technology: The Metallurgy of Turkish Armor," and K. DeVries, "Gunpowder Weapons at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453," in Y. Lev, ed., *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries* [The Medieval Mediterranean Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453 9] (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1997), pp. 363–399, 343–363, respectively; M. Philippides, "Urban's Bombard(s), Gunpowder, and the Siege of Constantinople (1453)," *BSEB* 4 (1999 [= 2002, n.s.]): 1–67; and *SFC*, ch. 7, sec. 2, and ch. 9, sec. 1.
- 15 E. Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks* (New York, 1968; repr.: 1903 ed.), p. 242, makes this claim, evidently from personal examination of the inscriptions that were still *in situ* at the end of the nineteenth century. For repairs and renovations on the walls, in general, after this siege but before 1453, see *SFC*, ch. 5; and M. Philippides, "Venice Genoa, and John VIII Palaeologus' Renovation of the Fortifications of Constantinople," *GRBS* 56 (2016): 377–399.
- 16 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.15 (pp. 182, 383): τηλεβόλοις δὲ ἔτυπτε τὸ τεῖχος καὶ ἐπειράτο, οὐ μέντοι κατέβαλέ γε.
- 17 *CBB* 1: 13.1 (p. 116): ἔτους ς' αὐτῶν, ἰνδικτιῶνος ιε', μηνὶ ἰουνίῳ ι', ἡμέρα τετράδι, ὥρα τετάρτη μετὰ τὸ μεσημέρι, ἐπιλάλησεν ὁ Μιχάλλεις τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν. Sphrantzes, 10.1, states that Mihal Beg began the siege on June 8 and that Murad arrived with the bulk of his forces on June 15. Kananos agrees with the short chronicle: June 10.
- 18 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.10 (pp. 376, 377): οὐ πολλῶ δὲ ὕστερον ἐστρατεύετο ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας. προέπεμψε δὲ Μιχαλόγλην, πρυτανέα ἅμα καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς Εὐρώπης. καὶ λαβὼν οὗτος τὸ ἀπὸ Εὐρώπης στρατεύμα ἅπαν, ἐπέδραμε τε τὴν Βυζαντίου χώραν, καὶ αὐτίκα ἀπήλαυεν Ἀμουράτης ὁ Μεχμέτω, τοὺς τε νεηλυδας ἔχων καὶ τὴν θύραν ἅμα, ὅσοι βασιλεῖ ἔπονται, ὅποι ἂν στρατεύηται. καὶ τὰ Ἀσίας στρατεύματα ἔχων παρεγένετο, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύετο ἀπὸ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν. On Mihal-oğlu, see D. J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413* [The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 38] (Leiden and Boston, 2007), pp. 170, 171, 191–194.
- 19 *CBB* 1: 13.2 (p. 116): καὶ τῆ κ' τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνός, ἡμέραν σάββατον, ἦλθε καὶ ὁ ἀμηνῶς ὁ Μουράτεις, ὥρα ἕκτη μετὰ τὸ μεσημέρι.
- 20 Kananos, 460: ὁ δὲ στρατάρχης ὁ μέγας καὶ πάντων ἐκείνων ἀμηνῶς καὶ δεσπότης ἔφθασεν.
- 21 *Minus*, 10.1 (text quoted *supra*, n. 5).
- 22 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.10. The siege by Murad II was depicted in a miniature by George Klontzas in the late sixteenth century; see A. D. Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλοντζᾶς (1540 ci. – 1608) καὶ αἱ Μικρογραφίαι τοῦ Κώδικος Αὐτοῦ* (Athens, 1977), pl. 169 (fol. 78^v). In the corner of the same miniature, Klontzas has superimposed his depiction of Manuel II with sword on his throne, bearing the caption ὁ βασιλεὺς Μανουήλ ὁ Παλαιολόγος while Murad II is depicted riding his horse and leading his troops to the walls.

23 Doukas, 28.1–6.

24 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.10.

25 *CBB* 1: 9.49 (p. 99); 13.2, 3 (p. 116); 22.34 (p. 185); and 94A.5 (p. 630).

26 *Minus*, 10.

27 For editions and translations of Kananos, see *supra*, n. 7. Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, pp. 114, 115; and *FC*, p. 91; *MP*, pp. 359–366 and M. C. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia, 1992), p. 117. For detailed commentary, see Purdie, *An Account by John Cananus*; and Cuomo, *Ioannis Canani de Constantinopolitana obsidione relatio*.

28 Greek text in *PkP* 3: 200–221.

29 *PkP* 3: 215: ὄθεν ἀγείρας στρατὸν πανταχῆ οὐκ εὐαρίθμητον, ἡμῶν μὴ προγινωσκόντων, ἀμνητοῦ ἐν ὥρα προσβάλλει μάλα δεινῶς τῆ καθ' ἡμᾶς μεγίστη τῶν πόλεων, καὶ πόλεμον ἀνωρπιτίει τῶν πώποτε γινομένων χαλεπώτατον. πολλῶν τοίνυν καὶ μεγάλων ἐπικειμένων ταύτῃ τὸ πρότερον καὶ οὗτος τῶν τηνικαῦτα γενομένων εἰς ἦν. καὶ πρῶτον ἤρξατο ληΐζειν ἅπαντα τὰ περὶ τῆς Πόλεως. ὁ μέντοι λαὸς προφθάσας οὐκ ἀνηπάργη τῆ τῶν πολεμίων ἐφόδῳ, ἐπεὶ προκατείχτο τῶν γενησομένων καὶ αὐτὸν ὁ τι τάχιστα ηὔτρεπίσαστο. εἴτα συνειλογῶς ἐλεπόλεις καὶ ταύτας συγνῶς τῷ τείχει μάλα δεινῶς εὔτρεπίει ἐξώλης καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἀλλήλοισ βάλλοντες, μετέπειτα καὶ τὰς κλίμακας, νόκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν οὐ διέλιπε ταύτην πολιορκῶν τῷ πλήθει μὲν τῶν βελῶν ὁ ἥλιος ἀπεκρύπτετο ἐν ὥρα πολέμου, ἡπειρος δὲ κύκλω τοῦ ἄστεως τῷ πλήθει τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐν στενώσει καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐτόγχανεν . . . τὰ περὶ δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ μὲν κρατήσαντες, τὰ δὲ ληισάμενοι. τούτων μὲν οὕτω γινομένων, ὁ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἡγούμενος διαδιδράσκει τῶν πολεμίων μετὰ πεντήκοντα στρατιωτῶν καὶ γὰρ . . . τηνικαῦτα διατελῶν ἦν σύμμαχος τῶν πολεμίων οὐκουν ἐθελοῦσιος. καὶ εὐθὺς καταλέγει τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἅπασαν. ἐντεῦθεν σημεῖον ἐναργῆς ἦν τὸ γινόμενον φέρον ἡμῖν βοήθειαν, ἀποστροφὴν δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς πολεμίοις. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἔληγε πάντα πράττων καὶ κατασκευαζόμενος ὅπως παραστήσῃται ταύτην, πῆ μὲν ἰσθμῶν ἐλεπόλεις καὶ τειχομαχίας, πῆ δὲ κλίμακας ἐντιθεὶς τῷ τείχει ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὀρυγῆς ἐνέλιπεν ἀλιτήμων ὑπέρνεθεν τῶν θεμελίων διαπραττόμενος. ἀλλ' εἰς κενὸν ἦν ὁ κόπος αὐτῷ . . . μὴν μὲν ὑπῆρχεν ὅθ' οἱ πολέμιοι ἤρξαντο πολιορκεῖν Ποσειδεῶν, Γαμηλιῶν, Ἀνθεστηριῶν, Ἐλαφοβολιῶν τῆ πέμπτη τοῦ μηνὸς τούτου μόγις τὰ τῆς μάχης κατέληξε, καὶ τὸ πολέμιον ἄρα διεσκέπτετο ὑπονοστήσαι. καταλιπὼν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοις τῶν κρειττόνων μέχρι χιλίων . . . ἀπῆει κατησχυμένος . . . ἢ τε Πόλις ἀνύμνει, περισσθεῖσα τῆ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφόδῳ καὶ μέσης ψυχῆς τῆ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου μητρί ὡς δι' ἐκείνης σωθεῖσα ἦδε τὰ χαριστήρια. On chronology, cf. V. Grumel, *La Chronologie. Traité d'études byzantines*, ed. P. Lemerle, vol. 1 (Paris, 1958), p. 177. In the calendar of ancient Athens, the consecutive months of Poseideon, Gamelion, Anthesterion, and Elaphebolion correspond to November/December, December/January, January/February, and February/March, respectively, while the author of this speech undoubtedly means to indicate the period from June to September. For the ancient Attic calendar, see E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica: An Archaeological Commentary* [Wisconsin Studies in Classics] (Madison, 1983), pp. 4, 5, and A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* [Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 1.7] (Munich, 1972), pp. 57–138.

30 The day of the general assault is given in the *Minus*, 10.2, as August 22: καὶ τῆ κβ^α τοῦ Αὐγούστου μηνὸς ἐπολέμησε αὐτὴν δὴ τὴν πόλιν καθολικὸν πόλεμον. It seems more reasonable to accept August 24. Cf. *MP*, p. 364, n. 115; *PaL* 2: 12, and n. 32; *LCB*, p. 348; and P. Schreiner, *Studien zu den Βραχέα Χρονικά* [Miscellanea byzantina monastica 6] (Munich, 1967), pp. 172–175.

31 The prophet of the Turks is called Μηρσαίτης by Kananos, who adds that he was regarded as a direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad himself. There is reason to believe that his actual name was Seid-Bokhari. On Μηρσαίτης, cf. *MP*, p. 364 and n. 113, and *LCB*, p. 348. I believe Kananos is not intending a personal name with his “Mersaites” but is citing instead, in Greek dress, a religious title of a holy man, a spiritual guide: a *mursid*. For a similar spiritual guide to Mehmed II in the siege of 1453, see H.

- Inalcik, "Istanbul: An Islamic City," in H. Inalcik, *Essays in Ottoman History* (Istanbul, 1998), pp. 249–271, esp. pp. 252, 253. On this topic, cf. *infra*, n. 42.
- 32 Kananos, pp. 472, 473: και πᾶν πολεμικὸν ὄργανον ἔφερον ἀνά χεῖρας, καὶ ἠκούμβησαν εἰς τὰ τεῖχη, ἔθηκαν σκάλας, ἀνέβαιναν εἰς τὸ κάστρον, ἐτρυποῦσαν τοὺς πύργους. καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐρέθην ὁ ἐμποδίσας ἐκείνους ἐκ τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου καὶ δειλίας ὅποιας ἔλαβον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἐτρόμαξεν τὴν ὥραν ἐκείνην; τίς οὐκ ἔφριξε ταύτην τὴν θέαν; τίς ἀκοῆ φέρει τὸ ἄκουσμα, ποία ὄνις τὸ θέαμα καὶ γὰρ ἐν μιᾷ καιροῦ ῥοπή μυριάδους βελῶν, τοῦτέστι σαγίττας, ἐτόξευσαν ἐπάνω τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ ἔπεσον εἰς τὰ τεῖχη τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐντός, ὥστε καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα ἐκάλυψαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου ἐσκέπασαν, καὶ ἡμᾶς πάντας φόβος ἐκράτησε καὶ δειλία ἐξέπληξε, καὶ μικρὸν ἀπεκρύβημεν. ἀλλ' οὐ μακρὰν, ἀλλ' ὅπισθεν τὸν προμαχίωνων ἐστάθημεν. ὡς μὲν οἱ Τοῦρκοι γυμνὸν τὸ κάστρον ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἰδόντες ὑπέλαβον ἀφυλάκτως εἶναι, καὶ μετὰ θράσους μεγίστου καθ' ἡμῶν εἰσβάλλουσι πάντες. καὶ οἱ μὲν μετὰ σκαλῶν ἀνέβαινον εἰς τὸ κάστρον, οἱ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὰς ἀγγύρας καὶ τὰς φάλκας ἐκείνας. ἄλλοι δὲ ἐτρυποῦσαν μετὰ συστάς τοὺς πύργους, ἄλλοι ἐχαλοῦσαν μετὰ τζόκους τὸ κάστρον, ἄλλοι ἔκασαν τὰς πόρτας τοῦ ἔξω κάστρου, καὶ πᾶν τολμηρὸν καὶ ἀνδρείον οἱ ἀσεβεῖς ἐποίουντο. On Greek terms for gunpowder weapons, see S. P. Lampros, "Ὄνόματα τοῦ Πυροβόλου, τοῦ Τυφεκίου καὶ τῆς Πυρίτιδος παρὰ τοῖς Βυζαντινοῖς," *NH* 5 (1908): 403–414.
- 33 Kananos, p. 474: ἕκαστος μεθ' ὃν ἠδύνατο ὄπλων, ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ ἄνευ ὄπλων, ἄλλοι μετὰ ξιφῶν καὶ κονταρίων. ἕτεροι δὲ οὐδὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν εὐποροῦσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰς τάβλας ὅπου ἐτρώγαν καὶ τὰ τυμπάνια τῶν βουτζίων ἔδωσαν μετὰ σχοινία, καὶ ἐβάσταζον ἀντὶ σκουταρίων. τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲ μετ' αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἦλθον, ἀλλὰ μετὰ λίθους καὶ μόνον ἐμάχοντο τολμηρῶς καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὡς κατάφρακτοι μετὰ παντοίων τῶν ὄπλων.
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 472, 473: ὁ δὲ λαὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὄρων τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ μάχια ἔργα τῶν Τοῦρκων, καὶ τὴν πλημμονὴν τοῦ φωσάτου γενεῶν τῶν ἀπειρών, καὶ τὴν ὀρμὴν τῶν Ταρτάρων καὶ τῶν Μουσουλμάνων τὴν τόλμην, καὶ τὰ πρὸ ὀλίγουπραχθέντα, ὅτι ἐντός τῆς σούδας ἀπέκτειναν οἱ Τοῦρκοι Ῥωμαίους καὶ ἄλλους ἐμπροσθεν εἰς τὰς πόρτας, ἐδειλίασαν μέγα, καὶ σχεδὸν πρὸς φυγὴν οἱ πλείονες ἐθεώρουν. ὦ ὦρας ἀπελπισίας μεγίστης. τίς οὐκ ἔφριξε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην; τίς οὐκ ἐτρόμαξε τὴν ὥραν ταύτην ὄρων τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς τοσαύτην δειλίαν καὶ τοὺς Μουσουλμάνους εἰς θάρσος τοσοῦτον; καὶ τίς τῶν ἀκαταπλήκτων τότε οὐ κατεπλήγη καὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων οὐκ ἐφοβήθη, οὐχὶ τὸν θάνατον λέγω, φυσικὸς γὰρ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τῆς μεγαλοπόλεως ταύτης τὴν ἄλωσιν καὶ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν τοῦ γένους, τῶν γυναικῶν τὰς ἀτιμίας, τῶν σωφρόνων τὰς αἰσχουρίας, τὴν περιτομὴν τῶν βρεφῶν, τῶν ναῶν τὴν ἀπώλειαν, τῶν ἁγίων εἰκόνων τοὺς ἐμπαγμούς, τοῦ μεγίστου θεοῦ τὴν σοφίαν ὑμνητήριον τοῦ Μωάμεθ καὶ κατοικίηριον τῶν δαιμόνων.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 475, 476: καὶ μὴ μόνον οἱ στρατιῶται καὶ οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τοῦ πολέμου εἰργάζοντο ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἄρχοντες καὶ τῆς χώρας οἱ ἐπιστήμονες καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἅπαν καὶ τῶν ἱερέων καὶ τῶν μοναχῶν τὰ συστήματα καὶ τῶν ἀρχιερέων οἱ κρεῖττονες καὶ πνευματικῶν τῶν ὁσίων οἱ ὁσιώτατοι καὶ τῶν ἔξω χωρῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τολμηροὶ καὶ γενναῖοι καὶ περιφρονηταὶ τῶν πληγῶν καὶ τῶν θανάτων ἐφάνησαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες πολλαὶ εἰς ἀνδρὸς θάρσους μεταλλαττόμεναι ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου τὴν ὥραν φρικτοτάτην ἐκείνην οὐκ ἀπεκρύβησαν, οὐδὲ ὡς γυναῖκες ἐδειλίασαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ πολέμου τὴν ὥραν εἰς τὸ ἔξω κάστρον ἐφθασαν, καὶ αἱ μὲν πέτρας εἰς τὸ τεῖχος ἀνέβαζον πρὸς τοὺς πολεμιστὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ ἠνδρείωναν αὐτούς, καὶ ὠθοῦσαν πρὸς τὴν μάχην καὶ τὸν πόλεμον. ἄλλοι δὲ ἐκρατοῦσαν ὡὰ καὶ στουππία, καὶ τοὺς λαβωμένους ἰάτρευον ἄλλοι ὕδατα καὶ οἶνους ἐπότιζον αὐτοὺς φλεγόμενους τῇ δίψῃ ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου. ἄλλοι δὲ τοὺς γνησίους αὐτῶν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ τοὺς ὁμοζύγους καταπέδιζον μὴ καταβῆναι τοῦ τείχους τοῦ κάστρου καὶ τοῦ πολέμου σχολάσαι . . . ἐστρατεύοντο δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, μία τὴν ἄλλην ἐνουθετεῖ . . . ἐλαβώθησαν καὶ τινες μετὰ σαγίττας.
- 36 *Minus*, 10.2: ἀπῆλθεν ἄπρακτος ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως βοήθεια θεοῦ. For other similar instances of divine intervention, see N. H. Baynes, "The Supernatural Defenders of Constantinople," *Analecta Bollandiana* 7 (1949): 165–177 [= N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London, 1955), pp. 248–260].

- 37 See A. A. Vasiliev, “Pero Tafur, a Spanish Traveller of the Fifteenth Century and His Visit to Constantinople, Trebizond, and Italy,” *Byz* 7 (1932): 75–122, esp. p. 110. The story that Tafur picked up was much older than the siege of 1422; see *infra*, n. 40.
- 38 Tafur, 179, 180: *Dizen que vino el Turco á la çercar é la tuvo en grant estrecho . . . é toda vía el Turco continuando en su propósito, dizen que vieron por ençima del muro andar un onbre á cavallo, é preguntó á un griego, que allí tenía preso, ¿qué maravilla era aquella que cada noche veyen aquel cavallero por ençima de las almenas y corriendo á cavallo é armado? Dixo: señor, los griegos dizen que creen que, quando Constantino edificó esta yglesia, andavan en la labor della muchas gente . . . é que un dia . . . quel maestro mayor mandó á un niño . . . aguardar las ferramientas; é que, quendando allí, le apresció un onbre á cavallo muy fermoso é le dixo: . . . anda, non ayas miedo, que yo te prometo que yo guarde la yglesia é la çibdat fasta que tú vengas; é qué niño se fué, é despues, con miedo que uvo de amenazas que le fizieron, nunca bolvió, así que quedó el cavallero en guarda de la promesa que fizo. É este se dize que es el Angel.* For Tafur’s visit, in general, see A. Bravo García, “La Constantinopla que vieron R. González de Clavijo y P. Tafur,” *Erytheia* 3 (1983): 39–47.
- 39 Tafur, 180: *Pero poderse ía dezir agora quel niño era venido, é el Angel avie dexado su guarda, pues todo es tomado é ocupadó pero por aquella vez el Turco se partió.*
- 40 E. Kriaras, *Tò Ανακάλυμμα τῆς Κωνσταντινόπολης, Κριτική Ἐκδόση μεῖ Εἰσαγωγή, Σχόλια καὶ Γλωσσάριο* (Thessalonica, 1956; 2nd ed.: 1965), lines 109–115 [CC 2: 376, with Italian translation]: ὁ κόσμος τῆς Ἁγίας Σοφίας, τὰ πέπλα τῆς τραπέζης / τῆς παναγίας, τῆς σεπτῆς, τὰ καθιερωμένα, / τὰ σκεύη τὰ πανάγια καὶ ποῦ νὰ καταστήσαν; / ἄρα ἐβλεπεν ὁ ἄγγελος, ὡς ἦτον τεταγμένοι, / ὅστις καὶ ἔταξεν ποτὲ τοῦ πάλαι νεανίσκου; / εἶπεν γὰρ οὐκ ἐξέρχομαι ἕως οὔτου νὰ ἔλθῃς. / ὁ νεανίας ἔρχεται, ὁ ἄγγελος ἀπῆλθεν. This story was well known and the angel in question is most often identified as the Archangel Michael. In fact, the tale is often cited in Slavonic texts; a version in G. P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* [DOS 19] (Washington, DC, 1984), pp. 128–131 (commentary with bibliography: pp. 203–206, esp. 84, 85, and 100, 101). For the genre of the poetic lamentation over the fall of cities, see A. Polites, *Tò Δημοτικὸ Τραγοῦδι* (Herakleion, 2010), pp. 351–359; and Karanika, “Messengers, Angels, and Laments for the Fall of Constantinople,” pp. 226–251.
- 41 Scholarius, *Oeuvres complètes*, 3: 163.
- 42 The atmosphere was religiously charged on both sides. The holy man “Mersaites”/ *murşid* ensured that the attackers had worked themselves up to a religious fervor. In 1453 Mehmed II also was under the influence of a holy man, who even suggested changes in strategy: Mehmed Şems el-Mille ve’d Din (= Sufi Şeyh Aq-Şemseddin), who had been born in Damascus but had spent some years in the Porte and was present during the siege and sack. A letter of his survives in a manuscript (in the Top Kapı Palace, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi 5584*), published by H. Inalcik, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar, Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Ankara, 1954), pp. 217, 218. An Italian rendition (without the original text) is included in CC 1: 301–303, based on an unpublished English translation by R. Murphey. Şeyh Aq-Şemseddin had become a *murşid*, a spiritual guide, to the sultan. Mehmed had asked his *murşid* to calculate the exact date the city was fated to fall; he did so and reported the day but on that day the Christians scored a victory in the naval sector. The *şeyh* acknowledged his error and attributed his miscalculation to the fact that, in his opinion, there were too many insincere converts in Mehmed’s staff, indirectly criticizing the presence and influence of renegades. Cardinal Isidore also had a deep interest in astrology, prophecies, and matters of the occult, in general. Manuscripts of ancient works copied by his own hand illustrate his interests, e.g., his Pseudo-Ptolemy (*Vatic. 1698*). See C. G. Patrinelis, “Ἑλληνες Κωδικογράφοι τῶν Χρόνων τῆς Αναγεννήσεως,” *EMA* 8–9 (1958/59): 63–124.
- 43 On Manuel and John during the siege, see Kananos, p. 471: ὁ μὲν εἰς βασιλεὺς κατατροχόμενος ὑπῆρχεν ἐκ νόσου καὶ γήρους, καὶ ἡδύνατο ὀπισθῆναι ἢ ἀναβῆναι ἐφ’ ἵππου, ἀλλὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ παλατιοῦ εὕρισκετο καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ἑπαρτεν ὁ δ’ ἄλλος

- ἀνέβη ἐφ' ἵππου. Also cf. *FC*, p. 91; and Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, pp. 114, 115.
- 44 Kananos, p. 471: ἀνέβη ἐφ' ἵππου καθωπλισμένος, ὡς ἔδει, καὶ τὴν πύλην ἐξῆλθε Ῥωμανοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου, καὶ ἔσθη ἐκεῖσε πλησίον τῆς πόρτης.
- 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 461, 462: ἐπεὶ ἐβδόμηκοντα βοκία τῆς βολῆς τῆς μεγίστης ἐκείνης τὸν σεσαθρωμένον ἔκρουσε πύργον, καὶ οὐδεμίαν βλάβην τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τοῦτο προὔξενησεν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς Τούρκοις ὠφέλειαν. ἦν γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ σοῦδα καὶ πύργος πλησίον Κυριακῆς τῆς ἁγίας, μέσον Ῥωμανοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ τῆς Χαροσῆς τε τὴν πύλην, καὶ πλησιέστερον τούτων εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν ἐπονομαζόμενον Λύκον. Kananos is the only author in Byzantine literature to cite the name of Lycus River. Nowadays its stream runs under the pavement of the highway *Vatan Caddesi*. The topography of the sector, near the modern neighborhood of *Sulu Kule*, remains problematic. There are no traces left of the Church of Santa Kyriake. For a survey of this vicinity, see *SFC*, pp. 338–342.
- 46 Doukas, 28.8: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Μανουὴλ κατάκοιτος ὢν . . . σοφίζεται κατὰ τοῦ Μωράτ . . . ὁ Μωράτ οὖν ἠσχολεῖτο ἐν ἐπάλλεσιν καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς τοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν Κωνσταντῖνον . . . ἀφίση τὴν ἔχθραν καὶ λύει τὰς παρατάξεις καὶ τὰς μελετωμένας ἐλεπόλους καὶ δίδωσιν λύσιν τῷ μυριαριθμῷ στρατῷ . . . ἐποίησε γοῦν ὁ Μωράτ σὺν τοῖς στρατεύμασι αὐτοῦ ἐπάνω τῆς πόλεως μῆνας τρεῖς. The departure of the Ottoman army was also depicted in a miniature by Klontzas; see Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλώντζας*, p. 170 (fol. 78^v).
- 47 Cf., e.g., *LCB*, p. 348; J. P. Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (New York, 1977), p. 83; and Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 117: “Murad was forced to abandon the siege because civil war had broken out again. . . . In another triumph of Byzantine diplomacy Manuel II had successfully prompted Murad II’s younger brother Mustafa to make his bid for control of the Ottoman throne.” Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, p. 190, produces some evidence to indicate that the plague may have attacked the Turkish camp. Kritoboulos suggests that internal problems at the Porte dictated the withdrawal, 1.16.11: ὁ δὲ γε πατήρ οὐμός [Murad II], ἴστε, μεθ’ οἷας παρασκευῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν [Constantinople] καὶ ὡς τοσοῦτον τῆ πολιορκία ταύτης ἐκράτησεν, ὡς μηδ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος ἔχειν εἶσαι τοὺς προμαχομένους ἐλεύθερον βαλλομένους τοῖς τε τοίχοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μηχανῶν λίθοις οὕτως εἶχεν αὐτὴν ἐν χεροῖν. κἂν εἶλε βία τοῖς ὅπλοις μαχόμενος, εἰ μὴ τοὺς σφόδρα οικειοὺς καὶ οἷς μάλιστα ἐπίστευεν ἀντιπράττοντας ἀφανῶς εἶχεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πλέον τῆς γνώμης νέμοντας τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις ἰδίων ἔνεκα κερδῶν οὗτοι τοίνυν τῆς τε πολιορκίας αὐτὸν ἀνέστησαν καὶ ταύτην περιεσώσαντο.
- 48 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.18 (pp. 386, 387): μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὡς πειρωμένοις τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῶν σπονδῶν οὐδὲν προεχῶρει, τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὸν Μουσταφᾶν τὸν Μεγεμέτεω παῖδα. ἔτυχε δὲ διατριβῶν παρὰ τῷ Καραμάνῳ τὴν δίαιτα ποιούμενος. πρέσβεις δὲ πέμψαντες μετεπέμποντο ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον τὸν παῖδα, γεγονότα ἀμφὶ τὰ τρισκαίδεκα ἔτη. Khalkokondyles is followed, as usual, by the *BCIII*, 6.8.
- 49 *Minus*, 10.2 and 11.1, respectively: καὶ τῇ ς^η τοῦ Σεπτεμβρίου μηνός . . . ἀπῆλθεν ἄπρακτος ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως . . . καὶ τῇ λ^η τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνός ἦλθεν ὁ Μουσταφόπουλος. By “Moustaphopoulos” Sphrantzes indicates that he was aware that the Turks called him Küçük Mustafa, “Little Mustafa,” to differentiate him from his uncle, Düzme Mustafa, “False Mustafa”; see Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid*, p. 3. Doukas, 28.6: πέμπει κρυφίως γραφάς . . . ὁ βασιλεὺς [Μανουήλ] τοῦ ἁγίου τοῦ παιδίου [Μουσταφᾶ] . . . στείλας αὐτὸν καὶ χρυσίου μέρος πολὺ . . . ὁ Μωράτ οὖν ἠσχολεῖτο.
- 50 *Ibid.*: καὶ τῇ λ^η τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνός ἦλθεν ὁ Μουσταφόπουλος καὶ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ Μουράτη καὶ ἐπέρασεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν καὶ ἔπεσεν ἔξω εἰς τὸν αὐθεντικὸν περιβόλον καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐρίον, τῇ α^η Ὀκτωβρίου ἦλθεν εἰς προσκύνησιν τῶν βασιλέων.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 11.2: καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐγένετο τὸ τῆς ἡμιπληγίας νόσημα τῷ ἁγίῳ βασιλεῖ κυρ Μανουήλ, ὃν ἰδόντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ανατολῆς μετὰ τοῦ Μουσταφοπούλου Τούρκοι καὶ θαυμάσαντες . . . ἔλεγον ὅτι τὸν πίστεως αὐτῶν ἀρχηγὸν Μαχοῦμετ ὁμοιάζει. Doukas, 28.6, skips the embassy and only mentions the emperor’s paraplegic

- attack: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Μανουὴλ ἔκειτο τὰ λoίσθια πνέων, γενόμενος παράπληκτος. *CBB* 1: 13.5, 13.6, and 13.7 (p. 117) reports that September 30 was a Wednesday and October 1 was a Thursday.
- 52 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.18 (pp. 386, 387): ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκετο ἐς Βυζάντιον ὁ παῖς, ἔπεμπε λόγους παρὰ τοὺς Τούρκους, μεγάλα τε ὑπισχνούμενος, καὶ μετιῶν ἕκαστον ἐπηγγέλετο διαπλάσιον πάντων, ὧν εἶχεν ὑπὸ Ἀμουράτεω. καὶ ἠυτομόλησαν μὲν τινες Τούρκοι παρὰ τὸν παῖδα, οὐ πολλοὶ δέ. ὁ μέντοι παῖς τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβάς, συνεπιλαβομένου καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλήνων βασιλέως, τό τε Ἴερὸν καλούμενον ἐξεπολιόρκησε, καὶ προσελεύοντι αὐτῷ διὰ τῆς Ἀσίας προσεχώρουν οἱ τῆς Ἀσίας Τούρκοι ἅτε βασιλέως παιδὶ ὄντι.
- 53 *EX*, 4: περαιώσαντες γὰρ αὐτὸν οἱ πολῖται μετὰ στρατιωτῶν καὶ δορυφορίας ἐν τῇ Ἀνατολῇ, ὑπέκυναν αὐτῷ ἄπαντες ἔλαβε δὲ καὶ κάστηρ καὶ χώρας σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν πάσης Ἀνατολῆς καθεζόμενος ἐν τῇ Προύσῃ.
- 54 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.19 (pp. 386, 387): ἐνταῦθα Ἀλιάζης ὁ οἰνοχόος ἐπὶ κλινῆν . . . συντίθεται προδοσίαν τῷ Ἀμουράτῃ, ὥστε καταπροδοῦναι αὐτῷ τὸ παιδίον. καὶ ὡς συνέθετο αὐτῷ, ἔπρασεν, ὥστε τὸν παῖδα αὐτῷ παραδοίη, διεσήμαινέ τε ἄγγελον, ὅποι διατρίβων τυγγάνοι ὁ παῖς. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐς Νίκαιαν ἀφίκετο ὁ παῖς, τὴν τε Νίκαιαν ὑπηγάγετο, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διατρίβων ὁ παῖς μετῆι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀρίστους. καὶ ὡς ἤδη χειμῶν ἦν, διεκωλύετο ἐς τὸ πρόσω τῆς Ἀσίας ἰέναι. ἐνταῦθα πυθόμενος Ἀμουράτης παρὰ Ἀλιάζεω τοῦ σαραπτάρη τὴν τε διατριβὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὡς εἶχε τάχους, λαβὼν ἄμφι τοὺς ἐξακισχιλίους τῶν θυρῶν, ἀφικόμενος ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλησποντον καὶ διαβάς ἤλανε ἐνθὺ Βιθυνίας. ἐπιπεσῶν δὲ ἄφνω ἐς τὴν πόλιν συλλαμβάνει τε τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ, παραδιδόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ Ἀλιάζεω . . . τοῦτον μέντοι ὁ Ἀμουράτης λαβὼν ἀγχόνῃ ἀνεῦλεν, ἧ νομίζεται παρ' αὐτοῖς. N. Iorga, "Sur le deux prétendants Moustafa du XV^e siècle," *RHSE* 10 (1933): 12, 13; S. Kougeas, "Notizbuch eines beamten des Anfang des XV. Jahrhunderts," *BZ* 23 (1914–19): 143–163; and *MP*, p. 369, n. 121.
- 55 *EX*, 4: Μουσταφᾶν, ὃς καὶ φυγῶν εἰσῆλθεν ἐντὸς τῆς Πόλεως, ὄνπερ ὑπεδέξαντο οἱ πολῖται ὥσπερ τι μέγα θήραμα· δέδωκαν δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς γυναῖκα τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ Τόρια εὐγενεοῦς Γενουβίτου ὁ γὰρ βασιλεὺς κύρις Μανουὴλ ἔχων θυγατέρα ἐκ πορνεῖας ὀνόματι Ζαμπία Παλαιολογίνα δέδωκεν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸν Τόριαν τὴν θυγατέρα δὲ αὐτῆς πάλιν δέδωκαν τῷ σουλτᾶν Μουσταφᾶ εἰς γυναῖκα ὀνομάσαντες αὐτὴν Κυρὰν τῆς Ἀνατολῆς κενῷ ὀνόματι.
- 56 *Minus*, 12.1: καὶ τοῦ θέρους τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἔφυγεν ὁ αὐθεντόπουλος κύρ Δημήτριος μετὰ Ἰλαρίωνος Ντόρια καὶ Γιούργη Ἰζαούλ . . . ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸν Γαλατᾶν, ἵνα ὑπάγωσι εἰς τοὺς Τούρκους, εἰ καὶ οὐκ ἀπῆλθον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν Οὐγγαρίαν.
- 57 *CBB* 1: 13.8 (p. 139): καὶ τῇ δ' ἰουλίῳ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἰνδικτιῶνος, διέβη εἰς τὸν Γαλατᾶν ὁ αὐθέντης κύρ Δημήτριος μετὰ Ἰλαρίωνος Ντόρια, and *CBB* 1: 13.9 (p. 139): καὶ τῇ ζ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ μηνός, τῆς αὐτῆς ἰνδικτιῶνος, διέβη εἰς τὴν Οὐγκρίαν μετὰ κατέργου ὁ αὐτὸς αὐθεντόπουλος κύρ Δημήτριος.
- 58 *MP*, p. 368, n. 120; p. 370, n. 125.
- 59 Sygrououlos, 2.11: τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐν στενωχωρίᾳ ἦσαν ὑπὸ τῆς μάχης, καὶ ἀναγκασθεῖς ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Δημήτριος, ἀρξαμένου τοῦ δευτέρου ἔτους τῆς μάχης, ἀπέδρα ἐν τῷ Γαλατᾶ μετὰ τοῦ γαμβροῦ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ Ντόρια. διεμνήνετο οὖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποστρέψαι καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ' ἐβουλήθη ἀπελθεῖν εἰς τὸν βασιλεῖα τῶν Ἀλαμανῶν καὶ ἄκοντες οὖν ἐνέδωκαν καὶ ὠκονόμησαν αὐτὸν μετὰ κύρ Ματθαίου τοῦ Ἀσάνη καὶ τοῦ Ντόρια καὶ τινῶν ἐτέρων ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀπῆλθε διὰ τοῦ Ἀσπροκάστρου εἰς Οὐγγρίαν κατὰ σεπτέμβριον ἰνδικτιῶνος δευτέρας.
- 60 *Minus*, 12.3: καὶ τῇ ιε' τοῦ Νοεμβρίου τοῦ λβ^{ου} ἔτους διέβη ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Οὐγγαρίαν, ποιήσας δεσπότην τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν αὐθεντόπουλον κύρ Κωνσταντῖνον καὶ καταλείψας αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἀντ' αὐτοῦ.
- 61 That Demetrios was acting in the tradition of Andronikos IV and John VII, who had rebelled against the regime, was suggested by N. Iorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 1 (Gotha, 1900) pp. 382, 383.; also see *MP*, p. 370, n. 125.

- 62 P. Topping, “The Morea, 1363–1460,” in H. W. Hazard, ed., *A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Madison, 1975), pp. 141–167, esp. pp. 163, 164; A. G. Mompherratos, *Oi Palaioλόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* (Athens, 1913), pp. 49, 50; N. Cheetham, *Medieval Greece* (New Haven and London, 1981), p. 204; S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), p. 71; and *LMB*, pp. 538–546. On Venier’s mission and Venice’s reaction to the events, see *PaL* 2: 13, 14.
- 63 *DGM* 1: 196 ff.
- 64 *PaL* 2: 14.
- 65 *Minus*, 12.1: καὶ τὸν Μάιον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἐχάλασε ὁ Τουραχάνης τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον εἰς τὸν Μορέα καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀλβανιτῶν ἐσκότωσεν.
- 66 *CBB* 1: 33.34 (249): ἔτους ζῳλα΄, μηνὶ μαῖῳ κβ΄, ἦλθεν Τοῦρκος ὁ Τουραχάνης μετὰ φοσσάτου εἰς τὸ Ἐξαμίλι καὶ ἐπῆρεν το καὶ ἐχάλασέν το. Also cf. *CBB* 1: 32.37 (p. 235). On Turahan’s family, cf. *PaL* 2: 17.
- 67 Syropoulos, 2.6: ὑπὲρ τε τῆς τοῦ Ἐξαμιλίου φυλακῆς μεγίστην πρόνοιαν ὁ μακαριώτατος [sc. ὁ πάπας] ἐποιήσατο, ἥτις γε τοσοῦτον αὐτὸ ὤνησεν, ὅσον καὶ ὄνου σκιάν γράμμα ὁ μακαριώτατος ἐκθήμενος ἐστεῖλε συγχωροῦν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν προαιρουμένων παραγίνεσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον καὶ φυλάσσειν αὐτό. πρὸς οὓς δὲ ἡ συγχώρησις . . . βέλτιον ἠγήσαντο οἰκοὶ μένοντες ῥέγγειν καὶ ταῖς συνήθεσι συζῆν ἁμαρτίας ἢ συγχωροῦμενοι φυλάσσειν τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον. ὄθεν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐρρεγχοὺς οἰκοὶ, οἱ δὲ τῆς Ἄγαρ τὸ τεῖχος συσχόντες καὶ καταστρέψαντες Μυσῶν λεῖαν τὰ Ῥωμαϊκὰ τε καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖσε Λατινικὰ ἐποιήσαντο. Cf. S. P. Lampros, “Τὰ Τεῖχη τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ κατὰ τοὺς Μέσους Αἰῶνας,” *NH* 2: 435–489, esp. pp. 469 ff.
- 68 *Ibid.*: συνελέγοντο οἱ τῆς Πελοποννήσου Ἀλβανοὶ περὶ τὴν μεσόγειον, Δαβίην καλουμένην χώραν, καὶ σφίσι στρατηγὸν ἐστήσαντο, καὶ ἀπόστασιν ἐβουλεύοντο ἀπὸ Ἑλλήνων, ὡς τὸ Τουραχάνεω στρατεύμα διαφθεῖρωσι. Τουραχάνης μὲντοι ὡς ἐπόθετο τοὺς Ἀλβανοὺς ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ὁμοσε ἰόντας ὡς διὰ μάχης, ὡς οὐκ ἠδύνατο διαφυγεῖν, παρετάξατό τε εἰς μάχην. καὶ οἱ Ἀλβανοὶ συνταξάμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπῆσαν καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθόντες οὐδὲ ἐδέξαντο τοὺς Τοῦρκους, ἀλλ’ ἐτράποντο ἐς φυγὴν.
- 69 *CBB* 1: 33.35 (p. 249): εἶτα ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν, εἶτα εἰς τὸ Γαρδίκι, εἶτα εἰς τὴν Ταβίαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔκοψαν τοὺς Ἀλβανίτας, μηνὶ ἰουνίῳ ε΄. *CBB* 1: 36.15 (p. 292), supplies the same information without providing a specific date. A different date altogether is found in *CBB* 1: 72.5 (p. 555), which conflates the loss of the Hexamilion with the massacre of the Albanians: ζῳλα΄ ἔκοψαν οἱ Τοῦρκοὶ τοὺς Ἀλβανίτας εἰς τὴν Ταβίαν, μαῖῳ κβ΄, ἡμέρα σαββάτῳ. Cf. Topping, “The Morea, 1363–1460,” p. 164; *idem*, “Albanian Settlements in Medieval Greece: Some Venetian Testimonies,” in A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis, ed., *Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis* (New Brunswick, 1980), pp. 261–271; Cheetham, *Medieval Greece*, p. 204; Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 71; and *PaL* 2: 17.
- 70 *CBB* 1: 33.35 (p. 249).
- 71 The chronic condition of Andronikos is cited as leprosy or elephantiasis. He died a few years after the transfer of Thessalonica; it has been suspected that this illness prevented Manuel from finding a bride for him; cf. S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi* 1 (1981): 277; D. Balfour, *Politico-Historical Works of Symeon, Archbishop of Thessalonica* [Wiener Byzantinische Studien 13] (Vienna, 1979), pp. 272–278; *VeG*, 93 (pp. 61, 62) wrongly stated that Andronikos “sold” Thessalonica to the Venetians; and *PLP* 9: no. 21427 (pp. 79, 80).
- 72 On the transfer of this city to Venice, cf. *RdD* 2: 1908; and *NE* 1: 347. For the negotiations and the occupation of Thessalonica by the Venetians, cf. *PaL* 2: 21–31; *MP*, pp. 373, 374; *LCB*, pp. 350, 351; D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 360–362; J. R. Melville-Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Venetian Documents, Archivio del Litorale Adriatico VII* (Padua, 2002); and *idem*, *Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Greek Accounts* [Archivio del Litorale Adriatico VIII] (Padua, 2002 [*sic*; in fact: 2006]).

- 73 M. Spremic, “Harac Soluna u XV veku,” *ZRVI* 10 (1967), 187–195.
- 74 See, e.g., J. Tsaras, “La fin d’Andronic Paléologue dernier despote de Thessalonique,” *RESE* 3 (1965): 419–432; criticism of Tsaras’ position in *PaL* 2: 21, n. 64; and Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, 361, n. 1: “The tale that Andronikos sold the city to the Venetians derives from the much later account of Pseudo-Phrantzes. . . . The truth of the transaction is contained in the Venetian documents.” For documents, cf. Melville-Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430*.
- 75 *EX*, 9: οὗτος οὖν ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος περιέπεσεν ἐν τῷ πάθει τῆς ἐλεφαντιώσεως ἐβουλεύσατο γὰρ μετὰ τῶν συνηλικιωτῶν αὐτοῦ ὅπως πωλήσῃ αὐτήν, εἰπόντων αὐτῷ ὡς ὁ πατήρ σου ταύτην τὴν πόλιν δέδωκέ σοι κληρονομίαν ὡς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σοῖς ἀδελφοῖς πώλησον οὖν αὐτήν καὶ λαβὼν τὰ φλωρία πορευθήτη ἐν μοναστηρίῳ. ἐποίησεν οὖν οὕτως καὶ ἐπώλησεν αὐτήν τοῖς Βενετικούς διὰ φλωρία χιλιάδας πεντήκοντα ταύτην τὴν περιφημον καὶ λαμπρὰν πόλιν καὶ λαβὼν τὰ φλωρία τὰ μὲν ἐφθεῖρε κακῶς, τὰ δὲ ἐχαρίσατο τοῖς δαιτυμόσι αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ καταλειφθέντα ἄρας ἀπῆλθεν ἐν τῷ Ἁγίῳ Ὁρει εἰς ἓν τῶν ἐκεῖσε μοναστηρίων, καὶ ἐτελεύτησε.
- 76 *BCIII*, 6.10: καὶ οἱ Ρωμαῖοι ἀναμειναινε ἀπὸ ἐκεῖνα, ὅπου ὠλπίζανε, ὅπου ἡ τύχη τοῦς ἐπῆγαινε ἀπὸ κακῶ εἰς χειρότερο. Καὶ ἐπούλησε ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ βασιλέως τὴν Σαλονικὴν τῶν Βενετζάνω διὰ πενήντα χιλιάδες φλωρία, διατι δὲν ἠπόρειε νὰ τῆνε κρατῆ.
- 77 *CBB* 1: 22.33 (p. 185): καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λωβὸς πωλεῖ τὴν Θεσσαλονικὴν τῶν Βενετικῶν εἰς φλωρία βενέτικα κ καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν. *CBB* 1: 34.1 (p. 266), 38.8 (p. 304), and 39.4 (p. 310) know of the transfer of power.
- 78 *PaL* 2: 19, n. 63; K. Mertzios, *Μνημεῖα Μακεδονικῆς Ἱστορίας* [Μακεδονικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη 7] (Thessalonica, 1947), pp. 34 ff.; and P. Lemerle, “La domination vénitienne à Thessalonique,” in *Miscellanea G. Galbiati*, vol. 3 [Fontes Ambrosiani 27] (Rome, 1951), pp. 219–225.
- 79 *PaL* 2: 20, 21.
- 80 On the secular title of “despot,” see R. Guiland, “Recherches sur l’histoire administrative de l’empire byzantin le despote, δεσπότης,” *REB* 17 (1959): 52–89; B. Ferjančić, *Despoti u Vizantinizi Jurnoslovenskim Zemljama* [Srpska Akademija Nauk 33] (Belgrade, 1960); *idem*, “Još jednom oročecima titule despota,” *ZRVI* 14/15 (1973): 45–53; and A. Failler, “Les insignes et la signature du despote,” *REB* 40 (1982): 171–186.
- 81 *Minus*, 12.3 (Greek text *supra* n. 68). Also mentioned in *CBB* 1: 13.10 (p. 117), with a different date: καὶ τῇ ἰδ’ τοῦ νοεμβρίου, τῆς β’ ἰνδικτιῶνος, διέβη ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης μετὰ τῶν Βενετικῶν κατέργων ἐν τῇ Φραγκίᾳ. *CBB* 1: 34.2 (p. 266), mistakenly states that John went to attend a synod. Syropoulos states that John’s objective was to secure aid from Hungary, 2.12: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης, ὁρῶν τὸ ἀδιόρθωτον τῆς μάχης καὶ δυσχεραίων, δεῖν ἔγνω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπελθεῖν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον βασιλεῖα τῶν Ἀλαμανῶν, ὅπως παρακινήσῃ τοῦτον καὶ ποιήσῃ βοήθειάν τινα ὑπὲρ Πόλεως. οικονομηθεῖς οὖν ἐξῆλθε.
- 82 *MP*, pp. 375, 376. The documents that pertain to his visit in Venice include a contract, which states that the emperor borrowed 1,500 ducats from the doge. The loan was witnessed by Jacopo Trevisano, the ducal notary, and by two members of the retinue of John, Manuel Iagaris (*PLP* 4: no. 7810 [p. 78]) and Manuel Eskammatismenos (*PLP* 2: no. 6145 [p. 111]); cf. S. P. Lampros, “Ἐμμανουὴλ Ἐκκαμματισμένος,” *NH* 12 (1915): 371, 372; *NE* 1: 354; and S. P. Lampros, “Μῦθοι ἐν Κώδικι τῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Βατικανοῦ,” *NH* 11 (1914): 182, 183.
- 83 John VIII reached Milan in February of 1424; see *MP*, p. 378.
- 84 On Sigismund and John VIII, cf. *CF*, p. 39; G. Beckmann, *Der Kampf Kaiser Sigismunds gegen die werdende Weltmacht der Osmanen, 1392–1437. Eine historische Grundlegung* (Gotha, 1902), p. 97; and G. Moravcsik, “Византийские Императоры их Послы в Г. Буда,” *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 8 (1961): 239–256.
- 85 *MP*, pp. 376 ff.
- 86 Syropoulos, 3.20, makes it clear that Sigismund continued to press John on the union of the churches long after his visit. See *MP*, p. 378, n. 148.

- 87 This concern of Murad II is illustrated in a celebrated passage of Sphrantzes, dealing with the events of 1437, when John VIII went to Italy in order to participate in the Council of Florence. Sphrantzes reports that Murad was so alarmed that he even contemplated attacking Constantinople; he was prevented from doing so only by his fear of a western counter-offensive. He did all he could to stop John VIII from leaving his capital and from participating in the Council and even extended a bribe to induce him to stay in Constantinople; see *Minus*, 23.8–10: ὡς ἐστάθη, ἵνα ἀπέλθῃ εἰς τὴν σύνοδον, ἐστάλῃ εἰς τὸν ἀμηρᾶ ἀποκριστάρη Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ἰαγρός, δηλῶσαι τοῦτο . . . κάκεινος [*sc.* Murad] ἀπελογήσατο, ὅτι οὐδὲν μοι φαίνεται καλὸν νὰ ὑπάγῃ νὰ κοιιάσῃ τοσοῦτον καὶ νὰ ἐξοδιάσῃ καὶ τί νὰ κερδίσῃ; ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ, καὶ ἐὰν ἔχῃ χρεῖαν καὶ ἄσπρων δι' ἐξοδὸν καὶ εἰσόδημα καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς θεραπείαν αὐτοῦ, ἔτοιμός εἰμι νὰ τὸν θεραπεύσω. That the Turks were always in fear of a crusade to the Balkans is also stated in the anonymous *Chronicle of Epirus*; cf. *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo. Prolegomeni, testo critico e traduzione*, ed. G. Schirò [= CFHB 10] (Rome, 1975), 12.378. On this chronicle, see A. Kazhdan, “Some Notes on the ‘Chronicle of Tocco,’” in *Bizancio e l’Italia. Raccolta di studi in memoria di Agostino Pertusi* (Milan, 1982), pp. 169–176.
- 88 *MP*, p. 380. The visit of John to Hungary is overlooked by *LCB*, by C. Head, *Imperial Twilight: The Palaiologos Dynasty and the Decline of Byzantium* (Chicago, 1977), by *PaL* 2, and by D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans* (Cambridge, 1992). Similarly, J. Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus: A Character Study,” *SBN* 9 (1957) [*Silloge bizantina in onore di S. G. Mercati*], pp. 152–170, repr. in *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964), pp. 104–124, devotes only one sentence to this journey: p. 154 (106). For the documents, cf. *RKOR*: 3408 (p. 111), 3408a (p. 111), 3409 (p. 111), 3412 (p. 112), and 3411 (p. 112).
- 89 Ubertino Pusculo was not aware of this regency, which is also ignored in the anonymous poem, the *Lamentation* on the fall of Constantinople. Pusculo introduces Constantine and comments on his surname, the Serbian *Dragaš*, which he cites as *Draco*, and suggests that it derived from Constantine’s personal exploits in warfare; of course, “dragon” was a misunderstanding, a folk etymology of Constantine XI’s matronymic, the Serbian name, which happens to sound like δράκων/δράκος in Greek and *draco* in Latin. See Pusculo, 2.48–57 (pp. 27, 28): *Defuncti interea successor frater Achivis / Constantinus adest aegris cognomine dictus / ex belli virtute, Draco, ob sua fortia gesta / magnanimus. Quondam fuerat bellator, et armis/ consiliisque potens: Teucros et fuderat hostes / cum Pelopis regnum antiquum ditone tenebat. / Ausus quin etiam fines exire sub armis / hostiles populari agros, vique oppida multa / expugnare, tulit magnum virtutis honorem, / et laudem bello insignem.* Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, overlooks this first regency.
- 90 The few documents listed in *RKOR*: p. 109, do not seem to be associated with Constantine at all. The Italians appeared to have addressed their business and complaints to the *imperator senior*, i.e., Manuel, to his representative, and thirdly to the Despot Constantine. See *RdD*: 1930 and 1948. In addition, see *MP*, p. 382.
- 91 *Minus*, 12.4: ἀποκριστάρων ἀπελθόντων . . . καὶ ἐμοῦ δι’ αἰτίας ταύτας . . . ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ τὴν ἀγίαν δέσποιναν συγγενίδα αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀμηρᾶ ἀπὸ τὴν μάναν του, καί, ὅτι, ἂν δεήσῃ, νὰ γράψω καὶ δι’ ὑφελτῶν εἰς τε τὸν ἅγιον βασιλέα καὶ εἰς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν βασιλέα εἰς τὴν Οὐγγαρίαν εὕρισκόμενον. *MP*, p. 379, n. 151. Sphrantzes was to keep an eye on the negotiations and report, as he saw fit, to Manuel and John directly.
- 92 *Minus*, 12.4.
- 93 *Ibid.*, 13.2: προέπεμψε γὰρ ἀπὸ τὴν Οὐγγαρίαν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλόγλωσσον καὶ ἀλλογενῆ, τοῦ ἐλθεῖν διὰ τῆς στερεᾶς μετὰ πινακίου ὑφελτοῦ.
- 94 *Ibid.*, 13.3: τοῦ δεσπότη [Κωνσταντίνου] λείποντος εἰς τὸ κυνήγιον.

- 95 *CBB* 1: 13.11 (p. 118): και τῆ κ' τοῦ φεβρουαρίου μηνός, τῆς αὐτῆς ἰνδικτιῶνος, ἡμέρα κυριακῆ, ἐποίησεν ὁ ἀμηρᾶς Μουράτπεις ὀρκωμοτικὴν ἀγάπην μετὰ τῶν αὐθεντῶν και βασιλέων ἡμῶν. An echo of this statement in *CBB* 1: 22.35 (p. 186). *RKOR*, 3413 (p. 12), accepts the date supplied in the *Minus*.
- 96 Doukas, 29.3: ἔστειλε γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸν κύρ Λουκᾶν Νοταρᾶν τὸν αὐτοῦ μεσάζοντα σὺν δώροις πολλοῖς.
- 97 Doukas, 29.1: ὁ βασιλεὺς οὖν Ἰωάννης ποιήσας κατάστασιν και τελείαν εἰρήνην μετὰ τοῦ Μωράτ, δούς αὐτῷ τὰς πόλεις και τὰς κόμας ἃς εἶχεν ἡ Ποντικὴ θάλασσα, πλὴν τῶν κάστρων ὧν οὐκ ἠδυνήθη λαβεῖν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, οἷον Μεσημβρίας Δέρκουσ και ἄλλα, και τὸ Ζητούνιον σὺν ταῖς λοιπαῖς χώραις τοῦ Στρυμόνος, και κατ' ἔτος τέλος ἀσπρῶν τριακοσίων χιλιάδων, εἰρηνεύων κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάθητο.
- 98 For the treaty of Kallipolis, cf. *supra*, ch. 2, text with n. 86.
- 99 *MP*, p. 380. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 6; and Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 117, employ the same adjective to describe the treaty: “humiliating.”
- 100 *Minus*, 23.5, 6: και ἀκούσατε λόγους ἀληθεῖς, τὴν αὐτοαλήθειαν προβαλομένου μου μάρτυρα. εἶπεν ὁ αἰδιδμος βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸν βασιλεῖα κύρ Ἰωάννην, μόνος πρὸς μόνον, ἰσταμένου και ἐμοῦ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτῶν, ἐμπεσόντος λόγου περὶ τῆς συνόδου . . . τὸ περὶ τῆς συνόδου, μελέτα μὲν αὐτὸ και ἀνακάτωνε, και μάλισθ' ὅταν ἔχῃς χρεῖαν τινα φοβῆσαι τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς τὸ δὲ νὰ ποιήσης αὐτὴν, μηδὲ ἐπιχειρησθῆς.
- 101 John VIII evidently employed Latins in his service. When Pero Tafur visited Constantinople, John attempted to recruit him into his service. From Tafur we find out that John had a number of other Spaniards in his service also. See Tafur, pp. 137–139. Syropoulos agrees and makes frequent references to the Byzantine emperor’s “janissaries.” See, e.g., 6.3: ὁ βασιλεὺς . . . κατόκησεν . . . μετ' ὀλίγων ἀρχόντων και στρατιωτῶν και γιαντιζάρων. By γιαντιζάρων Syropoulos cannot mean “Turkish janissaries” but probably indicates “foreigners” or “foreign mercenaries.” The services of one of those individuals were employed on this occasion, when John sent his message to the court. In general, see E. A. Zachariadou, “Les ‘janissaires’ de l’empereur byzantin,” in *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata* (Naples, 1982), pp. 591–597.
- 102 *Minus*, 13.1–4.
- 103 *CBB* 1: 13.12 (p. 118): και τῆ ἱγ' τοῦ σεπτεμβρίου μηνός, τῆς γ' ἰνδικτιῶνος, τοῦ ζαλγ' ἔτους, ἀπῆλθον κάτεργα δύο εἰς τὸ Ἀσπροκάστρον, νὰ ἐπάρωσι τὸν βασιλεῖα τὸν ἅγιον, κύρ Ἰωάννην και αὐθέντην ἡμῶν.
- 104 *Ibid.*: και τῆ α' νοεμβρίου, τῆς αὐτῆς ἰνδικτιῶνος, ἦλθεν ἐνταῦθα εἰς τὸ ὀσπίτιόν του ὁ ῥηθεις αὐθέντης ἡμῶν, ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης. For Kellios (Sphrantzes) or Asprokastron (*CBB* 1: 13.12), see V. Tapkova-Zaimova, “Quelques observations sur la domination byzantine aux bouches du Danube. Le sort de Lykostomion et quelques autres villes cotières,” *Studia Balcania* 1 (1970): 79–86. *CBB* 1: 34.2 (p. 66), the wrong date, October 20, seems to be confused with the arrival of John in Mesembria. The same note suggests that John VIII went to Italy εἰς τὴν σύνοδον, obviously a confusion with his later journey that brought him to the Council of Florence.
- 105 *CBB* 1: 29.8 (p. 215): ἐν ἔτει ζαλγ', ἰνδικτιῶνος γ', ἦλθεν ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσπροκάστρου εἰς τὴν Μεσημβρίαν μετὰ β' κατέργων, μηνὶ Ὀκτωβρίῳ κ', ἡμέρα παρασκευῆ.
- 106 The terms of his will are supplied in the *Minus*, 15.2. Sphrantzes was named as one of the executors, 15.2: ἐπίτροποι δὲ νὰ ᾧσιν ὁ πνευματικὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ εἰς τῶν Ξανθοπούλων Μακάριος ὁ ἐξ Ἰουδαίων, ὁ διδάσκαλος Ἰωσήφ ὁ εἰς τοῦ Χαρσιανίτου, και ἐγώ.
- 107 *Minus*, 15.3–4. Manuel entrusted Sphrantzes, his chamberlain, to John’s care, expressing regret that he was not able to reward his services properly: ἰδίως δὲ πάλιν λέγω σοι [Ἰωάννην] διὰ τοῦτον διὴ τὸν Σφραντζῆν ὅτι ἐδούλευσέ μοι καλῶς και ἐθεράπευσέ μοι εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μου και σώματος . . . ἀφίημι δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς ἐσέ και νὰ ἔχῃς τὴν εὐχὴν μου, τὸ ἐτύχενεν ἵνα γένηται παρ' ἐμοῦ και οὐδὲν ἐγένετο . . . ἃς γένηται παρὰ σοῦ.

- 108 The monastic name of Manuel is also mentioned in the eulogy pronounced by Bessarion (cf. *infra*, nn. 113 and 114) and in *CBB* 1: 7.28 (p. 71), 100.7 (p. 652). For the problems concerning the actual date of his death, see *MP*, p. 383, n. 161. *CBB* 1: 22.37 (p. 186) suggests that Manuel died of grief over the capture of Thessalonica by the Turks in 1430 (!). Also cf. *CBB* 1: 32.32 (p. 234); 32.38 (p. 235); 39.3 (p. 310); 53.13 (p. 381); 97.6 (p. 639); and 100.5–7 (p. 652).
- 109 *Minus*, 14.1: τῆ δὲ κα^η τοῦ Ἰουλίου μηνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους τέθνηκεν ὁ ἐν μακαρία τῇ λήξει γενόμενος αἰοιδίμος καὶ εὐσεβῆς βασιλεὺς κῦρ Μανουήλ, ὁ διὰ θείου σχήματος πρὸ ἡμερῶν δύο Ματθαῖος μοναχός καὶ ἐτάφη τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν τῇ σεβασμίᾳ καὶ περικαλλεῖ μονῇ τοῦ Παντοκράτορος μετὰ πένθους καὶ συνδρομῆς, οἴας οὐ γέγονε πώποτε εἰς τινα τῶν ἄλλων. ἦσαν δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ζῶσῃς αὐτοῦ ἡμέραι ἔτη οὗζ' καὶ ἡμέραι κε'. For the burial site of the Palaeologan emperors, the monastery of St. Savior Pantokrator (still standing under the name *Zeyrek Camii* and under restoration), cf. *MP*, Appendix 24, p. 550; A. Van Millingen, *Byzantine Churches in Constantinople, Their History and Architecture* (London, 1912), p. 229; and J. Freely and A. S. Çakmak, *Byzantine Monuments of Istanbul* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 211–220. For recent efforts at restoration, cf. R. Ousterhout, Z. Ahunbay, and M. Ahunbay, “Study and Restoration of the Zeyrek Camii in Istanbul, First Report, 1997–98,” *DOP* 54 (2000): 265–270. For the burial sites of the Byzantine emperors, cf. P. Koukoules, *Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμὸς*, vol. 4 (Athens, 1951), pp. 237–248, with interesting details on the ritual of mourning. For the funeral service for Manuel II, cf., *Minus*, 14.1.
- 110 For an overview of Manuel II as emperor, see *MP*, ch. 6.
- 111 *CBB* 1: 7.29 (p. 71): κατὰ τὸν Ἰούνιον μῆνα τοῦ ς' μηνὸς ἔτους ἀπέστειλεν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, ὁ δεσπότης τοῦ Μορέως, κῦρ Θεόδωρος, ἀξιόλογόν τι πρᾶγμα χρυσοκλαδικόν, τὰς στήλας τοῦ τε βασιλέως τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς δεσποίνης τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ, ἅς καὶ ἔστησαν πλησίον τοῦ τάφου τοῦ βασιλέως.
- 112 Greek text in *PkP* 3: 284–290.
- 113 *Ibid.*, p. 287: ὃ γνώσεως θαυμαστῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ἣ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγίγνετο, μηδὲν προσοπτόμενος ὄπλων. ὃ τῆς ἐν ὄπλοις αὐτῷ ἐμπειρίας, ἣ κρείττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων περιποιήσατο πόλεων, οὐ Πελοποννήσου μόνης ὅσον κράτιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ Θετταλίας οὐκ ὀλίγον ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ποιησάμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν στρατιώτης καὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ σύμβουλος ἀγαθός, ἔχων ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς Θουκυδίδην καὶ Ξενοφῶντα . . . ὡς Ὅμηρος ἔφη, βασιλέα τε ἀγαθὸν κρατερόν τ' αἰχμητήν, καὶ ῥήτορα ἄριστον. In later times, after Bessarion had become a famous cardinal in Italy, the humanist Niccolò Perotti, who had been allowed access to Bessarion's collection of manuscripts, discovered the autograph of this speech. Perotti was clearly impressed by the rhetorical talents of Bessarion; as he knew that the cardinal had followed rules set in antiquity, Perotti searched for ancient examples of this genre, which he found in the works of Libanius and Aristides; after reading the texts of the ancient authors, he declared that Bessarion's speech was stylistically superior to its ancient precedents. Cf. N. G. Wilson, *From Byzantium to Italy: Greek Studies in the Italian Renaissance* (Baltimore, 1992), pp. 82–84. On Perotti, cf. J. Monfasani, “Platina, Caprana, and Perotti: Bessarion's Latin Eulogists and His Date of Birth,” in P. Medioli Mazotti, ed., *Bartolomeo Sacchi II Platina (Piadena 1421-Roma 1481): Atti del convegno internazionale di studi per il V centenario (Cremona, 14–15 novembre 1981)* (Padua, 1986), pp. 97–136 [= J. Monfasani, *Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other Emigrés* (London, 1995), Essay 6].
- 114 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 7.

5 *Morea redivivus?*

The prince's offensive

1 The boiling pot

The internal situation of the Morea was serious.¹ The local, fiercely independent, barons nourished a resentment toward overlords appointed by Constantinople, who treated the natives with snobbery and arrogance. In addition, the ethnic make-up of the Morea lacked cohesion. Composed in the middle of the previous decade, Mazaris' satire, *A Conversation with the Dead*, includes a fictitious letter presenting the impressions of a Constantinopolitan on its confusing state. Delighting in affronts, Mazaris' narrative is also studded with serious observations demonstrating that the Morea could not be viewed as an ethnic unit. It was not a melting but a boiling pot:²

In the Peloponnesus [Morea] . . . numerous groups live together; it is neither easy nor pressing to distinguish among them exactly. People do hear most often of the dominant and major groups; these are: Lacedaemonians, Italians, Peloponnesians, Slavs, Illyrians, Egyptians, and Jews; a considerable mixture of hybrids exists in-between. Altogether there are seven groups.

The author of this satire employs ethnic slurs to characterize each group. It is safe to assume that Mazaris' numerous slurs represent the sentiments of the Constantinopolitan aristocracy.³

The ethnic minorities, native Moreots, Albanians, Italians, Slavs, Gypsies, Jews, and a mixed component, the *gasmouloi*, had failed to develop a uniform culture and ethnic identity. Recently arrived groups of Albanian mercenaries, who had been encouraged to settle in the area, maintained tribal bonds elsewhere⁴ and tended to keep to themselves and speak their own language. The region around Mistra, i.e., the major urban center, was prosperous.⁵ The countryside, the realm of the peasants, did not share in the wealth. Heavy and unpredictable taxation along with primitive agricultural methods had contributed greatly to their poverty. On numerous occasions peasants had felt compelled to flee the rule of Despot Theodoros and seek relief in Venetian territories. At times the Venetians refused to return these refugees. Moreover, the Palaeologan lords of the Morea had failed to exploit the natural resources. It was believed that the southern part of the peninsula was abundant in metals. Yet no efforts were ever made to mine or to exploit any native natural resource.⁶

Mistra, the capital, identified with ancient Sparta,⁷ became a cultural center and presented a contrast to the poverty of the countryside,⁸ displaying the intellectual and artistic interests of the upper classes. A virtual “renaissance” seemed to have come into being, with a lively interest in classical antiquity, a precursor of the Italian counterpart, it has been concluded,⁹ perhaps somewhat hastily. The last generation of the major medieval thinkers, scholars, and intellectuals spent a portion of their lives in Mistra at one time or another: George Gemistus Plethon,¹⁰ the Eugenicus brothers,¹¹ George Scholarius,¹² John Dokeianos,¹³ Isidore,¹⁴ John Bessarion,¹⁵ Laonikos Khalkokondyles,¹⁶ and George Sphrantzes.¹⁷ Mistra attracted even Italian humanists, such as Cyriacus of Ancona and perhaps even Guarino of Verona.¹⁸

The imperial authorities embarked upon several campaigns against their Latin neighbors. Their operations produced the side effect of weakening the territory. The offensive to place a unified Morea under the control of one Byzantine lord ironically facilitated the peninsula’s fall to the Turks. Already the despot of Mistra had campaigned against the Latin prince of Achaea, against the Greco-Florentine Antonio Acciajuoli of Athens, who coveted possession of Corinth, and against Carlo Tocco, the lord of the Ionian islands of Cephalonia and Leucas, who was attempting to extend his territories into Epeiros and into the Morea.¹⁹ In 1421 Tocco acquired the port of Glarentza,²⁰ a strategic location as related in a panegyric composed by Isidore.²¹

According to the anonymous Tocco Chronicle, Carlo formed an alliance with Zaccaria Centurione, the Latin prince of Achaea, and asked his Ottoman allies to supply reinforcements.²² While John VIII had been on his way to Venice and Hungary, the court turned its attention to Tocco and John delayed his voyage to the west.²³ After Tocco withdrew behind the formidable defenses of Glarentza, John proceeded to Italy.²⁴ Tocco presented a problem throughout the early reign of John VIII. Tocco’s control of Glarentza, which provided him with a secure, fortified base within the despotate, remained a concern (as from Glarentza Tocco extended operations into Elis, as far as River Alpheios). Theodoros left Tocco alone for the time being, as he had his hands full with Centurione and the Venetians. Tocco then furnished a *casus belli* in the fall of 1427.²⁵ Albanian groups under Theodoros’ protection had brought their flocks into winter quarters in Elis, when Tocco’s men raided their camps. This incident eventually led to open hostilities:²⁶

While he was in control of all these places, and having no wish to remain quiet, he [Tocco] showed ingratitude to his benefactors. Three years had passed and it was already the middle of the winter; he seized all the herds of the Peloponnesian Illyrians [Moreot Albanians]; there were many horses, many oxen, many sheep, and many pigs. Even though he had agreed to a treaty, he did not hesitate to violate its terms and he took away the herds.

Theodoros came to the aid of his Albanian subjects and declared war upon Tocco.²⁷ As soon as news of the conflict reached Constantinople, John VIII decided to take personal charge of the campaign and hastened to the Morea.

2 The prince's bride

After the death of his father, John VIII did nothing to prevent his Italian wife, whom he detested, from abandoning him.²⁸ While his father was alive, John had shown respect for the aged emperor and did not repudiate his queen, even though he went out of his way to avoid her. After Manuel died, John's behavior towards Sophia of Montferrat became so offensive that she finally departed, first seeking refuge in Pera and then returning to her homeland:²⁹ "In August 6934 [1426], Lady Sophia fled to her homeland." Under the erroneous notion that Sophia had been abducted, the Constantinopolitans took up arms to launch an attack upon Pera, as if they were the Achaeans of Homer about to attack Troy and rescue Helen. John was no Menelaus, however, and did his utmost to restrain his subjects. Sophia spent the rest of her life in a convent in Italy, claiming the title of "empress of the Romans [= Greeks]." The only personal item she removed from Constantinople was her wedding crown.³⁰ Patriarch Joseph gave dispensation to the emperor to take another wife. Through the mediating efforts of the Trebizondian John Bessarion, John VIII arranged a match with a princess from Trebizond, famous for her beauty: Maria, the daughter of Emperor Alexios Komnenos.³¹ John promptly fell in love with his bride, whose beauty impressed his subjects and westerners alike.³² The emperor was so devoted to Maria that her death in a later period, after the Council of Florence, affected him gravely.³³ This third marriage also remained childless.

In the summer of 1427 John made preparations to confront Carlo Tocco. A fleet was assembled, the last known Byzantine "armada" to take to the sea.³⁴ At this time, Theodoros expressed the wish to enter a monastery and to give up his lordship:³⁵

The emperor of the Hellenes . . . sailed to the Peloponnesus [= Morea]; he had been summoned by his brother Theodoros, the lord of Sparta [= Mistra], who . . . was determined to embrace the life-style of the Nazeraeans [monks], because of the enmity that he had conceived for his Italian wife.

Constantine was the natural choice to succeed Theodoros. Constantine was in command of the western shores of the Black Sea, of Mesembria and Ankhialos, ready to give up this lordship in exchange for the Morea.³⁶ John proceeded to the Morea to confirm Constantine as the despot.³⁷

In November of the same year [1427] our emperor left the City and reached the Morea on December 26; he was accompanied by his brother, Lord Constantine. As their brother, Lord Theodoros the despot, wished to become a monk, Lord Constantine would remain in charge of the Morea.

The three brothers, John, Constantine, and Theodoros, joined forces to stop Tocco's raids:³⁸ "We came to the Morea and campaigned in areas which were under the control of Despot Carlo [Tocco]." Yet this campaign was not crowned with the anticipated success:³⁹ "Finally, my lords, the brothers, left Carlo's lands, as they were not confident that they would conquer all his territories." The land operations

were inconclusive, even though some historians believe that they resulted in total success.⁴⁰ The brothers and Tocco seem to have tested each other's strengths without committing their forces to serious engagements. Eventually a major victory was won at sea. It is, in fact, the last Byzantine naval victory on record. Sphrantzes and Khalkokondyles do not report it.

The engagement took place near Actium, the site of Octavian's victory against Mark Antony, and in the area where the monumental battle of Lepanto was destined to be fought in the future, i.e., in the vicinity of the Echinades (Curzolari) islands in the Ionian Sea. The "fleet" was placed under Leontaris⁴¹ and was sent to confront Tocco, who had summoned reinforcements from Marseilles and ships from the Ionian islands and Epirus. Tocco's admiral was his own son Torno/ Turnus. The battle resulted in a decisive victory for the Greeks. Tocco's nephew was captured in the course of the battle while Turnus barely escaped:⁴²

They brought their forces against him . . . with their land troops and with their triremes from the sea. When Carlo [Tocco] was informed, he became apprehensive and put together a fleet from the islands and from Epeiros; he also invited some ships from Marseilles. In command he placed his own son called Turnus. The emperor appointed, as lord and admiral over his triremes [galleys], Leontarios, a good man, whom he advised as to the safe course of action that was to be taken in order to win a victory in the ensuing engagement. Then the ships set sail. Once they were in the vicinity of the Echinades islands, they raised their standards, sang the paeon, and sounded the trumpets . . . they made a courageous and daring attack. They broke the oars of the enemy ships and put many opponents to death. At first, they used bows and missiles; then, once they drew near, they used spears, lances, and catapults. This engagement resembled a pitched battle on foot. Some ships they captured with their crews and others they pressed so hard that they had no choice but to flee. Their flagship came very close to being captured by our admiral himself, as most soldiers on the deck had perished. Those few still alive lowered their shields and spears and acknowledged the emperor, adding in supplication that they were his slaves. The rowers in the hold of the ship broke away. She would have been captured, if luck had not intervened. Under the impression that she could not hold out any longer, they turned their attention to the other ships. She broke loose from her rope and from her crooked anchor and started drifting. As the flagship sailed on and was making her way slowly on account of her size and mass, suddenly she ran away. They spread the sails. With an unexpected sea breeze suddenly rising, her main sail became full and she found her way to freedom. Under pursuit she made it to Leucas and to safety. One hundred and fifty of their men were captured; many of them were notable individuals; among them was the son of Despot Carlo's sister. . . . Our side enjoyed an almost tearless victory.

Carlo Tocco counted the outcome as a setback and displayed willingness to negotiate.⁴³ An arrangement removed the sting of humiliation: he became a relative of the imperial family through marriage:⁴⁴

This triumph . . . restored all the cities of Elis to us and turned a former enemy [Carlo Tocco] into a friend, a former stranger into a relative, and a former foe into an ally. Abandoning war and arms, he came to a feast and a celebration; he found a son-in-law in our most divine emperor's brother, the noble and brave despot [Constantine], whose good qualities can only be described by numerous encomia.

Sphrantzes suggests that this marriage arrangement was the only long-term solution for both sides:⁴⁵

Finally, my lords, the brothers, left Carlo's lands, as they were not confident that they would conquer all his territories. He also saw that it would not be feasible to maintain control over the areas left to him, since some of his lands had passed into the possession of the brothers. Thus, it was decided that Despot Carlo's niece should marry the despot Lord Constantine.

Constantine found his first wife,⁴⁶ Magdalena-Maddalena Tocco, the daughter of Leonardo II, the brother of Carlo, duke of Leucas and count of Cephalonia and Zacynthus. Maddalena had been under Carlo's care since the death of her father (ca. 1414). It appears that soon after the wedding Maddalena converted to Orthodoxy and was given an Orthodox name, Theodora.⁴⁷ We have no information as to the negotiations that were carried out after Ekhinades but we do know that they lasted until May of 1428.⁴⁸ Details are cited by a short chronicle:⁴⁹ "Despot Carlo made a marriage arrangement; and Lord Constantine, the despot, married his niece, the precious queen, and received, as her dowry, Glarentza and all his regions in the Morea." Sphrantzes accepted the surrender of Glarentza, the point of contention:⁵⁰ "I was personally dispatched to receive control of Glarentza, while others took charge of other places." Constantine met with moderate successes; he had carved territory for himself, to which he added the dowry of his wife. All indications pointed to his eventual conquest of the entire Morea.

Constantine's wedding to Magdalena-Maddalena-Theodora Tocco was celebrated in the outskirts of Patras:⁵¹ "They pitched their tents in the vicinity of the city mills. They brought along Lady Theodora, Tocco's niece; and Lord Constantine's wedding ceremony was celebrated in this area." At that time, the brothers were laying siege to Patras, still under Latin control. Sphrantzes suggests that John and Constantine utilized the siege to absent themselves from Mistra, thus granting Theodoros time to take monastic vows:⁵² "In order to seize Patras, if possible – a strategic and important location – and in order to be absent from Mistra, where their brother was, wishing to take monastic vows, the three brothers moved against Patras on July 1 of the same year." Theodoros failed to participate in the siege of Patras. His absence from their camp at Patras may have been dictated by the fact that Pandolfo Malatesta, Patras' lord, was the brother of Theodoros' wife, Cleopa.⁵³ During the marriage negotiations⁵⁴ her Catholicism, it had been stipulated, would be respected. In fact, the pope had assigned Patras, a papal fief, to Pandolfo Malatesta in order to secure stability in the peninsula. It is possible that Theodoros chose

to stay away from Patras in order to avoid problems with the pope and with his wife's Italian family. Theodoros does not seem to have been supportive of his brothers, even though he had initiated the conflict against the Latins, with Tocco as his primary target. After Constantine married Tocco's niece, Theodoros refused to participate in attacks upon his wife's family.

The attack upon Patras degenerated into skirmishes. Constantine and his brother may have been testing the defenses, intending to return later for a full-scale siege. Perhaps the brothers expected the Patrenses to surrender without a fight. Sphrantzes admits the failure of the campaign:⁵⁵ "We could not capture Patras." Then he blames this setback on Theodoros, who did not participate in the campaign and could not make up his mind whether to become a monk or retain his post as despot at Mistra:⁵⁶ "The greatest part of our failure must be attributed to Lord Theodoros the despot, who remained at Mistra and could not decide whether or not he should become a monk; his indecision was the cause of many evils." Theodoros contributed, directly or indirectly, to the failure of the campaign,⁵⁷ but he was not the sole reason. Of concern was the actual status of the city. Archbishop Pandolfo Malatesta was the nominal lord of Patras, a papal fief.⁵⁸ It was not known how Venice would react to the siege or to a take-over of the city. More importantly, the Turks also cast covetous eyes on this city, which paid tribute to the Porte. All parties wished to assume direct control of Patras. The brothers withdrew their troops under a treaty.⁵⁹

As nothing useful could be accomplished against Patras, with the exception of the capture of three fortified villages,⁶⁰ a peace treaty was struck with those in the castle; it specified that they would pay an annual tribute of 500 gold coins to the despot, Lord Constantine; they lifted the siege and departed.

After his return to Mistra, John seems to have focused his attention on the administration of the Morea, on the needs of the Church, and on various important individuals within the appanage. A short chronicle⁶¹ mentions a chrysobull dealing with the jurisdiction of the see of Monemvasia over the general region.⁶² It was probably during this stay at Mistra that John persuaded Theodoros to agree to the permanent presence of Constantine in the Morea, who was to receive extensive territories, in addition to the regions that had come to him as the dowry of Madalena de' Tocchi.

Towards the end of the summer of 1428 John, in the company of his brothers, Constantine, Thomas, and Theodoros, rode to Corinth. At Kenkhreai, the port of Corinth, the emperor embarked and left for the capital:⁶³ "The brothers . . . traveled on horseback to Corinth. There the emperor embarked and sailed to Constantinople. Lord Theodoros, the despot, returned to Mistra by the same road." Even though Theodoros was the senior prince, the future campaign against Patras was left in the hands of Constantine who was to proceed with or without cooperation of the despot. Accordingly, Constantine moved on to Vostitza (modern Aigion), a city that belonged to him in the neighborhood of Patras, in order to map out future strategy.⁶⁴

Lord Constantine the despot and I took another road and came to Vostitza [Aigion]. As Lord Theodoros had decided against taking monastic vows, the Morea had not come under the control of Lord Constantine, his brother. Nevertheless, his brother, Lord Constantine, had been assigned to the Vostitza [Aigion] area and to the territories that had been formerly governed by Phrankopoulos, the *protostrator*: Androusa, Kalamata, Pedema, Mani, Nesi, Spetali, Grempeni, Aetos, Loi, Neokastron, Arkhangelos, and many others. I was appointed to receive control of these areas from the aforementioned protostrator.

Constantine's dominion extended from the northwest of Vostitza and Khloumoutzi, by the southern side of the Corinthian Gulf, to the Messenian Gulf, Laconia, and Mani. Constantine took possession of other important areas in Messenia, including Phyliatra and Pylos, as far as the plain of Stenikraron and the stream of Velira. Even in the neighborhood of Mount Taygetos, i.e., Mistra itself, Constantine controlled a number of fortresses, including Oitylon, Zarnata, Gastitsa, Diaseiston, Mele, Drakhion, and Polianous.⁶⁵ Sphrantzes was appointed governor of this extensive fief. Moreover, Alexios Laskaris and Andronikos Laskaris Padiates, whom Sphrantzes knows as "Pediates,"⁶⁶ were also appointed governors of Vostitza and of Ithome-Androusa.

This arrangement was probably the product of long negotiations involving John, Theodoros, Constantine, and, to a lesser extent, Thomas, and represented the least offensive compromise. Theodoros stood to lose the most. His lack of zeal in the offensive against Patras and against his brother-in-law, Pandolfo Malatesta, would not have endeared him to the emperor who could have interpreted Theodoros' hesitation and procrastination as crucial factors in the failure of his campaign at Patras. Constantine was firmly established on Moreot soil and John VIII could count on him to carry on an aggressive strategy. Conversely, Theodoros seems to have lost favor with the emperor, even though he retained his post as despot.

3 Victory at Patras

In June/July Pandolfo Malatesta visited Venice and petitioned for aid to his city.⁶⁷ Venice allowed Malatesta to buy provisions and weapons for his troops but refused to intervene.⁶⁸ While the archbishop was recruiting mercenaries, Constantine decided to annex Patras. Theodoros had decided to hold on to his command and Patras was the most attractive candidate for Constantine to serve as his base. He made Vostitza and Khloumoutzi in the vicinity his headquarters. That Patras had become essential in the prince's strategy becomes evident when it is realized that Constantine had made secret plans to leave the Morea if he failed to seize this city.⁶⁹

My lord the despot and I held a secret meeting and we decided to march against Patras. If we were successful in seizing Patras, we would remain in the Morea, while his territories in the Black Sea would be transferred to his brother the emperor. If we failed, we would return to the City and he would

retain possession of his castles in the Morea that were part of his wife's dowry, in addition to his territories in the Black Sea.

He immediately opened secret talks with a number of prominent Patrenses, hoping for the surrender of this city through betrayal to avoid a long blockade and to forestall Malatesta's expected return with reinforcements. A party within the city favored Constantine's take-over:⁷⁰ "The men from the city formed a plot and surrendered the city to him, while its archbishop was away in Italy." The following sequence of events can be reconstructed from Sphrantzes' narrative: Constantine's henchman, Andronikos Laskaris Padiates-Pediate, was dispatched to Patras ostensibly on business. While there, he secretly sounded out the sentiments of numerous prominent citizens. His contacts claimed that they would betray the city. After Padiates returned, Constantine evaluated the intelligence information and concluded that the proposals of the Patrenses were not feasible.⁷¹ This approach was not entirely abandoned, however, and Constantine set up a meeting with Padiates' contacts from Patras in order to interview them in person. Padiates was then entrusted with the administration of Androusa,⁷² presumably as a reward for his efforts.

Constantine mustered his forces on March 15. His real objective was not divulged but it was rumored that Constantine wished to be escorted through his fief to Androusa.⁷³ Once the march began, the troopers realized that something was going on and began to speculate about their destination. After an all-night march, the army arrived in the neighborhood of Patras on Palm Sunday and bivouacked at Three Churches, near the vineyards, where Constantine met his supporters from the city. It had been Constantine's hope that his agents in the city had formulated a plan; instead, he realized that their intrigues had borne no fruit:⁷⁴ "About the time of the first cockcrow, we arrived at the agreed place and met with our contacts from the city; they had achieved nothing and their proposals were unrealistic. So they were dismissed and we spent the rest of the night evaluating our options." The most promising course of action, it was decided, was a sudden attack upon the city's Jewish quarter.⁷⁵ Prisoners would then be taken and the soldiers would be given an opportunity to plunder. But the element of surprise had been lost and the despot's troops had been detected by the garrison, which sent emissaries to Constantine. He issued an ultimatum:⁷⁶ "We have come here in order to receive the surrender of your city or to storm your citadel." The alarm was then sounded and Constantine kept his forces back. So the despot's troopers celebrated Palm Sunday and then were deployed around the city. The siege of Patras began.

On Holy Saturday, a minor skirmish occurred that almost cost Constantine his life and resulted in the capture of Sphrantzes:⁷⁷

While we were there, on March 26, I had dinner and was talking at length with my lord in his tent after Holy Saturday services. Suddenly a few horsemen galloped out of the Jewish Gate, also known as Zeugolonia; as soon as they appeared, we gave chase; they fled and entered the Agialos Gate, where the whole force of the defenders had gathered with war engines, spears, and

stakes. My lord and I were the first ones to pursue the horsemen, because our horses happened to be ready near the small bridge on the way to Saint Andreas. The despot's horse was hit by an arrow released by someone from Patras and fell immediately; they rushed to capture or kill him, but I was able to defend him until, with God's help, he untangled himself from his horse and fled on foot.

Evidently this ambush had been prepared with care. Thanks to the help of Sphrantzes, Constantine extricated himself from his mount and escaped but Sphrantzes was taken prisoner and experienced a very uncomfortable period of captivity.⁷⁸ After forty days had passed, his circumstances improved, especially since his captors decided to write a letter to Constantine and arrange a meeting in order to discuss a truce, for which the services of Sphrantzes were required.⁷⁹ A truce was then declared, which secured the release of Sphrantzes. Moreover, under its terms the fortress Seravalle was surrendered to Constantine, who then agreed to pull back from the walls of Patras.⁸⁰ The truce's terms stipulated that if, during the month of May, Pandolfo Malatesta returned, he would enter into negotiations with Constantine; if he failed to return within the month, Patras would surrender. On May 5 Constantine withdrew⁸¹ and returned to Glarentza.⁸²

At this point the complicated, diplomatic situation surrounding Patras attracted the attention of the Porte:⁸³ "A few days later an ambassador from the sultan arrived with an ultimatum: 'The inhabitants of Patras have expressed willingness to pay tribute and become my vassals. Depart and discontinue the siege or we will send an army against you.'" Against an invading Ottoman army Constantine would have had no chance. Constantine was aware of the fact that Pandolfo Malatesta had been recruiting Catalan mercenaries and presented his operations as "services rendered" to the Porte, by claiming that Patras would have been seized by the Catalans and the Italians if he had not intervened. In effect, he implied, he had saved Patras for the Porte.⁸⁴

My lord gave the following answer to the sultan's emissary: "We heard that the inhabitants of Patras wished to surrender their city to the Catalans. It did not seem proper to allow my enemies and those of my brother, the great sultan, to take this important castle in the midst of our territories. This was the reason for the siege. When we examined the matter closely it did not seem feasible to us and we abandoned our enterprise. Now, as you can see, we have lifted the siege and returned home."

Constantine thus managed to conceal his aggression in feigned friendship. Nothing was said about the truce. The Turkish envoy did not press the matter, as he was handsomely bribed and was also told that Constantine would presently dispatch Sphrantzes to the Porte to give a full account,⁸⁵ adding this as an afterthought:⁸⁶

He had not informed me of his intention previously. I replied: "I only hope that God will delay the metropolitan's [Malatesta's] arrival and that they will

not surrender the castle to us. . . . In any case, I will make everything ready for the fulfillment of your command.”

The end of May came and Malatesta did not return. Early in June Constantine joined forces with his brother Thomas and moved against Patras. On June 5, a Sunday, Patras formally surrendered to Constantine. The keys were presented to Constantine at the Church of Saint Andrew. Constantine then led a procession into the city, as far as the Church of Saint Nicholas.⁸⁷ The Greek population welcomed Constantine with joy and showered his procession with roses and carnations. The citadel, however, did not surrender. Malatesta’s partisans fired bolts and missiles:⁸⁸

All the way the streets had been strewn with all sorts of flowers and decorations; from the houses of all the citizens, right and left, all the inhabitants were showering us with perfume, roses, and carnations. From the tower above, however, we were greeted with a nasty welcome of bolts and missiles, but we suffered no casualties.

The formal oath of allegiance to Constantine was administered in the Church of Saint Nicholas on Monday, June 6, as is also noted in two short chronicles. One entry states:⁸⁹ “In the year 6937 [1429] the despot Lord Constantine took Patras.” Khalkokondyles provides a summary:⁹⁰

The emperor of the Hellenes began the siege of Patras in Achaea. Then he sailed away to Byzantium [Constantinople] and left behind his brother Constantine, who continued the siege but proved unable to take the city. The men in the city plotted to surrender and did so, while its archbishop was away in Italy for some time, asking help from the archbishop of the Romans [pope]. . . . Constantine seized the city and then laid siege to the acropolis [citadel].

After a Frankish interlude of 224 years, the city of Patras, excepting its citadel, was in Constantinopolitan hands once more.

4 Assertion of authority

After the surrender Sphrantzes set out to visit the sultan⁹¹ and settle the status of Patras. He reached Naupaktos across the Corinthian Gulf, where he fell in with Pandolfo Malatesta. Through the mediation of the Venetian governor of Naupaktos, Sphrantzes and Malatesta held a meeting and each unsuccessfully attempted to read the other’s mind.⁹² To complicate matters, also present in Naupaktos were Turkish envoys, with whom Malatesta conversed and to whom he entrusted letters to be forwarded to the sultan and to Turahan. Malatesta’s letters undoubtedly challenged Constantine’s claim that he had conquered Patras for the Porte, and the bishop probably attempted to pass himself off as a loyal tributary of the sultan also. Consequently, Sphrantzes viewed these letters with anxiety. He has preserved for us a realistically vivid picture of late Byzantine diplomacy.⁹³

The metropolitan [Malatesta] gave letters to the envoys for the sultan and for Turahan. This action made me greatly suspicious, in case the metropolitan promised to surrender some castles of Patras in return for financial and military aid. My suspicions found no rest until, through a great deal of trouble in which I made myself drunk against my inclination, I intoxicated the Turks to such a degree that I was able to remove the letters, read them, and make copies; then I sealed them and I replaced them.

This is probably the most amusing drinking bout on record in the annals of Byzantine diplomacy. Sphrantzes does not reveal the contents of Malatesta's letters and makes no further mention of them.⁹⁴ Yet they had their intended effect, because the Porte ultimately sided with Malatesta. From Naupaktos Sphrantzes proceeded to Constantinople. The emperor had appointed Markos Iagros/Iagaris as Sphrantzes' fellow ambassador to the Porte.⁹⁵ Disliking each other intensely, the two envoys failed to cooperate and attempted to sabotage each other's initiative to the detriment of the embassy's objective:⁹⁶

As soon as I arrived in the City, Markos Palaeologus Iagros was appointed as my fellow ambassador. At this time, he held the post of first lord of the imperial wardrobe and later advanced to the position of *protostrator*. He was more against my mission than for it. The only reason for his attitude that I could discover is stated by the proverb, "Spite knows not how to assess its advantage."

Sphrantzes states that he managed to prevail at the Porte. While the sultan's grand vizier, Ibrahim, insisted that Patras be restored to Malatesta, Sphrantzes was ready with a response, as he was familiar with the contents of Malatesta's letters. He feigned terror at the prospect of being the bearer of such bad news, that Patras was to be restored to the metropolitan, to his lord⁹⁷ and asked to be accompanied by a Turkish envoy to the Morea, who would announce the Ottoman response to Constantine. Procrastination seems to have been his tactic. He returned to the Morea with a Turkish envoy, while Patras remained in the hands of Constantine.

By September Sphrantzes was again on the road, to Thessaly this time, in order to negotiate the status of Patras with Turahan.⁹⁸ Thus it would seem that the Porte left the matter of Patras in the hands of Turahan, to whom Malatesta had also sent a letter. By the autumn of the same year Murad must have begun his preparations to launch his assault upon Thessalonica. Thus, the comparatively minor matters of southern Greece were left to the discretion of his lieutenant in Thessaly. Sphrantzes claims that in the same month of September the matter of sovereignty over Patras was concluded.⁹⁹ By then Malatesta must have given up all hope of recovering his city. In view of the success of Sphrantzes' mission to Turahan, in October of 1429 Venice discontinued all assistance to Malatesta.¹⁰⁰

In November of the same year Constantine's young wife died:¹⁰¹ "In November of the same year [1429], Queen Theodora passed away at Stameron [Saint Ömer]. She left behind her a great deal of grief for her husband and for us, his attendants, as she had been extremely comely." After one year and six months Constantine's

marriage ended. Sphrantzes fails to specify the cause of her death but his statement implies that the event was sudden and unexpected. The cause of Maddalena's death is stated by John Bessarion (who had earlier pronounced the eulogy at Manuel II's funeral and had then negotiated the match between John VIII and Maria of Trebizond) in his poem inscribed on her tomb.¹⁰² This epigram has survived in four manuscripts. One of them seems to be Bessarion's autographed version.¹⁰³ Lines 22 and 23 reveal the cause of her death:¹⁰⁴ she died in childbirth. Thus, Constantine began to meet with personal tragedies that would mark his career and force the impression that Constantine had been born under an unlucky star.¹⁰⁵ "Emperor Constantine, your destiny was so unhappy./Your luck was evil; your fortune was bad,/dark, treacherous, burned by lightning." In addition to the poem of Bessarion, John Eugenicus (who was destined to oppose the religious policy of John VIII and Constantine XI) also composed a speech of consolation and addressed it to Constantine.¹⁰⁶ In contrast to the archaizing, classical style of Bessarion's lines, the speech by Eugenicus is within Christian boundaries, producing pious commonplaces. Typical of this *consolatio* is the following extract:¹⁰⁷ "You too were handed over, admirable [despot], to the greatest and unexpected trials; but there is nothing unprecedented in this: many other friends of God in antiquity [suffered so]: Joseph of Israel . . . the brave athlete Job." Towards the end of this uninspired speech, similar platitudes are encountered:¹⁰⁸ "The Lord has given; the Lord has taken away."

Sphrantzes states that Maddalena-Theodora was buried at Glarentza. Her remains were later moved to Mistra:¹⁰⁹ "For the time being she was buried in one of the churches at Glarentza; later her remains were transferred to the Zoodotos Convent at Mistra." Four years later the wife of Theodoros, Cleopa Malatesta, was buried in the Katholikon of the same convent. Its exact location is not certain but it has been identified with the palace chapel, Saint Sophia. Archaeological investigation has revealed no traces of these graves.¹¹⁰ Years later, after the annexation of the despotate by the Turks, Sigismondo Malatesta led an incursion into the area and disinterred the remains of Plethon, which he took back to Italy on his return.¹¹¹ Is it conceivable that he also took the trouble to remove the remains of his relative, Cleopa, and those of Maddalena? No surviving text states that he did. Yet the absence of their graves at Mistra is puzzling and may suggest that something drastic occurred. Were these burials disturbed?

In the meantime, Thomas had been busy besieging Khalandritza, the fortress that belonged to Zaccaria Centurione, who was still holding on to some remnants of the Latin principality of Achaea. Centurione was in no position to defend his possessions. After Venice abandoned him,¹¹² he had to come to some arrangement:¹¹³ "In January of the same year [1430] Prince Thomas married Lady Aikaterine, the daughter of the aforementioned prince [Centurione], at Mistra." Negotiations for a settlement of the conflict between Thomas and Centurione had begun four months earlier in September.¹¹⁴ The model was undoubtedly the match of Constantine XI with the niece of Tocco.¹¹⁵ Thomas married Caterina-Aikaterine-Catherine Zaccaria:¹¹⁶

The Hellenes had their long-standing differences with the lord of Achaea, the Italian Centurione. Then they concluded a treaty based on a marriage: the

emperor's youngest son, Thomas, it was arranged by the terms of the treaty, would marry the daughter of the lord and would receive, as dowry, Messenia and Ithome, excepting the coast of Arcadia. Yet Thomas, the emperor's brother, received even that [the coast], after his [Centurione's] death.

As a reward for his activities in the Morea, Thomas was honored, in August of 1430, with the title of "despot" by the emperor.¹¹⁷ Thomas came into possession of considerable territory, which was further enlarged by the district of Kyparisia in 1432, after the death of his father-in-law. The demise of Centurione put a formal end to the Latin domination of the Morea and the principality of Achaia vanished.¹¹⁸ The peninsula was in the process of being divided among the three scions of the imperial family.

The citadel of Patras was still holding out. Through the efforts of Sphrantzes no direct threat or ultimatum came from the Porte. Murad had been busy, making preparations to annex Thessalonica. Constantine patiently awaited the surrender of the city's citadel. After the passage of one year, the citadel surrendered:¹¹⁹ "Constantine took over this city and besieged its acropolis [citadel] for one year; then it too surrendered to him."¹²⁰ Sphrantzes mentions the fall:¹²¹ "In May of the same year [1430], the despot Lord Constantine, my master, took possession of the tower of Patras, as its defenders had suffered greatly by hunger and hardship." This date is contradicted by two entries in the short chronicles, which place the surrender after May:¹²²

1. In the same year, in the month of July, the tower of Patras surrendered to the despot, Lord Constantine, on account of hunger.
2. In the same year, in the month of July, the tower of Old Patras surrendered to the despot, Lord Constantine, on account of hunger.

However, if we compare the testimony of Sphrantzes to that of Khalkokondyles, we may, perhaps, tentatively conclude that the date provided in the *Minus* is correct. Khalkokondyles states that the surrender of the citadel came after one year of siege, which would place it in May/June and not as late as July, the date provided in the short chronicles.¹²³

Venice decided to withhold assistance to Malatesta.¹²⁴ More importantly, the arrangement that Sphrantzes secured with Turahan would have been dictated by the sultan's preparations to seize Thessalonica, postponing the fate of Patras. Murad had been formally assured that Constantine was holding Patras for him; at this point, there was no need to doubt or even to challenge this explanation. Thessalonica was finally lost to Venice¹²⁵ on March 29, 1430, and it remained in Turkish hands until its liberation by Greek troops during the Balkan Wars on October 27, 1912. As far as Patras is concerned, its citadel surrendered but the fall had not been precipitated by Constantine's direct military operations. His forces proved unable to storm its fortifications in the course of the year-long siege. What compelled the defenders to give up, in the final analysis, was a combination of three factors: famine occasioned by the blockade of Constantine, lack of interest

in Italy to assist Malatesta actively, and the failure of the Turks to intervene on behalf of the archbishop.

Malatesta persisted and hired Catalan mercenaries to recover Patras. Under the orders of Trocha Barila, a company of Catalans devastated the western coast of the Morea and, on July 17, 1430, seized and occupied Glarentza, the second major city in Constantine's territory.¹²⁶ Constantine was elsewhere and he had left the city unprotected.¹²⁷

The triremes [galleys] of the archbishop [Malatesta] seized the metropolis of Elis. When he discovered that the Hellenes had seized the metropolis of Achaea [Patras], he sent ten triremes [galleys] to conquer it back for him, if possible. But they did not go to Achaea; instead they reached Clarence [Glarentza], while its lord [Constantine] was away; because the garrison was not within the city, they entered in secret and seized and occupied the city.

This seems to have been an inexcusable blunder on the part of Constantine. The capture of Glarentza could have been avoided if minimal care had been exercised. Constantine must have known that the Catalans were in the vicinity, seeking an opportunity to seize Patras, and he must have concentrated his forces in Achaea, to the detriment of his other possessions. The apparent ease with which the Catalans entered Glarentza may even suggest that the city was betrayed from within. Without a garrison and with the possible presence of discontented elements, Glarentza was taken easily. Constantine considered the event serious, as he was willing to pay a high ransom for the city's recovery. Sphrantzes places the Catalan occupation of Glarentza on July 17:¹²⁸ "On July 17 of the same year, the Catalans took Glarentza, held it for a while, and then sold it again." The Catalan occupation is also recorded in a number of entries in the corpus of the short chronicles.¹²⁹ The amount of the ransom is recorded in Khalkokondyles:¹³⁰ "Later they restored the city to the emperor's brother for five thousand gold coins and sailed away to Italy." Constantine's eagerness to acquire the city through ransom demonstrates the fact that the despot could not rely on his military resources, which were no match for the Catalans. As Constantine had failed to take the citadel of Patras by storm in the space of an entire year, the quality of his troops must have been low, at best, which was further evident in the fact that no Moreot army of this period was able to pose a serious threat to any Ottoman incursion.

What occurred next is not clear. Our sources maintain a silence over this matter. Yet a rather neglected anonymous source¹³¹ states that Constantine had the fortifications of Glarentza dismantled and that some sort of atrocity followed in the form of retaliatory measures upon the population. This source traces Constantine's overall "bad luck" to his treatment of Glarentza:¹³²

How I wish the sky had been ablaze, the hour had been burned,/when you ascended the throne, that fateful day./You, ill-fated man, dismantled the fortifications of Glarentza./You razed the towers and dug up all their foundations./Churches were destroyed and monks went into mourning./Magnates and poor

were in terrible grief./You demolished their houses and sent them into exile,/ as all their wives and children were put to the sword./All were exiled. What a great shame it was!/Who was that man who gave you that piece of advice?/ Bad advice it was for you, as your own end indicated./This was the origin of your unlucky fate,/which saw the shame you committed on that day.

This citation presents a most unflattering picture of Constantine. The anonymous poet has preserved the sole hostile account of Constantine's conduct in the Morea. It is not impossible that some sort of massacre took place at Glarentza after the withdrawal of the Catalans. Perhaps the enraged troops of the despot committed atrocities, especially if their expectations to take and plunder Patras had been frustrated.¹³³ Did they transfer their expectations for plunder to the helpless Glarentza after it was ransomed and a terrible vengeance was exacted? The testimony of the anonymous poet finds an echo in the short chronicles and in the sixteenth-century *Maius*.¹³⁴ The short chronicles supply the following information:

1. In a war he took Glarentza and destroyed it; it earlier belonged to the pope.¹³⁵
2. The Catalans took Glarentza; the despot, Lord Constantine, paid ransom for it and destroyed it.¹³⁶
3. In the [year] [69]38 the Catalans took Glarentza; Lord Constantine the despot paid ransom for it and destroyed it.¹³⁷

Additional factors may have included disloyalty on the part of some of Glarentza's citizens (especially as the city had been betrayed to the Catalans by a pro-Latin party) and the difficulty of attacking its fortifications, in case it fell into enemy hands a second time. A large-scale massacre, however, does not seem probable, in spite of the testimony of the anonymous poet. The short chronicles do not speak of a massacre. The verb used, "destroyed,"¹³⁸ may refer to the city or its fortifications. The chronicles say nothing about the inhabitants. Could Glarentza's fate have been intended as a warning to Patras, should its citizens decide to place themselves under Latin protection in the future? Again, there is no need to suppose that the entire city was destroyed and that all citizens were put to the sword. In the near future Thomas was to take over Glarentza.¹³⁹ "About March . . . he [Thomas] . . . took over . . . Glarentza." As has been reasonably concluded,¹⁴⁰ "in March, 1432, Constantine accepted Thomas' castle town of Kalavryta in exchange for Glarentza, where Thomas now took up his residence with Caterina. If Constantine had destroyed the city walls, as the Pseudo-Sphrantzes says, Thomas may now have restored them."

5 The new map

Constantine and Thomas assumed control of considerable territories in the Morea mainly through marriage arrangements.¹⁴¹ Thus their victories were primarily the fruit of negotiations and not actual conquests by the sword. Although there were military campaigns, none came to a swift, decisive victory. Constantine proved unable to storm Patras or seize the citadel. He had to wait for the surrender of the

“acropolis,” which came about through famine and not through direct assault. Furthermore, he lost Glarentza to the Catalans and had to pay a humiliating ransom. He does not seem to have entertained the possibility of attacking this city while it was in the hands of the Catalans. Perhaps he was aware of the limitations and of the low quality of his troops.

Diplomacy and marriage alliances with Latin princesses brought territories in the form of dowries; the unwillingness or inability of Venice to act on behalf of Malatesta assisted in the surrender of Patras, further facilitated by the fact that Murad II was occupied in Macedonia. Such were the favorable circumstances that produced major land acquisitions. In the final analysis, Venice still retained possession of key bases in the peninsula, while the Porte could annex the Morea any time it wished; at best, these were only temporary gains. Thus, contrary to the accolades that Constantine XI receives in court literature (further echoed in modern scholarly publications), one should not hastily conclude that he proved himself a capable soldier. His campaigns only demonstrated mediocre abilities. Even though he won the flattery of the court intellectuals, his aggressive stance was of no concern to the Porte or Venice, as the despot amounted to an annoyance. Constantine was not personally responsible for the victory at the Ekhinades that brought Tocco to the negotiating table. Constantine assumed control over Patras only because Malatesta failed in his efforts to prevail in Italy or at the Porte.

Consequently, this “*reconquista*” of the Morea should not be viewed as a triumph. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that these developments were indicative of the vitality of the mainland, in sharp contrast to the “tired” Byzantine state centered on Constantinople, and they see in the Morea an assertion of Greek independence and an omen about the future resurgence of the Greek nation.¹⁴² Nothing of the sort happened here. The Morea was in trouble. Its circumstances resembled those of Anatolia and Thessaly, which had earlier come under the Ottoman control. Constantine and his siblings proved powerless against the Turks. The Palaeologan campaigns in the Morea minimized the Latin presence. Conversely, they rendered the peninsula an easier prey for the Turks. Thus, the campaigns of the Greek despot facilitated the Porte’s future policy of expansion, a fact that was probably noted with satisfaction by Murad’s staff when Sphrantzes claimed that Constantine had taken over Patras in order to demonstrate his loyalty to the Porte. The ultimate irony is that Sphrantzes had been perfectly correct in his suggestion that Constantine’s actions were to the sultan’s advantage. Contrary to the sentiments and the court flattery encountered in the literature of the period, exemplified by Bessarion’s memorable phrase,¹⁴³ Constantine was neither “a formidable warrior” nor “the incarnation of Ares.”¹⁴⁴

Notes

- 1 Cf., among others, *LCB*, pp. 357–365; N. Cheetham, *Mediaeval Greece* (New Haven and London, 1981), chs. 9 and 10; A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation, 1204–1261* (New Brunswick, 1970), ch. 9; *DGM* 1 & 2; S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), esp. chaps. 6, 7, and 8; P. Topping, “The Morea, 1364–1460,” in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K. M. Setton and H. W.

- Hazard, vol. 3 (Madison, 1975), pp. 141–167; A. G. Mompherratos, *Oi Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, (Athens, 1913); *LMB*, pp. 538–547; and *PaL* 2: ch. 1.
- 2 Cf. Mazaris' *Journey to Hades* [Arethusa Monographs 5] (Buffalo, 1975); and A. Ellissen, ed., *Analekten der mittel-und neugriechischen Literatur*, vol. 4 (Leipzig, 1860), pp. 187–362; I have followed the Buffalo edition, p. 76: ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ . . . οἰκεῖ ἀναμιξ γένῃ . . . πάμπολλα, ὧν τὸν χωρισμὸν εὐρεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτε κατεπεῖγον ἃ δὲ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς περιηχέται, ὡς πᾶσι δῆλα καὶ κορυφαῖα, ταῦτα τυγχάνει Λακεδαιμόνες, Ἴταλοί, Πελοποννήσιοι, Σθλαβῖνοι, Ἰλλυριοί, Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι (οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ μέσον τούτων καὶ ὑποβολιμαῖοι), ὁμοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπαριθμούμενα ἑπτὰ. Also cf. *LCB*, pp. 363, 364.
- 3 Mazaris, p. 76: τί δ' ἂν εἴποι τις πρὸς τοὺς Σοδόμων καὶ Γομόρων καὶ αἰμομικτὸν καὶ ἄλλων ἀσελγειῶν ἔργα διαπραττομένους; εἰ γὰρ ἐθελήσαμεν τὸν ἅπαντων εἰπεῖν ἀκριβὲς πολιτεῖαν, παμπόλλων ἄρα δεηθήσομαι λόγων καὶ μακρὰς διηγήσεως . . . ἐν ἐνὶ λόγῳ παραστήσασθαι βούλομαι τὴν τούτων ἅπασαν φύσιν καὶ κακίαν. αἱ ἄρεται φησὶ τις τῶν μεγάλων ὅτι διαφθεῖρονται ὑπὸ ἀχρήστων ὁμιλιῶν εἰ οὖν τὰ χρηστὰ διαφθεῖρονται ὑπὸ ἀχρήστων, τί ἂν γίνονται αἱ καὶ ὑπὸ κακίωνων συναναστραφόμεναι τε καὶ συνουσιώμεναι, μᾶλλον δὲ συνδιατώμεναι καὶ συγκρινώμεναι τε καὶ κυλινδούμεναι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ τέλματι καὶ βορβόρῳ σῦες;
- 4 Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, pp. 6 ff.; P. Topping, “Albanian Settlements in Medieval Greece: Some Venetian Testimonies,” in A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis, ed., *Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis* (New Brunswick, 1980), pp. 261–272; and Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, pp. 114, 115. For the problems that the Venetians were also experiencing with the Albanians, see A. Ducellier, “Les Albanais dans les colonies vénitiennes au XV^e siècle,” *Studi Veneziani* 10 (1968): 47–64 [A. Ducellier, *L'Albanie entre Byzance et Venise (X^e-XV^e siècles)* (London, 1987), Essay 10].
- 5 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital, passim*; L. Maksimovic, *The Byzantine Provincial Administration under the Palaeologi* (Amsterdam, 1988); and A. Kazhdan, *Деревня и Город в Византии IX-X BB* (Moscow, 1974).
- 6 *LCB*, p. 358; and C. N. Sathas, *Τουρκοκρατούμενη Ἑλλάς: Ἱστορικὸν Δοκίμιον περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀποτίαζιν τοῦ Ὀθωμανικοῦ Ζυγοῦ Ἐπαναστάσεων τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους (1453–1821)* (Athens, 1869; repr.: 1985), ch. 1. Plethon proposed a new system for efficient exploitation of land; his proposal assumes that the existing resources had been under-utilized. C. E. Barker, *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 198–218; the Greek text of Plethon's reforms: *PkP* 3: 246–266 [= *Γεωργίου Γεμιστοῦ εἰς Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγον περὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Πραγμάτων*]; *PkP* 4: 113–136 [= *Πλήθωνος Συμβουλευτικὸς πρὸς τὸν Δεσπότην Θεόδωρον περὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου*]; and *PG* 160, 161. Cf. C. M. Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 92 ff.; and *PaL* 2: 33, 34, and n. 104.
- 7 Mazaris only employs “Sparta” and never the vulgar Μυζηθρᾶς/Mistra.
- 8 In addition to Mistra, Kalavryta also seems to have enjoyed conditions favorable for a “revival of learning.” Zakythinus has convincingly argued that this resurgence was only restricted to the elite, while the rest of the population did not share in it; see *DGM* 2: *Vie et Institutions* (Athens, 1953), p. 310. Zakythinus' views are accepted in *LMB*, p. 541. It was in Kalavryta that Cyriacus of Ancona encountered a rich library, which contained a notable copy of Herodotus; cf. W. Miller, *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 149; V. Laurent, “Le Vaticanus latinus 4789. Alliances et filiations des Cantacuzènes au XV^e siècle,” *REB* 9 (1951): 78; and Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, ch. 13.
- 9 S. Runciman, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1970); *idem*, *Byzantium and the Renaissance* (Tucson, 1970); I. Ševčenko, “The Palaeologan Renaissance,” in W. Treadgold, ed., *Renaissances before the Renaissance: Cultural Revivals of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Stanford, 1984), pp. 144–173; and I. P. Medvedev, *Византийски Гуманизм XIV-XV BB* (Leningrad, 1976).
- 10 Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon, passim*.

- 11 On Markos and John Eugenicus, cf. S. Pétridès, “Le synaxaire de Marc d’Ephèse,” *Revue d’Orient Chrétien* 15 (1910): 97–107; J. Gill, “The Year of the Death of Mark Eugenicus,” *BZ* 52 (1959): 23–31 [= J. Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964), pp. 222–233]; and J. Gill, “Mark Eugenicus, Metropolitan of Ephesus,” *Unitas* 11 (1959; Eng. ed.): 120–128 [= *Personalities*, pp. 55–65]. Works and letters by the Eugenicus brothers *PkP* 1: 15–43, and 45–215.
- 12 *PLP* 11: no. 27304 (pp. 156–158); J. Gill, “George Scholarius,” *Unitas* 12 (1960; Eng. ed.): 99–112 [= *Personalities*, pp. 79–95]; Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon, passim*; and M. G. Serges, *Γεώργιος Σχολάριος-Γεννάδιος Β΄ ο Πρώτος μετά την Άλωση Οικουμενικός Πατριάρχης: Εθνοϊστορική Μελέτη [Μελέτες για τη Βυζαντινή και Μεταβυζαντινή Ιστορία 3]* (Athens, 1996).
- 13 On Dokeianos, see *supra*, ch. 2, nn. 46–49; and P. Topping, “Greek MS 1 (The Works of Ioannes Dokeianos) of the University of Pennsylvania Library,” *The Library Chronicle* 29 (1963): 1–15. Dokeianos was well read in ancient literature and was certainly a member of Plethon’s circle, if not an actual disciple.
- 14 *PLP* 4: no. 8300 (pp. 130, 131); J. Gill, “Isidore, Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia,” *Unitas* 11 (1959; Eng. ed.), 263–275 [= *Personalities*, pp. 65–79]; M. Philippides, *Mehmed II the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant* (Tempe, 2007), pp. 121–132; and M. Philippides and W. K. Hanak, *Cardinal Isidore (c. 1390–1462): A Byzantine Scholar, Warlord, and Prelate* (London and New York, 2018), ch. 1.
- 15 L. Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsman*, 3 vols. (Paderborn, 1923–42; repr.: 1967); *PLP* 2: no. 2707 (pp. 65–68); A. Κυρου, *Βησσαρίων ὁ Ἑλληγν*, 2 vols. (Athens, 1947); H. Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion* (Paris, 1878); C. N. Sathas, *Νεοελληνική Φιλολογία: Βιογραφίαι τῶν ἐν τοῖς Γράμμασι Διαλαμψάντων Ἑλλήνων ἀπὸ τῆς Καταλύσεως τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Αυτοκρατορίας μέχρι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐθνεγερσίας (1453–1821)* (Athens, 1868; repr.: 1960), pp. 25–35; R.-J. Loenertz, “Pour la biographie du Cardinal Bessarion,” *OCP* 10 (1944): 116–149; D. A. Zakythinis, *Μεταβυζαντινὰ καὶ Νέα Ἑλληνικά* (Athens, 1978), pp. 229–349; K. S. Staikos, *Χάρτα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Τοπογραφίας: Ἡ Ἐκδοτικὴ Δραστηριότητα τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἡ Συμβολὴ τους στὴν Πνευματικὴ Ἀναγέννηση τῆς Δύσης 1: 15ος Αἰώνας* (Athens, 1989), pp. 89–103; and J. Monfasani, *Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other Emigrés* (London, 1995).
- 16 D. G. Kampouroglous, *Οἱ Χαλκοκονδύλαι: Μονογραφία* (Athens, 1926; repr.: Athens, 1996); E. Darkó, “Zum Leben des Laonikos Chalkokandyles,” *BZ* 14 (1923/24): 29–39; V. Grecu, “К вопросу о Биографий и Историческом Труд Лаоника Халкокондила,” *BB* 13 (1958): 198–210; W. Miller, “The Last Athenian Historian: Laonikos Chalkokondyles,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 42 (1922): 36–49; M. Philippides, “Early Post-Byzantine Historiography,” in A. S. Bernardo and S. Levin, eds., *The Classics in the Middle Ages* [Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies: Papers of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies] (Binghamton, 1990), pp. 253–263; A. Wifstrand, *Laonikos Chalkokondyles, der letzte Athener. Ein Vortrag* (Lund, 1972); C. J. G. Turner, “Pages from the Late Byzantine Philosophy of History,” *BZ* 57 (1964): 358–361; E. von Ivanka, “Der Fall Konstantinopel und das byzantinischen Geschichtsdenken,” *Jahrbuch des oesterreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 3 (1954), pp. 19–34; N. B. Tomadakes, *Δούκα-Κριτοβούλου-Σφραντζή-Χαλκοκονδύλη περί Αλώσεως τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (1453): Συναγωγή Κειμένων μετὰ Προλόγου καὶ Βιογραφικῶν Μελετημάτων περί τῶν Τεσσάρων Ἱστοριογράφων καὶ τοῦ Ἰωσήφ Βρυεννίου* (Athens, 1953; repr.: Thessalonica, 1993), pp. 207–213. Also see the meticulous study by A. Kaldellis, *A New Herodotos: Laonikos Chalkokondyles on the Ottoman Empire, the Fall of Byzantium, and the Emergence of the West* [Supplements to the Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 33–34] (Washington, DC, 2014).
- 17 See the introduction in M. Philippides, *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes, 1401–1477* (Amherst, 1980); and *SFC*, pp. 139–146.
- 18 On Cyriacus of Ancona, see E. W. Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona and Athens* [Collection Latomus 33] (Brussels, 1960); Guarino of Verona was a typical humanist of the period

who had traveled to Constantinople in order to study ancient literature and to perfect his knowledge of the ancient Greek language; there he had formed lasting friendships with various Constantinopolitans; on his life and his connections in the capital, cf. R. Sabbadini, *Guarino Veronese e il suo epistolario* (Salerno, 1885); *idem*, *Vita di Guarino Veronese* (Genoa, 1891); and *idem*, *La scuola e gli studi di Guarino Guarini Veronese* (Catania, 1896).

- 19 Cf. G. Schirò, ed., *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo. Prolegomeni, testo critico, e traduzione* [CFHB 10] (Rome, 1975); A. Kazhdan, "Some Notes on the 'Chronicle of Tocco'," in *Bisanzio e l'Italia. Raccolta di studi in memoria di Agostino Pertusi* (Milan, 1982), pp. 169–176; and D. M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epirus 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984), esp. ch. 10.
- 20 *DGM* 1: 184.
- 21 *PkP* 3: 194, 195: ἔστι Κάρολος γένος Ἰταλός, ὁξὺς καὶ δραστήριος ἀνὴρ, τὰ μέγιστα πεπονθὼς πρὸς τῶν βασιλέων εὐ τιμηθεὶς ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς δεσπότην φθάσας ἀξίωμα, τὴν προγονικὴν τῶν νήσων προκατάρχων ἀρχὴν νησιῶτις γὰρ ἡ δ' ἐστὶν Ἰθάκη, Ζάκυνθος, Λευκάς καὶ Κεφαλληνία· συγκατέλαβε παρὰ μικρὸν τὴν ἀπ' Αἰτωλῶν μέχρι Θεσπρωτῶν καὶ Μολοτῶν, ἢ τῆς Ἠπειροῦ μέρος, οὐ ζῦμπασα, ἀλλὰ τὴν καὶ τῆς Ἀχαΐας τελεῖ. ὅσον ἀπ' Ἀχελώου μέχρις Εὐήνου διήκει ποταμοῦ. πάσης δὲ ἐκείνης τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλατταν χωρία Ἑλληνας ὄκουν, τὰ δ' ἀνωτέρω καὶ πρὸς μεσόγειαν βάρβαροι καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν, οὓς ἐκβαλῶν, τοῦτο μὲν ἀπάτη, τοῦτο δὲ δόλω, ἔστι δ' οἷς καὶ βίαν ἐπαγαγόν, ἄρχει ζυμπάσης, ἐν ἧ τὸ παλαιὸν τοσάδε διανεμένητο τὰ γένη, Αἰτωλῶν, Ἀκαρνάνων, Ἀμφιλόχων, Κασσιοπαίων, Δολόπων, Ἀμπρακιωτῶν, Ἀθαμάνων, Θεσπρωτῶν, Μολοτῶν καὶ Χαόνων τῶν καὶ ἀνηκόντων ἐς Ἀκροκεραῦνια ὄρη. ταῦτα γένη παλαιὰ καὶ πολλὰ, εὐανδροῦντα καὶ πολυανδροῦντα τὸ πάλαι, νῦν ἀπορία μεγάλη κατεῖληπται καὶ τοῦνομα προσαπολωλὸς ἕκαστόν ἐστι. χρόνος γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λήθην καταχέει πάντων μακρὰν. καὶ τανῦν ὄκισται σποράδην ἐκείνη καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ὑπ' Ἀλβανῶν, γένους ἰλλυρικοῦ ζῦμπασα καὶ κωμηδόν νομαδικῶν γὰρ τὸ γένος καὶ λυπρόβιον, οὐ πόλεισιν, οὐ φρουρίοις, οὐ κώμαις, οὐκ ἀγροῖς, οὐκ ἀμπελώσιν, ἀλλ' ὄρεσι χαίρον καὶ πεδιάσιν. αἱ δὲ πόλεις καθαρὸν ἐτι σώζουσι τὸ ἑλληνικὸν γένος, ὧν δύο ἐστὸν ἄρτι προκαθεζομένω, Ἀμπρακία μὲν τῷ παρ' αὐτῆς ἐπωνύμω κόλπω, ἀνωτέρω κειμένη τοῦ μυχοῦ ὄκισται δὲ παρὰ Γόλγου τοῦ Κυμέλου . . . ἡ δ' ἑτέρα πρὸς τῇ Ἀχερουσίᾳ λίμνῃ . . . ταῦτα τοίνυν προσκτεθῆσάμενος ὠνεῖται παρὰ Λιβερίου καὶ τινα Πελοποννήσου πόλιν, ἢ Κυλλήνην τὸ παλαιόν, οἶμαι ἐλέγετο καὶ ἦν Ἠλείον ἐπίνειον, ἐξ ὅτου δὲ παρ' Ἰταλῶν ἐάλω Πελοπόννησος . . . Κλαρέντζης παρ' αὐτῶν μετονομασθείσης.
- 22 Nicol, *The Despotate of Epirus*, pp. 190, 191.
- 23 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, pp. 71, 78.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 72. Runciman is the only modern historian to mention these activities of John VIII and he cites no evidence or primary source. I have been unable to find any source material on this "campaign."
- 25 *PaL* 2: 18, presents a confused and confusing chronology on this point; it is implied that John VIII came to the Morea in 1426, while the actual date is, of course, 1427, as is clearly stated in *PaL* 2: 31. Similar is the confusion (or misprint?) in *LCB*, p. 364, which is under the impression that John VIII went to the Morea in 1426; the correct date, 1427, appears in D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 8. The actual chronology is well preserved in the *Minus*, 14 and 15.1: καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτει Νοεμβρίῳ ἐξῆλθεν αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως καὶ ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὸν Μορέαν τῆς κς! Δεκεμβρίου. The date is confirmed by an entry in a short chronicle, which speaks of the arrival of Constantine (who accompanied John VIII) in the Morea, *CBB* 1: 41.6 (p. 322): ἐτους ς'αλζ', μηνὶ δεκεβρίῳ, ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος <ῆλθεν εἰς τὸν Μορέαν>. Runciman, *Mistra: The Byzantine Capital*, p. 72, implies that the battle of Ekinades took place soon after 1427. The standard date for this victory is, in fact, 1427 (*PaL* 2: 18,

- and *LCB*, p. 364). If so, it took place before the arrival of John VIII (i.e., during the few days remaining in December); alternatively, it may have taken place in the late winter or early spring of 1428.
- 26 Isidore's Greek text in *PkP* 3: 132–199; the text quoted here: p. 195: ταῦτα τοίνυν ἔχων πάντα καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος ἡρεμεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀχαριστῶν περὶ τοὺς εὐεργέτας, μεσοῦντος ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος, τρίτου ἔτους ἤδη παρερρυηκότος, τὰς ἀγέλας ἀφαιρεῖται τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πάσας Ἰλλυριῶν, παμπόλλας μὲν ἵππων, παμπόλλας δὲ βοῶν, πλείστας προβάτων, πλείστας συῶν ἔνσπονδος γὰρ ὧν, παρασπονδήσας εὐθύς, πάσας ὑφείλεν ἐκείνας. On this speech, see *DGM* 1: 200, 201.
- 27 *PaL* 2: 18.
- 28 *Minus*, 14.2; Doukas, 20.6; and *MP*, p. 349, n. 96.
- 29 *Minus*, 14.2: καὶ τῷ λδ^ο ἔτει μηνὶ Αὐγούστῳ διέβη φυγοῦσα εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς πατρίδα ἢ δέσποινα κυρὰ Σοφία.
- 30 Doukas, 20.6: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης τὸ γεγονός [sc. τὴν ἀπόδρασιν τῆς βασιλίδος] ἀπεδέξατο. ἦν δὲ τὰ φορτία φέρουσα μία ναὺς ὑπερμεγέθης τῶν Γενουιτῶν, ἐτοίμως ἔχουσα τοῦ πλεῦσαι ἐν Ἰταλία. ἀνέμου δὲ βαρέως πνεύσαντος εἰσηλθεν ἐντίμως μετὰ δόξης ἢ βασιλὶς ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ τὰ ἰστία περῶσαντες εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἀφίκοντο, ἄλλο μὲν μηδὲν ἕτερον κερθάνασα πλὴν τοῦ οὗ ἐστέφθη στέμματος, εἰποῦσα καὶ τοῦτο, “ἀρκεῖ μοι τοῦτο εἰς μαρτύριον ὅτι βασιλίσα τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐγενόμην καὶ εἰμί περὶ δὲ τῶν θησαυρῶν μυριστοάλαντων οὐ μέλει μοι.”
- 31 See W. Miller, *Trebizond: The Last Greek Empire of the Byzantine Era 1204–1261* (Historical Introduction and Select Bibliography by A. C. Bandy) (Chicago, 1964; repr.: 1926). See *RKOR*: 3421 (p. 11); also see *V&G*: 90 (p. 59).
- 32 See the Burgundian knight Bertrand de la Broquière's detailed description of Maria of Trebizond in Mijatovich, *Constantine Palaeologus, the Last Emperor of the Greeks, 1448–1453*, pp. 53, 54; the complete work of de la Broquière: T. Wright, *Early Travels in Palestine* (London, 1848), pp. 283–382. Also see S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi* 1 (1981): 278, 279.
- 33 *Supra*, ch. 3, nn. 107–110.
- 34 *PaL* 2: 18, 19; and *LCB*, p. 364.
- 35 Khalkokondyles, 1.527 (pp. 396, 397): ὁ μὲν οὖν βασιλεὺς . . . ἔπλει ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον, μεταπεμπομένου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Σπάρτης ἡγεμόνος, ὃς . . . διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν γυναικα αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπὸ Ἰταλίας ἔχθος αὐτῷ γενόμενον ὄρμητο ἐπὶ τὴν Ναζιραίων ἰέναι διαίταν. Also cf. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 7.
- 36 Sphrantzes formally and permanently was attached to the retinue of Constantine XI; previously, in accordance with the last wishes of Manuel II, Sphrantzes had been assigned to the staff of John VIII. See *Minus*, 15.2–8.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 15.1: καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτει μηνὶ Νοεμβρίῳ ἐξῆλθεν αὐτὸς δὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως καὶ ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὸν Μορέαν τῆς κς^η Δεκεμβρίου μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ κυροῦ Κωνσταντίνου, διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτῶν τὸν δεσπότην κυρὸ Θεόδωρον καλῶγενον, καὶ ὁ κυρὸ Κωνσταντῖνος ἐναπομείνει αὐθέντης τοῦ Μορέως.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 16.1: ἀποσωθέντες οὖν εἰς τὸν Μορέαν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τόπου παντός, οὗ ἐκράτει δεσπότης Κάρουλος.
- 39 *Ibid.*: ἀπελθόντες πάντες οἱ αὐθένται καὶ ἀδελφοί, τέλος, ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἦσαν θεθαρήκοτες, ὅτι θέλουν δουλώσειν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ὅλον τὸν τόπον, ὃν εἶχεν ὁ Κάρουλος.
- 40 E.g., Cheetham, *Mediaeval Greece*, p. 205.
- 41 Presumably he was Demetrios Laskaris Leontares/Leontarios/Leontaris; see *PaL* 2: 19, n. 60. Constantinople no longer possessed an imperial fleet that we know of. Is it possible that these galleys had been rented and if so from whom?
- 42 Isidore's Greek text in *PkP* 3: 197: πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τοίνυν τὰς δυνάμεις συναγαγόντες . . . ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἡπείρου τὰς πεζικὰς περιαγαγόντες δυνάμεις, ἀπὸ δὲ θαλάττης ταῖς τριήρεσιν περικυκλώσαντες. ταῦτα μαθὼν καὶ δεῖσας ὁ Κάρουλος, στόλον ἀθροίζει τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν νήσων, τὸν δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἠπείρου, καὶ τινὰς προσκαλεσάμενος Μασσαλιωτῶν,

ἐκπέμπει στρατηγὸν ἓνα τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ, ὃ Τόρνος, ἐπιστήσας, ὄνομα. ἐκπέμπει δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὰς τριῆρεις, ἀναδείξας ἄρχοντα καὶ στρατηγὸν καὶ ὑποθεῖς αὐτῷ πάνθ' ὅσα πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν πρῶτον καὶ σύστασιν καθορᾶ τῶν ἰδίων, Λεοντάριον τὸν καλόν, εἶτα καὶ τὴν νίκην καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ὡς δεῖ καταπραχθῆναι. ἄραντες οὖν πρὸς ταῖς Ἐχινάσιον ἐντυγχάνουσι ταῖς ἐναντίοις νήσοις, [καὶ] σημεῖων ἀρθέντων παιανί[σαντ]ες καὶ ταῖς μὲν σάλπιγξι ἠχή[σαντ]ες . . . καὶ τούτοις ὀρμῇ τι καὶ τεχνήματι θάρσους ἐμβάλοντες καὶ ἀναρρήξαντές τινων παρεξαιρεσίας συνέτριψαν, φόνον ἐργασάμενοι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ὀλίγον, τόξοις τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς χρώμενοι, εἶτα δόρασι καὶ κοντοῖς καὶ καταπέλταις, ἐγγυτέρω γεγονότες, ὡς περ τινὸς πᾶσιμαχίας συνισταμένης, καὶ τὰς μὲν αὐτάνδρους εἶλον τῶν νεῶν, τὰς δ' ἐς ἀπορίαν κατέστησαν ἐσχάτην, ἔσω ὑποχωρήσας πρὸς φυγὴν. εἶλω δ' ἂν καὶ ἡ στρατηγὸς παρὰ μικρὸν αὐτῷ, τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος στρατιωτῶν τῶν πλείστον πεσόντων. τῶν δὲ περιλειπομένων ἀσπίδας ῥίψαντές τινες καὶ δόρατα βασιλεῖα εὐφήμου, καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κατωνόμαζον δούλους, πρὸς ἰκεσίαν τραπέντες. οἱ δ' ἐρέτα ἐς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς νεῶς ἀπερρυήκεισαν. σχεδὸν δ' ἤλω, εἰ μὴ τύχη τις ἐκάλυψε παρεμπεσοῦσα. οἰομένον γὰρ ἤδη οὐχ οἶαν τε οὖσαν ὄλωσ' ἀντέχειν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλας τρεπομένων ἀπερρυήκει γὰρ τοῦ δεσμοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ καμπύλου σιδηρᾶς ἐκείνης ἐπανακάμψαντος ἀγκύρας, δι' ἧς καὶ συνείχεται ἀπερρηγνυτο γὰρ καὶ περίπλου τῆς στρατηγίδος ποιήσας βουλομένης, ὑπὸ δὲ ὄγκου καὶ βριθοῦς βραδείαν τὴν ἀναστροφὴν καὶ ἀντεπεξέλασιν ποιούσης, ἐξαίφνης ὑπέδρα, τὰ ἰστία χαλάσασα, πνεῦμα τι ἐγερθὲν πελάγιον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἐμπεσὸν τὴν ὀθόνην ὑπεκόλου, τῇ φυγῇ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῆς χαρισάμενον. ἡ καὶ διωκομένη πρόωκειλε τῇ Λευκαδίων, ἀποδράσει τὴν σωτηρίαν ὑφελομένη. ἤλωσαν τοῖνον ἄνδρες πεντήκοντα μὲν πρὸς τοῖς ἑκατόν, καὶ τούτων πολλοὶ τῶν εὖ γεγονότων, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἀδελφίδους Καρούλου δεσπότη . . . οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι τὴν ἄδακρυν σχεδὸν εἰργάσαντο νίκην. As I. K. Bogiatzides, the editor of *PkP* 4, realized (pp. ια' and ιβ' of the introduction), there is a brief allusion to this naval victory in an inelegant poem in *PkP* 4: 88, 89, entitled *Τῷ εὐσεβεστάτῳ δεσπότη καὶ αὐταδέλφῳ τοῦ κραταιοῦ καὶ ἀγίου ἡμῶν αὐθέντου καὶ βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνῳ ἐν Ἀχαῖα ἐπιστολὴ διὰ μέτρων ἡρωϊκῶν*. Lines 24 and 25 may refer to Carlo Tocco (*PkP* 4: 89): ἐκθύμως φορέειν ἐφόδους πειρατηρίων μινεῖσθαι δεῖε τοῦ ἐξ Αὐσίτιδος πάνυ. In the introduction of *PkP* 4 (p. ιβ') Bogiatzides correctly understands the prepositional phrase ἐξ Αὐσίτιδος to mean ἐξ Αὐσονίας [= from Ausonia, i.e., Italy].

43 *DGM* 1: 200; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 8.

44 Isidore's text in *PkP* 3: 197: τοῦτο τὸ τρόποιον . . . ἡμῖν ἀπέδωκε Ἥλιδος ἀπάσας πόλεις, καὶ φίλον μὲν ἀντὶ δυσμενοῦς, συγγενῆ δ' ἀντ' ἄλλοτριου καὶ ξύμμαχον πεποίηκε ἀντὶ πολεμίου. καὶ πόλεμον ἐκείνος καὶ ὄπλα διεκφυγῶν ἐνέτυχε θαλίᾳ καὶ πανηγύρει, τὸν αὐτάδελφον αὐτοκράτορος τοῦ θειοτάτου γαμβρὸν εὐρηκῶς δεσπότην τὸν καλὸν καὶ γενναῖον, οὗ τὰ πλεονεκτῆματα πολλῶν δεῖται ἐγκωμίων.

45 *Minus*, 16.1: ἀπελθόντες πάντες οἱ αὐθένται καὶ ἀδελφοί, τέλος, ἐπεὶ οὔτε οὔτοι ἦσαν τεθαρρήκότες, ὅτι θέλουν δουλώσειν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ὅλον τὸν τόπον, ὃν εἶχεν ὁ Κάρουλος, οὔτε πάλιν ἐκείνος, ὅτι νὰ δυνηθῆ νὰ φυλάξῃ τὸν ἐπίλοιπον τόπον, ὅπου ἀπέμεινε αὐτόν, – ἀπήρασι γὰρ οἱ αὐθένται ἡμῶν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ, – ἐφάνη καλόν, ἵνα ὁ δεσπότης κῆρ Κωνσταντίνος ἐπάρῃ τὴν ἀνεγιάν αὐτοῦ δη τοῦ Καρούλου δεσπότη εἰς νόμιμον γυναῖκα. Khalkokondyles, 1.5.28 (pp. 396–399): ὁ μέντοι Ἑλλήνων βασιλεὺς πρὸς τε τὸν τῆς Ἠπείρου ἡγεμόνα τὸν Κάρουλον πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκε, καὶ Κλαρεντίαν τῆς Ἥλιδος μητρόπολιν ἐπολιόρκει. μετ' οὐ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ προεχώρει πολιορκοῦντι, ἡμόσατο τὴν ἀδελφίδου ἡγεμόνος, Λεονάρδου δὲ θυγατέρα, ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ Κωνσταντίνῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῇ ἐδόθη αὐτῷ ἐς φερνήν. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epirus*, p. 191; *DGM* 1: 198–204; and Miller, *The Latins in the Levant*, pp. 385–388.

46 S. P. Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις,” *NH* 4 (1907): 417–466, esp. pp. 417–427.

47 On Maddalena, see *PLP* 9: no. 21377 (p. 71) [s.v. Παλαιολογίνα, Θεοδώρα]. See S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” in *Rivista di Studi*

- Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), pp. 279–281; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 10.
- 48 *Minus*, 16. 1: οὐ δὴ γενομένου τελείου τῆ α^η Μαΐου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους, σταλεῖς ἐγὼ παρέλαβον τὴν Γλαρέντζαν, καὶ ἄλλοι τὰ ἄλλα.
- 49 *CBB* 1: 34.3 (p. 266): ἐποίησεν συμπεθερίαν ὁ δεσπότης Κάρουλος, καὶ ἐπῆρεν ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος τὴν ἀνεψιάν αὐτοῦ, τὴν βασιλίσσαν, τὴν ἀκριβὴν, καὶ ἔλαβε προῖκα τὴν Γλαρέντζα καὶ ὅσον τόπον εἶχεν εἰς τὸν Μωρέαν.
- 50 *Minus*, 16.1.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 16.3: καὶ περὶ τοὺς μύλους αὐτῆς σκηνώσαντες, ἐκέισε καὶ τὴν ἀνεψιάν τοῦ δεσπότη τοῦ Καρούλου ἔφερον, κυρὰν Θεοδώραν καὶ ἐκέισε αὐτὴν καὶ ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος τὴν εὐλογήθη. By μύλους *DGM* 1: 205 seems to understand Μύλους and identifies it with the “Myloi” village in the Argolid: “Le marriage de Constantine avec Théodora fu célèbre à Myloi, le 1er juillet.” Sphrantzes’ statement, περὶ τοὺς μύλους αὐτῆς, clearly indicates that Patras must be understood with the pronoun αὐτῆς, “about the mills of it [i.e., Patras].” Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 56, correctly understood the meaning of the phrase: παρὰ τοὺς μύλους πρὸ τῆς πόλεως [Πατρῶν].
- 52 *Minus*, 16.3: διὰ δὲ τὸ νὰ ἐπάρουν, ἂν ἠμπορέσουν τὴν Πάτραν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρήσιμον τόπον, καὶ διὰ τὸ νὰ μηδὲν εὐρίσκωνται εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῶν βουλομένου γενέσθαι καλόγερον, ἐξελεθόντες τῆ α^η Ἰουλίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους, ἦλθον κατὰ τῆς Πάτρας οἱ τρεῖς τῶν ἀδελφῶν.
- 53 On Theodoros and Cleopa, cf. *RdD* 2: no. 1782; *NE* 1: 305; and Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons,” p. 278. On Pandolfo, see *PLP* 7: no. 16463 (pp. 50, 51). In the early years of the twentieth century the carved coat of arms of Pandolfo Malatesta was discovered on the citadel of Patras, bearing the following inscription: Σημεῖον αὐθέντου Πανδούλου ντὲ Μαλατέστιας μητροπολίτου Παλαιῶν Πατρῶν τὸν ἀνακαινίσαντος τὸν τῆδε θεῖον ναὸν τῷ χιλιοστῷ τετρακοσιοστῷ εικοστῷ ἔτει. See S. P. Lampros, “Σημεῖον ὁ Θυρεὸς παρὰ Βυζαντίνοις,” *NH* 6 (1909): 104, 105. Cleopa’s distant kinsman, Sigismondo Malatesta of Rimini, became a most ardent admirer of George Plethon. In 1464 Sigismondo, a prominent *condottiere* by then, launched an invasion of Laconia, which had fallen into the hands of the Turks, advanced into Mistra and removed the remains of Plethon from his grave; see Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 374. On Sigismondo’s admiration of Greek antiquity, cf. Ševčenko, “The Palaeologan Renaissance,” pp. 170, 171; and A. F. D’Elia, *Pagan Virtue in a Christian World: Sigismondo Malatesta and the Italian Renaissance* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).
- 54 *DGM* 1: 188–190; Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 69; *idem*, “The Marriages of the Sons,” pp. 279, 280; *MP*, pp. 344–350; and G. Schmalzbauer, “Einer bisher unedierter Monodie auf Kleope Palaiologina von Demetrius Pepagomenos,” *JdB* 20 (1971): 223–240.
- 55 *Minus*, 16.4: εἰς δὲ τὴν Πάτραν οὐδὲν ἑκατορθώθη τι πρὸς τὴν ἄλωσιν.
- 56 *Ibid.*: ἀλλ’ ἦν μᾶλλον καὶ αἴτιον, ὅτι καὶ ὅπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτῶν κύρ Θεόδωρος ὁ δεσπότης εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν ἔστησεν, ἵνα ποιήσῃ ἀθετήσῃ, ὅπερ αἴτιον πολλῶν κακῶν.
- 57 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 73: “Theodore disapproved of the venture, not because of jealousy of his brother, as Sphrantzes supposed, though there may have been a touch of it, and certainly not from any love of his brother-in-law, the Archbishop; but his policy was to keep on good terms with Venice and the Sultan and as far as it was practicable.”
- 58 *PaL* 2: 33.
- 59 *Minus*, 16.5: ὡς οὖν εἰς τὰ τῆς Πάτρας τι συμπέρασμα χρηστὸν οὐδὲν ἑκατορθοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ἦ μόνον τρία καστελόπουλα ὀποῦ ἀπῆραν, ποιήσαντες εἰρήνην μετὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ κάστρῳ καὶ ὅτι νὰ δίδουν καὶ κατ’ ἔτος πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην κύρ Κωνσταντῖνον φλωρία φ’, ἐγερθέντες ἀπῆλθον.
- 60 *PaL* 2: 32.
- 61 *CBB* 1: 32.41 (p. 236); Kalligas, *Byzantine Monemvasia*, pp. 251, 252.
- 62 *RKOR*: 3518 (p. 132), with *CBB* 2: 437, n. 32.

- 63 Minus, 16.6: οἱ δὲ ἀδελφοί . . . ἐκαβαλλίκευσαν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπῆλθον μέχρι καὶ τῆς Κορίνθου. καὶ ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς ἐμβὰς εἰς τὰ κάτεργα ἀπέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν, ὁ δὲ δεσπότης κύρ Θεόδωρος ἀπῆλθεν ὀπισθεν τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν τὴν φέρουσαν εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 16.7: ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ αὐθεντοῦς ἡμῶν κυροῦ Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ δεσπότη διὰ ἄλλης ὁδοῦ ἤλθομεν εἰς τὴν Βοστίτζαν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ καλόγερος οὐκ ἐγένετο ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Θεόδωρος, ἵνα ἀπομείνῃ ἅπας ὁ τόπος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύρ Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὖν καὶ οὕτως δέδωκεν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν Βοστίτζαν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλλο μέρος, ὅσα δὴ ἤρχεν ὁ Φραγκόπουλος πρωτοστράτωρ, Ἀνδρούσαν λέγω καὶ Καλαμάταν καὶ Πήδημα καὶ Μάνην καὶ Νησίν καὶ Σπιτάλιν καὶ Γρεμπένιν καὶ Ἄετον καὶ Λωῖ καὶ Νεόκαστρον καὶ Ἀρχάγγελον καὶ ἕτερα πολλά ἃ καὶ σταλεῖς ἐγὼ παρέλαβον ταῦτα παρὰ τοῦ ῥηθέντος πρωτοστράτου.
- 65 Mompherratos, *Oi Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, pp. 58, 59; *DGM* 1: 206; and *PaL* 2: 33.
- 66 *Minus*, 17.2.
- 67 *PaL* 2: 33, n. 103: “Knowing that Constantine could not be dissuaded from his designs upon Patras, the Venetians spent little time and money on the effort.”
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 69 *Minus*, 17.1: βουλής δὲ ἀποκρύφου, μόνον εἰς ἐμὲ οὔσης παρὰ τοῦ αὐθεντοῦ μου καὶ δεσπότη, ὅτι νὰ ἀπέλθωμεν κατὰ τῆς Πάτρας καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπάρωμεν αὐτήν, ἰδοὺ νὰ εὐρισκώμεθα εἰς τὸν Μορέαν καὶ ὁ τόπος αὐτοῦ ὁ τῆς Μαύρης δηλονότι θαλάσσης νὰ δοθῇ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν βασιλέα. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπάρωμεν τὴν Πάτραν, νὰ ὑπάγωμεν ὀπισθεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, καὶ νὰ ἔχη ἐνταῦθα εἰς τὸν Μορέαν τὰ τῆς προικὸς αὐτοῦ κάστρη καὶ ἐκείσε τὸν τόπον τοῦ τῆς Μαύρης δηλονότι θάλασσαν.
- 70 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.28 (pp. 398, 399): συντίθενται οἱ τῆς πόλεως ἄνδρες προδοσίαν αὐτῶ, καὶ ἐπαγόμενοι τὴν πόλιν παρεδίδοσαν ἀπόντος τοῦ ἀρχιερέως ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ.
- 71 *Ibid.*, 17.2: ἐστάλη ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος Λάσκαρις ὁ Παδιάτης εἰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Πάτρᾳ ἄρχοντας διὰ τινος δουλείας κάκεισε προσμείναντος συνέντευχον αὐτῶ ἰδίως καὶ ἱερεὺς καὶ λαϊκοὶ περὶ τοῦ ἂν θέλῃ ὁ αὐθέντης αὐτοῦ, ἔχουσι τρόπον, ὅτι νὰ ποιήσουν νὰ ἐπάρῃ τὴν Πάτραν. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ Λάσκαρι καὶ εἰπόντος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰ τῶν Πατριῶν ἀπόκρυφα ἀπεπέμφθη ὡς ἀδύνατα καὶ περισσὰ καὶ ἀκούσαντος καὶ λέγοντος.
- 72 *Ibid.*
- 73 *Ibid.*, 17.6: καὶ ἰδοὺ ἐγράψαμεν ὀρισμούς . . . εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ περιοχῇ τῆς Ἀνδρούσης, ὅτι τῇ 1^ῃ τοῦ Μαρτίου μηνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἵνα ἔλθωσι μετ' ἄρμάτων καὶ τῶν πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐνός, ἐκάστου αὐτῶν, ἵνα μετὰ πρέποντος διέλθῃ τὸν τόπον τοῦ πριγκίπου καὶ ἀπέλθῃ εἰς τὰ περὶ Ἀνδρούσαν ὁ νέος αὐθέντης τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου ὁμοίως ἐμνηθῆ καὶ ὁ Λάσκαρις ἀπὸ τὴν Βοστίτζαν.
- 74 *Ibid.*, 17.7: ἐλθόντες δὲ περὶ τὸν συμφωνηθέντα τόπον περὶ ὧραν ἀλεκτροφωνίας καὶ εὐρόντες καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἰδόντες αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀπράκτους καὶ ἀπρακτὰ λέγοντες, ἀποπέμψαμεν. ἐξημερωθέντες δ' ἐκείσε, βουλευόμενοι τί ἄρα νὰ πραχθῇ.
- 75 On the Jewish community of Patras, see S. B. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium, 1204–1453* (University, 1985), pp. 86–88.
- 76 *Minus*, 17.7: ἤλθομεν ἢ νὰ μᾶς δώσητε τὸ κάστρον ἢ νὰ τὸ ἐπάρωμεν.
- 77 *Ibid.*, 17.8: ὡς δ' ἐκείμεθα τῇ 1^ῃ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς Μαρτίου μετὰ τὴν τοῦ μεγάλου Σαββάτου ἀκολουθίαν, ὡς ἐφάγομεν, ἐκαθήμεθα εἰς τὴν τοῦ αὐθεντοῦς ἡμῶν τένταν, ὁμιλοῦντες περισσά. ἄνω δὲ ἐξεπύρτησαν ἀπὸ τῆς Πόρτας τῆς Ἑβραϊκῆς ἢ τοῦ Ζευγολατίου, – καὶ οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάζετο, – καβαλλάριοι ὀλίγοι καὶ, διωχθέντες ὡς ἐφάνησαν, ἀπῆλθον καὶ ἐσέβησαν εἰς τὴν τοῦ Ἀγιαλοῦ Πόρταν, ἐκείσε κατασκευαστικῶς πάντες οἱ τοῦ κάστρου ὑπάρχοντες μετὰ τζαγρῶν καὶ τοξαρίων καὶ σκολόπων. τοῦ δὲ δεσπότη καμὸς εὐρεθέντων ἔμποσθεν εἰς τὸν διωγμὸν τῶν καβαλλαρίων, διὰ τὸ εὐρεθῆναι κατὰ τύχην τὰ ἄλογα ἡμῶν ἔτοιμα πλησίον τοῦ γεφυρίου τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἀπερχομένης εἰς τὸν ἅγιον Ἀνδρέαν, τῆς τῶν Πατριῶν ἐτόξευσεν οὕτως τὸ τοῦ δεσπότη ἄλογον, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἔπεσε καὶ δραμόντες, ἵνα ἢ σκοτώσωσιν ἢ πιάσωσιν αὐτόν, εὐρέθη ἔγὼ ὑπέρμαχος καὶ ἐκείνος μὲν θεοῦ βοήθειᾳ ἀποπλακεῖς ἀπὸ τὸ ἄλογον ἐφυγε πεζός.

- 78 *Ibid.*, 17.10: πιάσαντές με οὖν, μετὰ πολλῶν λαβωμάτων ἀπαγαγόντες με, ἔβαλον με εἰς τὸν κουλᾶν εἰς ὄσπῆτιον σκοτεινόν, ἔχον μύρμηκας καὶ σιταρόφιρας καὶ ποντικούς διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ τοῦ σιτηρέσιον ἔβαλον με καὶ σίδηρα μονοκάνονα καὶ εἰς τὸν ἀριστερὸν πῶδα ἄλυσον στερεάν εἰς τζόπον μέγαν καρφομένην καὶ ἔκοιμώμην ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φυλακῇ πικρῶς διαβιβάζων ἀπὸ τε τῶν λαβωμάτων καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ κοιτασμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων . . . κακῶν.
- 79 *Ibid.*, 19.2: οἱ τοῦ κουλᾶ ἄρχοντες . . . ἐλθόντες . . . ζητοῦσί με καὶ δέομαι τοῦ αὐθεντός μου διὰ γραφῆς, ὅτι νὰ ἐνδώσῃ νὰ ἐξέλθουν ἄρχοντες νὰ συντύχουν πρὸς συμβίβασιν, ὅπερ καὶ γέγονε.
- 80 *Ibid.*, 19.3: καὶ γεγονότων ὄρκων καὶ παραλαβόντος καὶ τὸ Σεραβάλε, τῇ εἰ^η Μαΐου ἐκαβαλλίκευσε καὶ ἀπῆλθε μέχρι τῆς Σκλαβιτζας καὶ τοῦ Ῥιόλου τὰ ὄρια.
- 81 *Ibid.*, 19.3.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 19.4: δι' ἐμέ δὲ ἐπαφῆκε Ἰωάννην τὸν Ῥωσατᾶν, ἵνα με ἐπάρῃ σωζομένου γὰρ τοῦ ἐλευθερωθῆναι με ἔξουσι τὸ βέβαιον τὰ προαχθέντα. καὶ ἐλευθερωθεὶς ἡμῖν δὲ μόλις ἀπέσωσα, ἔνθα καὶ ὁ αὐθέντης μου.
- 83 *Ibid.*, 19.5: ἰδοὺ καὶ ἄρχων τοῦ ἀμηνᾶ μετὰ τινὰς ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, λέγων ὅτι ἡ Πάτρα διδὲ με χαράτῳ καὶ διαβαίνει ἰδική μου σηκώθησαι οὖν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ μηδὲν πολιορκῆς αὐτῆν· εἰ δ' οὖν, θέλωμεν πέμψειν φωσάτον κατὰ σου.
- 84 *Ibid.*: ὁ δ' αὐθέντης μου πάλιν εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτόν “ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν, ὅτι θέλουν νὰ δώσουν αὐτὴν τοὺς Καταλάνους οὐδὲν ἐφάνη πρέπον ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου τοῦ μεγάλου ἀμηνᾶ καὶ ἡμῶν νὰ τοὺς ἀφήσωμεν νὰ ἐπάρωσι τοιοῦτον κάστρον εἰς τὴν μέσσην τοῦ τόπου μας. διὰ τοῦτο ἀπῆλθομεν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐξετάσαντες τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐστήκαμεν νὰ μηδὲν γένηται. καὶ ἰδοὺ, ὡς βλέπεις, ἐσηκώθημεν καὶ ἤλθομεν εἰς τὸ ὄσπίτιον ἡμῶν.”
- 85 *Ibid.*, 19.5: εἰς ὀλίγας οὖν ἡμέρας ἔχω σκοπὸν νὰ στέλλω τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα εἰς τὸν ἀδελφόν μου τὸν μέγαν ἀμηνᾶν – δεικνὺς ἐμέ, – καὶ ἐλεῖ δηλώσειν καὶ τοὺς πλείονας ἡμῶν λόγους. ὁ δὲ Τοῦρκος ἀκούσας τούτους τοὺς λόγους, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλοφρονηθεὶς καλῶς, ἀπῆλθε χαίρων.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 19.6: μὴ εἰδότης μου πρότερον τὸ τυχόν. ἐγὼ δ' ἀνέφερον αὐτῷ, ὅτι μόνον νὰ δώσῃ ὁ θεὸς νὰ μηδὲν ἔλθῃ ὁ μητροπολίτης καὶ νὰ δώσουν ἡμᾶς τὸ κάστρον . . . ἀμὴ πάντα θέλω τὰ ἔξινα εἵτοιμα εἰς ἐκπλήρωσιν τῆς ἀποδοχῆς σου.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 19.10: καὶ καβαλλικεύσαντες μετὰ πλείστης ἐπιχαρᾶς . . . ἐσέβημεν εἰς τὸ κάστρον καὶ μέχρι τῶν εἰς τὸν ναὸν τοῦ ἁγίου Νικολάου ὄσπιτιῶν ἀπῆλθομεν. Cf. Mompheratos, *Oi Palaiologoi en Peloponneso*, p. 62. This church was finally demolished in 1811 and no trace of it survives; see *PaL* 2: 34, n. 104.
- 88 *Minus*, 19.10: τῆς μὲν ὁδοῦ πάσης κατεστρωμένης πάντων ἀνθέων καὶ εὐκοσμίας καὶ ἀπὸ τὰ δεξιῶν καὶ ἀριστερῶν ὄσπῆτια πάντων ραινομένων διὰ ῥοδοσταγμάτων καὶ ῥόδων καὶ τριακονταφύλλων, ἀπὸ δ' ἄνωθεν τοῦ κουλᾶ διὰ σκευῶν καὶ τζαγρῶν κακῶς δεξιουμένων ἡμῶν, εἰ καὶ οὐδὲν τι ἔβλαψαν.
- 89 *CBB* 1: 35.16 (p. 288): ἔτους ςζς' ἐπῆρεν τὴν Πάτραν ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος. Also cf. 42.7 (p. 322). *Minus*, 19.10: τῇ δὲ εἰ^η πρωὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἡμέρα τῆς ἐβδομάδος α^η, ἐξελθόντες οἱ τοῦ κάστρου ἔκκριτοι καὶ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς καὶ ἐλθόντες μέχρι τοῦ ῥηθέντος ναοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου, τῷ δεσπότη καὶ αὐθέντῃ μου προσεκύνησαν καὶ τὰς κλεῖς τοῦ κάστρου δεδώκασι.
- 90 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.28 (pp. 398, 399): καὶ βασιλεὺς Ἑλλήνων ἐπολιόρκει Πάτρας τῆς Ἀχαΐας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταλιπὼν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Κωνσταντῖνον ὄρχετο ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ Βυζαντίου. τῷ μέντοι ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ Κωνσταντῖνῳ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν προσεχώρησε καὶ πολιορκῶν οὐκ ἀνίει τὴν πόλιν, συντίθενται οἱ τῆς πόλεως ἄνδρες προδοσίαν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπαγόμενοι τὴν πόλιν παρεδίδοσαν, ἀπόντος τοῦ ἀρχιερέως αὐτῆς ἐν Ἰταλία, ὅσον διατρίβοντος χρόνου, ἐπικουρίας δεόμενον παρὰ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἀρχιερέως . . . ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν πόλιν ἐπεὶ τε παρέλαβε Κωνσταντῖνος, τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν ἐπολιόρκει.
- 91 *Minus*, 20.5: and 20.8; also see *PaL* 2: 34, n. 106.
- 92 *Ibid.*, 20.3: ἐξετάζων οὖν ἐκεῖνος, τί βούλομαι ποιῆσαι εἰς τὸν ἀμηνᾶν, κἀγὼ ἐκείνον, τί κατὰ τῆς Πάτρας, ἀπῆρα ἐγὼ παρ' ἐκεῖνον τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον κουκουζέλα, ἐκεῖνος δὲ παρ' ἐμοῦ βρύα. Cf. *PaL* 2: 34, and *DGM* 1: 208, 209.

- 93 *Ibid.*, 20.4: ὁμως δεδωκὼς ὁ μητροπολίτης τοῖς σκλάβοις χαρτία πρὸς τε τὸν ἀμηνῶν καὶ τὸν Τουραχάνην, πολλὸν λογισμὸν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς ἐμέ, μὴ ποτε ὑπισχνεῖται δοῦναι καστέλλια τινα τῆς Πάτρας, εἴπερ αὐτὸν βοηθήσῃ, ἵνα ἐπάρῃ αὐτήν, ἢ πολλὰ τινα χρήματα. καὶ οὐκ ἔπαυσεν ὁ ἐμὸς λογισμὸς, ἕως οὐ πολλὰ κοπιάσας καὶ μεθύσας πολλάκις καὶ ἀκουσίως, ἐμέθυσα κάκεινους τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἀπῆρα τοὺς τὰ χαρτία καὶ ἀνέγνωσα καὶ μετέγραψα: κάκειν ἀλίην ἐβούλωσα καὶ ἀφῆκα.
- 94 Speculation with regard to their contents in Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 63: Φαίνεται ὅτι ὁ Μαλατέστας ἐκάλει τοὺς Τούρκους εἰς βοήθειαν.
- 95 On Iagaris, cf. *supra*, ch. 3, n. 3.
- 96 *Minus*, 20.5: ὡς δὲ ἔφθασα εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, ἐδόθη μοι συναποκρισιάρης Μάρκος Παλαιολόγος ὁ Ἰαγρός, ὁ ὕστερον πρωτοστράτωρ, τότε δὲ πρωτοβεστιαρίτης, πλέον ἀναθεῖς εἶναι κατὰ τῆς δουλείας μου ἢ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς: οὐκ οἶδα δὲ ἄλλο τι αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ “φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον.” Also cf. *PaL* 2: 34.
- 97 *Minus*, 20.5.
- 98 *Ibid.*, 20.8: ἐν ᾧ δὴ μηνί [September 1429] καγὼ πάλιν ἐπανέστρεψα εἰς τὰ Τρίκαλα πρὸς τὸν Τουραχάνην καὶ τὴν περὶ τῆς Πάτρας δουλείαν τελειῶς διώρθωσα.
- 99 It seems from the statement already quoted (*supra*, n. 98) that Sphrantzes had already visited Turahan on his way back from the sultan. In a previous paragraph, 20.4, we are told that the letters dispatched by Malatesta were addressed to the sultan and to Turahan, δεδωκὼς ὁ μητροπολίτης τοῖς σκλάβοις χαρτία πρὸς τε τὸν ἀμηνῶν καὶ τὸν Τουραχάνην. Sphrantzes attempted to minimize the damage to Constantine's cause by visiting Turahan on his way back to Patras from the Porte. Sphrantzes' modifier πάλιν indicates that he had already conferred with him, before his later mission in September. *PaL* 2: 34 and Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 63, state that Sphrantzes went to Larissa. Sphrantzes' own testimony is that he went to Trikkala. Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 63, also states that Sphrantzes went to Larissa.
- 100 See *PaL* 2: 34, 35. Pandolfo Malatesta died in Pesano in 1441. See Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 11.
- 101 *Minus*, 20.9: καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτει ἐν μηνί Νοεμβρίῳ, ἡ βασίλισσα κυρὰ Θεοδώρα εἰς τὸ Στάμηρον εὐρισκομένη ἀπέθανε, καταλείψασα λύπην πολλὴν καὶ εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν καλλίστην. Also cf. *VeG*: 95 (pp. 62, 63).
- 102 The historical importance of this poem was first noted by Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 424.
- 103 The *Codex Marcianus* 533, 48b, 49a.
- 104 Ll. 20–24: συζήσασα χρόνον δὲ βραχὺν καὶ πάνυ / τούτῳ, μετέστη πρὸς μονὰς οὐρανίους, / ὠδῖσιν αὐταῖς προσλιποῦσα τὸν βίον, / ὅπως, ὀδυνῶν ἐξιούσα τοῦ βίου, / χαρᾶς ἀλήκτου τῆς ἐν Οὐλύμπῳ τύχῃ. This observation was first made by Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 426.
- 105 This anonymous *Θρήνος/Lamentation* on the fall of Constantinople was published as an appendix to Ubertino Pusculo's poem on the siege of 1453; see A. Ellissen, *Analekten der mittel-und neugriechische Literatur* (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 106–249. In it the anonymous poet calls Constantine XI “ill-fated;” see, e.g., lines 46, 63, 84, 93, 246, etc. The same poem (based on the text of Manuscript 2909 in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris) was also printed under the title *La Prise de Constantinople* in É. Legrand, *Bibliothèque Grecque Vulgaire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1880; repr.: Athens, 1974), pp. 169–202: ὦ Κωνσταντῖνε βασιλεῦ, κακὸν ῥιζικὸν ὀποῦχες, / καὶ τύχην πάνυ βλαβερὴν, μοῖραν ἀτυχεστάτην, / καὶ σκοτεινὴν καὶ δολερὴν, ἀστραποκαϊμένην.
- 106 Greek text in *PkP* 1: 117–122. Analysis in *ibid.*, p. λβ' of the introduction.
- 107 *PkP* 1: 119: ἐξεδόθεις τοίνυν καὶ αὐτός, ὃ θαυμάσιε, πειρασμοῖς μεγίστοις τε ἅμα καὶ ἄδοκῆτοις, καὶ οὐδὲν δήπου καινόν, ἐπεὶ συχνοὶ τῶν πάλαι φίλων θεῶ' ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Ἰωσήφ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ . . . καὶ ὁ γενναῖος ἀθλητῆς Ἴώβ.
- 108 *PkP* 1: 122: ὁ Κύριος ἔδωκεν, ὁ Κύριος ἀφείλετο.

- 109 *Minus*, 20.9: ἐτάφη δὲ μέχρι τινὸς εἰς μίαν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν τῆς Γλαρέντζας καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπῆγαν αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν ἐν τῷ Μυζήθρῳ τοῦ Ζωοδότου μονήν.
- 110 *PaL* 2: 33, n. 102. On the convent, see *DGM* 2: 197.
- 111 See *supra*, n. 53.
- 112 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 73.
- 113 *Minus*, 20.10: καὶ τῷ Ἰαννουαρίῳ μηνὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους εὐλογήθη καὶ ὁ αὐθεντόπουλος κύρ Θωμᾶς εἰς τὸν Μυζήθρῶν κυρὰ Αἰκατερίναν, τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ ῥηθέντος πρίγκιπος.
- 114 *PaL* 2: 35.
- 115 Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 65.
- 116 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.30 (pp. 400, 401): διέφερον μὲν οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἡγεμόνα, Ἰταλικὸν Κεντηρίωνα, οἱ Ἕλληνες τὸν πόλεμον ἐπὶ συχρὸν τινα χρόνον μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπιγαμίαν ποιησάμενοι ἐπὶ τῷ βασιλεῶς παιδί τῷ νεωτέρῳ Θωμᾶ, ἀρμοσάμενοι τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ ἡγεμόνος, καὶ τὴν τε χώραν ἐς φερνὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπέδωκαν τῆς Μεσσηνίας τε καὶ Ἰθώμης, πλὴν τῆς παραλίου Ἀρκαδίας, σπονδὰς τε ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ ταύτην μὲν οὖν, ἐπεὶ τε ἐτελεύτησε, παρέλαβε Θωμᾶς ὁ τοῦ βασιλεῶς ἀδελφός.
- 117 *PaL* 2: 35. On the title “despot,” see R. Guillard, “Recherches sur l’histoire administrative de l’empire byzantin. Le despote, despotēs,” *REB* 17 (1959): 52–89; B. Ferjančič, *Despota u Vizantiji juznoslovenskim zemljama* [Srpska Akademija Nauk 33] (Belgrade, 1960); and *idem*, “Još jednom oročecima titule despota,” *ZRVI* 14/15 (1973): 45–53.
- 118 *DGM* 1: 209, 210; *LMB*, p. 544; and Topping, “The Morea, 1364–1460,” p. 165. According to Khalkokondyles, 1.5.30 (pp. 400, 401), Thomas eventually imprisoned his own mother-in-law: Θωμᾶς . . . καὶ τὴν τε γυναῖκα τοῦ Κεντηρίωνος εἶχε ἐν φυλακῇ. ἐς ἣν δὴ καὶ ἐτελεύτησε. Sphrantzes remains silent over this point.
- 119 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.30 (pp. 400, 401): ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν πόλιν ἐπεὶ τε παρέλαβε Κωνσταντῖνος, τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν ἐπολιόρκει ἐπ’ ἐνιαυτὸν μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προσεχώρησε αὐτῷ.
- 120 *Ibid.*: ἐπ’ ἐνιαυτὸν.
- 121 *Minus*, 21.3: ὁ δὲ δεσπότης καὶ αὐθέντης μου κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος, τὸν Μάϊον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους, τὸν κουλᾶν τῆς Πάτρας ἀπῆρεν ἀπὸ λιμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακοπαθείας τὸν εὐρισκομένον ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ.
- 122 *CBB* 1: 32.42 (p. 236): καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔτος, τὸν ἰούλιον μῆνα, ἔλαβεν ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος τὸν γουλᾶν τῆς Πάτρας ἀπὸ λιμόν. *CBB* 1: 34.6 (p. 267): καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔτος, τὸν ἰούλιον μῆνα, ἔλαβεν ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος τὸν γουλᾶν τῆς Παλαιᾶς Πάτρας ἀπὸ λιμόν.
- 123 Following Sphrantzes (or, more accurately, Pseudo-Sphrantzes), Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 63, places the surrender of Patras in May. Following Khalkokondyles, *DGM* 1: 208, agrees: “La chateau résista encore longtemps et ne capitula qu’au mois de mai de l’année suivante.” *LMB*, p. 544, is also in agreement. Topping, “The Morea, 1364–1460,” p. 165, supplies a condensed version of the events: “The turn of Patras came in 1429–1430, when town and citadel yielded successively to the Palaeologus destined to be the last emperor of Byzantium.” Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 11, states “Patras surrendered to Constantine in July 1430.”
- 124 *PaL* 2: 34, 35.
- 125 *Minus*, 21.2: ἐν ᾧ δὴ Μαρτίῳ μηνὶ καὶ ὁ ἀμυρᾶς Μουράτμπεϊς τὴν Θεσσαλονικὴν ἀπῆρεν ἀπὸ τοὺς Βενετικούς ἐν πολέμῳ. For the Ottoman annexation, cf., among others, A. E. Vacalopoulos, *History of Thessalonica 315 BC – 1912* (Thessalonica, 1963), pp. 71 ff.; *PaL* 2: 23–31; *LMB*, p. 536 (which devotes only one sentence to the fall of Thessalonica); and *LCB*, pp. 366, 367. On narratives of the fall of Thessalonica, cf. Melville-Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Greek Accounts*.
- 126 The western sources for this Catalan band are listed in *DGM* 1: 208, 209.
- 127 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.29 (pp. 398–401): τὴν μέντοι Ἥλιδος μητρόπολιν εἶλον αἱ τοῦ ἀρχιερέως τριήρεις. ἐπὶ τε γὰρ ἐπύθετο τὴν πόλιν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἀλῶναι ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων, ἔπεμψε δέκα, εἰ δύναιτο τὴν πόλιν αὐτῷ παραστήσασθαι. αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ Ἀχαΐαν

- οὐκέτι ἀφίκοντο, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Κλαρεντίαν ἀφικόμεναι ἀπόντος αὐτῆ τοῦ ἄρχοντος, καὶ φρουρᾶς οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ πόλει, εἰσελθόντες λάθρα τὴν πόλιν κατέχον καὶ ἠνδραποδίσαντο. This historian blames the pope and not Malatesta for this raid. A western source, *DGM* 1: 209, n. 3, agrees and adds that the captain of the Catalans took Glarentza in the name of the pope.
- 128 *Minus*, 21.4: καὶ τῇ ἰζ^η Ἰουλίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἀπῆραν οἱ Καταλάνοι τὴν Γλαρέντζαν, ἦν καὶ κρατήσαντες μέχρι τινὸς πάλιν ἐπούλησαν αὐτήν.
- 129 *CBB* 1: 22.25 (p. 183), 32.44 (p. 236), and 34.7 (p. 267). There is some evidence to suggest that Catalans took Glarentza in August and not in July; see *DGM* 1: 209; the detailed evidence is supplied in *NE* 1: 511.
- 130 Khalkokondyles, 1.5.29 (pp. 400, 401): ὕστερον δὲ ἀποδιδόμενοι ταύτην τῷ βασιλεῶς ἀδελφῷ πεντακισχλίον χρυσίνων ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Ἰταλίας. Pseudo-Sphrantzes, *Maius*, 3.156 (p. 298), suggests a higher price. Without citing a source, Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 11, fixes the sum at six thousand.
- 131 *Supra*, n. 105. The identity of the poem's author still remains a mystery, although he has been repeatedly, if unconvincingly, identified with the Rhodian poet Emmanuel Georgillas; cf. A. Gidel, *Études sur la littérature grecque moderne* (Paris, 1866), 66; E. Egger, *L'Hellenisme en France* (Paris, 1869), p. 439, n. 1; Lampros, "Μονωδία καὶ Θρήνοι," p. 194, rejected the attribution to Georgillas; B. Knös, *L'Histoire de la Littérature néo-grecque. La période jusqu'en 1821* (Stockholm, Göteborg, and Uppsala, 1962), pp. 165, 166; and G. H. Henrich, "Ποιὸς Ἐγραψε τὸ ποίημα Ἀλωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (BB 1, 177–197)," in È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds., *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια ἀπὸ τὴν Ἄλωση* (Granada, 2006), pp. 405–414, who, through internal evidence of hints and obscure allusions and riddles, concludes that the poet was Manolis Limenites identified with Emmanuel Georgillas, thus restoring the original attribution.
- 132 *Θρήνος*, ll. 45–61: νᾶχεν ἀστράπη ὁ οὐρανός, νᾶχεν καὶ ἡ ὥρα, / ὅταν ἐσὺ βασιλεύσας ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν, / ἐχάλασες, βαρόμοιρε, τὸ κάστρον τῆς Κλαρέντζας / τοὺς πύργους, τὰ θεμέλια τοῦ ὄλα ἐξερρίζωσές τα / αἱ ἐκκλησιαὶ ἐχάλασασιν, οἱ καλογήροι ἐκλαίαν, / οἱ ἄρχοντες μὲ τοὺς πτωχοὺς μεγάλην λύπην εἶχαν / τὰ σπῆτια τὸν ἐχάλασες, ἐκείνοι ἐξορισθῆκαν, / γυναῖκες καὶ παιδία τὸν ὄλα ἐξολοθρευθῆκαν, / ὄλοι ἐξορισθῆκασιν, μέγαν κρίμαν ἦτον. / τίς ἦτον ὁποῦ σ' ἔδωκεν τὴν συμβουλὴν ἐκείνην; / κακὴ βουλὴ ἦτον εἰς ἐσέ, ὡς ἔδειξε τὸ τέλος / καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἔδειξεν ἡ ἄτυχός σου μοῖρα / ἔδε κρίμαν ὁποῦποικες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν.
- 133 Glarentza may have provided the *casus belli* for the campaign that had earlier culminated in the battle of the Ekhinades.
- 134 Pseudo-Sphrantzes, *Maius* 3.156 (p. 298), mentions the dismantling of the walls only. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 11, states, without documentary support, that Constantine destroyed the walls.
- 135 *CBB* 1: 22. 25 (p. 183): καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ λαβὼν τὴν Γλαρέντζαν ἐχάλασε ταύτην, πρότερον τοῦ πάπα ὄντος.
- 136 *CBB* 1: 32.44 (p. 236): ἐπῆραν οἱ Καταλάνοι τὴν Κλαρέντζαν, καὶ ἐξαγόρασέ τὴν ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνος καὶ ἐχάλασέ τὴν.
- 137 *CBB* 1: 34.7 (p. 267): τὸ δὲ λθ' ἐπῆραν οἱ Κατελάνοι τὴν Γλαρέντζα καὶ ἐξαγόρασε τὴν ὁ κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ δεσπότης καὶ ἐχάλασέ τὴν.
- 138 Thus, the same verb, ἐχάλασε, is utilized in the brief chronicles (*supra*, nn. 136 and 137).
- 139 *Minus*, 21.11: κατὰ τὸν Μάρτιον μῆνα . . . ἀπῆρε . . . ὁ δέ . . . τὴν Γλαρέντζαν.
- 140 *Pal* 2: 35. Even those scholars who accept the testimony of the anonymous poet, of the short chronicles, and of Pseudo-Sphrantzes do so with extreme caution; cf., e.g., *Pal* 2: 35, and Mompherratos, *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 64, who only mention the dismantling of the fortifications.
- 141 Certain key areas remained in the hands of the Venetians: Methone, Korone, Nauplion, and Argos. See *LMB*, pp. 543, 544.

- 142 That is precisely the thesis advocated by Vacalopoulos, *Origins*. Others have also hastily concluded that the campaigns of Constantine were “brilliant.” See, e.g., Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 11. I remain unconvinced as to the brilliant nature and execution of Constantine’s military operations.
- 143 Elegy on Maddalena-Theodora, ll. 15–17 (*PKP* 4: 426): Ἄρην πνέοντι . . . δεινῷ μαχητῆι Κωνσταντίνῳ δεσπότῃ.
- 144 Glarentza never fully recovered. It was still in ruins in 1436, when it was visited by a Spanish traveler; see Tafur, p. 44 (Letts translation). Also see Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 11, n. 21.

6 *Ecce homines*

Emperor and regent

1 Southern intrigues

Turahan overwhelmed the Hexamilion a second time:¹ “At the end of the spring of the same year [1431], Turahan advanced and once more destroyed [the fortifications of] the Hexamilion. The plague claimed numerous victims at Patras.” Turahan’s foray is mentioned in a short chronicle:² “The Turks entered the Morea; on the eleventh of the same month Turahan launched an attack and seized <the Hexamilion>.” The raid was designed to curtail Constantine’s ambitions. Turahan did not advance beyond the Hexamilion, leaving Constantine in command of his newly acquired territory but in fear of annexation. In the spring of 1432 a major change of command took place, when Constantine and Thomas exchanged their territories:³

About March of the same year, the exchange of territories of the two brothers, the despots Lord Constantine and Lord Thomas, took place. Lord Constantine received Kalavryta and all the surrounding areas of Lord Thomas, who in turn took control of Glarentza and of all the lands around Androusa.

Thomas was, by marriage, the heir of the Latin prince of Achaea, and had a legitimate title to Glarentza,⁴ a town assigned to Constantine. Furthermore, this exchange may have had something to do with Constantine’s intention to extend his sphere of operations northward, into Attica and Boeotia.⁵ It is possible that Constantine was trying to formulate a defense-in-depth, after Turahan had demonstrated that Constantine could not rely on the Hexamilion.

The Maginot line at the Hexamilion had failed and the Morea was still vulnerable to raids. Perhaps Constantine intended to create a buffer zone between his appanage and the Turkish territories in central Greece by occupying Attica and Boeotia. A scenario of this sort would allow his regiments from the south to engage and perhaps contain future enemy troop movements in Attica, sparing the Morea. The short chronicles cite a handful of events for the period 1432–1437. After giving an account of the fall of Patras, Khalkokondyles turns his attention to a tour of the Orient and the Occident. Sphrantzes only reports the death of Cleopa Malatesta, the wife of Theodoros, at Mistra,⁶ also noted in an entry of a short chronicle.⁷

Almost three years after Turahan's assault upon the Isthmus, Sphrantzes undertook a mission:⁸ "On January 7, <69>42 [1434] I went as ambassador to Antonio, the lord of Athens, to the sultan, and to the emperor." We do not know what Sphrantzes was supposed to accomplish in Athens; perhaps it was connected with Constantine's ambitious plan to annex Attica and Boeotia. As with Patras, Constantine may also have attempted to establish contacts with pro-Constantinian elements in Athens. Sphrantzes could have been gathering intelligence information, since the duchy of Athens was the next step in Constantine's expansion. It was perhaps at this time that close ties between Constantine and the Khalkokondyles family were forged and these prominent Athenian patricians became heavily involved in the political developments at the duchy.⁹

The mission of Sphrantzes to Athens in 1434 seems to have borne some fruit: when in the following year the Greco-Florentine lord of Athens, Antonio I Acciajuoli died, as noted in two entries of short chronicles,¹⁰ the anti-Latin faction of the Athenians, headed by the father of the historian Laonikos Khalkokondyles, asserted itself:¹¹

After Antonio died . . . his wife sent an embassy to the king [sultan], asking that power be invested in her and in one of the foremost citizens, her own relative (who was also my own father). She sent him armed with a great amount of money to bribe the king [sultan] and thus secure for them the lordship of Attica and Boeotia. After he left the city and was on his way to the king [sultan], some prominent citizens, who hated Khalkokondyles, tricked Antonio's widow and she left the Acropolis. They placed Antonio's relatives in charge and further sent into exile the family [of Khalkokondyles], assuming control themselves.

Perhaps the seeds of this coup headed by Antonio's widow¹² had been planted during Sphrantzes' trip in the previous year. From this point on the Khalkokondyles family remained close to the Palaeologi of the Morea. Laonikos became a student of Plethon during the family's sojourn at Mistra. The fact that immediately after Constantine's failure to take over Athens this family placed itself under his protection and patronage demonstrates that it had somehow earned the despot's favor, perhaps by performing a service after the death of the Greco-Florentine duke. It would not be unnatural to suspect that George Khalkokondyles and Antonio's widow had cooperated with Constantine's "plans."¹³ Under this light, the coup at Athens can be interpreted as a maneuver in support of Constantine.

The account of Khalkokondyles is supplemented by Sphrantzes' narrative:¹⁴

In the beginning of the summer of <69>43 [1435], Antonio del Acciajuoli, the lord of Athens and Thebes, died. At his widow's request, I was sent with a sworn document sealed with silver and with a large military escort to receive Athens and transfer his wife to another place, whatever I thought suitable. Turahan, however, was faster: he blockaded Thebes and took it a few days later. Unable to accomplish anything I returned from the Hexamilion.

It has been suggested¹⁵ that the information presented by Sphrantzes contradicts Khalkokondyles' narrative and at least one scholar¹⁶ is not convinced that Constantine was making an attempt to intervene in the affairs of Athens. He suggests that Constantine was reacting to a situation, which had nothing to do with his plans or with the earlier trip of Sphrantzes but that troops from the Morea were invited by the widow, precisely as Sphrantzes states. It should be remembered, however, that Sphrantzes was a diplomat, with some experience in intelligence and counter-intelligence matters, and that he was devoted to Constantine. He would not have written of a covert operation openly, even after the fact. He goes only so far as to state what he really wished to be accepted as the "official" version of the events. No attempt at intervention could even be hinted at, and he had to give the impression that his hero had been invited to Athens by the proper authorities.¹⁷ In fact, the two versions, by Khalkokondyles and by Sphrantzes, are compatible. Khalkokondyles concentrates on the situation within the city and on its two factions, the pro-Constantinian and the pro-Latin. Sphrantzes looks at the same situation from without, from the vantage point of a potential conqueror, who must not give the appearance of being an aggressor.

After the death of the duke, a message was dispatched to the Porte to inform the sultan, as Sphrantzes hastened with his troops to the Megarid, expecting an easy occupation of Athens, especially since the pro-Constantine camp had already won the upper hand and was in control of the Acropolis. It was assumed that the city and its citadel would be handed over, duplicating the events that had occurred earlier at Patras: a show of force, a take-over by partisans from within, and a swift surrender may have been envisaged, with the notable difference that not only the city but its citadel, the famous Acropolis of Athens, would also fall into Constantine's hands and no siege would be required. Then the despot and his associates would make their next move and acquire Thebes in Boeotia. A similar strategy had produced results at Patras. Back then, however, the Turks had remained aloof. At this time in Athens Sphrantzes and Constantine met with disappointment. Turahan put a swift end to their plans. The duchy of Athens was too close to the Turk's *sancak* of Thessaly and Turahan took preventive action, demonstrating that Constantine could achieve nothing without Turkish approval. Athens and Boeotia would not fall into Constantine's hands, after all.

This setback may have prompted Constantine to travel to Constantinople and consult with the emperor:¹⁸

While my lord the despot was at Stylaria, expecting the official Venetian vessels for his passage to the City, I arrived, without accomplishing anything [at Athens]. So I took the boat with him. When we reached Euripos [Negroponte/Khalkis], it was decided that I should go to Turahan who was in Thebes; I told him about my mission concerning Athens.

It was Turahan's turn to frustrate Constantine through diplomacy. The Ottoman warlord had not forgotten the game that Sphrantzes had played with regard to Patras, when he pretended that Constantine had conquered the city to prevent its

fall to the Catalans, as a demonstration of his loyalty to the Turkish sultan. Turahan answered with similar irony, as he feigned regret over his occupation of Thebes and expressed apprehension, explaining that it would be impossible for him to withdraw, as the sultan would never allow it; had he known about Constantine's designs he would have refrained from making this move but it was too late to do so:¹⁹

Turahan took an oath and spoke: "Because of my acquaintance and good will toward the despot and you, I would have gladly granted that this happen, if only I had been told something before I left my palace and came here, for I did this without the great lord's [sultan's] orders. While I was in my palace, I had many things to cover my head but now I have no more." He treated me honorably . . . I accomplished nothing there [at Thebes] and returned.

Thus, at last, Constantine and Sphrantzes met their military and diplomatic master.²⁰ Sphrantzes returned to Negroponte and was forced to spend an uncomfortable night outside the walls.²¹ The next day, despot and diplomat set sail and reached Constantinople on September 23.²²

George Khalkokondyles, the Athenian partisan of Constantine, went through a number of adventures before he was able to extricate himself from the thorny situation that he faced at the Porte and ended up as a refugee in the Morea under the protection of the Palaeologi:²³

So [*sc.* George] Khalkokondyles came to the king [sultan], who imprisoned him; he was ordered to surrender the territory. He promised to pay thirty thousand gold pieces but could accomplish nothing. When he found out that the king [sultan] had sent an army to Boeotia in order to occupy Thebes, he arranged his own escape to Byzantium, leaving behind his servants, his tents, and his pack animals . . . ships of the tyrants of Attica . . . captured his vessel, took Khalkokondyles prisoner, and brought him in chains to the king [sultan]. The king [sultan] . . . pardoned him and did not blame him for what had passed.

The duchess in Athens married Nerio II and the family of the Acciajuoli retained control through Murad's good will.²⁴

2 Northern intrigues

Constantine spent most of the following year in the capital; according to Sphrantzes, Constantine had become the emperor's favorite brother. Because John openly favored Constantine, Theodoros also hastened to Constantinople with the objective of enforcing his position in the succession, as John VIII had no children.²⁵

Lord Theodoros also came to the City in order to remain in the City as a successor to the throne, being the second oldest brother. Our emperor condoned

his presence unwillingly, because he favored my master, Lord Constantine (often did he tell me about it with an oath, as if it were a secret).

As Theodoros seemed unstable, indecisive, and unreliable, his position in the succession had come under a serious threat but he still wished to be the regent during the emperor's absence from Constantinople to attend the council of Florence and conclude the union of the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches.²⁶

The choice of regent threatened strife. John VIII was not thrilled with the presence of Theodoros in Constantinople, who must have been trying to form his own circle of partisans. John was unwilling to designate Theodoros, with his strong Orthodox leanings,²⁷ as his successor or even as his regent. It was not unthinkable that Theodoros could attempt to sabotage his brother's efforts by openly supporting, or by refusing to suppress, the vocal anti-union elements in the capital. Worst of all, he could reach some kind of an agreement with the Turks, whose sultan strongly disapproved of the emperor's journey. Constantine was the most reliable choice for the position of regent.

Neither Theodoros nor Demetrios could be trusted to support John's religious policy. Thomas was the youngest brother and seemed satisfied with his lands in the Morea. He probably considered the recent arrangement with Constantine his personal gain. He could be counted upon not to make any waves. Perhaps his acquiescence in this matter had been secured by Constantine as a tacit condition of their agreement pertaining to the mutually acceptable exchange of territories. The emperor was determined to succeed where his predecessors had failed and conclude the union, as, in his view, it could provide the only secular solution to the threat posed by the Ottoman Turks. Constantine firmly supported his brother's policy and religious compromise. John achieved his purpose in a roundabout way. He announced that the Morea would go to Constantine and Thomas, while Theodoros and Demetrios, the least reliable member of the imperial family, would remain in the capital. Thomas supported the arrangement enthusiastically:²⁸ "My master, Lord Constantine the despot, together with his brother, Lord Thomas the despot (the first lord of his palace, Michael Rhaoul Ises, was with us in the City), were planning that the other two brothers [Theodoros and Demetrios] remain in the City with the emperor, while the two of them would be sent to the Morea as lords."

John dispatched Constantine to the Morea, probably in secret, as Sphrantzes implies. Constantine directed Sphrantzes to the Porte to seek the approval of Murad, which was secured; then he proceeded to the Morea.²⁹ If the real goal had been to alarm Theodoros, it succeeded: he left Constantinople and hastened after his brother to the Morea. As soon as he reached the appanage, Theodoros mobilized his forces and prepared for war:³⁰

I discovered that the brothers and despots were disposed toward a great battle; Lord Theodoros had traveled by ship to the Morea, to the rear of Lord Constantine, my lord, and was fighting his two brothers. For on both sides armies had been collected and there was some conflict.

Had John VIII anticipated this breakdown in the Morea? The situation deteriorated to such a degree that an embassy was dispatched from the capital with instructions to arrange a truce. These envoys were apparently unsuccessful, and a second embassy was sent, which managed to restore peace by proposing a compromise:³¹ “My master, Lord Constantine the despot, would return to the City, while the despots Lord Theodoros and Lord Thomas would remain in the Morea.”

Thus, John VIII got his way, for this turn of events was exactly what he had wished for all along. Theodoros was effectively removed from the capital and the emperor was free to proceed with the appointment of his regent. In all probability, John won this round by constructing a direct threat against Theodoros’ holdings in the appanage. He was probably aware of the fact that Theodoros was not serious about giving up his territory, since he had received no assurance that he would become the heir apparent. Had he acquiesced with John’s proposal, which had been endorsed by Constantine and sanctioned by Murad, Theodoros would have traded his command for the chance that he could ultimately prevail upon his brother to designate him his successor. Residence in Constantinople with the mere hope of future designation to be John’s heir could not compensate for the loss of an entire despotate. Was this an orchestrated maneuver to rid the emperor of Theodoros’ presence in the capital or was it a fortuitous course of events that brought about the desired goal? Had the possibility of civil war breaking out been taken into account?³²

Constantine and Sphrantzes returned to Constantinople on September 24, 1437, almost two months before the emperor’s departure for Italy.³³ The arrival of Constantine in the capital was noted by Syropoulos,³⁴ who added that it was accompanied by a bad omen. Bad luck seems to have been hounding Constantine, as his contemporaries remarked after his death and after the fall. Syropoulos undoubtedly intended the bad omen to apply to the upcoming council and not for Constantine’s future, upon whom, he states, fortune was smiling at that time:

Toward the end of the month of September . . . came, on board the same galleys from the Peloponnesus [Morea], the despot, Lord Constantine, who was, at that time enjoying extremely good fortune, in order to become the regent in the City during the absence of the emperor (as it had been decreed by him). . . . For those who would like to speculate about the upcoming event through the observation of bad omens, I list the following event as food for thought: As soon as the triremes [galleys] docked in the harbor . . . a mighty earthquake occurred, which the most prudent took as a sign from God.

That Constantine took over the imperial duties is noted in the variant texts of Syropoulos.³⁵

John VIII also took care to neutralize Demetrios. While Theodoros was contained in the Morea with Thomas providing the necessary counter-balance, John assigned Demetrios to his own retinue, even though Demetrios was an anti-unionist, was not interested in the Latin west, and was less than eager to embark on the journey. Constantine was thus spared the tiresome presence of his brother. Syropoulos assigns the following statement to John VIII:³⁶

I granted my brother the despot [*sc.* Demetrios] two thousand [*sc.* florins]; no one can claim that I gave him a great amount or that he did not have to come with us; indeed, this sum hardly meets his needs. Yet all people know that it is necessary for him also to accompany us.

A variant of Syropoulos' text is more explicit:³⁷ "Thomas was left behind to guard the Peloponnesus. Constantine became the guardian of the City; the emperor, Lord John, ordered his brother, Lord Demetrios, to Italy so that he would not create intrigue and for other reasons." Elsewhere in his narrative, Syropoulos describe the relations between John and Demetrios:³⁸ "Lord Demetrios . . . [and] his disagreement with the emperor, on account of which he was planning to go to war." An entry in a short chronicle also cites the ominous shadow of Demetrios:³⁹

Emperor John saw that the City was in dire straits and traveled to the land of the Franks in the days of Pope Eugenius; the Eighth Synod convened. He was away two and a half years; he had brought along Demetrios, who was plotting against the City.

Constantine now found himself in complete charge of Constantinople. His appointment was supported by a contingent of Cretan crossbowmen recruited at the westerners' expense as part of the original settlement between Constantinople and Italy that allowed the emperor to travel abroad.⁴⁰ Constantine could count on this force to control possible riots in the capital (even though its avowed, although unrealistic, aim was to defend Constantinople against a Turkish attack). Among the known ministers that were left in place during the emperor's absence were Loukas Notaras and Demetrios Kantakouzenos. Syropoulos⁴¹ states that they were left behind "to manage the affairs of the City." Two weeks before the emperor's departure a western visitor arrived in Constantinople: the Spaniard Pero Tafur, who was touring the Levant. He was easily, perhaps eagerly, granted an audience with the emperor, who welcomed westerners. The emperor was extremely polite to Tafur, whom he attempted to recruit into his service.⁴² Tafur was then invited to participate in an imperial hunt and was introduced to Constantine.⁴³ Tafur was still in Constantinople when the Byzantine delegation set sail for Italy. He supplies a description of the festivities that accompanied the departure of the emperor and his entourage:⁴⁴

He departed in great pomp; his two brothers, and eight hundred men, all members of the nobility, accompanied him. On the day of his departure from Constantinople there was a great festival, and everyone followed the procession with the ecclesiastics to the point of embarkation, and many provided an escort as far as a day's journey out to sea and I went also.

The inhabitants of Constantinople were not too pleased to see their delegation depart, since they suspected that their religious independence was about to be bartered away.

Theodoros Agallianos, an ecclesiastic and a convinced anti-unionist, who had been spared the journey because of professed ill health, observed the atmosphere of sadness:⁴⁵

It so happened that I did not sail to Italy. . . . I had been bedridden, resembling an unburied corpse, for almost three months. But they made themselves ready, boarded the ships, and set sail. Thereupon arose a roar among the people and the bells of monasteries and of churches tolled, accompanying their departure with a note of sadness rather than joy.

Agallianos (who must have recovered swiftly, once he found out that he did not have to go to Italy) relates that he proceeded to the Hippodrome and observed the fleet sail away. Miraculously, we are told, he was cured on the spot and he concluded that God had sent him his illness, as He did not want Agallianos to participate in the council.

The imperial departure is noted in numerous short chronicles⁴⁶ and is further assigned a detailed description in Syropoulos,⁴⁷ who is one of the few sources to supply hints about the regency of Constantine. Most of the surviving narratives devote a great deal of attention to the council itself, to the journey of John VIII, and to his stay to Italy, but display little interest in events at home.

3 The emperor's regent

It was not an ideal time for the emperor to be away from his capital.⁴⁸ Responding to the threat presented by the Turks, John VIII had carried out needed repair work on the dilapidated fortifications. Numerous inscriptions were *in situ* in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when they were recorded;⁴⁹ a number of restorations were carried out.⁵⁰ To begin with, attention was paid to the moat:⁵¹ “Here the channels around the walls and the moat had long ago been dug to some depth by the emperors of old . . . but with the passage of time, in winters, under the influence of water, gradually the soil was loosened and filled the moat all the way up.” This author further compares the emperor’s accomplishment to the feat of Xerxes who cut a channel through the peninsula of Mount Athos.⁵² The narrative concludes with the observation that the cleaning of the moat took no more than two months, a short period of time, implying strenuous efforts of planners and laborers.⁵³ John then turned his attention to fortifications and finished a tower near the Basilike Gate by the harbor.⁵⁴ Finally, he erected two towers in the neighborhood of Blankas⁵⁵ and crowned his building program with a renovation of the facilities by the Kontoskalion harbor.⁵⁶ During John’s absence, Constantine could rely on strengthened fortifications.

Yet the overall situation did not inspire confidence. The capital had been reduced to a collection of ruins.⁵⁷ Human resources were lacking and it was clear to John that salvation could only come from the west and not from within. He knew that the price for western aid required the return of his schismatic, in the eyes of Rome, Orthodox Church to the fold, even though the majority of his subjects disapproved

of this policy, which was prompted, with time running out, by military considerations and not by any deep passion to recognize the authority of the pope.

Constantine embraced his brother's realistic position to accept union with Rome, which, Sphrantzes declared with hindsight, was a monumental error:⁵⁸ "On November 27 of the same year [1437], our emperor Lord John, accompanied by the patriarch, Lord Demetrios the despot, numerous senators, clerics, and almost all the metropolitans and bishops, departed for the scheduled synod. Would that he had never left!" Sphrantzes concludes that it was the union that sealed the fate of Constantinople:⁵⁹ "The synod was the single most important cause for the attack that the impious [Turks] launched against our City, which resulted in the siege, our enslavement, and our great misfortunes."

Manuel II had avoided this course of action and had endlessly referred this matter of religious union to interminable negotiations. John broke away from his father's policies and concluded the union. The emperor had no choice. John viewed this problem from the vantage point of *Realpolitik*. Infusion of aid from the west, in the form of guarantees, of promises, of funds, and of a massive expedition into the Balkans was desperately needed.⁶⁰ Not surprisingly, the sultan became alarmed and accelerated his preparations to launch an attack timed to coincide with the emperor's departure. Thus, the usual diplomatic minuet had to be danced out. Murad II offered financial assistance to John to remain in Constantinople and abandon the scheduled council:⁶¹

Since Lord John was determined to attend the synod, it was decided to send Andronikos Iagros as ambassador to the sultan to inform him of this, as if he were a friend and a brother. The sultan replied as follows: "It does not seem a good idea to me, to labor so hard and to spend so much money. What will he win? I am here: if he is in need of aspers for his expenses or for any other funds for his maintenance, I am prepared to serve him."

Syropoulos⁶² mentions a different embassy headed by Paul Asen with identical arguments against the imperial journey:

The advice originating from friendly Christians and from our enemies was in harmony. For when Lord Paul Asen was sent as an envoy to the sultan, his viziers said: "Why is the emperor in such an urgent hurry to go to the Latins? If he is in need of something, let him name it and our master will take care of it. He will be better served by our master than by the Latins; in addition, the friendship of the sultan will be of greater advantage to the emperor than that of the Latins. Let him give up the trip to the Latins and all his requests will be granted by our master." His intention prevailed, however, and the advice of all parties counted for nothing.

Both Sphrantzes and Syropoulos imply that the counter-proposal and generous offer of the sultan were weighed seriously and were even favored by the anti-union faction. Sphrantzes speaks of an official debate and a council.⁶³ "A long discussion and debate ensued over whether to follow the sultan's recommendation or to attend the synod. Our emperor's desire, or rather our evil fortune, prevailed in the end."

After the Porte's bribe was rejected, the sultan became furious and mobilized his troops, intending to launch an immediate assault upon the capital, just as John was about to depart:⁶⁴ "While our emperor was preparing to leave and while he was away from the City, the sultan decided to attack and to send an army against the City. His intention, however, was not so much conquest as to recall our emperor." He was finally dissuaded by his vizier, Halil Çandarlı. The sultan's well-publicized goal, nevertheless, created confusion in Constantinople, bringing about greater division within the imperial court:⁶⁵

Before discovering that Halil Pasha had changed the sultan's mind in time, we were aware of the unfriendly advice given by others; so my lord, the despot [*sc.* Constantine] and the other magnates dispatched Thomas Palaeologus to the emperor. Deliberations and confusion ensued until we learned that Halil's advice had prevailed.

Thus, Constantine's regency commenced with a note of alarm or perhaps even panic. Eventually, it became evident that the sultan was neither prepared nor willing to launch an attack. This threat, however, remained in the background and continued to cause anxiety throughout the absence of John VIII, both in Constantinople's court and among the delegates in Italy.

Our surviving sources supply few details on Constantine's regency. The major historians of the late medieval period understandably focus their narratives on the imperial trip to Italy and on the sensation that it caused, but neglect to treat the situation in the capital. The Spaniard traveler to the Levant, Tafur, furnishes interesting observations. Tafur visited Constantinople a second time, after the departure of John VIII, and was entertained by Despot Constantine, to whom he had been introduced during his previous visit. Tafur has preserved an unmatched picture of the regent, who granted him an audience with due courtesy:⁶⁶ "I asked, through one of my men, the permission of Despot [Constantine] Dragaš to enter the city . . . he gave instructions to meet and escort me . . . he received me graciously."

Constantine personally conducted Tafur on a tour of Santa Sophia.⁶⁷ Tafur states that the despot (in his official capacity as regent, no doubt) kept one of the three keys to the vault that housed sacred relics.⁶⁸ So Constantine guided his distinguished guest through the "marvels" of Constantinople. It is interesting to note that Constantinople was still trying to capitalize on its relics at this late date, in an effort to win the good will of the west. Tafur supplies a list of the relics, which had been allegedly collected by Saint Helen at Jerusalem: the lance which pierced Christ's side, a nail from the cross, a seamless coat discolored by age, thorns from Christ's crown, splinters of the true cross, the pillar at which Christ was scourged, several items pertaining to the Virgin, and the grill on which Saint Lawrence had been roasted. Apparently, there was no shortage of relics, in spite of the sack of Constantinople by western armies in 1204, when treasures and religious artifacts were carried away by the victors. Some relics had escaped the crusaders and were still treasured in the city; they are mentioned in an anonymous account:⁶⁹

And we kissed the nail that was used to crucify Christ, our Lord, the crown of thorns (still alive and blooming), the red cloak that He put on, the garment that He wore when He washed the feet of the disciples, the sandals that He wore on His feet, the letters that the Lord wrote on the girdle of Saint Mary, the entire forearm, still bearing flesh, of Saint George, and many other [relics].

Tafur has preserved in his narrative an otherwise unmatched picture of Constantine dispensing justice, in a matter that involved Tafur directly.⁷⁰ This is the only existing picture of Constantine executing his judicial functions. Also notable in the same passage is Tafur's indifferent usage of the titles "emperor" and "despot":

One day the Castilian captain who was there sent for me, because one of his men had been killed while out to sea by a Greek, whose objective had been to rob him of his ship, and I went to him; we took the criminal and the corpse to the emperor to ask for justice. Out of respect for me and because I said that our people might punish those who did not deserve mercy, the emperor, in spite of the wishes of the Greeks, summoned his executioners and, in front of his palace, he ordered them to amputate the criminal's hands and to gouge out his eyes.

Assuming that in this case the defendant had actually committed murder, one might still be surprised at the severity of the sentence pronounced by Constantine. It should be observed that such cruelty, imposed by the state and its officers, was not unusual in the east or west at this time; nor should we expect circumstances in the Levant to be different.⁷¹ One may further remark that in the present case the culprit was not condemned to death, after all. Constantine may have compromised; it is clear from Tafur's text that the locals were not pleased when their despot sided with the Castilians. On the other hand, Tafur was adamant that he and his party would take matters into their own hands if satisfaction were not granted. Constantine could not afford a vendetta within his own capital, least of all an emotional dispute involving a visitor whom John VIII had tried to recruit into his service.⁷² Thus this incident captures, in a nutshell, the emperor's dilemma in the last years of Constantinople's independent existence: to satisfy his own subjects at the risk of displeasing his Latin allies or to side with the Latins at the risk of alienating his own subjects; in either case, the Turks seemed to profit. This dilemma would become problematic on the state level after Constantine's accession and would edge him on to his doom.

While Tafur was visiting Constantinople, the Turks tried to create anxiety and recall the emperor. Tafur states that Murad made an unannounced appearance with his army in the vicinity. Because the goals of the Turkish expedition were not clear, the inhabitants became alarmed, assumed the worst, and manned the fortifications. Eventually, it became evident that the Turks were not going to launch an attack and that this military excursion of Murad amounted to psychological warfare:⁷³

At this time, the Grand Turk marched to a place on the Black Sea, and his march brought him near Constantinople. The Despot and the inhabitants of

Pera thought that they were going to occupy the territory, and so they made preparations and took up arms. The Grand Turk passed near the wall and some skirmishes were fought on that day . . . a great gift was carried from Constantinople and was brought to him at the place where they camped for the day. I had made a stop because of his arrival, since I thought that he would sit down and besiege the city, but he continued his march to the Black Sea to put down a rebellion. Although we had few men, it was my wish that he would challenge us to a fight; nevertheless, it was good to see him and his large army move on without trouble or danger.

Envoys from the imperial court went to the sultan's camp with a suppliant's gift. Their mission may have had something to do with the skirmishing that had taken place earlier that day. Tafur, a professional soldier, pessimistically noted the inadequacy of defenses and defenders. Clearly, the capital was in no position to withstand a serious assault upon its fortifications. The Cretan contingent of crossbowmen, funded by Italian money, could effectively be utilized to control riots within the city but its contribution to the defense against the Ottoman forces, however, would have been minimal. The sultan marched on, but a possible attack remained a serious concern throughout Constantine's regency.

Rumors of impending doom reached the delegation in Italy, whose members began to panic, as they heard that the sultan was assembling an armada and was mobilizing his army to lay siege to the capital.⁷⁴ Syropoulos comments:⁷⁵

Numerous dire messages arrived often, reporting that the sultan was making preparations to attack the City. From Ainos, from Mytilene, from Chios, from Crete, from Euripos [Negroponte/Khalkis], and from all places letters reached the Venetians, announcing that the sultan was preparing 150 galleys and 150,000 soldiers and that he was about to march against the City. The Venetians forwarded these reports to the emperor and the patriarch. Later letters also came from the City; they reported the same events and demanded that the emperor and patriarch send whatever help they could as soon as possible. The members of our delegation heard of these events and took it badly; they renounced life, called upon God, cried aloud in horror, and begged with tears and shrieks.

Syropoulos reports that this expected attack upon Constantinople was used by members of the delegation as an argument in favor of immediate return:⁷⁶ "What do we stand to gain? We are suffering and we are accomplishing nothing here, while the City, our homeland, is in danger. Who knows whether the sultan means to attack the City next spring?"

Constantine and other members of the imperial family asked Tafur to carry dispatches to John VIII. He did so and he met the emperor in Ferrara, while the latter was being entertained at the palace of the marquis:⁷⁷ "Late that day I went to visit the emperor of Greece and gave him letters from his wife and from his brother, the despot; he received me with joy . . . he made me sit there, next to him

and asked news of his country.” No doubt, Tafur also gave an account of Murad’s “excursion.” Additional letters reached John, written by his regent, by his relatives, and by courtiers:⁷⁸

An envoy came to the emperor: Kantakouzenos Phakrases, who brought letters from the imperial ladies, from the despot, and from the ministers. The message ran as follows: “It seemed good and most useful to the council if the galleys of the pope, at least two of them, arrive in Constantinople by the end of the spring; in this way, we may check the sultan’s attack upon the City.” He made his report of these events to the emperor and demanded that this [matter] be settled as soon as possible, for it was already the beginning of spring.

So the period of 1437 to 1439 brought anxiety. At times both the Constantinopolitans and the delegates in Italy expected an attack, but it never materialized. In the beginning of May 1438, a galley from Crete brought news to Italy that the Venetian residents of Constantinople had abandoned their homes in the city and had sought refuge in Genoese Pera, as they feared a major Turkish assault.⁷⁹ The Venetians entered into negotiations with John VIII for the purpose of arming ships to be dispatched to the relief of Constantinople.⁸⁰ Murad’s cold war had its effect and harassed the delegates in Italy. The sultan knew how to sound the tune that spread terror among the residents of the imperial capital; far from being secure within his renovated walls and with a handful of mercenaries at his disposal, John’s regent nervously requested help from his brother in Italy.

4 A guest from the east

The council of Florence is beyond the scope of the present study and its story properly belongs to the history of the church.⁸¹ The proceedings of that fateful synod have been related in detail.⁸² John VIII and his delegation made a deep impression in Italy. The appearance of the easterners created a sensation, evident in the work of a number of Italian artists, who observed the visitors and were so influenced by their appearance and exotic attire that they included a number of them in their paintings. It is to Italian artists that we are indebted for the existing portraits of John VIII and of Patriarch Joseph II.⁸³ Moreover, these early Renaissance artists recorded the fashions that the Byzantines favored. John’s impact in Italy matched the impression that had been created by Manuel II, who had inspired French artists.⁸⁴ Manuel II and his son John VIII were immortalized by western painters and sculptors to such a degree that we can be confident about the details of their appearance. They may be the only emperors in the history of the Byzantine empire whose true likenesses have been preserved. These depictions amount to actual portraits and contrast with the lifeless images encountered on imperial coinage, which reduced actual appearances to formulaic motifs to accommodate the Byzantine conception of timeless, ideal rulers.⁸⁵

In 1438, before the council was relocated from Ferrara to Florence, Pisanello observed John VIII and produced sketches, which he supplemented with brief

notes, observing that the emperor was small in stature, with dark hair, dark beard, dark eyebrows, and grey eyes.⁸⁶ Pisanello produced a portrait of John, which was perhaps commissioned by the emperor. If so, this picture would have been executed in Florence in 1439, when Pisanello had the chance to meet the emperor. This work survives in a Greek manuscript at Sinai, to which it was subsequently appended.⁸⁷ Portrayed in profile, John is in a red overcoat with a white collar and his favorite hat usually termed “*skiadion*” (shade-provider).⁸⁸ This hat was of Florentine manufacture and design and there is reason to believe⁸⁹ that John acquired it during this visit and made it a steady item of his wardrobe.⁹⁰ The *skiadion* in the Sinai manuscript is white with red trim. The profile of the emperor is superimposed on blue-black background, to which an inscription was added at a later date,⁹¹ an abbreviated version of the emperor’s formal signature, “John, in Christ the God, faithful king and emperor of the Romans [= Greeks], Palaeologus.”⁹²

What makes this portrait highly unusual and interesting, especially if the emperor had commissioned it, is the fact that its subject is depicted in profile, looking to the right. This pose was superstitiously avoided by the Byzantines.⁹³ Pisanello had pioneered a revival of the ancient manner of producing medals and was deeply influenced by portraits of Roman emperors on coins.⁹⁴ The portrait presents us with an amalgam of Italian techniques and the *maniera greca* and supports the perception that John’s taste in art had a pro-western bias, especially if he commissioned this portrait personally. Pisanello also produced the famous medal that bears the profile of John VIII wearing his favorite Florentine hat, with a Greek inscription, in capitals:

† ΙΩΑΝΝΗC•ΒΑCΙΛΕΥC•ΚΑΙ•ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ•Ο•ΠΑΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟC

Pisanello’s inscription is an abbreviated variation of John’s official signature.⁹⁵ The *recto* of this medal shows the emperor on horseback⁹⁶ and praying before a cross; the *verso* identifies the artist by means of bilingual inscription, in Greek and Latin, “the work of Pisano, the painter”:

ΕΡΓΟΝ•ΤΟΥ•ΠΙCΑΝΟΥ•ΟΡΡΑC•ΠΙCΑΝΙ•ΠΙCΤΟΡΙC ΟΡΡΑC

This medal has indeed proven extremely influential in the history of art.⁹⁷

John VIII has the distinction of being the subject of the earliest bust of a living emperor on record. His three-dimensional image bust in the Museo Vaticano, made in the lost wax technique, betrays, it was thought, the hand of Antonio di Pietro Averlino (also known as Filarete).⁹⁸ Already in the beginning of the twentieth century the attribution of this bust to Filarete was challenged and the theory was proposed that the bust was not produced by direct observation but was a derivative work based on examples of two-dimensional portraits. The bust was modeled, it was concluded, after Pisanello’s medal;⁹⁹ after all, its best side is the profile, which would be natural if the artist had been working from a two-dimensional image such as Pisanello’s medal. More recently, the possibility has been entertained that Donatello produced this bust.¹⁰⁰

The most celebrated depiction of John VIII is the magnificent Journey of the Magi by Benozzo Gozzoli (1420–1497), the student of Fra Angelico. This fresco, 7.5 meters wide, is in the chapel of the Palazzo Medici-Riccardi in Florence, designed by the architect Michelozzo.¹⁰¹ In 1459 Cosimo de Medici commissioned Gozzoli to decorate this family chapel with a scene of the procession of the Magi. Gozzoli's *il viaggio dei Magi* was painted in the period 1459 to 1461, a long time after John's visit to Florence. Executed on a grand scale, it produces luxuriant detail and is reminiscent of an immense tapestry. Gozzoli has included numerous portraits of prominent members of the Medici family, who were the followers of a religious confraternity devoted to the Magi. It is quite possible that Gozzoli had seen the emperor twenty years earlier and had taken notes or had even drawn his features, as Pisanello had done. Gozzoli was a native of the neighboring Fiesole. The emperor's portrait by Gozzoli resembles the other surviving depictions. Thus, the three Magi in his fresco are portrayals of historical personalities: in addition to John who is depicted as the third king, Gozzoli assigned the features of Joseph II, the patriarch of Constantinople (who had accompanied his emperor to Italy) and those of Lorenzo the Magnificent to the remaining two Magi. Numerous attendants crowd the elaborate procession. Exotic touches are the order of the day. John rides a white horse and wears a silk tunic profusely decorated with an intricate floral pattern; he bears the imperial purple boots sporting golden spurs. Unlike most portrayals of John, Gozzoli's Magus-emperor does not include John's beloved hat but bears a "crown" decorated with gems and elaborate feathers arranged in such a manner as to suggest that Gozzoli was perhaps attempting to portray a Byzantine version of the Oriental/Turkish turban that was coming into fashion at this time even in the west. Other depictions of John VIII also exist.¹⁰²

There survives a verbal account of the emperor at leisure, supplementing other existing narratives that treat John's visit.¹⁰³ On July 27, 1439, John VIII enjoyed an excursion into Florence's neighboring countryside of Peretola. He made an unscheduled stop at the home of Giovanni de' Pigi, who left us his impressions of his encounter with Byzantine royalty. At Giovanni's home, John VIII was served an improvised dinner consisting of a salad and of a main dish of boiled and fried chicken and pigeon, followed by eggs cooked on hot bricks.¹⁰⁴ Giovanni further informs us that a member of the emperor's retinue was the indefatigable Cyriacus of Ancona.¹⁰⁵

Giovanni observed that the emperor was impeccably polite and that he took the trouble to thank his host personally for his generous hospitality and offered to reciprocate when and if Giovanni found himself in Constantinople. Furthermore, the emperor had his host's name recorded by his secretary and insisted on pronouncing it correctly himself.¹⁰⁶ This unscheduled visit by the imperial party probably provided one of the high points in Giovanni's life and the incident was surely remembered by members of his family.¹⁰⁷ After the departure of his distinguished guest, Giovanni painted the emperor's coat of arms in the room that John VIII had rested during the few hours that he spent at Peretola.

While John's facial features may be well known, as Pisanello and Gozzoli executed portraits of him, we have no surviving portrait of his brother and last

emperor of Constantinople.¹⁰⁸ Constantine remains featureless, behind the image of his famous brother. We do possess a depiction of Constantine XI on a chryso-bull¹⁰⁹ of 1451 as a generic Byzantine emperor bearing the cross on his right arm with a formulaic, abbreviated inscription of his official signature: “Constantine, Emperor in Ch<rist>, Palaeologus.”¹¹⁰ This “generic” image is encountered in the few surviving examples of Constantine’s coinage, which bear the formulaic portrayal without individual characterization. All additional depictions of the last emperor are fictional and date from the period after his death. Thus, the well-known Modena miniature of Constantine, which decorates the margin of the text of Zonaras, was executed in the fifteenth century but after his death. There is no reason to assume that this portrayal or any other in the group was inspired by direct observation,¹¹¹ even though the miniaturist has indeed taken some trouble to equip each emperor with a differently styled beard. Within the group of the Palaeologan emperors, Constantine is the only member of the dynasty to be assigned a short, rounded beard but we have no evidence to suspect that this touch actually reflects reality.

Interesting, but equally imaginary, are the compositions of the Cretan artist George Klontzas,¹¹² who decorated his famous *codex* ca. 1590. He was a friend and an associate of the youthful Domenikos Theotokopoulos (el Greco). Both artists had been students together at a young age, more than one century after the death of the last emperor.¹¹³ One of Klontzas’ depictions, a masterpiece of the dying art of the miniature, deserves special mention. It depicts Constantine XI in the trappings of western royalty, equipped with a western-style crown, sitting on his throne in deep thought. Constantine supports his head on his left arm and rests his right arm on his knee, while Death in the form of a skeleton bearing hourglass and scimitar draws near. Klontzas further added the following caption below his drawing:¹¹⁴ “[This is] Emperor Constantine, who lost his kingdom and perished in the war. The capture of Constantinople. It took place in the days of Emperor Constantine Palaeologus, also named Dragaš, by the impious Ishmaelites [= Turks] in the year 1453 since the incarnation of our Lord, Jesus Christ, on May 29, a Tuesday.”

This depiction of the last emperor manages to capture the atmosphere of doom and the tragic end of an empire. A modern art historian has aptly described the qualities that the artist successfully conveys in his miniature, even though he is mistaken when he states that Death carries a lantern. Klontzas did draw an hourglass, nevertheless, supplying a touch that surely adds even more pathos to the scene, when we take into account the fact that in this miniature Constantine’s time on earth is running out:¹¹⁵

Thick shadows have been added to the emperor’s dress, to his throne, and to its steps. The face of Constantine, with its expression, portrays all the despair and the torment of a man, who fights on in full knowledge of the fact that the contest is lost. Death, present in the form of a skeleton, with his implements on hand depicts the end of this page from history. Already his scythe is over the head of the hero, ready to give an end to his life. . . . In this composition Klontzas did not just portray the sorrow caused by the

death of a man; the very fine point of his pen has rendered artfully the fall of an entire nation. Whatever historians described in numerous volumes, the painter from Khandax [= Candia] has depicted in a simple composition with tragic dignity.

Klontzas' second depiction of Constantine portrays the emperor in military armor, lying dead on his tomb, as if he had been a western knight; Klontzas supplied the following caption:¹¹⁶ "The death of the aforementioned [i.e., previously depicted?] Constantine, who was killed in the capture of the City." The third depiction of Constantine by Klontzas shows the emperor on his throne; no trappings of the eastern empire are present. The emperor bears a western crown, while his throne would have been at home anywhere in Europe. The following legend is placed below this miniature:¹¹⁷ "And her [= Helena Dragaš'] son, Emperor Constantine, was killed during the capture; from the first Constantine and his mother Helena up to these last ones there was no other emperor Constantine, whose mother was also called Helena." It should be emphasized here that Klontzas was far removed from the Byzantine tradition in his portrayal of the emperor, as he repeats none of the formulas encountered in Byzantine depictions of the emperors of Constantinople. His details do not come close to echoing the official pose of a late medieval potentate; nor does he include any of the Palaeologan imperial trappings:¹¹⁸ "Standing in a frontal position, clad in stemma, sakkos and loros, and holding the scepter in one hand and the akakia in the other."

The corpse of Constantine, tightly wrapped in a shroud, is further depicted in a sixteenth-century manuscript that contains the prophecies of Leo the Wise.¹¹⁹ The last depiction of Constantine that will concern us is to be found in a sixteenth-century fresco decorating the monastery church of Moldovița in Bucovina, whose general theme is the siege of Constantinople in 1453.¹²⁰ Here the city and its fortifications are illustrated in a generic manner while the details of the armament borne by defenders and besiegers are authentic. Constantine XI is pictured on the ramparts, with his retinue, in a procession of clergymen. All defenders are in full view of the attacking enemy. Constantine bears the traditional imperial trappings of the late Byzantine emperor: the imperial black tunic (the *sakkos melas*) decorated with the gold *loros* (the medieval descendant of the Roman *trabea triumphalis*) around the shoulder and waist.¹²¹ Yet the picture is again not absolutely authentic, as, in contrast to the general eastern splendor, Constantine XI bears a western-style crown. Higher up on the walls there is a procession of ladies led by a "queen" (perhaps Constantine's supposed wife?). The ladies are dressed in robes of western origin and fashion, resembling perhaps those that the artist had seen in works of art that had reached his region via Hungary. Outside the walls, the Turkish artillery, cavalry, and janissary regiments, portrayed in authentic detail, can be easily identified. This depiction of Constantine is also imaginary. It was executed well after 1453 but at least this fresco seems to reflect, in tragic tones, the hopeless situation of the imperial city in its last days of independent existence.

5 Second thoughts

The union¹²² was concluded and celebrated in Florence. Pope and emperor had their way with the delegates and harmony was restored, at least superficially. Slowly the delegation made its way home. Once the ships put into ports with Orthodox inhabitants, members of the emperor's retinue were accused of "selling out" the true faith. The delegates began to have second thoughts and the farther away they found themselves from Italy, the more convinced they became that they had been coerced to append their signatures to the decree.¹²³ After their arrival in Constantinople they were enveloped in infamy¹²⁴ and became the objects of scorn, facing the contempt of their Orthodox compatriots, who viewed them as traitors. At his arrival, the emperor discovered that his beloved wife had died some time earlier and that members of his delegation had been cognizant of the fact but had refrained from informing him. His official regent, Constantine, also kept quiet during the welcoming ceremony. The sad duty finally fell upon his mother's shoulders.¹²⁵

Constantine's regency came to an end. Constantine (with the help of a capable staff) had performed adequately and had played the part of the perfect host when he had entertained at least one western guest but had risked alienating his subjects by siding in a judicial case with a westerner. His regency also experienced moments of anxiety. Perhaps Constantine had been unduly alarmed at the appearance of Murad before the walls, but his concern may have been genuine, as there were fears about mounting a successful defense. It was obvious to Tafur that Constantinople was in no position to repel an attack. Constantine must have been painfully aware of the same fact also, as he was quick, perhaps even too anxious, to request reinforcements. His notes of alarm must have been a cause of concern and resentment for the emperor in Italy, especially since the dire threats in the correspondence came to nothing. As it turned out, Constantine's appeals for help simply created unnecessary anxiety. Constantine played the part that Murad intended him to play and the regent apprehensively danced to the tune that the sultan sounded. On each occasion that the sultan chose to apply psychological pressure in this *quattrocento* version of a cold war, Constantine predictably obliged and his actions must have amused the Porte immensely. With hindsight, after his return, John must have felt some resentment caused by the endless stream of alarming letters. Indirectly then, Constantine's contribution may be judged in negative terms. John may have found personal reasons to disapprove of his regent's actions, compounded by the latter's failure to inform him of the death of his wife even at the time of his arrival.¹²⁶

Thus, one should not conclude that the regency of Constantine was crowned with unqualified success, as some scholars have estimated hastily.¹²⁷ These judgments of modern scholars can be matched by the court literature of late medieval Greece, which found in Constantine a hero equal to Themistocles. John Dokeianos, a scholar and a copyist, alluded to the regency in an *encomium* that he wrote of Constantine, whom he addressed directly. He includes the following evaluation of Constantine's regency:¹²⁸

On top of these events, your brother, the emperor summoned you to our metropolis [Constantinople], as he was about to sail away to Italy. . . . The reigning emperor summoned you with good hopes. How your mere presence provided greater shelter against all danger, all imminent disasters, and all fear, I will leave to others to explain. You demonstrated the validity of the maxim stated by Demosthenes and Aristeides, which declares: “Cities are not made up of stones, timber, or the art of the stonemasons; wherever there are men, who know how to save themselves, there one will find walls and cities.” The entire City fell in love with you, as her prayers were realized in full, and the Constantinopolitans began to dream that one day you would hold the scepter.

Dokeianos then compares Constantine XI with Alexander the Great.¹²⁹ Surely, rigid court flattery and court etiquette played a part in the formulation of this bombastic praise. Similarly, Bessarion had compared Constantine to Ares, a statement that we also found to be court flattery.¹³⁰ The fact remains that Constantine was not rewarded for his service during his brother’s absence. On the contrary, he found himself without any official duties and without a post after John’s return. Constantine was neither Alexander the Great nor a statesman of the caliber of Manuel II. The picture that emerges indicates that Constantine was an average individual, whose accomplishments in military strategy, scholarship, and statesmanship were neither outstanding nor impressive but mediocre, at best.

Notes

- 1 *Minus*, 21.9: καὶ τῷ τέλει τοῦ ἔαρος αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ ἔτους ἦλθεν ὁ Τουραχάνης καὶ κατεχάλασε καὶ ἔτι τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον. καὶ θανατικὸν ὅτι πολὺ εἰς τὴν Πάτραν ἐγένετο. See D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 12, 13.
- 2 *CBB* 1: 36.17 (p. 293): ἐσέβησαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι εἰς τὸν Μωρέαν, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἑνδεκα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἐπολέμησε ὁ Τουραχάνης <τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον> καὶ ἠπῆρέ το.
- 3 *Minus* 21.11: καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔτει κατὰ τὸν Μάρτιον μῆνα καὶ ἡ ἐναλλαγὴ τῶν τόπων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ δεσποτῶν κυροῦ Κωνσταντίνου καὶ κυροῦ Θωμᾶ ἐγένετο· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπῆρε τὰ Καλάβρυτα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκείσε τοῦ κυροῦ Θωμᾶ, ὁ δὲ πάλιν τὴν Γλαρέντζαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀνδροῦσαν. Cf. *LMB*, p. 545; *DGM* 1: 222–224; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 13, devotes two sentences to this exchange of fiefs; and E. Gerland, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras* (Leipzig, 1903), p. 67.
- 4 A. Mompherratos, *Oi Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* (Athens, 1913), p. 65: Μηνὶ Μαρτίῳ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους 1432 μεταξὺ τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ ἀδελφῶν Θωμᾶ καὶ Κωνσταντίνου ἔλαβε χώραν ἀνταλλαγῆ τῶν τόπων. Ὁ Κωνσταντίνος παρέλαβε τὰ Καλάβρυτα καὶ πάσας τὰς περὶ τὴν χώρας, ὁ δὲ Θωμᾶς, ὡς κληρονόμος τῶν Φράγκων, νόμιμος πρίγκιψ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, ὥρισεν ὡς διαμονὴν του τὴν ἀρχαίαν πρωτεύουσαν αὐτῆς Γλαρέντζαν μετὰ τῶν περιοχῶν.
- 5 S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), p. 74.
- 6 *Minus*, 21.12: καὶ τῷ μα⁹ ἔτει τέθνηκεν ἡ τοῦ Μαλατέστα μὲν θυγάτηρ, γυνὴ δὲ τοῦ δεσπότη κυροῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου, κυρὰ Κλεώπη καὶ ἐτάφη ἐν Ζωοδότου μονῆ. On Cleopa, cf. *PLP* 9: no. 21385 (pp. 72, 73) [s.v. Παλαιολογίνα, Κλεόπα].
- 7 *CBB* 1: 38.4 (p. 303): ἐν ἔτει ςχα^α ἐκοιμήθη ἡ αὐτὴ βασίλισσα, ἀπριλλίῳ ιη´. “Queen,” βασίλισσα, was, the proper title for the wives both of emperors and of despots; see

- S. P. Lampros, “Avva ἡ Καντακουζηνή, Βυζαντιακὴ Ἐπιγραφή ἐξ Αἰτωλίας,” *NH* 1 (1904): 37–42, esp. p. 39: Πολὺ δὲ συχνοτέρα εἶνε ἡ ἐπωνυμία τῆς βασιλείσης περὶ τῶν δεσποινῶν. Οὕτως . . . εἰς τὴν Κλεόπην ἐκ γένους Μαλατέστα. Her death was lamented in prose monodies composed by Nikephoros Kheilas (Greek text in *PkP* 4: 144–152); by Bessarion (Greek text in *PkP* 4: 154–160); by a priest named John (Greek text in *PkP* 4: 153); by Plethon (Greek text in *PkP* 4: 161–175); and by Demetrios Pepagomenos (Greek text in G. Schmalzbauer, “Eine bisher unedierte Monodie auf Kleope Palaiologina von Demetrios Pepagomenos,” *JöB* 20 (1971): 223–240). On Cleopa, see S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi* 1 (1981): 278–280. The authorship of Bessarion’s poem has recently come under question and the eulogy has been attributed anew to her husband, Theodoros of Mistra; see D. G. Wright, “Funerary Iambic Lines on the Tomb of the Blessed Basilissa, Lady Kleofe Palaiologina: MS Venice, Marciana Gr. 553, f. 48^v, Reattribution from Bessarion to Theodoros Palaiologos,” in *Thirty-Sixth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference 8–10 October, 2010: Abstracts of Papers* (Philadelphia, 2010), p. 29; further argumentation and palaeographical evidence are needed to produce a convincing case for this reattribution.
- 8 *Minus*, 21.13: καὶ τῷ μβ⁹ ἔτει Ἰαννουαρίου ζ¹ πάλιν ἀπήλθον ἀποκρισιάριος ἐς τε τὸν Ἀντώνιον καὶ αὐθέντην τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἀμηνῶν καὶ εἰς τὸν βασιλέα.
- 9 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, neglects Constantine and Athens. On the Athenian family of the Khalkokondylai, cf. D. G. Kampourglous, *Οἱ Χαλκοκονδύλαι: Μονογραφία* (Athens, 1926; repr.: Athens, 1996); and A. Wifstrand, *Laonikos Chalkokondyles, der letzte Athener. Ein Vortrag* [Scripta Minora Soc. Hum. Litt. Lundensis 2] (Lund, 1972). For Athens at this time, the standard works remain F. Gregorovius, *Ἱστορία τῆς Πόλεως Ἀθηνῶν κατὰ τοῦς Μέσους Αἰῶνας ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰουστινιανοῦ μέχρι τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων Κατακτήσεως*, vol. 3 (Athens, 1904; repr.: 1977) trans. into Greek with corrections, improvements, and additions by S. P. Lampros, pp. 334, 335; and T. N. Philadelphus, *Ἱστορία τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐπὶ Τουρκοκρατίας ἀπὸ τοῦ 1400 μέχρι τοῦ 1800*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1902; repr.: 1981), pp. 142, 143.
- 10 *CBB* 1: 34.8 (p. 267): τὸ μγ’ ἀπέθανεν ὁ Ἀντώνιος Δελατζιόλας, ἀφέντης Ἀθηνῶν καὶ Θήβας. *CBB* 1: 47.8 (pp. 345, 346), which betrays pro-Latin sympathies, adds erroneously “Nerio” to Antonio; for this mistake, see *CBB* 2: p. 448: τῷ ζαμγ’ ἔτει, ἰνδικτιῶνος γ’, μηνὶ ἰουλίῳ γ’, ἀπέθανεν ὁ εὐγενῆς καὶ τετιμημένος αὐθέντης Ἀθηνῶν, μίσερ Νέρης Ἀντώνιος τῆ Ἀστσιαῖλλη. Cf. K. M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens 1311–1388* (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 202–206; *PaL* 2: 50, 51; *DGM* 1: 204–213; W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908), pp. 404–406; and Kampourglous, *Οἱ Χαλκοκονδύλαι*, pp. 32–34.
- 11 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.51 (pp. 66–70): ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτελεύτησεν Ἀντώνιος . . . ἦ τε γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἐπεμπε ἐς βασιλέα [= sultan] τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπιτραπῆναι αὐτῇ τε καὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἀμεινόνι, ἐαυτῆς δὲ προσήκοντι πατρὶ δὲ ἡμετέρῳ. τοῦτον ὡς ἐπεμπε πειρασόμενον βασιλεῖ, καὶ χρήματα διδοῦσα μεγάλα, ὥστε διαπράττεσθαι σφίσι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἅμα καὶ Βοιωτίας, ὡς ἐξελαύνων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπορευθεὶ παρὰ βασιλέα, οἱ προέστησαν τοῦ δήμου, κατὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν Χαλκοκονδύλην ἔχθος τὴν τε γυναικὰ τοῦ Ἀντωνίου ἀπάτη παρήγαγον ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως, καὶ τοὺς προσήκοντας Ἀντωνίου καθίστασαν τυράννους, καὶ τὸ γένος ἐξελάσαντες αὐτοὶ ἴσχυοσι τὴν πόλιν.
- 12 The family of Antonio’s widow cannot be established. Khalkokondyles states that she was the wife of Antonio. Sphrantzes fails to mention the Christian or family name of this duchess in his authentic work. The sixteenth-century elaborator of Sphrantzes claims that she was “Maria Melissene;” see *Maius*, 2.10 (302): ἀπέθανεν καὶ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐθέντης καὶ Θηβῶν ὁ προρρήθεις κύρ Ἀντώνιος Δελατζιόλης ὁ Κομνηνός καὶ ζητήσῃ τῆς ἐκεῖνου γυναικὸς Μαρίας Μελισσηνῆς, θυγατρὸς Λέοντος τοῦ Μελισσηνοῦ, πρώτου ἐξαδέλφου Νικηφόρου τοῦ Μελισσηνοῦ. One may question the authenticity of this citation. The forger Makarios Melissourgos wished to identify himself with the family of the Melissenoi (whose name he adopted and even signed documents as “Melissenos”) and with

the family of Sphrantzes by altering the text of the *Minus*; cf. M. Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople: Bishop Leonard and the Greek Accounts,” *GRBS* 22 (1981): 288, 289; and T. Ganchou, “Le mésazon Démétrius Paléologue Cantacuzène a-t-il figuré parmi les défenseurs du siège de Constantinople (29 Mai 1453)?,” *REB* 52 (1994): 256–260, esp. p. 260: “Sphrantzès rapporte dans ses Mémoires – c’est-à-dire dans le *Minus*-, qu’il avait l’intention, peu avant la chute de Constantinople, de faire épouser à son fils la fille de ce même Nicolas Goudélès, pour mieux asseoir par cette alliance leur prochaine nomination au pouvoir. Or dans le *Maius*, sous la plume de Macaire, Sphrantzès ne veut plus marier son fils mais sa fille, et à . . . Nicolas Mélissène!” On the family of these industrious forgers, the Melissourgoi, and their attempt to identify themselves with the illustrious family of the Melissenoi (and indirectly with the old dynasty of the Komnenoi), cf. I. K. Khasiotēs, *Μακάριος, Θεόδωρος και Νικηφόρος οί Μελισσουργοί (Μελισσουργοί) (16^{ος}-17^{ος} Αί.)* (Thessalonica, 1966), esp. pp. 177 ff.; and *SFC*, ch. 3. *PaL* 2: 51, n. 34, asks: “was she really a ‘Maria Melissena’?” A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation 1204–1261: The Byzantine Period* (New Brunswick, 1970), p. 134, *LMB*, p. 544; and N. Cheetham, *Mediaeval Greece* (New Haven and London, 1981), p. 206, accept the version supplied by Pseudo-Sphrantzes and assign the name “Melissene” to the duchess; Philadelphus, *Ιστορία τῶν Ἀθηνῶν* 1: 142, and Gregorovius-Lampros, *Ιστορία τῆς Πόλεως Ἀθηνῶν*, p. 335, are similarly misled.

- 13 Similar is the conclusion reached in *PaL* 2: 50, 51. Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 135, exaggerates when he states that the sultan was alarmed by the activities of Constantine. Constantine never posed a threat to the Porte. His activities may have caused irritation but never concern.
- 14 *Minus*, 22.1: καί εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ θέρους τοῦ μγ^{ου} ἔτους ἐπέθανε καὶ ὁ Ἀθηνῶν καὶ Θηβῶν αὐθεντῆς κύρ Ἀντώνιος Ντελαντζιόλης καὶ ζητήσῃ τῆς ἐκείνου γυναικὸς ἐστάλην ἐγὼ μετὰ ἐνόρκου ἀργυροβούλου καὶ πολλῶν στρατιωτῶν, ἵνα παραλάβω τὴν Ἀθήναν καὶ ἄλλον εἰς τὸν Μορέαν αὐτῇ δώσω τόπον, ὅποσον καὶ ὅποιον φαίνηται μοι προλαβόντος δὲ τοῦ Τουραχάνη καὶ τὴν Θήβαν ἀποκλείσαντος, ἦν καὶ ἀπῆρε μετὰ τινος ἡμέρα, ἄπρακτος ἐγύρισα ἀπὸ τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον.
- 15 *PaL* 2: 51.
- 16 *LMB*, p. 545.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 *Minus*, 22.2: εἰς δὲ τὰ Στυλάρια εὕρισκομένου τοῦ δεσπότη καὶ αὐθεντός μου καὶ τὰ τῆς πραγματείας κάτεργα Βενετικά ἐκδεχομένου, ἵνα ἐμβὰς εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἀπέλθῃ, ἰδοὺ κἀγὼ ἄπρακτος ἔφθασα. καὶ ἐμβὰς κἀγὼ ἀπερχόμεθα καὶ εἰς τὴν Εὐρύπιον φθάσαντες, ἐφάνη καλὸν καὶ ἐστάλην εἰς τὸν Τουραχάνη, εἰς τὴν Θήβαν εὕρισκόμενον καὶ τὴν δουλείαν τὴν περὶ Ἀθήνας ἐδηλοποίησα αὐτῷ. The site of Styllaria or Skylaria (*CBB* 2: p. 449) has not been identified with any certainty. *RdD* 2: 1896, suggests that it was somewhere around Styllis in the Gulf of Lamia, but this location seems unlikely. It should be sought on the northeast coast of the Morea, I believe.
- 19 *Minus*, 22.3: καὶ ἐπληροφόρησέ μοι μεθ’ ὄρκου ὅτι “διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην καὶ σὲ ἐγνωριμίαν καὶ ἀγάπην, καλῶς καὶ προθύμως ἤθελα παραχωρήσει, ἵναπραχθῇ τοῦτο, ἂν εἶχα ἐξεύρειν τι πρὸ τοῦ ἐξελεθῆναι με ἀπὸ τὸ ὀσιπίτιόν μου καὶ ἐλθεῖν ἐνταῦθα, ἐπεὶ ὀρισμῶ τοῦ μεγάλου αὐθεντός οὐδὲν ἐποίησα τοῦτο· καὶ εὕρισκομένου εἰς τὸ ὀσιπίτιόν μου, εἶχον πολλὰ σκεπάσματα, νῦν δὲ πλέον σκέπασμά τι οὐκ ἔχω.” φιλοφρονηθεὶς δὲ φιλοτίμως παρ’ ἐκείνου . . . ἐπανέστρεψα κἀκεῖθεν ἄπρακτος.
- 20 *DGM* 1: 212; Kampouroglous, *Οἱ Χαλκοκονδύλαι*, p. 90.
- 21 *Minus*, 22.4: καὶ ἐπεὶ προλαβόντες οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐρύπῳ ἐσήκωσαν τὸ γεφυρίον, καὶ ἀκουσίως ἐμειναιμεν εἰς τὰς ἔξω τοῦ γεφυρίου πέτρας διεβίβασαμεν οὐδ’ τοιαύτην νύκταν ἀπὸ τε κρύου . . . ἀπὸ τε πείνας, ἀπὸ τε ξηρότητος τῶν πετρῶν, ἀπὸ τε φόβου καὶ κλεπτῶν τῶν ἀπὸ φωσάτου τοῦ Τουραχάνη . . . ὅτι παροιμία ἐγένετο ἐπὶ κακῷ τοῖς μετ’ ἐμοῦ τότε οὖσιν εἰς τὸν μετέπειτα χρόνον.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 22.5: τῇ κγ^ῃ τοῦ Σεπτεμβρίου μηνὸς τοῦ μδ^{ου} ἔτους εἰς τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν ἐφθάσαμεν. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 14, states (I know not on what grounds

- or evidence) that “in August 1435 the Emperor summoned him [Constantine] to Constantinople.” Constantine’s departure is also noted in a short chronicle, *CBB* 1: 42.8 (p. 322): ἔτους ςζμγ’ ἐπῆγεν ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος στή Πόλι.
- 23 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.51 (pp. 68, 69): ὁ μὲν δὴ [*sc.* Γεώργιος] Χαλκοκανδύλης ἀφικόμενος παρὰ βασιλέα ἐς φυλακὴν μέντοι περὶ αὐτὸν ἐγένετο, ὑπὸ βασιλέως κελευόμενος παραδοῦναι τὴν χώραν. ὡς δὲ ὑποσχόμενος ἐς τρεῖς μυριάδας χρυσίου οὐδὲν τι ἔπρασσε, στρατὸν δὲ ἐπύθετο πεπομφέναι τὸν βασιλέα ἐπὶ Βοιωτῖαν ὡς τῶν Θηβῶν πόλιν παρασησόμενον. διεπράξατό τε καὶ ἀπέδρα ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον, καταλιπὼν τοὺς τε θεράποντας καὶ σκηνὰς ἅμα καὶ ὑποζύγια . . . καὶ . . . νῆες . . . τῶν τυράννων τῆς Ἀττικῆς συλλαμβάνουσι τε τὸ πλοῖον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐλόντες Χαλκοκανδύλην ἀνήγαγον παρὰ βασιλέα δέσμιον. βασιλεὺς μὲν αὐτῶ . . . συνέγνω, μηδὲν ἐπὶ τοῦτο αἰτιασάμενος.
- 24 Venice’s decision to maintain its distance is illustrated in a surviving summary of a lost document: *Rubrica-Senato, Delib. 1431–1482*, c. 78, published in C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεῖα Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας: Documents relatifs à l’histoire de la Grece au Moyen Âge*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1880; repr.: Athens, 1972), no. 131 (p. 199): *Quid scriptum fuit regimini Nigropontis super locis Athenarum et castris que tenebat quondam dominus Antonius de Azaiolis, videlicet quod si Turci aut heredes dicti quondam domini Antonii ipsa intromittant, non se impediunt, sed alii illa acciperent, ipsi potius ea possendo habere accipiant, et quid de villanis in utroque casu confugientibus Nigropontem faciendum*. This summary is supplemented by a note: *Dicta pars in folio non est registrata, et forte perdetur, ut multe alie que scribere non potui, perche el me tien de dirlo*. Cf. *PaL* 2: 51, n. 34. A Venetian document dated September 5, 1435, makes it clear that the widow of Antonio married Nerio II; see Sathas, *Μνημεῖα* 3 (Paris, 1892; repr.: Athens, 1972), no. 1020 (p. 427): *Scriptisistis nobis, quod post mortem Magnifici domini Antonii de Azaiolis ejus uxor introivit Castrum, et eius nepos civitatem Athenarum et denique ex matrimonio secuto in pace et concordia remanserunt*. See *RdD* 3: 2396.
- 25 *Minus*, 22.7: ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν καὶ ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Θεόδωρος, ἵνα ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὴν Πόλιν εὐρίσκειται καὶ διάδοχος, ὡς δεῦτερος ἀδελφός, τῆς βασιλείας. ὁ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔστρηγε μὲν ἄκουσιως, ἐπεὶ τὸν κύρ Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν αὐθέντην μου, – πολλὰκις με ἐπιπροφώρησε καὶ ἐνόρκως ὡς ἐν μυστηρίῳ, – ἠγάπα.
- 26 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, pp. 74, 75; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 14.
- 27 It was not only his wish to take monastic vows that demonstrated Theodoros’ Orthodox bias. He seems to have encouraged his wife, Cleopa Malatesta, to convert to Orthodoxy, even though assurances had been given to the pope, at the time of the marriage negotiations, that her Catholicism would be respected. On her conversion and her adoption of “Hellenic” ways, cf. G. Hoffman, “Kirchengeschichtliches zur Ehe des Herrschers Theodor II Palaiologos (1407–1443),” *Ostkirchliche Studien* 4 (1955): 129–137; Vacapoulos, *Origins*, p. 132; and *DGM* 1: 188–191, 299–302. Theodoros also brought up his daughter, destined to become the queen of Cyprus, as Orthodox; see Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 75.
- 28 *Minus*, 22.8: ὁ γοῦν αὐθέντης μου πάλιν ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ κύρ Θωμᾶ τοῦ δεσπότη – ἦν γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν μεθ’ ἡμῶν ὁ πρῶτος ἄρχων τοῦ ὀσπιτίου ἐκείνου Ραοῦλ Μιχαῖλ ὁ Ἰσης, – ἐσπούδαζον, ἵνα οἱ δύο μὲν σὺν τῷ βασιλεῖ εὐρίσκωνται εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὗτοι δὲ οἱ δύο αὐθένται εἰς τὸν Μορέαν.
- 29 *Minus*, 22.9, which also implies that Constantine left *incognito* for the Morea: καὶ τὸν Ἰούνιον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους διέβη ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως εἰς τὸν Μορέαν ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος ὡς φυγὰς μετὰ γαλιώτου καὶ ἐγὼ ἐστάλην παρ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν ἀμυρᾶν διὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν δουλείαν, ἵνα αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν ἔχωσι. καὶ ἀπῆλθον καὶ καλῶς ὠκονόμησα τὰ ἀνατεθειμένα καὶ διὰ τῆς στερεᾶς εἰς τὸν Μορέαν ἔφθασα.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 22.10: εὔρον τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ αὐθέντας ἔχοντας ὄλησιν μάχης μεγάλης. καὶ γὰρ ὄπισθεν τοῦ κυροῦ Κωνσταντῖνου καὶ αὐθεντός μου σταλεῖς μετὰ κατέργου καὶ ὁ κύρ Θεόδωρος ἐμάχετο τοῖς δυσὶν ἀδελφοῖς αὐτοῦ, ὡς καὶ φωσάτων συναχθέντων ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ πολέμου μερικῶν μέσον αὐτῶν γεγονότος.

- 31 *Ibid.*, 22.11: ἴνα ὁ μὲν αὐθέντης μου δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος ἀπέλθῃ καὶ ἔνι εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ κύρ Θεόδωρος καὶ κύρ Θωμᾶς οἱ δεσπότες εἰς τὸν Μορέαν. *DGM* 1: 213: “Jean VIII envoya, vers la fin de 1436 ou le commencement de 1437, le moine Denys, autrefois métropolit des Sardes, et Georges Disypatos, diplomate bien connu, qui réussirent à apaiser le conflit engagé entre les deux frères. Plus tard, le moine Grégoire Mamas Mélissène, futur patriarche de Constantinople comme Grégoire III (1443–1450), et ce même Disypatos arrivèrent à régler le différend. Suivant l’accord conclu alors entre les trois frères, Constantin devait se rendre à la capitale tandis que Théodore et Thomas restaient en Morée comme despotes.”
- 32 Mompherratos, *Oi Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, p. 67, states that the emperor was so appalled at this turn of events that he directed an urgent embassy to the Morea: ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ κατεπαράχθη καὶ ἀπέστειλεν . . . πρέσβεις τὸν μοναχὸν Διονύσιον, χρηματίσαντα καὶ μητροπολίτην Σάρδεων καὶ τὸν Δισύπατον Γεώργιον, οἵτινες ἐλθόντες κατεπράυναν μικρὸν τι τὴν διαμάχην. Κατόπιν δὲ ἦλθον καὶ ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἧτοι ὁ Γρηγόριος Μελισσηνὸς ἱερομόναχος καὶ πνευματικός, ὅστις καὶ Στρατηγόπουλος ἐκαλεῖτο. Οἱ δύο πρέσβεις μετὰ τοῦ Γρηγορίου καὶ τοῦ Φραντζῆ κατώρθωσαν νὰ συμβιβάσωσι καὶ συμφωνήσωσι τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς Παλαιολόγους. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 75, makes no mention of the embassies: “It was decided that Constantine should act as his regent in Constantinople in his absence, and in the meantime Theodore would administer Constantine’s lands in the Peloponnese.”
- 33 *Minus*, 22.12: καὶ τῇ κδ^η αὐτοῦ μηνὸς Σεπτεμβρίου ἀπεσώθημεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν. *Ibid.*, 23.1: καὶ τῇ κζ^η Νοεμβρίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους διέβη ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης.
- 34 Syrooulos, 34.12: περὶ δὲ τὰ τέλη τοῦ σεπτεμβρίου μηνὸς . . . μετὰ δὲ τῶν κατέργων τούτων ἦλθε καὶ ὁ πανευχέστατος τῷ τότε δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐπὶ τῷ ὧς ἐπίτροπος εὐρίσκεσθαι ἐν τῇ Πόλει, ἀποδημοῦντος τοῦ βασιλέως (οὗτω γὰρ αὐτὸς διωρίσατο) . . . εἰ δὲ τινες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀπαισίων οἰωνῶν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων μαντεύονται, ἐξῆν ἂν αὐτοῖς καὶ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου στοχάζεσθαι ἅμα γὰρ τῷ σῆναι τὰς τριηρεῖς ἐν τῷ λιμένι . . . εὐθὺς σεισμός ἐγένετο μέγας, καὶ θεομηνίαν οἱ συνετώτεροι τοῦτο γήγισαντο. On Syrooulos, see *PLP* 11: no. 27217 (pp. 146, 147).
- 35 Syrooulos, Recension B, 15: μετὰ δὲ τῶν κατέργων τούτων ἦλθεν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος ὡς ἂν προσμείνῃ ἐν τῇ Πόλει ὡς αὐθέντης δι’ ἀσφάλειαν πλείονα. For the official documents concerning Constantine’s appointment, see *RKOR*: 3474 (p. 124).
- 36 Syrooulos, 3.30: ἐδώκαμεν γὰρ τῷ ἀδελφῷ μου τῷ δεσπότη [sc. Δημητρίῳ] τὰς δισχιλίας [sc. τῶν φλωρίων], καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τις εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐδώκαμεν αὐτῷ πολλά, ἧ ὅτι περισσόν ἐστι τὸ ἐλθεῖν καὶ αὐτὸν μεθ’ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα εἰσι πρὸς οικονομίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντες οἶδασιν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἐλθεῖν καὶ αὐτὸν μεθ’ ἡμῶν.
- 37 Recension B, 1–3 (608) (with its numerous eccentricities in spelling and accentuation): ὁ δὲ Θόμας ἐπίμεινε φύλαξ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ὁ δε Κωνσταντῖνος ἔμεινε φηλαξ τῆς Πόλης τον δε κυρ Δημίτριον τον ἔταξεν ὁ βασιλεὺς κυρ Ἰωάννης ὁ ἀδελφός του ἧς Ἠταλῆαν δια το μη πηνη σκάνδαλα ἐν τῇ Πόλει καὶ δια αἰτέρας ἀφορμάς [= in proper orthography: ὁ δὲ Θωμᾶς ἐπέμεινε φύλαξ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ὁ δὲ Κωνσταντῖνος ἔμεινε φύλαξ τῆς Πόλης τὸν δὲ κύρ Δημήτριον τὸν ἔταξεν ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης ὁ ἀδελφός του εἰς Ἰταλίαν διὰ τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν σκάνδαλα ἐν τῇ Πόλει καὶ ἐτέρας ἀφορμάς].
- 38 Syrooulos, 12.17: δεσπότης κύρ Δημητρίου . . . καὶ ἡ διενέξις, ἣν εἶχε μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, δι’ ἣν καὶ μάχη ἐμελεῖτο.
- 39 *CBB* 1: 22.43 (p. 187): ὁ γοῦν Ἰωάννης ὁ βασιλεὺς ἰδὼν τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς Πόλεως ἐπορεύθη ἐν τῇ Φραγγίᾳ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ πάπα Εὐγενίου, καὶ γέγονε σύνοδος ἡ ἧ’. ἔλιπε δὲ χρόνους β’ ἡμισυ, ἔχων μετ’ αὐτοῦ τὸν Δημήτριον ὡς ἐπίβουλον τῆς Πόλεως. Cf. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 15.
- 40 Syrooulos, 3.12: μετὰ δὲ τῶν κατέργων τούτων ἦλθεν καὶ ὁ . . . κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος . . . καὶ οἱ τζαγράτορες ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης. Recension B, 608: ἔφερον δὲ καὶ τοὺς τζαγράτορας ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης διὰ φυλακὴν τῆς Πόλεως κατὰ τὴν ἐν δεκρέτῳ συμφωνίαν.

- 41 Syropoulos, 4.18: διοικεῖν τὰ τῆς Πόλεως. On Demetrios Kantakouzenos, see Ganchou, “Le mésazon Démétrius Paléologue Cantacuzène,” pp. 245–272; he was one of the old friends and associates of John VIII and a colleague of Loukas Notaras. On Demetrios’ career, see D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460* [DOS 11] (Washington, DC, 1968), no. 75 (pp. 192–195).
- 42 That John VIII was surrounded by westerners becomes evident in the narrative of Tafur, p. 149 [English translation in Letts, p. 123]: *Allí fallé muchos castellanos de otras nación de los latinos á suleto del Emperador*. He also states that John listened to western secular music with pleasure; Tafur, p. 139 [English translation in Letts, p. 117], informs us that one of the emperor’s interpreters was Juan of Seville, a Castilian by birth, who was selected for this post precisely because the emperor enjoyed listening to Castilian romances, which Juan sang to the accompaniment of the lute: *é embiá por un trujaman del Emperador; que llamavan Juan de Sevilla, castellano por nación; é dizen quel Emperador; allende de ser Trujaman, porque le cantava romances castellanos en un laud*. In his audience with the emperor, Tafur suggested in vague terms that he was remotely related to the imperial house of Constantinople and the emperor directed someone to investigate this matter. The emperor’s agents went to great lengths to legitimize the vague claims of Tafur, as John could use all the good will of westerners on the eve of his departure to Italy. He would have welcomed Tafur in his retinue, p. 151 [English translation in Letts, p. 125]: *É despues de quinze dias pasados de mi llegada, el Emperador ovo de partir, par se acordar con el Papa, en las galeas de veneçianos, é fuí mucho mandado é asaz rogado por él que feziera, salvo que me escusé diziendo, que me era forçado de ver primero toda la Greçia é la Turquía é áun Tartaria*. The emperor closely questioned Tafur on his news about the west and especially about the war that the king of Spain was waging against the Moors (pp. 117, 118).
- 43 Tafur, p. 151 [English translation in Letts, p. 125]: *é quando vido que non podía más conmigo, encomendóme á la Emperatriz zu muger é á Dragas, su hermano, á quien él dexó por heredero en el imperio, -éste fué el que los turcos mataron agora, -é él pretióse con grant estado*.
- 44 Tafur, pp. 153, 154: *é él partióse con grant estado; é levava consigo dos hermanos suyos é ochoçientos onbres, todos los más fijosdalgo; é el dia que partió de Constantinopla, se fizo una grant fiesta é salieron con él todos religiosos con la proçesion fasta lo embarcar; é muchos le acompañaron una jornada de allí por la mar; é yo fuí con él*. Tafur’s details are matched by Syropoulos, 4.1, who also uses the same occasion to describe that yet another sign of divine wrath: συνήλθομεν . . . ἐν τῷ δηλωθέντι αἰγιαλῷ καὶ πλήθος λαοῦ συνήλθεν ἐκεῖσε . . . τῇ δὲ ἐφεξῆς πάλιν προσωρμίσθησαν τὰ κάτεργα εἰς τὸν Κωννηγόν, καὶ περὶ τετάρτην ὥραν εἰσήλθε καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰς τὸ ἴδιον κάτεργον, καὶ εὐθὺς πάλιν σεισμὸς μέγας ἐγένετο, σύμβολον δευτέρας θεομηνίας. μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον φιλοτιμῶς παραπλευσασαί αἱ τριήρεις ἤλθον μετὰ κρότων καὶ σαλπύγγων.
- 45 Agallianos, Speech 1, p. 95 (ll. 153–158): ἐγγόνει τοῦ μὴ ἀσπλευσαι κάμῃ ἐς Ἰταλίαν . . . ἐμὲ εἶχεν ἡ κλίνη, οἶον νεκρὸν ἄταφον, ἥδη μῆνας τρεῖς ὀλίγου τινὸς δέοντος, οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάσθησαν ἐν ἅπασιν, ἐπέβησάν τε τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἀνήγοντο ἥδη. ἐπὶ τούτῳ θροῦς τε ἤρθη πολὺς ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ οἱ κώδωνες ἤχουν τῶν τε μονῶν καὶ ναῶν, προπεμπόντων αὐτοὺς σὺν βοῇ μᾶλλον λύπης ἢ χαρᾶς. On this fascinating personality, whose career in the Church extended into the early period of the Turkish occupation of Constantinople, see *PLP* 1: no. 94 (p. 8); and M. Angold, “Theodore Agallianos: The Last Byzantine Autobiography,” in E. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds., *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Kωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια από την Άλωση* (Granada, 2006), pp. 35–44.
- 46 *CBB* 1: 22.43 (p. 187), 29.10 (p. 215), 34.9 (p. 267), 55.10 (p. 399), 60.15 (p. 452), 62.9 (p. 462), 72.7 (p. 555), 102.3 (p. 656), 105.1 (p. 64).
- 47 Syropoulos 4.1, 2; see Doukas, 31.1; and *Mimus*, 23.1.
- 48 A. Bravo García, “La Constantinopla que vieron R. González de Clavijo y P. Tafur,” *Erytheia* 3 (1983): 39–47.

- 49 Cf. S. D. Byzantios, *Ἡ Κωνσταντινούπολις, ἡ Περιγραφή Τοπογραφικῆ Ἀρχαιολογικῆ καὶ Ἱστορικῆ τῆς Περιωνύμου Ταύτης Μεγαλοπόλεως*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1851), pp. 106 ff.; A. G. Paspates, *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται: Τοπογραφικὰ καὶ Ἱστορικὰ* (Constantinople, 1877; repr.: Athens, 1986), pp. 2–83; A. Mordtmann, *Esquisse Topographique de Constantinople* (Lille, 1892), pp. 11 ff.; and A. Van Millingen, *Byzantine Constantinople: The Walls of the City and Adjoining Historical Sites* (London, 1899), pp. 40 ff. For the western walls and the repairs that were carried out by John VIII, see *SFC*, ch. 5; and M. Philippides, “Venice, Genoa, and John VIII Palaeologus’ Renovation of the Fortifications of Constantinople,” *GRBS* 56 (2016): 377–397.
- 50 The historical significance embedded in this anonymous *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὸν Αὐτοκράτορα [Ἰωάννην τὸν Παλαιολόγον]* (*PkP* 3: 292–308) was noted by I. K. Bogiatzides, who supervised the publication of *PkP*, vols. 3 and 4, after the death of S. P. Lampros; see *PkP* 3: pp. δ’-ι’ of the introduction. The passage quoted: *PkP* 3: 296. In addition, the panegyric of Isidore (whose true authorship was not known to Lampros), in *PkP* 3: 132–199, also provides a description of the moat, p. 136: τάφος ὀρώρκεται πρὸ τούτου, ὡς μὲν εὐρεῖα, ὡς δὲ βαθεῖα, ὡς δὲ μήκιστος καὶ διὰ πάσης ὑποτρέχουσα τῆς ἡπειρωτικῆς ἐκείνης πευρῶς, τῶν χειλέων αὐτῆς ἀμφοῖν λίθοις μεγάλοις λογάδην τιτάνω προσερηρισμένοι, συνηρμοσμένοι καὶ συνδεδεμένοι ισχυρῶς, ταῖν θάλατταιν ἀμφοῖν προσαποδίδωσι.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 296: ἐνταῦθα γὰρ αἱ διώρυχες περὶ τὸ τεῖχος καὶ οἱ τάφοι πάλα μὲν εἰς βάθος ὠρύγησαν παρὰ τῶν τηρικαῦτα κρατούντων . . . χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος ἐν ὧραις χειμεριναῖς τῇ τῶν ὑδάτων ἐπιρροῇ κατὰ μικρὸν τὴν ὕλην ἐπισπωμένων ἐπληρώθησαν ταύτης ἄχρι τῶν ἄνω.
- 52 *Ibid.*: ἦν ἔργον δεόμενον χειρὸς Ξέρξου τοῦ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέως, ὃν φασὶ κατὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρῶν ἐκστρατεύσαντα κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλατταιν ἀριθμοῦ κρείττον ἐπαγόμενον στρατόπεδον, ἐλθεῖν <λέγεται> ἐν τῷ Ἄθω ναυσὶν ἀπείροισ καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον περαιωθῆναι τούτου ἐν τῷ τραχίλῳ διὰ τῆς ἡπείρου, αὐθὺς <δ’> ἀνακυκεῦσαι ἑκατὸν δῆπου σημείους πρὸς ἔω, κατολιγοροῦντα, διώρυχα τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ὡς ἐν πελάγει τὴν ἡπειρον <λέγεται> διελθεῖν.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 297: ἔνθεν τοι καὶ μεταξὺ δύο μηνῶν τὸ ἔργον συνεπεραίνετο, καὶ ἦν θαῦμα τοῖς ὀρώσι μόνον οὐκ ἀπιστούμενον, ὅπερ ἂν ἄλλος διεπράξατο ἐν ἔτεσι πλείστοις ἄναξ ἐν τοσοῦτῳ καιρῷ ἧπού τις παῖζων δεινῶς ἐξέτελεσεν.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 297: πύργος ἦν ἀτελής πρὸς τῇ λεγομένῃ Βασιλικῇ πύλῃ, ἐκ προγόνων μὲν ἀρχόμενος ἀνοικοδομεῖσθαι . . . διαβαίνων ἐγγύς που περὶ τὸ τεῖχος τοῦ ἄστεως καὶ θεασάμενος ἐπυθάνετο τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν εἰ δεῖ πέρασ λαβεῖν τὴν οικοδομὴν. καὶ τούτων, ὡσπερ εἰκός, κατανευσάντων, εὐθὺς ἐκέλευσεν ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, καὶ τοὺς προσθησαμένους τοῦ ἔργου διαταξάμενος καὶ παραινέσεις ὅπως ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι, ἀπηλλάγη. καὶ νῦν ἔστηκε παντόθεν σχεδὸν καθορώμενος.
- 55 *Ibid.*: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἑτέρους δύο ἐν χώρῳ λεγομένῳ τοῦ Βλάγκα ἐκ βάθρων ἀνήγειρε, μεγέθει μεγίστους καὶ κάλλει διαπρεπεῖς καὶ μηδαμῶς ὄντας δευτέρους τῶν μάλιστα διαφερόντων καὶ περιεστώσι κύκλῳ τοῦ ἄστεως οἰοεῖ τινα κόσμον παρέχουσι τῇ βασιλίδι τῶν πόλεως. ὁ μὲν ἔλαχε τὴν θέσιν πρὸς βορρᾶν ἴστασθαι, ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸν ἀέρα διαιρούμενος καὶ κατατέμων, οἱ δὲ πρὸς μεσημβριαν, οὐ πολὺ διεσθηκότες ἀλλήλων.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 298.
- 57 *MCT*, p. 83, estimates a population of only 45,00–50,000 inhabitants in 1453; A. M. Schneider, “Die Bevölkerung Konstantinopels im XV. Jahrhundert,” *Nachrichten d. Akad. Wiss. in Göttingen, Philos.-Hist. Kl.* 9 (1949): 233–244; E. Francès, “Constantinople byzantine aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles. Population, Commerce, Métiers,” *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* 7 (1969): 405–412; and D. Jacoby, “La population de Constantinople à l’époque byzantine: un problème de démographie urbaine,” *Byz* 31 (1961): 81–109. After the conquest, Sultan Mehmed II Fatih had to face, without being able to solve, the scarcity of inhabitants; see S. Gerasimou, “Ἡ Επανοίκηση τῆς Κωνσταντινούπολης μετὰ τὴν Ἄλωση,” in T. Kiousopoulou, ed., *1453: Ἡ Ἄλωση τῆς Κωνσταντινούπολης καὶ ἡ Μετάβαση ἀπὸ τῶν Μεσαιωνικῶν στοὺς Νεώτερους Χρόνους* (Herakleion, 2007), pp. 3–23.

- 58 *Minus*, 23.2: καὶ τῇ κζ^η Νοεμβρίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους διέβη ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης μετὰ τοῦ πατριάρχου καὶ τοῦ δεσπότη κυροῦ Δημητρίου καὶ πολλῶν ἀρχόντων τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν μητροπολιτῶν καὶ ἐπισκόπων διὰ τὴν μελετηθεῖσαν, ὡς μὴ ὠφέλε, σύνοδον.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 22.4: καὶ αὕτη ἡ τῆς συνόδου δουλεία αἰτία μία καὶ πρώτη καὶ μεγάλη εἰς τὸ νὰ γένηται ἢ κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως τὸν ἀσεβῶν ἐφοδός καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτην πάλιν ἡ πολιορκία καὶ ἡ αἰχμαλωσία καὶ τοσαύτη συμφορὰ ἡμῶν.
- 60 *CF*, p. 88. Sphrantzes, in a celebrated flashback to the reign of Manuel II, *Minus*, 23.6, relates the advice that Manuel gave to his son: λοιπὸν τὸ περὶ συνόδου, μελέτα μὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνακάτωε, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅταν ἔχῃς χρεῖαν τινα φοβῆσαι τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς τὸ δὲ νὰ ποιῆσῃ αὐτήν, μηδὲν ἐπιχειρησθῆς αὐτό, διότι οὐδὲν βλέπω τοὺς ἡμετέρους, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀρμόδιοι πρὸς τὸ εὐρὲν τρόπον ἐνώσεως καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας, ἀλλ' ὅτι νὰ τοὺς ἐπιστρέψουν εἰς τὸ νὰ ἔσμεν ὡς ἀρχῆθεν. τούτου δὲ ἀδύνατον ὄντος σχεδόν, φοβοῦμαι μὴ καὶ χεῖρον σχίσμα γένηται καὶ ἰδοὺ ἀπεσκεπάσθημεν εἰς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς. Cf. G. Walter, *La Ruine de Byzance, 1204–1453* (Paris, 1958), p. 311; *MP*, pp. 329–331; *PaL* 2: 58; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 16, 17.
- 61 *Minus*, 23.8: ὡς ἐστάθη, ἵνα ἀπέλθῃ εἰς τὴν σύνοδον, ἐστάλη εἰς τὸν ἀμηνᾶν ἀποκριτάρης Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ἰαγρος, δηλώσαι τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκείνους ὡς τάχα φίλον καὶ ἀδελφόν. κακεῖνος ἀπελογίστατο ὅτι “οὐδὲν μοι φαίνεται καλὸν νὰ υπάγῃ καὶ νὰ κοπιᾷσῃ τοσοῦτον καὶ νὰ ἐξοδιάσῃ καὶ τί νὰ κερδίσῃ; ἰδοὺ ἐγώ, καὶ ἐὰν ἔχῃ χρεῖαν καὶ ἄσπρον δι' ἔξοδον καὶ εἰσόδημα καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς θεραπείαν αὐτοῦ, ἔτοιμός εἰμι νὰ τὸν θεραπεύσω.”
- 62 Syropoulos, 3.21: οὐ μόνον γὰρ αἱ τῶν πολλῶν χριστιανῶν καὶ τῶν φίλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐχθρῶν συμβουλαὶ συνεφόνουν. τοῦ γὰρ Ἀσάν κύρ Παύλου πρέσβευς σταλέντος τότε πρὸς τὸν Ἀμηνᾶν, εἶπον αὐτῷ οἱ βεζήριδες τί ἐνὶ τὸ κατεπεῖνον τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἀπέρχεται πρὸς τοὺς Λατίνους; εἰ ἔχει τινὰ ἀνάγκην, εἰπάτω ταύτην, καὶ ὁ αὐθέντης θεραπεύσει ταύτην κρεῖττονα θεραπείαν εὐρήσει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐθέντου παρά ἀπὸ τῶν Λατίνων, καὶ πλέον συμφέρει τῷ βασιλεῖ ἢ φιλία τοῦ Ἀμηνᾶ ἢ ἐρ ἢ τῶν Λατίνων. παραιτησάσθω οὖν τὴν πρὸς Λατίνους ἀποδημίαν καὶ εὐρήσει ὅπερ ἂν ζητήσῃ παρὰ τοῦ αὐθέντου. ἀλλὰ προέβαιναν ὁ ἀπέκειτο, καὶ πάντων αἱ συμβουλαὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἐλογίζοντο.
- 63 *Minus*, 23.8: καὶ ἐγένετο πολὺς λόγος καὶ βουλή, πότερον νὰ γένηται τὸ τοῦ ἀμηνᾶ, ἢ νὰ ἀπέλθωσι εἰς τὴν σύνοδον. καὶ ἐγένετο ὅπερ ἠθέλεν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ κακὴ τύχη.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 23.9: ἐξεληθόντος οὖν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἀπερχομένου, ἐβουλεύσατο ὁ ἀμηνᾶς, ὅτι νὰ ποιῆσῃ μάχην τὴν Πόλιν καὶ νὰ πέμψῃ φωσάτον κατ' αὐτῆς οὐ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι νὰ ἐπάρῃ αὐτήν, ὅσον ἵνα ποιῆσῃ τὸν βασιλέα νὰ ἐπιστρέψῃ.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 23.11: πρὸ δὲ τοῦ Χαλιλῆ πασία τὴν βουλήν δόντος τοῦ καιροῦ μαθεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλλων, ὁ αὐθέντης μου ὁ δεσπότης καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐξώρθωσαν τὸν Παλαιολόγον Θωμᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ἀπέστειλαν, καὶ λογισμὸς πάλιν καὶ τρικυμία τοῖς ἐν τῇ Πόλει περιέπεσεν ὅτι πλείστη, ἕως οὗ πάλιν ἐμάθομεν τὴν ἰσχύσαν βουλήν τοῦ Χαλιλῆ.
- 66 Tafur, p. 170: *É yo embié demandar licencia al dispote Dragas con un onbre mio para entrar en la cibdat . . . é luégo me mandó embiar una barca bien aderesçada, é vinieron pro mí . . . el qual me rescibió mucho bien.* Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, does not note Tafur's visit.
- 67 Tafur, pp. 170–172 [English translation in Letts, 138, 139]: *Otro dia siguiente fuí al señor Dispote é pedile por merçet que me mandase mostrar á Santa Sufia é las santas reliquias . . . É ansí fuemos á la yglesia é oymos missa, é despues fizieron mostrar toda la yglesia, la qual es tan grande, que dizen que, quando Constantinopla prosperava, avie en ella seys mil clérigos.*
- 68 Tafur, p. 172 [English translation in Letts, p. 140]: *É allí los señores, que dixen, mandaron á los clérigos que sacasen allí las santas reliquias; é el Dispote tiene la una llave, é el Patriarcha de Constantinopla, que aí estava, tieno la otra, é la tercera el Prior de la yglesia.*
- 69 S. P. Lampros, “Ἀνέκδοτος Περιγραφή Κωνσταντινουπόλεως,” *NH* 3 (1906): 250: καὶ ἠσπασάμεθα τὸν ἦλον ᾧ ἐσταυρώθη ὁ δεσπότης ἡμῶν Χριστὸς καὶ τὸν ἀκάνθινον στέφανον ἔτι θάλλοντα καὶ ἀνθοῦντα καὶ τὴν κόκκινην γλαμύδα ἣ ἐνέδεδυτο καὶ τὸ

λεντίον ᾧ ἦν ἔξωσμένος ὅτε τοὺς πόδας τῶν μαθητῶν ἐνίστατο καὶ τὰ σανδάλια τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ γράμματα ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὁ Κύριος ἔγραψε εἰς τὴν ζώνην τῆς ἁγίας Μαρίας καὶ τὸν χιτῶνα καὶ βραχιῶνα ἀκέραιον τοῦ ἁγίου Γεωργίου καὶ σσεαρκομένον καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα. In this connection with this list, see Tafur, pp. 172, 173 [English translation in Letts, p. 140]: *é vestidos los clérigos, con proçesion truxeron las reliquias, que fué: primeramente, la lança que entró en el costado de Nuestro Señor; maravil-losa reliquia; é la saya sin costura de Nuestro Señor, la qual paresçia que deviera ser morada épor longueça de tiempo estava como pardilla; e un clavo de Nuestro Señor é çiertas espinas de la corona; é muchas otras cosas ansí del madero de la Cruz como de la colupna en que fué açotado Nuestro Señor; é ansí cosas de Nuestra Señora la Virgen María; é las parrillas en que fué asado Sant Lorenço, é otras muchas reliquias que Santa Elena, quando fué á Ierusalem, las tomó é truxo allí, las quales están en gradissima reverençia é grant guarda. ¡Plega á Dios que ellas en esta destruyçion de los griegos non ayen venido en manos de los enemigos de la fé, porque ellas serían maltratadas é poco reverençiadadas!* An unpublished manuscript compiled by a westerner and dating from about 1453 provides the last list of relics in Constantinople; it begins as follows: *Incipit tractatus alius de locis Terre Sancte, per me, Franciscum Pipinum, Ordinis Praedicatorum, visitatis*. A short abstract in NE 4: no. II (p. 53). On Constantinople's role as a repository of relics, see P. Sherrard, *Constantinople: Iconography of a Sacred City* (London, 1965). Various other lists of relics located in Constantinople were compiled by Russian pilgrims; see G. P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* [DOS 19] (Washington, DC, 1984). In addition, see Sir John Mandeville, *Mandeville's Travels: Texts and Translations*, ed. M. Letts (London, 1953), 1: pp. 6–10, and 2: pp. 233–236.

70 Tafur, pp. 182, 183: *Un dia viniéronme á llamar de parte del patron castellano, que allí estava, que le avían muerto un onbre un griego dentro en la mar; por le robar la nao, é yo fuí allá é prendímoslo, é truxímoslo ante el Emperador, ansí mesmo al muerto, porque fiziese justiçia; é luégo el Emperador, puesto que los griegos quisieran que non lo fiziera, por grant vergüençaque ovo de mí, é aún porque yo dixhe que podría ser que nosotros la fiziésemos en personas que non lo merescien, luégo mandó venir los executores, é delante su palacio le mandó cortar las manos ó sacar los ojos.*

71 Cruelty was a fact of life in this age, whether in the east or in the west. See, e.g., the discussion about Mehmed II's tendencies in *MCT*, pp. 421–423, which points out that the sultan's excesses can be matched by similar atrocities by various potentates in Renaissance Italy.

72 Tafur, pp. 124, 125.

73 Tafur, p. 184: *En este tiempo el Turco avie de passar á un lugar del mar Mayor, é fizo su camino por çerca de Constantinopla, é el Dispote é los de Pera pensaron que querían ocupar la tierra, é anderescaronse é pusiéronse en armas; é el Grant Turco pasó por çerca del muro, é aún aquel dia ovo escaramuças . . . le sacaron un grant presente de Constantinopla, é levárongelo á do fué asentar aquel dia. É por esta venida suya yo me avie detenido, pensando qué quierá asentar sobre Constantinopla, é non se detuvo allí é fizo su camino contra el mar Mayor á una tierra que se le avia rebelado; é bien que yo quisiera, aunque teníamoss pocas gentes, que nos provara á fazer alguna fuerça, más buena cosa fué sin peligro é trabajo verle pasar con tan grant exército.*

74 This side trip was intended to deliver a psychological blow, as the sultan's ultimate goal was Serbia; see *MCT*, pp. 116–118.

75 Syropoulos, 5.19: ἀγγελίαί ἐφοίτουσιν δειναί καὶ συχναί, ὅπως ὁ ἀμηρᾶς ἐτοιμάζεται κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως ἀφικέσθαι ἔγραφον γάρ εἰς τοὺς Βενετικούς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἴνου καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Μιτυλήνης καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Χίου καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Κρήτης καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Εὐρίπου καὶ πανταχόθεν, ὅτι ἐτοιμάζει ὁ ἀμηρᾶς κάτεργα ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα καὶ φασάτα χιλιάδας ἑκατὸν πενήκοντα καὶ ἐπέρχεται κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως οἱ δὲ Βενετικοὶ ἐστελλόν τὰ πιττάκια πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τὸν πατριάρχη. ὕστερον δὲ ἔφθασαν καὶ ἐκ τῆς Πόλεως γραφαὶ τὰ αὐτὰ διαλαμβάνουσαι καὶ ἀπαιτοῦσαι τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τὸν πατριάρχη ἐπιμεληθῆναι

- γενέσθαι ταχέως τὴν δυνατὴν βοήθειαν. ἀκούοντες ταῦτα οἱ ἡμέτεροι, ἔπασχον, ἀπελέγοντο τὴν ζωὴν, ἐθεοκλήτουν, ἐποτινῶντο, οἰμωγαῖς καὶ δάκρυσιν καθικέτευον.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 7.5: τίς οὖν ὠφέλεια γίνεται, ἀργούντων ἡμῶν ἐνταῦθα καὶ πασχόντων, πρὸς δὲ κινδυνευούσης τῆς Πόλεως, τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν; τίς οἶδεν εἰ βουλήσεται ὁ ἀμυρᾶς ὀρμησαὶ κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως κατὰ τὸ ἐρχόμενον ἔαρ;
- 77 Tafur, p. 220: *É hese dia en la tarde fui ver al emperador de Grecia é dile letras de su muger é de su hermano el Dispoite, el qual me resçibió muy alegremente . . . é fizome asentar allí baxo çerca de sí, perguntádo me por las nuevas de su tierra.*
- 78 Sygrououlos, 8.7: πρέσβεις ἐπεδήμησεν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα Καντακουζηνὸς ὁ Φακραστῆς μετὰ γραμμάτων τῶν τε δεσποινῶν καὶ τοῦ δεσπότη καὶ τῶν μεσαζόντων ἡ δὲ πρεσβεία ἦν, ὅπως ἔδοξε καλὸν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ λυσιτελέστατον πᾶσι τρόποις, ἵνα περὶ τὰ τέλη τοῦ ἔαρος εὐρεθῶσιν ἐν τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει τὰ κάτεργα τοῦ πάπα δύο τὸ ἔλαττον οὕτω γὰρ ἐπισχεθῆσεται ἡ κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως ὀρμὴ τοῦ ἀμυρᾶ. ἀνέφερον οὖν εἰς πλάτος ταῦτα τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ ἀπήτη ἐπιμέλειαν γενέσθαι ταχίστην πρὸς τοῦτο ἥδη ἦρξατο ἡ τοῦ ἔαρος ὥρα. On Phakrases, see Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, no. 74 (p. 192), and no. 11 (p. 237).
- 79 *CF*, p. 117.
- 80 The documents are listed in *NE* 3: 35, n. 3; *CF*, p. 117: “When, or indeed whether, the expedition ever set off, there is no indication.” In April 1439, dire news reached the delegation with an urgent request for two papal galleys to neutralize an expected attack by the Turks. John VIII made preparations to return to his capital aboard a papal galley but it seems that the pope concluded that he could send no further aid and his pronouncement put an end to this incident. See *CF*, pp. 239, 240.
- 81 *LCB*, p. 372.
- 82 The definitive work on this subject in English remains *CF*. In addition, see J. Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964); Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 1: 56–192; and S. Kolditz, *Johannes VIII. Palaiologos und das Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz (1438/39). Das byzantinische Kaisertum im Dialog mit dem Westen* [Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, Band 60], 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 2013–2014).
- 83 On the portrayal of Byzantine emperors, see S. P. Lampros, *Λεῶκωμα τῶν Βυζαντινῶν Αὐτοκρατόρων* (Athens, 1930); various depictions of John VIII are reproduced in plates 86, 87, 88, and 90: a fifteenth-century miniature from the *Cod. graec. 1188, f. 4*, of the National Library in Paris; the bronze bust in the Museo Borgiano; Pisanello’s medallion; an engraving in the Berlin *Kupferstichkabinet*; a woodcut by Hartmann Schedel from the *Liber Chronicarum Norimbergae* (1493); and the Gozzoli fresco. In general, cf. I. Spatharakis, *The Portrait in Byzantine Illuminated Manuscripts* (Leiden, 1976); and C. Head, *Imperial Byzantine Portraits: A Verbal and Graphic Gallery* (New Rochelle, 1982).
- 84 C. Marinesco, “Deux Empereurs byzantins en Occident: Manuel II et Jean Paléologue,” in *Comptes rendus de l’Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (January–March, 1957; Paris, 1958), pp. 23–34; *idem*, “Deux Empereurs byzantins, Manuel II et Jean VIII Paléologue, vus par des artistes occidentaux,” *Le Flambeau* 40 (November–December 1957): 758–762; and *MP*, Appendix 24, pp. 531–551.
- 85 Cf. the examples in Lampros, *Λεῶκωμα*, and in Head, *Imperial Byzantine Portraits*. Also cf. A. Grabar, *L’Empereur dans l’art byzantin* (Paris, 1936; repr.: 1971); and S. P. Lampros, “H ἐν Ρώμῃ Ἐκθεσις τῶν Εἰκόνων Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου,” *NH* 7 (1911): 399–434 [= S. P. Lampros, *Catalogue illustré de la collection de portraits des empereurs de Byzance* (Athens, 1911)]. On the Byzantine tendency to produce imaginary, generic portraits, cf. Lampros, *Λεῶκωμα*, p. 21.
- 86 This drawing of Pisanello (Antonio Pisano, ca. 1395–ca. 1455) is included in the Louvre manuscript *M. I. 1062*; cf. J. A. Fasanelli, “Some Notes on Pisanello and the Council of Florence,” *Master Drawings* 3 (1965): 36–47, fig. 2. In addition, cf. M. Fossi Todorow, *I disegni di Pisanello e della sua cerchia* (Florence, 1966), plates 68 and 69. For Pisanello’s verbal description of John’s appearance, see the comments, in the artist’s own hand,

- on an annotated sketch in the Louvre: *de la facia palida la barpa negra chapelj e cilgli el simile hochi grizzy e tra jn verde e chine le spale piccolo*. Also see Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, p. 53, and the bibliography cited in the next note. Discussion of these drawings in C. C. Bambach, *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1557)*, ed. H. C. Evans (New Haven and London, 2004), nos. 318A and 318B (pp. 527–532).
- 87 *Ms. Sinait. gr. 2123* is discussed in *extenso* in Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, pp. 51–54, in which a black-and-white photograph of the portrait of John VIII is included as fig. 20. Cf. G. Galavaris, *Ελληνική Τέχνη: Ζωγραφική Βυζαντινών Χειρογράφων* (Athens, 1995), pl. 237 (p. 206); and *idem*, “East and West in an Illustrated Manuscript at Sinai,” in *Ευφρόσυνον, Αφιέρωμα στον Μανόλη Χατζηδάκη*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1992), pp. 180–192. The portrait is pasted onto fol. 30^v of the *codex 2123*. Cf., in addition, V. Benešević, *Monumenta Sinaitia Archaeologica et Palaeographica* (St. Petersburg, 1925), pl. 3; S. P. Lampros, “Καὶ Ἄλλαι Εἰκόνες Ἰωάννου καὶ Κωνσταντίνου τῶν Παλαιολόγων,” *NH* 6 (1909): 403–405, was aware of the existence of this portrait but had been unable to examine it personally. M. Restle, “Ein Porträt Johannes VIII. Palaiologos auf dem Sinai,” *Festschrift Luitpold Dussler* (Munich, 1972); and R. S. Nelson, “The Italian Appreciation and Appropriation of Illuminated Byzantine Manuscripts, ca 1200–1450,” *DOP* 49 (1995) [= *Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries*]: 209–235, esp. 229: “The delicate brush strokes . . . [and] the subtle rendition of light and shadow bespeak a formal idiom entirely different from that of Byzantine miniatures.” In general, see L. Syson and D. Gordon, *Pisanello: Painter to the Renaissance Court* (London, 2001), pp. 29–34. In addition, the magnificent Louvre drawing of the emperor (also executed in the same manner as the Sinai picture, *all’antica*, but looking to the left) is discussed by Bambach, *Byzantium: Faith and Power*, nos. 319 and 319.1 (pp. 532, 533).
- 88 The word σκιᾶδιον was adopted from ancient Greek, when it meant “shade against sunlight,” i.e., the original meaning of our “umbrella.”
- 89 S. P. Lampros, “Εἰκόνες Ἰωάννου Η΄ τοῦ Παλαιολόγου καὶ Πατριάρχου Ἰωσήφ,” *NH* 4 (1907): 390, 391. Pisanello also noted, in his own eccentric spelling, his observations on John’s hat on the margin of his Louvre drawings of the emperor and his retinue: *Lo chapelo de linperadore sie biancho dessoure e roverso rosso el priflo da torno nero la zuppa verde de dalmascin e lagona de soura de chermезin*.
- 90 In addition to Lampros, “Εἰκόνες,” and “Καὶ Ἄλλαι Εἰκόνες,” see the illustrations that accompany the edition of Syropoulos’ text, edited by Father Laurent, figs., 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11. The hat of the emperor made an impression among the Italians. In the sixteenth century, Giorgio Vassari called it “weird” and assigned it to the “Greek style” (*ho ancora una bellissima medaglia di Giovanni Palaeologo, imperatore di Costantinopoli con quel bizzaro capello alla grecanica, che solevano portare gl’imperatori: e fu fatta da esso Pisano in Fiorenza*, as quoted by Bambach, *Byzantium*, p. 532, n. 1). By the time Vassari wrote, the hat’s Florentine origins had been forgotten; see *ibid.*, p. 532. As Professor Melville-Jones informs me, some scholars believe that it was Turkish, and this is the subject of an article by D. Alexander, “Pisanello’s Hat. The Costume and Weapons depicted in Pisanello’s Medal for John VIII Palaeologus,” *Gladius* 24 (2004): 135–186.
- 91 ἸΩΑΝΝΗΣ ΕΝ Χ<Ρ>ΙΣΤΩ Ω<Ι> ΤΩ Ω<Ι> Θ<Ε>Ω Ω<Ι> ΠΙΣΤΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ Ο ΠΑΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ.
- 92 Ἰωάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος. Cf. Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, pp. 51–53; and Galavaris, *Ελληνική Τέχνη*, pl. 237 (p. 206).
- 93 Head, *Imperial Byzantine Portraits*, p. 162. A traditional Byzantine portrayal of John VIII can be found in the fifteenth-century *codex Mutinensis A. S. 5.5* [= *gr. 122*], f. 294^v, housed in the Biblioteca Estense of Modena. This *codex* contains (in miniature) the (imaginary) portrait of every Roman and Byzantine emperor (from Augustus through Constantine XI). Different groups of emperors were painted at different times by different hands, decorating the margins of the text of John Zonaras. These examples are highly

- stereotyped. Yet the artist responsible for the Palaeologi has made valiant attempts at individual characterization, such as John VIII's hooked nose (*MP*, p. 531). See Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, pp. 172–183. P. 183: “There must have been any number of historical manuscripts which were illustrated in a similar way with the portraits of emperors. One such manuscript must have been used as a model for the artist of the *Mutinensis codex*. It is characteristic of the great losses among monuments of Byzantine art that we possess only one such *codex* of rather mediocre quality, and not a more magnificent example such as surely adorned the libraries of Byzantine nobility”.
- 94 Syson and Gordon, *Pisanello*, pp. 112–130.
- 95 *Supra*, nn. 91 and 92.
- 96 The equestrian image of John VIII praying before a cross seems to be derived from a traditional depiction of the vision of Saint Eustace in vogue at this time, especially with Pisanello. See Syson and Gordon, *Pisanello, Painter to the Renaissance Court*, ch. 3 and ch. 4. It is also possible that the beloved wife of John VIII, Maria of Trebizond, also inspired Pisanello to depict her as the princess in his fresco of Saint George and the dragon at Verona; cf. Syson and Gordon, *Pisanello*, 19–26, esp. 26 (with illustrations): “Given the geographical setting for the action, it is not surprising that scholars have suggested that the person of the princess stands for the danger in which Christian Greece and Asia Minor then stood. It may not be coincidental that her traditional title – the Princess of Trebizond – recalls that of the consort of the Byzantine emperor John VIII Palaeologus”; A. Bryer, “Pisanello and the Princess of Trebizonda,” *Apollo* (1961): 601–603; and I. Puppi, “La Principessa di Trebizonda,” in *idem, Verso Gerusalemme: Immagini e temi di urbanistica e di architettura simboliche* (Rome and Reggio, Calabria, 1982), pp. 44–61.
- 97 The first scholar to draw attention to (and illustrate) this medal was C. DuFresne DuCange, *Historia byzantina duplici commentario illustrata, pt. i: Familiae Augustae Byzantinae. Familiae Dalmaticae, Slavonicae, Turcicae* (Paris, 1680), p. 245. Detailed discussion with black-and-white photographs of Pisanello's medal in Lampros, “Καὶ Ἄλλαι Εἰκόνες,” pp. 392–396. Color photographs of high quality are found in Syson and Gordon, *Pisanello, Painter to the Renaissance Court* fig. 1.35, and in *Byzantium: Faith and Power*, no. 321. For a black-and-white photograph of the Pisanello medal, see Lampros, *Λεύκωμα*, pl. 88; for a color photograph of the medal currently housed in the Hôtel des Médailles in Paris, see *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους 9: Βυζαντινὸς Ἑλληνισμὸς: Μεσοβυζαντινοὶ καὶ Υπερβυζαντινοὶ Χρόνοι* (Athens, 1979), p. 206. Without doubt, the Pisanello medal was the principal work through which the west became familiar with the likeness of John VIII. See R. Weiss, *Pisanello's Medallion of Emperor John VIII Palaeologus* (London, 1966); Syson and Gordon, *Pisanello, Painter to the Renaissance Court*, p. 123: “Pisanello's medal of John VIII . . . has regularly been called the ‘first Renaissance medal’”; and Scher, *Byzantium: Faith and Power*, no. 321 (pp. 535, 536): “One cannot underestimate the influence exercised by this medal, not only on the proliferation of the form itself but also on other media.”
- 98 M. Lazzaroni and A. Muñoz, “Un buste en bronze d'Antonio Filarete représentant l'empereur Jean Paléologue,” *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* (June 1907): 300–339; and *idem*, *Filarete scultore e architetto del secolo XV* (Rome, 1908). S. P. Lampros disagreed with the attribution: “Ἡ Πρωτομὴ τοῦ Ἰωάννου Παλαιολόγου καὶ ἡ Ἀνακοίνωσις τοῦ κ. Muñoz,” *NH* 4 (1907): 409–416. The bust is illustrated in Lampros, *Λεύκωμα*, pl. 87, and, in *Byzantium: Faith and Power*, no. 321. Filarete is called “Avellino” in Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, p. 53. The bust may have served as the prototype for the depiction of John VIII on the bronze doors of the Saint Peter's Cathedral in the Vatican, fashioned by Filarete. See M. Georgopoulou, “Portrait Bust of John VIII Palaiologos,” in H. C. Evans, ed., *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1557)* (New Haven and London, 2004), no. 320 (p. 534).
- 99 Lampros, “Καὶ Ἄλλαι Εἰκόνες,” pp. 401–403, with plates 5.2 and 9; and Lampros, “Εἰκόνες Ἰωάννου Η΄,” pl. 87.

- 100 J. Schuyler, "Emperor John VIII Palaeologus: Donatello's First Portrait Bust of a Living Person?," *Source: Notes on the History of Art* 5 (1986): 27–32.
- 101 The photographs of A. Quattrone, *The Chapel of the Magi: Benozzo Gozzoli's Frescoes in the Palazzo Medici-Riccardi Florence*, ed. C. Aldini Luchinat (New York, 1994), provide us with the most detailed record of the chapel, even though the text is marred by the eccentric opinion (offered without any argumentation) that Gozzoli may not have had John VIII as the model for his *magus*.
- 102 See, e.g., the German woodcuts discussed and illustrated in Lampros, "Εἰκόνες Ἰωάννου Η΄," and *idem*, *Λεύκωμα*, pl. 88. Also interesting, although fictitious, are the portrayals of John VIII by George Klontzas. S. P. Lampros, "Ὁ Μαρκανὸς Κῶδιξ τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα," *NH* 12 (1915): 41–52, was one of the first scholars to draw attention to these portrayals by Klontzas, who produced a masterpiece at a time when the illustrated *codex* was going out of fashion. See the black-and-white photograph of Klontzas' miniature of John VIII in A. D. Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας (1540 ci.–1608) καὶ αἱ Μικρογραφίαι τοῦ Κώδικος Αὐτοῦ* (Athens, 1977), pl. 165 (with comments on p. 216); Klontzas portrayed John VIII in the company of Pope Eugenius IV, of the doge of Venice (Francesco Foscari), and of Philip the Good, the duke of Burgundy. To the growing body of modern scholarship on the portrayals of John VIII, cf. C. Walter, "A Problem Picture of the Emperor John VIII," *Byzantinische Forschungen* 10 (1985): 295–302; and M. Philippides, "Some Artistic Portrayals of the Last Imperial Family, 1400–1470," in *Twenty-First Annual Byzantine Studies Conference: Abstracts of Papers* (New York, 1995), p. 33.
- 103 See *PaL* 2: 64, n. 85: "This charming picture of John VIII is at variance with the rather harsh and prejudiced account we have of him in Syropoulos' *Memoirs*." *Editio princeps* in P. Ferrato, *Relazione di Giovanni de' Pigli da Peretola intorno a un viaggio dell'imperatore di Costantinopoli fatto nel 1439* (Bologna, 1867); it was published once more by S. P. Lampros, "Μία Ἡμέρα Ἰωάννου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου ἐν Περετόλῃ τῆς Τοσκάνης," *ΔΙΕΕ* 6 (1901): 351–357 (with Greek translation and commentary), and reprinted as "Ἰωάννου de' Pigli Ἐκθεσις περὶ Ἐκδρομῆς Ἰωάννου Η΄ Παλαιολόγου εἰς Περέτολαν τῆς Τοσκάνης τῷ 1438," in *PkP* 3: 327–329 (without translation but with a misprint that turns the actual year of the excursion [1439] into 1438); see *PaL* 2: 63, n. 81. The most recent edition of Giovanni's text with English translation (also provided in *PaL* 2: 63, 64) is K. M. Setton, "Emperor John Slept Here," *Speculum* 33 (1958): 222–228.
- 104 Setton, "Emperor John," p. 226 [and with almost identical text: *PkP* 3: 328]: *Et provisto ch'ebono, si fecie porre una tavoletta inanzi a quello letuccio, et io gli trovai dell' tovaglie bianche; e quivi mangio solo, et gli altri suoi baroni e signori sotto la perghola et di fuori et dentro, chome alla sachomanna. Et gli altri famigli, dapoi ch'ebono mangiato, mangiarono in quello medesimo luogho. Et nota, chella prima vivanda mangio fu una insalata di porcellana et di presemoli chon delle cipolle, et lui stesso la vole nettare. Dipoi ebono pollastri e pipioni lessi, e dipoi pollastri e pipioni squartati e fritti nella padella chon lardo. Et chome venivano le vivande, tutte gli eran poste davanti, et lui prendeva quello voleva, et mandava agli altri suoi; el ultima sua vivanda fu certe huova gittate in su i mattoni chaldi, dove serano chotte laltre chose; e messogliele in una schodella chon di molto spezie, non so immaginare chome si eran fatte, ma chosi fu il vero.*
- 105 *Ibid.*, p. 226 [*PkP* 3: 329]: *Messere Angnolo e Ciriacho danchona, uomo dottissimo in grecho et in latino, et io ci stemo tutto giorno perlla sala, lui sempre giuchando a tavole e motteggiando con quelli suoi.*
- 106 *Ibid.*: *In sulla sera, a ore xxiii, e per ventura piu tardi, messere Angnolo mandò per me, chero nell' orto con quelli suoi gientili huomini, et fecemi inginiochiare ai piedi del detto imperadore; lui mi fecie ringranziare dal suo interpito dellonore che io gli avevo fatto del ricerverlo in chasa, et fattomi proferere, se mai chapitassi nesuoi terreni, mi farrebe onore ec., e prese il nome mio, et chome si chiamava, dove era stato e feciene fare nota.*

- 107 *Pal* 2: 63. Setton, “Emperor John,” p. 226 [*PkP* 3: 329]: *Et noi dipoi, a chommemorazione delle sudette chose, facciamo dipignere larme sua di sopra luscio della nostra salla, chome anchora si vede*. This excursion of the Greek emperor was paid for by Florentine funds; see the entry quoted in *ibid.*, p. 224, and dated September 30, 1439, which refers to the expenses incurred: *A Francescho di Guccio, maziere, per resto di spese per lui fatte innandare a Prato e a Pistoia, chome ser Angnolo Acciaiuoli, quando anchopangnò lò inperadore de’ Greci, grossi quattuordici p*—. In 1957 Setton visited Peretola, which has become a busy suburb of Florence, and discovered that the de’ Pigli family has no known descendants and that no one in the vicinity had ever heard of Giovanni de’ Pigli; see *ibid.*, p. 228.
- 108 The most competent (but not complete) survey of the existing “portraits” of Constantine XI still remains the study of S. P. Lampros, “Αἱ Εἰκόνες Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου,” *NH* 3 (1906): 229–243; in addition, cf. *idem*, “Νέαι Εἰκόνες Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου,” *NH* 4 (1907): 238–240. For some depictions, cf. the illustrations in Lampros, *Λεόκωμα*, plates 90 and 91; and Head, *Imperial Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 104–108, whose illustration of Constantine XI is a German adaptation of an earlier work depicting John VIII in profile (whose prototype, I would venture to suggest, can be none other than the Pisanello medal); furthermore, Constantine wears a very large earring; the artist must have misinterpreted the *prependulia*, the strings of pearls hanging down from the imperial crown as earrings.
- 109 Lampros, “Αἱ Εἰκόνες Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου,” pp. 230–232, which also includes an illustration of the chrysobull as pl. 41 (facing p. 242); and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pl. 8. On chrysobulls, cf. Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, pp. 186–190, 246–248. Nicol supplies, in pl. 9, a black-and-white photograph of a coin of Constantine XI, which recently surfaced in a private collection.
- 110 ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΕΝ Χ<PICT>Ω<I> ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ Ο ΠΑΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ.
- 111 A black-and-white enlargement of the miniature depicting Constantine XI can be found in Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 181, fig. 14; also see Lampros, “Αἱ Εἰκόνες Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου,” pl. 43 facing p. 242; and Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, fig. 121. Fol. 294^v of the same *Mutinensis codex* containing the depictions of the last eight Palaeologan emperors together with the founder of Constantinople, Constantine the Great, is reproduced in *MP*, p. 387, fig. 29.
- 112 Klontzas, as a miniaturist, painter, copyist, and chronicler, deserves greater scholarly attention than he has attracted thus far; his *codex* has been well-known since the days of Lampros but only recently have its miniatures been studied and published by Professor Paliouras, *Ο Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας*. In addition, cf. A. Paliouras, “Η Ζωγραφική στὸν Χάνδακα ἀπὸ 1500–1600,” *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 10 (1973): 101–123; *idem*, “Ὁ Ἀπόηχος τῆς Εἰκονομαχίας στὴ Ζωγραφικὴ τοῦ 16ου Αἰώνα. Ἡ Περίπτωση τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα,” in *Τιμητικὸ Ἀφιέρωμα στὸν Κωνσταντῖνο Δ. Καλοκέρη* (Thessalonica, 1985), pp. 403–413; and *idem*, “Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας στὸ Σινά,” in *Πεπραγμένα Ζ’ Διεθνούς Κρητολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου 2* (Rethymnon, 1995), pp. 318–328. All these studies have been reprinted in A. Paliouras, *Μεταβυζαντινὴ Ζωγραφικὴ: Συλλογὴ Ἀρθρῶν ποὺ Ἀναφέρονται στὰ Ζητήματα τῆς Ζωγραφικῆς Τέχνης μετὰ τὴν Ἀλωση (1453–1821)* (Ioannina, 2000).
- 113 On the Veneto-Cretan background of Klontzas and Domenikos Theotokopoulos (el Greco), see, among others, the collected studies of M. Chatzidakis, *Δομήνικος Θεοτοκόπουλος Κρής: Κείμενα 1940–1994* (2nd ed.: Athens, 1995).
- 114 Paliouras, *Ο Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας*, no. 189 (fol. 89^v): ὁ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος ὅπου ἔχασε τὴν βασιλείαν του καὶ ἐσκοτώθη εἰς τὸν πόλεμον. ἡ ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως γέγονε δέ, ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τοῦ βασιλείως Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου, ἐπονομαζομένου Δράγασι παρὰ τῶν ἄσεβῶν Ἰσημηλιτῶν ἔτους ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνσάρκου οικονομίας υγγ, μηνὸς Μαΐου, κθ^η, ἡμέρα Τρίτη.

- 115 Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας*, pp. 218, 219: πυκναὶ δὲ σκιαὶ γράφονται ἐπὶ τῆς στολῆς τοῦ βασιλέως, τοῦ θρόνου καὶ τῶν βαθμίδων αὐτοῦ. Τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου καὶ τὸ ὅλον ὕφος ἐκφράζει [*sic*] ὄλην τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν καὶ τὸν πόνον ἀνθρώπου, ὁ ὁποῖος παλαίει ἐν γνώσει τοῦ ἀρνητικοῦ ἀποτελέσματος τοῦ ἀγῶνος. Ὁ παριστάμενος “σκελετώδης θάνατος” μὲ τὰ ὄργανά του ἀνὰ χεῖρας γράφει τὸ τέλος τῆς ιστορικῆς ταύτης σελίδος. Ἦδη τὸ δρέπανον ἔχει διέλθει ὑπεράνω τοῦ ἥρωος καὶ εἶναι ἔτοιμον νὰ δώσῃ τέλος εἰς τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ . . . Δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σχεδιάσματος ὁ Κλόντζας δὲν ἀπέδωσε τὸ “πένθος θανάτου” ἐνὸς μόνον ἀνθρώπου. Ἡ λεπτεπίλεπτος ἄκρα τῆς μολυβδίδος του ἀπέδωσε τεχνηέντως τὴν πτώσιν ἐνὸς ὀλοκλήρου λαοῦ. Ὅ,τι ἔγραψαν ἱστορικοὶ εἰς τόμους βιβλίων, ὁ ζωγράφος τοῦ Χάνδακα ἀπεικόνισε μὲ τραγικὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν εἰς μίαν ἀπλῆν σύνθεσιν. Paliouras continues in the same vein, p. 219, n. 1: Ὁ ζωγράφος δὲν παριστᾷ τὸν Παλαιολόγον νὰ πίπῃ πρὸ τῆς Πύλης τοῦ Ρωμανοῦ μέσα εἰς τὸ χάος τῆς Ἀλώσεως τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως. Διότι δὲν γράφει ἀπλῆν ἱστορίαν, ὅπου πρέπει νὰ περιγραφοῦν αἱ ἡρωϊκαὶ στιγμαὶ τοῦ τελευταίου αὐτοκράτορος. Πρὸ τῆς τελευταίας μάχης τὸν εἰκονίζει μόνον βυθισμένον εἰς τὰς σκέψεις του. Ἡ φιλοσοφικὴ αὐτὴ ἐνατένισις τοῦ θανάτου, μὲ τὸν βαθύτατον συμβολισμόν τῆς εἰκόνης, ἀποδίδει τὸ τραγικὸν στοιχεῖον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῆς ζωῆς. Ἄν ἐποποθεῖ τὸν τελευταῖον αὐτοκράτορα νὰ πίπῃ ἡρωϊκῶς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς μάχης θὰ ἔγραφεν ἐν ἔπος. Τώρα ἡ μελέτη ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου ἀποκτᾷ λυρικὸν ὕφος. For a black-and-white illustration of this miniature by Klontzas, see Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας*, pl. 189 (fol. 89^v). For scholarship on this theme, see G. T. Zoras, “Ὁ Χάρος καὶ ἡ Ἀπεικόνισις Αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Στιχοῦργήματι Πένθος Θανάτου,” *Παρνασσός* 12 (1970): 420–438, who also provides an illustration of Klontzas’ miniature (p. 435).
- 116 Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας*, pl. 189 (fol. 90^v): ὁ θάνατος τοῦ ἀπάνω γεγραμμένου Κωνσταντίνου ὅπου ἐσκοτώθη εἰς τὴν ἄλωσιν τῆς πόλεως.
- 117 *Ibid.*, pl. 182 (fol. 85^v): ὁ δὲ υἱὸς αὐτῆς Κωνσταντίνος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐφονεύθη ἐν τῇ ἄλωσει καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου τοῖνον Κωνσταντίνου καὶ Ἑλένης τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ μέχρι τούτων τῶν τελευταίων Κωνσταντίνος καὶ Ἑλένης μήτηρ οὐκ ἐβασίλευσαν ἄλλοι. Klontzas has supplied yet a fourth depiction of Constantine XI together with his mother; they are both enthroned; see *ibid.*, pl. 180 (fol. 85^v). For a discussion of the miniatures of Klontzas, which depict the resurrected Constantine XI and his exploits as they were predicted in popular oracular literature, see *infra*, ch. 11.
- 118 Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, p. 248; on the late imperial costume, see *infra*, n. 121.
- 119 This miniature was not known to Lampros. For a color photograph, see *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους 10: Ὁ Ἑλληνισμὸς ὑπὸ Ξένη Κυριαρχία (Περίοδος 1453–1669): Τουρκοκρατία – Λατινοκρατία* (Athens, 1974), p. 249; the manuscript is currently housed in the Royal Library of Stockholm. This depiction did not attract the attention of Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, who reproduces as a frontispiece a nineteenth-century Greek woodcut based on this miniature, without mentioning its relationship to the Stockholm manuscript. For the definitive study of Constantine XI and the oracular literature of the sixteenth century, see N. A. Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησιμοῦ τῆς Κρατικῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Βερολίνου (*Codex Graecus*, fol. 62–297) καὶ τοῦ Θρύλου τοῦ Ἐμαρμαρωμένου Βασιλῆ,” *Byzantinische-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 13–14 (1936/37): 203–244^{a-c}.
- 120 This painting was not known to Lampros but it has attracted its share of scholarly attention. See, e.g., V. Grecu, “Eine Belagerung Konstantinopels in der rumanischen Kirchenmalerei,” *Byz 1* (1924): 273–289. A two-page, good-quality black-and-white photograph of this fresco appears in D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500–1453* (New York, 1971), pl. 92, without analysis. A color photograph of a detail of this painting was published in M. Antonucci, “Siege without Reprieve,” *Military History* 9.1 (April 1992), p. 49, but this photograph is of inferior quality and presents reversed images. A high-quality photograph was taken by J. L.

- Stanfield and accompanies the article by M. Sevey, “The Byzantine Empire: Rome of the East,” *National Geographic* 164.6 (1983): 708–767 (illustration: pp. 764, 765).
- 121 On the Byzantine imperial costume, see A. Hofmeister, “Von der Trabea Triumphalis des römischen Kaisers über das Byzant. Lorum zur Stolader abendländischen Herrescher,” in P. E. Schramm, ed., *Herrschaftszeichen und Staatsymbolik*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1955), pp. 25–50; as Spatharakis, *The Portrait*, p. 248, has observed: “Although much has been written on imperial costume, a systematic examination of it is still required.”
- 122 The ceremonies celebrating the union took place on Monday, July 6, 1439. The *duomo* of Florence preserves *in situ* a marble plaque with the inscription commemorating the event: under the title *AD PERPETVAM REI MEMORIAM* eight lines of Latin text commemorate the union of 1439.
- 123 A high-quality black-and-white photograph of the original decree bearing all signatures of the delegates is provided in *CF*, pl. I (facing p. 295) with a transcription of the Greek (and Russian) signatures.
- 124 It seems that the farther away the delegates found themselves from Italy, the stronger they felt that they had been “cheated” in some way or another and that they had been forced, coerced, or compelled to sign the decree. See Doukas, 31: εἰ γάρ τις πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἤρετο “καὶ διὰ τί ὑπεγράφετε;” ἔλεγον “φοβούμενοι τοὺς Φράγκους.” καὶ πάλιν ἐρωτῶντες αὐτοὺς εἰ ἐβασάνισαν οἱ Φράγκοι τινὰ, εἰ ἐμαστίγωσαν, εἰ εἰς φυλακὴν ἔβαλον, οὐχί. ἀλλὰ πῶς; “ἡ δεξιὰ αὐτῆ ὑπέγραψεν” ἔλεγον “κοπήτω ἡ γλῶσσα ὡμολόγησεν, ἐκριζούσθω.” οὐκ ἄλλο εἶχον τί λέγειν.
- 125 *Supra*, ch. 1, sec. 2.
- 126 See Doukas, 31.
- 127 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 15: “The fact that the Turks held to their truce and made no move against Constantinople while the Emperor was away may be a tribute to Constantine’s careful handling of a dangerous situation.” One may argue that the sultan achieved exactly what he wished by keeping Constantine at bay through the application of selective psychological pressure. In turn, Constantine had no choice but to alarm his brother. The question is who was more successful in his goal: was it Constantine, who danced to the tune of the sultan, or Murad who actually sounded the tune?
- 128 *PkP* 1: 229, 230: ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀδελφοῦ καὶ βασιλέως κλήσις εἰς μεγαλόπολιν, κατάπλους εἰς Ἰταλίαν αὐτοῦ . . . καὶ σὲ μετακαλεῖται τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡνία ὁ κρατῶν μετ’ ἀγαθῶν προχειρίσασθαι τῶν ἐλπίδων. ὡς μὲν οὖν παντὸς κινδύνου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσης δεινῶν προβολῆς καὶ φόβου κρείττον τῆ σῆ παρουσία διεφυλάχθημεν, δῆλόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἄλλοις λέγειν παρήμι. ἀντικρυσ γὰρ εἰδείξας τὸ καὶ Δημοσθένει καὶ Ἀριστείδει καλῶς δοκοῦν, ὡς ἄρα “οὐ λίθοι οὐδὲ ξύλα οὐδὲ τέχνη τεκτόνων αἱ πόλεις ἂν εἶεν, ἀλλ’ ὅπου ποτ’ ἂν ὦσιν ἄνδρες αὐτοὺς σώξιν εἰδότες, ἐνταῦθα καὶ τεῖχη καὶ πόλεις.” ὡς ἅπασαν Πόλιν καὶ πρὸς σὸν ἀνήρησας ἔρωτα καὶ τὴν εὐχὴν ἀμηγέτη πάντων ὡσπερ κεχηνότων ὡς ἐνεστήσω κάπι τὴν τοῦ κράτους ἰδεῖν σε σκηπτουχίαν οἱ τῆς Κωνσταντίνου πάντες ὠνευροπόλουν. This work, *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὸν Βασιλέα Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον* (*PkP* 1: 221–230), was composed after Constantine’s acclamation; it is a retrospective of Constantine’s achievements, which are viewed, in accordance with the court ritual, as heroic deeds. This is not the first time that Dokeianos has exaggerated the “exploits” of Constantine XI. We have also met his testimony in connection with the prince’s upbringing.
- 129 *PkP* 1: 230, 231: φασὶν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Μακεδόνα, τίνες οἱ θησαυροὶ παρά τινος ἐρωτηθέντα ποτέ, τοὺς ἰδίους συσσίτους καὶ φίλους παραγαγεῖν, καιτοὶ γ’ ὑπὸ τινον καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν φίλων δοκοῦντων ἐπιβουλευθέντα κακῶς. ταύτην τὴν εὐφημίαν δικαιοτέρον ἂν τις σοι περιθεῖη καὶ εὐλογώτερον ὄσω μειζόνων καὶ κρειττόνων τε χαρισμάτων πλουτεῖς παρά θεοῦ καὶ φίλων ἀνευθύνων καὶ οἰκετῶν, οἷ γε δη πάντας ἀσπάζονται θησαυροὺς καὶ βίου τὰ κράτιστα τὸν οἰκεῖον δεσπότην, καὶ μεῖζον ἕκαστος

ἡ γύναιον ἐπὶ τῇ σφενδόνῃ φιλοτιμεῖται τελεῖν ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ δεσπότῃ, μᾶλλον δ' ἠπίῳ πατρὶ καθ' ὄμηρον ἢ διδασκάλῳ καὶ κηδεμόνι. For the Homeric qualities of a king, admired by Dokeianos, see M. Philippides, "Herodian II.4.1 and Pertinax," *The Classical World* 75 (1984): 295–297.

- 130 See the *consolatio* on the untimely death of Constantine's wife, in which Bessarion described Constantine as Ἄρην πνέοντι καὶ φόνους ἐν ταῖς μάχαις . . . δεινῷ μαχητῇ Κωνσταντίνῳ. See also *supra*, ch. 4, text with n. 101.

7 *Dux bellorum*

Delusions of grandeur

1 Disgrace and inactivity

The days following the return from Italy brought paralysis. The emperor, whose health had not been sound, was dealt a severe blow by his beloved wife's death and displayed no enthusiasm for promoting the union. For his subjects, spiritual salvation was more important than secular or national deliverance. Patriarch Joseph II had died during the Council and had been buried at Florence. Metrophanes of Cyzicus reluctantly accepted the post.¹ Resistance to the union also came from within the imperial family,² while the strain of the journey was still bearing heavily.³

Such apparent imperial impotence encouraged the anti-unionists. Spurred on by the absence of a firm hand, the enemies of the emperor began to spread rumors and declared that John VIII was not serious about the union. A general impression was formed, maintaining that unofficially the emperor's sympathies agreed with the sentiments of the anti-unionists and that he would do nothing to stop their campaign.⁴ It was only at the insistence of the papal envoy, Cristoforo Garatone, who had accompanied the imperial party to Constantinople, that Metrophanes II finally dispatched an encyclical and letters to various ecclesiastics to announce his election and to proclaim the union.⁵

Constantine seems to have kept away from the debate that was the talk of the town. He presumably endorsed his brother's position in favor of the union. That the last emperor died a Catholic remains indisputable, and it was well known to his contemporaries.⁶ Yet Constantine, like his brother John VIII, failed to deal firmly with the outspoken anti-unionists, who continued, practically unopposed, their struggle against the pope, even under siege. Constantine seems to have been a loyal follower of his brother's policies, but he was not a man of action. He followed orders but does not seem to have snatched the initiative. This trait of Constantine frustrated Leonardo, the Latin archbishop of Mytilene, during the last days of Constantine's reign, while Constantinople was under attack. Leonardo thought that Constantine's Catholicism should be questioned:⁷

Neither logic nor scholarship (not even the numerous opinions of Scholarius, Isidore [not Cardinal Isidore but a local hieromonk], and Neophytos) could stand against the faith of the Roman Church; the efforts and good character of the

forementioned lord cardinal [Isidore of Russia] ensured that the sacred union was celebrated, with the agreement of the emperor and the senate (if it was not feigned), on the Ides of December [Dec. 12], the feast of Bishop Spiridion.

Constantine remained lethargic in the capital after his brother's return. He simply awaited orders (which were apparently never issued) and he failed to act on his own. He seems to have lingered in the capital without any official duties.

One may reasonably assume that Constantine did not return to the Morea because he had pledged to stay away from southern Greece when Theodoros had yielded the position of regent to him. Constantine must have realized that his elevation to the status of regent had not been totally free of risk. Surprisingly, Mesembria and its territory, his former fief, were assigned to Demetrios at this time. Why was Constantine passed over, in spite of his services as regent and of his position in the succession? A speculative answer to this puzzle suggests that the emperor wished to maintain control over his troublesome brother, Demetrios, who had escaped from his clutches while they were still in Italy, and would now attempt to ally himself with John's enemies, the anti-unionists.⁸ If the lordship of Mesembria was a bribe intended to buy the cooperation of Demetrios and an attempt to establish a measure of good will, John miscalculated. Demetrios interpreted the emperor's gesture as weakness, and launched an attack upon Constantinople. Constantine should have been assigned the command of Mesembria. Could it be that John had found some fault with Constantine's regency?

There survives one work by the pen of Scholarius, which alludes to the events that took place at this time. In a later period, probably during the early reign of Constantine XI, Scholarius wrote a rhetorical piece, ostensibly on ecclesiastical matters, which he addressed to Despot Demetrios.⁹ This work is a flattering speech on the "divine qualities" of Demetrios and praises his Orthodox faith. By implication, John and Constantine become the targets of Scholarius' invective. By the time this composition appeared (probably ca. 1450),¹⁰ John had died and Constantine had been advancing the union slowly and grudgingly, earning, in the process, the hatred of the anti-unionists, who threw their support behind their favorite Palaeologus, Demetrios. This composition provided an opportunity for Scholarius to applaud Demetrios' Orthodox tendencies and enthusiasm for true "piety" (which he contrasted sharply with the aberrant Catholic ways of John VIII and Constantine XI). Scholarius indirectly urged the despot to keep up the fight for the faith, expressed the gratitude of the anti-unionist party, and sought to divide the population even more sharply at a time when harmony was essential for the very survival of the capital.

Stripped of its flattering rhetoric and its devout statements, this composition provides historical evidence, as it reviews the career of Demetrios and cites the "unfair" treatment that this "pious" Orthodox prince had received in the hands of his heretical brothers. The historical importance of this "hagiographical" praise was realized early on in our century,¹¹ even though modern scholarship has neglected it. Historians assign a few sentences to the last civil war of Byzantium.¹² Scholarius' biased pen has furnished our sole glimpse into this matter.

Eager to evade acceptance of the union, Demetrios and his associate Scholarius had successfully eluded the watchful eyes of John VIII and had escaped from Italy, before the union was concluded, without informing the emperor of their intentions.¹³ The statements of Scholarius hint that Demetrios took over Mesembria soon after the delegation's return,¹⁴ in February of 1440. Scholarius implies that at the time of Demetrios' appointment to the lordship of Mesembria, written pledges were extended to the prince, which the emperor failed to observe in the following years:¹⁵ "He should have fulfilled his promises in deed and he should have surrendered those cities; for they had been granted long ago in a written document." Perhaps this appointment can be viewed as a concession by a weak administration to the anti-unionist party, which still refused to cooperate. If so, this gesture of good will was justifiably interpreted by the anti-unionists and by Demetrios as another sign of imperial impotence. It must have seemed obvious to all that, after his return, John VIII lacked the stamina to enforce the terms of the union in his capital. Demetrios seems to have launched an aggressive campaign to win the Constantinopolitan throne and he entered into an alliance with the Turks.

2 A state of siege

Sphrantzes cites the departure of Demetrios to Mesembria and his subsequent wedding to Theodora, the daughter of Paul Asen,¹⁶ interpreted by the court as an act of rebellion, since this marriage was arranged without consultation and without the blessing of the emperor's family. It infuriated John VIII and his mother, Helena Dragaš:¹⁷ "And Demetrios received and married the daughter of Asan [Asen] in Mesembria against the feelings of his mother and of the emperor." A modern scholar suggests that Demetrios simply fell in love.¹⁸ Surely, it was more than an affair of the heart. The Asen family brought important partisans to Demetrios and the despot's new brother-in-law became his right-hand man:¹⁹ "Asan [Asen], his [Demetrios'] brother-in-law, was a man possessing considerable power in Byzantium [Constantinople] and he [Demetrios] thought that he [Asen] would assist him in advancing his claim to the throne." Is it also coincidental that, by this time Constantine had selected a bride? It has been suggested that Constantine had earlier embarked upon this quest precisely because John had produced no male heirs and the succession appeared to be in danger.²⁰ Demetrios' marriage may be seen as his way of trying to interfere with the succession, attempting to anticipate Constantine and beget a male heir.

We do not know the arguments in favor of selecting Constantine's new bride.²¹ This marriage arrangement had been negotiated in the previous December and Sphrantzes had played a part:²² "On December 6, <69>49 [1440], I was sent to the island of Lesbos and arranged the betrothal and marriage of Lord Constantine and Aikaterine, the daughter of the lord of Mytilene and its adjacent areas, Dorino Gattilusio Palaeologus." A long interval ensued between the negotiations and the actual wedding ceremony. This period allowed Demetrios room for maneuver and he created his own sensation by eloping with Theodora Asenina. Constantine did not celebrate his wedding before July/August of 1441,²³ seven months after the

match had been concluded:²⁴ “On July 27 of the same year, my lord departed for Mytilene on board the imperial vessels commanded by Loukas Notaras, who later became the grand duke, and married the aforementioned Lady Aikaterine of the Gattilusio family.” An echo is found in the short chronicles:²⁵ “Dragaš took as his wife the daughter of the lord of Mytilene.”

Constantine spent August in Lesbos. Soon afterwards he departed:²⁶ “And in September <69>50 [1441], Lord Constantine left his wife and queen in the care of her father, and we sailed to the Morea on board the same imperial vessels accompanied by one other ship from Mytilene.” The purpose of Constantine’s present trip to the Morea is not known. Was he perhaps attempting to secure an arrangement that would allow him to return to his old territory? Apparently, he achieved nothing. Sphrantzes was dispatched to Mesembria but first went to the sultan to secure his approval of Constantine’s plan and then proceeded to Mesembria:²⁷

I was to go northward to Mesembria and offer Lord Demetrios all of my master’s lands in the Morea; he would then return to the City and receive Selybria and his former territory, Mesembria and the other lands up to Derkoi, and hope to become the successor, as the emperor desired.

This was a most satisfactory arrangement in the eyes of both John VIII and Constantine, but its terms must have enraged Demetrios, whose ambitions had focused on a higher goal than the possession of a mere fief in the Morea, which Constantine held only in name at this time. Demetrios summarily rejected the naive proposal:²⁸ “I left for Mesembria in the month of January. He [*sc.* Demetrios], acting more against the City than against his own brother, refused and sent me away empty-handed.”

Demetrios was in the midst of his own preparations to attack Constantinople. Constantine’s suggestions and bad timing forced Demetrios to accelerate his preparations. Murad II, the despot’s ally, must have known about Demetrios’ intentions, and must have been amused by Sphrantzes’ attempt to secure his approval for this pathetic proposal. How the Porte had become the ally of Demetrios is not very clear, but it has been concluded, through Scholarius’ text,²⁹ that the sultan had been informed of the massive expedition that was under preparation by the Europeans to attack him. From the Turkish point of view, an assault upon the capital by the emperor’s brother made perfect sense, as it would keep the imperial court busy and unable to participate, even nominally, in the expedition against the sultan. Sphrantzes alludes to a virtual civil war that broke out between the Constantinopolitan emperor and his unruly brother:³⁰ “I returned to the City and was awaiting the emperor’s command to return to my lord. On April 23 of the same year, Lord Demetrios the despot, supported by Turkish troops, ravaged and blockaded the suburbs of the City.” This civil war seems to have found its apparent cause in the refusal of the emperor to surrender the entire fief of Mesembria to Demetrios, in violation of his earlier promise:³¹

Their younger brother, Demetrios, quarreled with the emperor, who stripped him of most of his territory; as he was not able to extract from his brother

what he desired, he sent an embassy to King [Sultan] Murad, who sent him an expeditionary force; he advanced and began the siege of Byzantium [Constantinople].

It seems beyond doubt that Selybria, a second major town after Mesembria, was one of the major points of the dispute. Demetrios failed to win this additional “promised” territory. In time, the emperor placed Constantine in charge of Selybria precisely in order to keep an eye on Demetrios and in order to advertise the imperial control over the territory. For the present, Selybria remained under the authority of the emperor who could assign it at his pleasure.

The hostility may have come to the surface after Demetrios received Constantine’s proposal. Inadvertently, Constantine may have triggered the mobilization of Demetrios’ forces. Scholarius’ text also alludes to these events:³²

In spite of the fact that you [*sc.* Demetrios] had been praised as the best lord by people at home and abroad, the devil did not keep his distance and your brother and emperor began to look down on you; as you found this [attitude] unbearable, you began to prepare your defense. You wished . . . to bring him around to your view of justice, even though he was unwilling.

The same author mentions the blockade:³³

After the quarrel progressed to violence and necessity dictated a war against each other, as if they were the worst of enemies, he [*sc.* John VIII] fortified himself behind his gates while those who had committed no injustice were being enslaved; some of them were even butchered; and the land was ravaged and was put to the torch.

Demetrios began his blockade late in April 1442. The countryside suffered a great deal.³⁴ Soon after the commencement of hostilities, John summoned Constantine from the Morea. In July of the same year Constantine set out from southern Greece but does not seem to have rushed to Constantinople. He took his time, traveling at a leisurely pace and taking a roundabout route. He stopped at Lesbos, picked up his wife, and then set sail for Lemnos.³⁵ Constantine found himself immersed in trouble as soon as he reached Lemnos.

It was at the city of Kokkinos (or Kotzinos, in the vernacular of the period) that the Turks caught up with Constantine and prevented him from advancing farther and bringing his force to Constantinople. An Ottoman flotilla landed troops and began a regular siege of Kokkinos. The despot and his wife, found themselves trapped. Had Constantine known that an enemy was in the vicinity, he would not have brought his wife along. Obviously, he had not received good intelligence information. One may detect a fault in his character: lack of caution, excessive confidence in his own capabilities, and an inability to make adequate preparations in the face of adversity. The Ottoman raid seems to have come as a complete surprise to him and he found himself, as a passive player, in the unenviable position of

reacting to a situation that he had not foreseen. He was forced to defend Kokkinos:³⁶ “[Constantine] came to the island of Lemnos. Caught there, he was besieged at Kotzinos by the whole Turkish fleet for many days.” Khalkokondyles summarizes the events, erroneously places the wedding of Constantine at this time, and supplies the name of the Turkish admiral:³⁷

He came to Lemnos, after he married the daughter of the lord of Lesbos; Ahmed, with the fleet of the king [sultan], sailed against him and besieged him and his retinue in Kotzinos, the city of Lemnos. Ahmed landed on the island, raided, and besieged the emperor’s brother for twenty-seven days; even though he demolished the walls with cannons, he could not force his way and failed to enter the city. Then, as he proved unable to take it, he sailed away to his homeland.

So the relief column was trapped en route to the capital and Constantine found it necessary to ask for help from beleaguered Constantinople, as we discover in Venetian sources.³⁸ John VIII could do nothing to help, as he had his hands full and must have been disappointed to hear of his brother’s plight, who was supposed to assist him in the defense of the capital. The Venetians equipped and dispatched eight galleys from Constantinople in order to save the besieged despot. Thus, Constantine became a liability and had to be rescued, even though the Venetians diplomatically praised his operations in the defense of Kokkinos.³⁹

The Lemnian city was saved but “the incarnation of Ares,” as Bessarion had earlier dubbed Constantine, could only prevail with Venetian assistance. Constantine suffered another personal tragedy. His pregnant wife died. Life under siege must have complicated her condition.⁴⁰ She was buried at Lemnos:⁴¹ “With God’s help the [Turkish] armada departed empty-handed; the queen, however, fell ill under such circumstances, suffered a miscarriage in August of the same year, and passed away at Palaiokastron on the same island of Lemnos, where she was buried.” After the siege was lifted, Constantine did not rush to the capital. Constantine only reached Constantinople in November, after Demetrios and his allies had departed.⁴²

On August 6 Demetrios and his Turkish allies lifted the blockade.⁴³

In the year 6950 [1442], in the fifth indiction, on April 23, the Turks invaded the [region of the] City; Lord Demetrios, the despot, was assisting them. And in the same year, on August 6, they departed again, after they destroyed the fields and the vineyards.

The capital had been saved without Constantine’s help. The reasons for the departure of the Turkish blockading force are not stated but Khalkokondyles provides a conclusion by relating that Demetrios sent an embassy to his brother, the emperor, and then personally visited the capital:⁴⁴ “Shortly thereafter he dispatched an embassy to his brother the emperor and came to Byzantium.” There is a vague hint of this event in Syropoulos.⁴⁵

Scholarius, our main guide, suggests that Murad II attempted to mediate between despot and emperor in order to score some points in the game of diplomacy: Demetrios, he suggested, should surrender Mesembria in return for a temporary fief to be provided by Murad himself; the sultan would then turn his full attention to Demetrios' claims, after the end of the crisis that was developing between the Porte and Hungary.⁴⁶ "The barbarian [*sc.* Murad] demanded that you [*sc.* Demetrios] surrender the land to your brother; in its place he would grant you another comparable one, on the mainland; and he promised to help you after the war." This proposal was never adopted. We do not know which party found it unacceptable, but it has been concluded,⁴⁷ on the basis of Scholarius' speech, that Demetrios himself rejected the sultan's terms. Soon afterwards, this sorry state of affairs came to an end: Demetrios accepted total defeat and returned to the fold "like a suppliant."⁴⁸ According to Scholarius, John VIII did not deal with his rebellious brother harshly at first, because he recognized good traits in his personality. Nevertheless, the emperor appears to have withheld funds from Demetrios, whose financial needs subsequently became pressing.⁴⁹ Scholarius mentions in passing that Demetrios found himself in needy circumstances and suggests that Demetrios was not punished with confinement but with economic hardship:⁵⁰

He [*sc.* John VIII] agreed that you were virtuous and gracious. . . . He showed affection to you at that time but further begrudged your deserving reward and gave you nothing. . . . You endured, nevertheless, even though your entire house was being pressed by want; you placed your hopes on God.

The presence of Demetrios in the city must have encouraged seditious activity, perhaps because the emperor failed to deal with his brother firmly. John's failure to punish the culprit severely must have been interpreted as weakness.

The prevailing circumstances forced the emperor to turn to Constantine and appointed him lord over Selybria, a major town in the vicinity of Mesembria. This command Constantine had sought earlier but Demetrios had refused to cooperate:⁵¹

In November of the same year, my master, Lord Constantine the despot, came to the City. On March 1, he was granted Selybria by the emperor and he sent me there to be its governor and guard it against the sultan, against Lord Demetrios the despot, and against the emperor himself, who had given it to him.

Constantine was guarding himself against both Demetrios and the emperor.⁵²

A rift had somehow been created between Constantine and John. This situation has gone unnoticed by scholars but it had serious repercussions. After John VIII returned from Italy, he overlooked the previous service of Constantine and granted Mesembria and Selybria (in name at least) to Demetrios. Soon afterwards the emperor may have even restored Theodoros to his natural position as the heir to the throne, by-passing Constantine, who was assigned no responsibilities. Constantine then failed to bring aid to the capital under siege. Yet the emperor, in the face of Demetrios' determined opposition, turned to Constantine for support and finally

granted him Selybria. Constantine must have felt rather alienated by this time and preferred to send Sphrantzes to his new town. Selybria was to be guarded against his brothers, including the emperor.

Sphrantzes supplies a summary of the ensuing developments:⁵³

In June of the same year, Protostrator Phrankopoulos came to the City. I was ordered back to the City from Selybria. An agreement was reached that my master the despot would return to the Morea and receive the lands of the despot Lord Theodoros, who would come to the City and take control of Selybria. So it happened.

It is quite possible that this recall of Theodoros, with its accompanying implications for the succession, was intended as John's additional gesture of reconciliation towards the anti-unionists, to whom either Demetrios or Theodoros would be more acceptable as heir apparent.⁵⁴ Constantine headed for the Morea and Sphrantzes went back to Selybria:⁵⁵ "On October 10, <69>52, my lord the despot left the City by boat for the Morea; Lord Theodoros arrived in the City with the same boat in December of the same year. In March I surrendered Selybria to him."⁵⁶

From December 1442 to March 1443 Theodoros presented the emperor with unreasonable demands and entered into negotiations with Demetrios for the purpose of forming an offensive alliance against John VIII.⁵⁶ The emperor remained vigilant, anticipated the plot, and managed to capture and imprison Demetrios before he could pose a serious threat:⁵⁷ "The emperor . . . in fear . . . confined you [*sc.* Demetrios] to the palace and placed you under guard."⁵⁸ Khalkokondyles talks of the eventual escape of Demetrios, apparently accomplished with the help of his brother-in-law:⁵⁸

Soon afterwards he [*sc.* Demetrios] sent an embassy to his brother the emperor and came to Byzantium; shortly thereafter he and his wife's brother were arrested by order of John, the emperor of the Hellenes. The two of them were put in separate prisons; acting on a suggestion of Asen, he [*sc.* Demetrios] escaped at night and came to Galatas [Pera], the city across. He sent another embassy and peace was concluded; again he was restored to his command by the Euxine and his wife's brother was released by the emperor.

Scholarius states that a number of islands were then transferred to Demetrios. This grant must have undoubtedly been an added enticement to observe the terms of the peace.⁵⁹ Scholarius also informs us that Demetrios did not go back to Mesembria but traveled to his new command in the Aegean:⁶⁰ "You obeyed and went to the islands." This command should not be seen as a promotion. It amounted to a virtual exile, which Demetrios must have tacitly accepted while he was still a fugitive at Pera in order to secure the release of his brother-in-law. Accordingly, one may assume that Demetrios acquiesced and proceeded to Lemnos, the designated island of internal exile for all upper class. Theodoros then attempted to recruit Sphrantzes to his service but the diplomat declined, surrendered Selybria, and proceeded to

Mistra on board the ship of Antonios Hyalinas,⁶¹ who was destined to play a part in the defense of Constantinople in 1453. And so Sphrantzes joined his lord in Mistra.

3 The warlord

Constantine owed his new post to the activities and intrigues of Demetrios, to the aspirations of Theodoros, and to the emperor's view of the situation, but not to his own initiative. Constantine's arrival in southern Greece is noted in a short chronicle, which alludes to unrest in the capital and telescopes to his program of fortifying the Isthmus of Corinth.⁶²

In the year 6952 . . . Lord Constantine Palaeologus, the despot, came and took over the Morea; he built the Hexamilion. And his brother Lord Theodoros, the despot of the Morea, who had been born in purple, entered the City in order to become emperor but he did not realize his goal.

By June Constantine had revived the project dear to his father, Manuel II:⁶³ he renovated the fortifications of the Hexamilion, which had been lying in ruins.⁶⁴ Sphrantzes arrived and saw the final stage:⁶⁵ "On my way I found that the Hexamilion had been strengthened by my lord the despot, during the previous spring."

Khalkokondyles clarifies the position of Thomas within the appanage, alludes to the Hexamilion work,⁶⁶ and supplies details:⁶⁷

He assembled all Peloponnesians and built, as fast as he could do it, a wall across the Isthmus [Hexamilion]; he invited his brother [*sc.* Thomas], he summoned all from his own territory, and he built the wall, assigning to each individual a stretch to be finished within an allotted period of time.

The only source to mention the amount of time it took to complete the renovations is the anonymous lamentation on the fall of Constantinople:⁶⁸ "And you built that famous Hexamilion [wall]; in thirty days you built it with great eagerness, toiling a great deal."

Constantine's project created a sensation with echoes throughout the contemporary literature. He was congratulated by Cardinal Bessarion in a warm letter, in which he advised the despot to govern the Morea efficiently and urged him to achieve some autonomy.⁶⁹ Bessarion approved of the program⁷⁰ and suggested that quarters or barracks be erected for a permanent garrison. The cardinal still remembered that the Albanian troops had deserted their despots in the face of the earlier Turkish attack. He believed that with quarters in the vicinity a garrison might be more willing to fight, as it would be defending its own property and families. Bessarion suggests that the despot make the Hexamilion his headquarters, as he considered it the key point for the defense of the peninsula.⁷¹

Most imperial man: You have fortified the Isthmus [Hexamilion] in the best way possible and in a manner worthy of yourself. You did not stop there but

took the next step to establish a city in the vicinity and you considered additional marvels. Without guards walls alone can achieve nothing; without a city in the vicinity, there can be no permanent garrison confident enough and in sufficient numbers to come at a moment's notice to deal with the occasional demands. . . . With God's help, for the Peloponnesians [Moreots] to live without fear, it is imperative that their lord spends considerable time in the vicinity of the Isthmus [Hexamilion].

After this *exhortatio*, Cardinal Bessarion presents his political and economic program to improve the internal conditions of the Morea under Constantine's leadership. He suggests that the despot has divine support on his side:⁷²

Even in the past it was your burning wish to perform heroic deeds; in time, when you found the cause and the strength, you moved to action and created a noble foundation for posterity. I know that your soul is fueled by the desire to emulate the famous men of antiquity who, in spite of humble beginnings, accomplished great deeds. I am quite aware of what you think every day, of what you desire, of what you intend to do, and of the ways that you intend to bring them into fruition. I have no doubt: God will support you, will aid you, will watch over you, will assist you, and will support you. For He loves mankind and virtue and you are His worthy servant, who cares so much about virtue.

Bessarion develops his own vision of a self-sufficient Greek Morea as the nucleus of a "new Hellenic" nation.⁷³ It is talk of this nature that has caused modern scholars to propose the resurgence of a Hellenic consciousness and, despite the risks of anachronism, seek the origins of the Greek nation in the fifteenth century. Bessarion was following the notions of his older contemporary and teacher, the Neo-Platonist George Plethon. Their impractical suggestions were never adopted.⁷⁴ The despot's project was viewed as a concrete step and made a mark on the popular level also, since the project helped to create a mythic aura about the despot. Tales of all sorts accumulated around Constantine. Even before his death, Constantine attracted his share of millennial lore, as he became the subject of oracular literature. Although he is not actually named in the versions of a popular prophecy (which may have even existed before he repaired the fortifications but became attached to him eventually), it is evident that the renovation turned the despot into a Messianic figure.⁷⁵

This was a critical period in the history of Europe, as the Christian powers, in conjunction with the papacy in the wake of the union, were making preparations to attack the Turks in the eastern Balkans. The expedition, one of the last great crusades, was meant as Europe's response to the return of the eastern Christians to the Catholic fold.⁷⁶ The role that the despotate of the Morea played in this expedition was marginal, at best, but Constantine was in constant touch with the court of Constantinople and with the west during the preparatory stages. Sphrantzes was personally involved.⁷⁷

A few days after my arrival at Mistra, a cardinal, the plenipotentiary legate, vice chancellor, and Catholic legate of the pope, was about to depart for the City with many vessels, in order to inform the emperor of the expedition that the king of Hungary was preparing against the impious [Turks]. Once again I was dispatched as ambassador to the emperor, to the sultan, and to the king himself, but most of all to the legate and to the captain, Alvise Loredano, with strict instructions so that matters might go forward.

Thus, Mistra played a minor part in the upcoming expedition.⁷⁸ The Byzantine authorities wisely failed to burn all bridges to the Porte, as it is indicated by the mission of Sphrantzes to the sultan after June, i.e., after his arrival in the despotate.⁷⁹

Constantine made a thrust northward into central Greece. It is conceivable that he had formulated this objective during his previous tenure in the despotate.⁸⁰ At this time Constantine felt that, with Murad's attention focused elsewhere, an opportunity offered itself for expansion. Cyriacus of Ancona passed by Corinth in March 1444, observed his activities, and sent a report to John VIII, stating that he had communicated with Constantine on the upcoming crusade. Cyriacus mentioned the renovated Hexamilion,⁸¹ adding that Constantine planned to move into the Megarid, as he had already received the submission of Thebes in Boeotia, and that he was in the process of annexing Leivadia, Daulia, and Delphi.⁸² Sphrantzes only mentions his own diplomatic mission and bypasses the offensive of the despot and the events of the summer of 1444.

The despot's plans reported to John VIII were put into operation:⁸³ "In the year 6952 [1444], in the month of March, Lord Constantine Palaeologus, the despot of the Morea, built the Hexamilion. The same man also took over Thebes of the seven gates and raided as far as Leivadeia, Zetouni [Lamia], and the territory of Agrapha." Doukas states that the despot was under the impression that the western armies would destroy the Turks and that this notion provided the incentive to march northward and seize Thebes and the nearby villages.⁸⁴

Constantine, who was then the despot of Lacedaemonia, took note of the arrival of the [Hungarian] king and of the triremes [galleys] at the Hellespont; he had prophesied that the total destruction of the Turks was imminent; he therefore moved out of the Hexamilion and seized Thebes and the neighboring territory.

Khalkokondyles provides the single major account of this campaign:⁸⁵

While he was repairing the wall at the Isthmus [Hexamilion], he seized from the king [sultan] the land outside the Peloponnesus [Morea], annexed Boeotia, made the city of Thebes his own, and seized the entire Boeotia. The tyrant [= duke] of Athens made a pact with him and promised to pay tribute to him. The Walachians who inhabit Mount Pindos speak the Dacian language [Rumanian] and resemble the Dacians by the Ister [Danube] came and gave themselves up to him; they began to campaign against the Turks who had settled in Thessaly and

received a lord from the ruler of the Peloponnesians [Moreots]. Leodorikion, the small town in Lokris, settled by the city of Phanarion near Pindos, received its lord from the king [sultan]. . . . When he [Constantine] finished the repairs of the Isthmus [Hexamilion] wall, he sent an army against these territories of the king [sultan], raided the region, and maintained a state of war.

Thus, Constantine made his presence felt in Attica, Boeotia, Locris, and perhaps Thessaly, once the Walachian tribesmen of Mount Pindos allied themselves with him and launched raids into the Turkish settlements with his encouragement (if not with his logistical support). It has further been speculated that Constantine also concluded an alliance with Carlo II Tocco, the brother of his first wife.⁸⁶ After Constantine seized Thebes and assumed control of the Athenian duchy, he forced Nerio II Acciajuoli to switch his allegiance from the Porte to him.⁸⁷ Whether these actions of Constantine had been designed to complicate the situation for Murad, who was already under serious threat by the upcoming crusade, is a matter of debate. If Constantine made his thrust in order to coerce Murad to intervene in central and southern Greece, thus weakening, somewhat, the overall strength of the Ottoman army in the northern Balkans, Constantine failed to achieve his purpose, as Murad simply ignored the despot and concentrated his forces and resources in the north. It is further doubtful that Constantine's foray was an indispensable part of an overall Christian strategy designed to divide the Turkish forces, in spite of the information that Cyriacus provides in his letter. Doukas was probably correct in his assessment⁸⁸ that Constantine launched his incursion because he had concluded that the Turks were about to be eliminated. In other words, Constantine was overly optimistic and counted inordinately on the success of the western expedition.

Constantine's actions managed to infuriate a former ally, who had earlier rescued him during the siege of Lemnos:⁸⁹ Constantine proved more annoying to the Venetians than to the Porte, as his campaign was also directed against the Venetian possessions on the northern shore of the Corinthian Gulf. The commander of Naupaktos was instructed to complain formally to the despot.⁹⁰ Venice did not see Constantine's invasion as part of the overall strategy to harass Murad. Similarly, when the king of Naples was informed of these developments, he was reminded of his own claim to the duchy of Athens and dispatched his ambassador to lay formal claim to it but we do not know what became of this mission.⁹¹ It seems that Constantine, with this offensive, alienated some important western allies, reminded others of their ancient claims, and made no dent in the Ottoman armor.

Constantine's actions, the last offensive of the Byzantine era, have met with the admiration of most modern scholars, who have assessed this campaign as bold and momentous, reflecting the supposed dynamic personality of the despot of the Morea.⁹² It has further been surmised that the Greek-speaking inhabitants of western Greece and Thessaly actively participated in this campaign and assisted in the operations; this offensive demonstrates, it has been concluded with a touch of anachronism, the resurgence of Greek consciousness and a national resistance movement against the Turks.⁹³

For the chronology of the campaign we must rely on modern reconstructions. The most reasonable hypothesis assumes a number of phases.⁹⁴ The first phase consisted of a thrust into Attica and Boeotia. The battle of Varna then intervened,⁹⁵ and, while its reverberations were still being felt next summer, Constantine resumed his campaign with help from a Burgundian contingent that had reached him.⁹⁶ It was during this second phase that Constantine pushed into Phocis, contacted the Walachians of Pindos, secured their allegiance, moved back to the Gulf of Corinth, and then marched eastward along the northern shore, expelling the Venetians. During the third phase, he returned to the Morea and directed his general, Constantine Kantakouzenos, the son of his associate, John Kantakouzenos, to continue operations in Phocis.⁹⁷

Constantine Kantakouzenos' subsequent operations into Phocis seem to have been crowned with success, and he so impressed the pope with his achievements that he was made Palatine Count of the Lateran.⁹⁸ Additional details for his activities in central Greece are supplied by Cyriacus of Ancona.⁹⁹ Problems in chronology persist. Did this campaign take place in the spring of 1444, or did it extend further on into 1445 and perhaps into part of 1446, as modern scholarship has reasonably assumed? Constantine seems to have received some reinforcements from far away Burgundy shortly after his thrust into central Greece, if the later testimony of Stefano Magno is to be trusted:¹⁰⁰ "1444: Three hundred soldiers from Burgundy were sent to Constantine Palaeologus, the despot of the Peloponnesus; they arrived in the Peloponnesus [Morea] in March or April 1445." It remains doubtful whether Constantine or his subordinate, Constantine Kantakouzenos, utilized these troops. The duration of their stay in Greece remains unknown (even though modern scholars¹⁰¹ have assumed that use of the Burgundian contingent had been made in the operations in Phocis; I doubt that the Burgundian troops would have participated in the action against the Venetians on the northern shores of the Corinthian Gulf).

In contrast to the estimates of modern scholars, contemporary literature failed to praise, or even to take extensive notice of, Constantine's temporary conquests. Bessarion concentrates on his own pet project, which sought to turn the Morea into an autonomous, self-sufficient center of "Hellenism."¹⁰² Bessarion allowed no part in his vision for a northward expansion. The only author to allude to these events in a flattering light is John Dokeianos, who, in a letter addressed to Constantine, compares the despot to Themistocles and indirectly alludes to previous "victories" and perhaps to his conquest of Athens:¹⁰³

The legendary Themistocles, discovered [the meaning of the oracle's] the wooden wall, erected a great trophy [= won a great victory] at Salamis, and reclaimed the city of the Athenians from the barbarians [Persians]; he proved a sensible man and a benefactor to his homeland, when he forced the barbarian [Persian] to withdraw in shame. In the same way you, most glorious despot, made the enemies of this great city flee on a number of occasions and often you restored strength and wealth to her, while you turned her enemies into confused cowards.

4 The impregnable isle

Constantine also turned his attention to the administrative organization of the Morea.¹⁰⁴ Sphrantzes, in September 1446, was appointed governor of the fief of Mistra, while John Kantakouzenos was given the lordship of Corinth and Alexios Laskaris took over Patras.¹⁰⁵ Constantine appointed Sophianos Eudaimoniannes as his liaison officer to his various administrators.¹⁰⁶ The presence of the despot was required elsewhere.¹⁰⁷ He may have encouraged the cooperation of the local barons by liberally granting privileges and by making numerous appointments in the despotate.¹⁰⁸

In the days following the Turkish victory at Varna, the Porte failed to turn its attention to central and southern Greece. John VIII secured the continuation of his existing treaty of friendship, hastened to send rich gifts to the sultan, congratulated him on his triumph over the crusaders, and feigned his personal joy over the Turkish victory.¹⁰⁹ After the battle of Varna Murad unexpectedly announced his retirement and abdicated in favor of his young son and future conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmed II. During this retirement of the sultan, Nerio II of Athens came under threat by Turahan and his son from Thessaly, who conducted raids into his territory, attempting to reclaim the Porte's former vassal. Constantine took advantage of the changing of the guard at the Porte and launched a punitive raid against Nerio, dispatching his forces to Attica. This action must be counted as the last phase of his aggressive campaign.¹¹⁰ Khalkokondyles notes the developments:¹¹¹

Not long afterwards Ömer, the son of Turahan, took the army of Thessaly, advanced into Thebes and Attica, launched raids, and departed carrying away considerable booty. And so, when he saw that the Turks were about to recover their former control of the situation, Nerio, the tyrant [duke] of Athens, sent an embassy to the Porte and asked for a treaty with the king [sultan]. . . . He made peace with the king [sultan]. The Hellenes discovered this [development] and marched against Athens.

Turahan harassed Nerio but proved unable or unwilling, to seize the duchy. Shortly afterwards, Murad was prevailed upon by the senior officials of the Porte to reclaim his throne.¹¹² With control of the Ottoman state firmly in his hands, Murad decided to deal with the irritating occurrences in Greece by eliminating the aspirations of the despot of the Morea once and for all. Constantine must have been informed of the upcoming Ottoman expedition but felt that he could rely on his Hexamilion wall. Constantine headed for the Hexamilion, reinforced its defenses, and established his headquarters in the immediate vicinity. In October of the same year his brother, Thomas, who held his fief in the Morea with Glarentza as his base, traveled to Serbia to attend the wedding of his daughter to the son of George Branković, Serbia's despot.¹¹³ Constantine hastily summoned his brother from the celebrations, as he needed him and his troops for the defense of the Hexamilion.¹¹⁴

As soon as Constantine fortified the Isthmus [Hexamilion], he established a garrison and remained at the Isthmus, spending a great deal of time there.

When he discovered that Murad was marching against him, he summoned all the Peloponnesians [Moreots], including his brother, who happened to be attending the wedding of his daughter; for he had made a match with Lazar, the son of the lord of the Triballians [Serbs]. They came to the Isthmus [Hexamilion], obeying the summons, and fortified the wall so that it seemed to them that it would provide a strong defense.

Khalkokondyles must have been attached to the headquarters of the despot in some capacity, as his account includes details betraying the stamp of an eyewitness. Khalkokondyles, contrary to the impersonal tone of the bulk of his work, now slips into a “personal” style, and speaks of his observation of the camp of Murad:¹¹⁵ “I have seen, and I have heard of, no other camp surpassing this camp of the king [sultan].” He furnishes a detailed description of the Ottoman camp’s interior arrangement, which he must have abstracted from his direct observation.¹¹⁶

Murad was joined by Turahan in Thessaly. The sultan and his general then marched to Boeotia. Next their forces were augmented by the Athenian troops of Nerio II, who was obliged to accompany his overlord to the Megarid.¹¹⁷ They made camp at some distance from the Isthmus and prepared for the assault. The sultan had taken the trouble to transport bombards, mortar pieces, and field artillery. It has been speculated that by this time the Turks had been making strides in the production and use of artillery with the help of westerners and renegades.¹¹⁸ Perhaps the sultan had captured a number of European engineers and bronze-casters at Varna. Once the artillery pieces were found in working order, Murad moved within sight of the Hexamilion line and made camp.¹¹⁹

Murad marched and took along the forces that he encountered in his territories, as he moved on; he came to Thebes and was met by Nerio, who had brought an army from Athens. He reached Pagae [Mingai?], where he made camp and spent a number of days preparing his artillery pieces and his wicker defenses. Then he came down to the Isthmus and pitched his tents; his camp and his cannons stretched from sea to sea.

Accompanied by about six thousand of his best troops, Murad carried out an inspection of defenses. He found them formidable and became angry with Turahan who had urged him to carry out this campaign in the middle of the winter.¹²⁰ With past experiences in mind, Turahan urged the sultan to be patient, as he predicted that the defenders would abandon their posts as soon as they came under attack.¹²¹ Murad hesitated and postponed his assault, hoping that the despot would sue for peace.

Constantine assessed intelligence information. One of his spies returned with a report of the enemy’s strength. During his debriefing, Constantine expressed neither appreciation nor gratitude for the danger that this man had risked and failed to realize the value of an honest, although outspoken, report; in a fit of anger, he threw his own subordinate into prison, as he was not eager to hear the truth. Given the tone of the passage and the vividness of the narrative, one forms the impression

that Khalkokondyles, who was possibly an aide of the despot (or perhaps a secretary), was present when the spy presented his report to his lord. Khalkokondyles probably witnessed Constantine's rage over this report and recorded the incident in his text from direct observation:¹²²

Here a Peloponnesian [Moreot] spy came back and reported on the king's [sultan's] multitude, pack animals, and camels; he was unable to keep silent and spoke to the lord [Constantine] in the following manner: "Despot: You have really brought unmitigated disaster upon the Peloponnesus [Morea] when you declared war upon such a king [sultan]. He has led all of Asia and Europe and no place can be defended, not even if you had a double line of fortifications across the Isthmus [Hexamilion]. In the name of God: send envoys as soon as possible, and begin negotiations with such a king [sultan], so that we are not totally destroyed with an evil fate." The lord [Constantine] became angry at this speech and, in anger, ordered the man to be taken away to prison.

The exact chronology of the Hexamilion campaign is not presented in a consistent manner. Sphrantzes provides an overall view,¹²³ when he states that "on November 27 . . . the sultan marched against the Hexamilion and seized it on December 10." Khalkokondyles fails to mention actual dates but purports to give an account of the events day by day, perhaps echoing the rudimentary form of a diary that he may have kept:¹²⁴

He [Murad] waited for a number of days in case the lord [Constantine] of the Peloponnesians [Moreots] yielded. After these days had gone by, he moved and camped before the wall. On the following days, he bombarded the camp of the lord with his long-range artillery; on the next day, they tentatively attacked those on the walls and brought their siege engines into play. On the fourth day, they lit fires though the camp and each man lit as many bonfires as he could before his tent . . . thus, having lit the fires, they prepared themselves for the attack on the wall. On the fifth day, they brought the siege engines closer. . . . Then . . . they launched their assault and began the attack.

Khalkokondyles states that five days passed before the order for the final assault was issued. There is evidence, however, within the short chronicles to suggest that at least one week passed. Altogether the events are noted twenty-nine times.¹²⁵ Twenty-three of these entries supply the bare essentials,¹²⁶ while several of them include various mistakes in chronology,¹²⁷ and others mention briefly the names of the participants and the ultimate defeat of the despots. The six remaining entries¹²⁸ are specific, supply a longer text, and supplement Sphrantzes and Khalkokondyles.¹²⁹ One of these entries states:¹³⁰

In the year 6955 since [the creation of] the world, the 10th indiction, 1446 since the divine incarnation, on December 3, on Saturday, the Turkish sultan Murad came, with 50 thousand troops, to the Hexamilion of Corinth; on the

following Friday in the evening, he began the attack and all night long there was a mighty battle.

The same short chronicle suggests a week's interval before the battle. Two days are apparently missing in the narrative of Khalkokondyles, who allows only five days until the final assault and thus implies that Murad reached the immediate vicinity of the Hexamilion on December 5. The short chronicle is specific and states that it was December 3. In the final analysis, the two narratives are not contradictory. Furthermore, Khalkokondyles states that on the fourth day the Ottoman camp began its religious purification ritual with bonfires.¹³¹ This was a well known custom, also observed before the final assault upon Constantinople in May 1453.¹³² This ritual normally took place three days before a general assault and Khalkokondyles was aware of this detail, as he interrupts his narrative and inserts a parenthesis:¹³³

This nation of the Turks is accustomed to do as follows, whenever they are about to go into battle: three days before the day, on which they intend to fight, each man burns as many bonfires as possible throughout the camp; it is further evident that they also chant a hymn to God and to their hero [*sc.* Prophet Muhammad], before they join battle on the following day after the next one.

So Khalkokondyles states that the celebration took place three days before the general assault but then mentions that on the evening of the same day (i.e., his fifth day) the Turks launched the attack, thus contradicting himself.

In summation, if we combine the information supplied by Sphrantzes, Khalkokondyles, and the short chronicle, a reasonable reconstruction of the chronology becomes possible: Sphrantzes states that Murad approached the Isthmus on November 27. We also know from Khalkokondyles that a number of days passed before the sultan made camp directly under the walls. This period was used to apply psychological pressure, in the hope that the despot would yield. After this approach failed, the sultan moved his camp closer, within artillery range, on December 3, as the short chronicle states. This move amounts to the first day of Khalkokondyles. The following day (December 4) was taken up by the long-range bombardment of the despot's camp. December 5 witnessed skirmishes. Evidently, the Turks were testing defenses and defenders. Once the needed information had been assessed, the day of the general assault was decided and the rites were celebrated in the camp, on December 6, 7, and 8. December 9 was devoted to the deployment of artillery and the siege engines. It was in the evening of the same day that skirmishing commenced, to be followed by a serious engagement and by the general assault, launched in the early hours of December 10:¹³⁴

Dawn was already breaking . . . they attacked the wall. The king [sultan] himself and the new troops [janissaries] attacked the middle of the wall, where they had pitched their tents, and they brought ladders. They struggled to undermine the wall in their efforts to take it. He positioned his light artillery [mortar pieces?] at this spot and thus did not allow the Peloponnesians

[Moreots] to lean forward . . . and since the new troops [janissaries] realized their advantage, they positioned their ladders and began to scale the wall, which they surmounted in the area chosen by the king [sultan] to view [the battle].

It seems that the defenders had not taken adequate precautions to withstand the bombardment of the light and heavy artillery, which rendered them incapable of defending the wall. In addition to the mortar and light cannon fire, the earlier bombardment must have destroyed most of the battlements, allowing no cover for the defenders. It was precisely the lack of cover that created a problem. Artillery pieces could not be aimed accurately at this time but the volume of firing and the unpredictability of the strikes created a critical situation. Italian armies were better prepared against Turkish artillery fire. None of these complications were a problem for Giustiniani and his band of professional *condottieri* in the siege of Constantinople in 1453. At the Hexamilion the janissaries easily assumed control of the fortifications, which were abandoned by the terrified defenders; the janissaries opened the gates and began to plunder the camp of their opponents. Casualties were heavy and numerous prisoners were taken.¹³⁵

The high command attempted to check the flight to no avail and soon gave up. Constantine and Thomas joined in the flight.¹³⁶ They could not expect shelter at the citadel of Corinth, because, as Khalkokondyles states,¹³⁷ “they knew that they could not withstand a siege here, since no preparations had been made and no adequate food supplies were to be found within.” One is particularly at a loss to explain this incredible state of neglect of the Acrocorinth, since this magnificent citadel could have easily been defended and could have served as a rallying point to minimize casualties, provided that it had been supplied. How could Constantine and his governor John Kantakouzenos have neglected the provision of Corinth? Had they not entertained the possibility of Murad breaking through the Hexamilion? This lack of forethought seems particularly appalling in the light of the events surrounding the citadel of Patras, which was not as impregnable as the Acrocorinth and yet its defenders fought off the janissaries successfully, shortly after the disaster at the Hexamilion. Constantine and Thomas fled all the way to Laconia and made preparations to depart by sea and abandon their territories.¹³⁸ It was a sorry conclusion to a sorry incident.

Murad then initiated a reign of terror. He tricked three hundred men, who had escaped in the hills, into surrender and then butchered them.¹³⁹ He then performed some kind of human sacrifice of six hundred victims, a primitive *kurban* in honor of his father’s soul:¹⁴⁰ “He bought up to six hundred slaves, whom he sacrificed to his own father, appeasing him with the murder of these men.” His army proceeded to devastate the neighboring cities. Thus Corinth, Aigion (Vostitsa), and Basilika (Sicyon) were pillaged.¹⁴¹ Patras put up a notable resistance, whose strong citadel could not be taken and remained in Christian hands.¹⁴² Soon afterwards, Murad turned back and left the Morea. In his train were considerable booty and slaves.¹⁴³ Echoes of the tragedy can be found in a letter of Cyriacus, who, in February 1447, during an excursion in Gallipoli/Kallipolis to satisfy his passion for ancient

remains, came across a long chain of captives from the Morea destined to be sold into slavery in Asia. They told him of the destruction of the Hexamilion and of the terrible fate of the inhabitants.¹⁴⁴

George Scholarius criticized Constantine's role in these events in his eulogy for Theodoros II. Scholarius found the native defenders responsible for the terrible fate that fell upon the Morea. Indirectly, Constantine becomes the target of his criticism. It would not be improbable to trace the origins of the later tension between them to this piece of rhetoric, which Scholarius composed ostensibly to honor Constantine's brother and predecessor as the despot of the Morea. A section of the eulogy concerns Constantine directly, whom Scholarius criticizes implicitly through forced praise and excuses embedded in the text:¹⁴⁵

One could easily find fault with him [*sc.* Theodoros] in one matter, the problem concerning the Isthmus [Hexamilion] . . . when many inhabitants of the Peloponnesus were taken captives or were killed. He must share in the blame and his brother [*sc.* Constantine] cannot be spared. The latter fortified [the Hexamilion] a second time for defensive purposes, because he believed that, with this wall as his base, he could defeat all enemies against whom he had erected it in the first place. Yet he proved unable to check the enemy and could not send him away empty-handed; instead he barely managed to escape, unattended and ran to save his life. . . . Thus, the wall that had been erected with the care of the lord was overturned by its garrison's betrayal and stupidity. . . . Yet one cannot in fairness deprive the very brave Constantine of praise. . . . The responsibility for the subsequent misfortunes that overwhelmed all of the Peloponnesus [Morea] can be attributed firstly to the baseness of the inhabitants behind the Isthmus [Hexamilion] and secondly to the destruction of the Isthmus [Hexamilion]. And . . . he erected the wall, supervised the work everywhere, and assigned tasks; yet his presence later was not sufficient to save his work.

Scholarius then goes on to blame the misfortunes on the inhabitants of the Morea, who in his view are the base,¹⁴⁶ "illegitimate heirs of the ancient Peloponnesians." Thus, he manages to avoid a direct charge against Constantine but blames instead the inhabitants, who, in his view,¹⁴⁷ "always win dishonor instead of glory for their lords."

5 Panic and horror

What then were the achievements of Constantine while he ruled the despotate of the Morea for the second time? One may agree with Bessarion and find praise for Constantine's renovation of the Hexamilion fortifications; one may even admire the coordination of his aggressive campaign with the movements of the crusaders; after all, the early phases of his offensive north of the Isthmus were successful and met without notable resistance. Thus, the short-term policy of Constantine seems to have been crowned with success. The problem was that these conquests could

not be maintained on a permanent basis. Constantine was incapable of formulating or of enforcing a reasonable long-term policy. That he had aggressive instincts cannot be doubted but he lacked the skills, the means, and perhaps the ability to maintain long-term control of his territories. One wonders if Constantine thought of Bessarion's wise comment to the effect that "without guards walls alone can achieve nothing."¹⁴⁸

Constantine does not seem to have entertained the possibility of the Hexamilion being breached. Had he failed to learn his lesson from previous events, when the Turks had repeatedly overcome this obstacle? He neglected to provision Corinth, the major citadel capable of putting up a resistance to a besieger; it could have served as his base and a rallying point for his fleeing soldiers. He seems to have counted on one scenario: he was determined to hold the Hexamilion line. Murad was not going to pass and that was that. His hubristic conviction was so strong that he became angry with his own intelligence service officer when he was informed of the hopelessness of his position and directed unjustified anger against an honest officer. All these instances testify to his mediocrity and to his faulty judgments as a tactician, a strategist, and a policy-maker.

One has doubts as to the abilities of the diplomatic corps that must have been attached to the headquarters of the despot. It should have been made clear to him by his staff that he was in no position to make demands. After he was informed of the disaster at Varna and of the major expedition that the sultan was mounting against him, Constantine sent an envoy to Serres, with his own unrealistic proposals for peace. The envoy was Khalkokondyles' father:¹⁴⁹

It so happened that he [*sc.* Constantine] dispatched an envoy to the king [sultan] and he made excessive demands for himself. He demanded to keep the Isthmus [Hexamilion] and the territory of the king [sultan] outside [the Isthmus], as much as he had subjugated. Accordingly, the king [sultan] found fault with him and imprisoned this ambassador at Serres, before he marched to the Peloponnesus [Morea] in the middle of the winter. The envoy was [George] Khalkokondyles the Athenian.

One wonders what kind of grasp Constantine had over reality. After all, Murad had just annihilated a major European army at Varna. What chance could Constantine and his Hexamilion have against such an invincible foe? He failed to see doom descending upon him when the Ottoman forces drew near. To his credit, Murad offered the despot another chance to save himself and his subjects, while he paused at a distance from the Hexamilion, hoping that Constantine would come to his senses. Once more Constantine declined the generous offer and failed to recognize compassion. On whose advice did he rely to make such a disastrous decision? Given the treatment that the outspoken intelligence officer had received in the hands of his superior, could it be that Constantine's own subordinates in the office of military intelligence and in the diplomatic corps were so terrified of rousing his wrath that they simply endorsed their despot's opinion, out of fear, no matter how unreasonable his opinion was?

One further doubts the abilities of Constantine as a commander during the general assault. He seems to have exercised no control over his troops. This was not the first time that Moreot troops had fled before the Turks. Constantine had simply not taken appropriate counter-measures. Evidently, he had failed to learn from past experiences, which strongly suggested that better training methods were sorely needed. He and his officers proved unable to check their fleeing troops and joined in their panic themselves. Was the artillery of the Ottomans, no doubt an unprecedented phenomenon in southern Greece, responsible for this rout? The turning point came through the unnerving intervention of mortar or of light artillery that seemed to have been used to clear the defenders from the walls. Had Constantine not realized the psychological potential of gunpowder? He seems to have taken no defensive measures whatsoever and he had failed to familiarize his troops with the psychological effects of the “new” weapon. Perhaps there were other factors involved. There are hints in the contemporary record to suggest that elements of a fifth column may have been at work:¹⁵⁰ “All night long the mighty battle lasted; in the morning, the wall was abandoned by traitors and they [= Romans] turned to flight while the Turks entered.”

Ultimately Constantine’s policies resulted in disaster. A contemporary evaluation, void of all court flattery, was produced by an anonymous poet, who composed a lamentation on the fall of Constantinople and looked upon this event of 1446 as part of the sorrowful career of Constantine:¹⁵¹

Much-lamentable Corinth, what great destruction did you witness,/when the Turks destroyed the Hexamilion;/the entire world was filled with arms and bows, gold-feathered arrows, and decorated swords./Heads, arms, and bodies stretched over the plain./Ill-fated Corinth, how great a destruction did you witness,/as well as you, manly emperor [Constantine], who experienced an evil fate.

All this sounds as a prelude of what was to occur in 1453. While the ancient fortifications of Constantinople, as Sultan Mehmed II eventually realized in the course of his siege, were able to withstand the force of his bombards, the value of the new weapon was psychological, as it demoralized some native defenders and non-combatants. The destruction of the Hexamilion was only a foretaste of things to come.

So, what was achieved by Constantine’s aggression, by this “dynamic” campaign of an “indefatigable” soldier? In the final analysis, it resulted in human misery, as the uprooted inhabitants of the Morea bewailed their fate to Cyriacus in Gallipoli/Kallipolis. The terrified, terrorized, and paralyzed “incarnation of Ares” sought refuge in southern Greece, willing, ready, and perhaps eager to abandon his despotate to its misery; he was planning to escape by ship.¹⁵² That he did not depart, however, should not be attributed to a recovery of his spirit or to courage. It was simply due to Murad’s withdrawal from the peninsula. Once more the fate of the despot was decided by the decisions and actions of

the sultan. Constantine never seemed to be in control of his own destiny. The previous eight years had seen him lose the confidence of his brother, become a peripatetic lord without fief, and escape from the hands of the Turks through Venetian intervention; after he took the initiative in the Morea, he became the “mouse that roared,” while his accomplishments fell apart like a house of cards. He was not capable of achieving much.

The most recent evaluation (comparable to praises in court hyperboles of the *quattrocento*) of this phase of Constantine’s career expresses the perfunctory opinion that the despot was abandoned by the west, especially by the Venetians, who, it is stated, could have come to his aid from Methone.¹⁵³ It would have been extremely altruistic of the Venetians to do so, especially in view of the fact that Constantine, possibly with reinforcements from Burgundy, had recently campaigned against Venetian territories. The Venetians had rescued him once, at considerable expense and effort, in Lemnos, and had been compensated for their kindness by his encroachment upon their possessions on the northern shores of the Corinthian Gulf. The Venetians, in fact, showed compassion by aiding the real victims in a situation created by the despot’s ambitious plans: the numerous refugees who had fled from the advancing Turks from Achaia across the Corinthian Gulf had been admitted by Venetian as refugees in Naupaktos.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, while the same assessment declares that Constantine alone, after Varna, was courageous enough to continue the fight against the Turks, one should remember that a very fine line separates courage from stubbornness, or valor from inability to see impending doom.

Constantine’s Maginot line, his attempt to resurrect imperial control of the lands north of the Isthmus of Corinth, and his dreams of a permanent occupation of the newly acquired territories came to a swift, sorry end:¹⁵⁵

Shortly afterwards, a truce came into effect and the Peloponnesus [Morea] became a tributary [to the Turks] but was still held by the Hellenes. Up to now it had been free . . . the region outside [the Morea], Pindos and the remaining territory of the king [sultan] reverted to the [authority of] the king [sultan] after the fall of the Isthmus [Hexamilion]. So much for the developments in the Peloponnesus [Morea].

One is further reminded of the harsh, hostile appraisal of the leadership that is encountered in an anonymous, vulgar chronicle of the early seventeenth century, which owes a great deal to the narrative of Khalkokondyles; its realistic conclusion is an original contribution:¹⁵⁶

The nobles of the Morea who had sought protection in castles wished either to arrange a truce with Sultan Murad or to depart from the Morea by boat, because they saw that they lost this place which was taken over by Murad; so much did they fear him and such cowardice had taken hold of them.

Notes

- 1 *Minus*, 24.4: καὶ τὸν Φευρουάριον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἐπανέστρεψαν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἀπὸ τῆς συνόδου ὃ τε βασιλεὺς καὶ ὁ δεσπότης καὶ οἱ ἀπελθόντες πάντες ἄλλοι, τοῦ πατριάρχου καὶ μόνου καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ κάγαθου Σάρδεων κάμοι πλείστα φίλων ἐκείσε τελευτησάντων, τούτου μὲν εἰς Φερβράριαν, τοῦ δὲ πατριάρχου εἰς Φλωρεντίαν ὕστερον. On the elevation of Metrophanes II, see *Minus*, 24. 6: καὶ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἐγγένοι καὶ πατριάρχης ὁ πρότερον Κυζίκου κῦρ Μητροφάνης.
- 2 Helena Dragaš refused to accept the Catholicism of her two sons, John VIII and Constantine XI. Her “pious” disposition was praised by John Eugenicus, the brother of Markos; see John Eugenicus in *PkP* 1: 56–61, esp. p. 58. John is explicit in this speech to Constantine XI, after the latter had ascended the throne, and speaks of Helena’s acceptance of the anti-unionist hostility toward John VIII; see *PkP* 1: 123–133, esp. p. 125.
- 3 In Italy John VIII endured the quartan ague (*CF*, p. 169, and p. 194). Syropoulos states that John was unable to lift his head from his pillow, 8.29. Doukas, 33.1, specifies that John had been suffering from gout: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης ποδαλγία πιεζόμενος ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσι καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐπάνοδον ἀπὸ Ἰταλίας ἐν πολλαῖς θλίψεσι καὶ δυσφοραῖαι ὦν.
- 4 *CF*, p. 351, n. 1; the pope’s letter is dated August 25, 1440.
- 5 *CF*, p. 351. On Garatone, the papal *nuncius* to the capital, who had previously served as an assistant to the Venetian *bailo* and had acquired an excellent knowledge of Greek, see L. Pesce, “Cristoforo Garatone trevigiano, nunzio di Eugenio IV,” *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 28 (1974): 23–93. Garatone was active in the negotiations for the western crusade; see *PaL* 2: 65, n. 92.
- 6 After the “disappearance” of Constantine XI in the early hours of May 29, 1453, unionist literature began to emphasize the “martyrdom” of the emperor. Thus, Cardinal Isidore clearly thought that the last emperor was a true “athlete in Christ.” In one of his earliest reports to Pope Nicholas V, dated *pridie Nonas Julii MCCCCLIII* [= July 6, 1453], Isidore characterized the last moments of Constantine XI (*CC* 1: 60): *Illa enim die anima dicti ultimi Constantini Romanorum imperatorum, impensato martirio coronata non dubitatur ad superos evolasse cum alia christianorum multitudine copiosa qui cum eo impie occisi fuerunt, inter quos, crede, beatissime pater, fuisse multos solemnes clericos.* The predecessor of Pope Nicholas V, Eugenius IV, was aware of Constantine’s Catholicism, which he praised in a letter; see *Epistolae Pontificiae ad Concilium Florentinum Spectantes, Vol. 3: Concilium Florentinum: Documenta et Scriptores*, ed. G. Hofmann [Series A.1] (Rome, 1946), no. 249 (pp. 35, 36).
- 7 *PG* 159: 925 [*CC* 1: 127, 128]: *Verum quoniam nec ratio, nec auctoritas, nec variae Scholarii, Isidori, Neophytique opinionones adversus Romanae Ecclesiae fidem stare poterant, actum est industria et probitate praefati domini cardinalis [Isidori], ut sancta unio, assentiente imperatore senatque (si non ficta fuit), celebrareturque secundo Idus Decembris, Spirid<i>onis episcopi sancti die.*
- 8 See D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 18. I. K. Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγή Βυζαντινῆς Ἱστορίας, (1437–1450),” *NH* 18 (1924): 72–105, provides the only major scholarly analysis of the events in this period.
- 9 Edited from the sixteenth-century manuscript in Venice (*Cod. Marc. gr. II. 186, 193^v-200^v*) by S. P. Lampros in *PkP* 2: 52–76 [also published in *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*, ed. L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, 8 vols., vol. 3 (Paris, 1928–1936), pp. 119–121]: *Γεωργίου Σχολαρίου ἐκ Προτροπῆς τῆς Ἱερᾶς Συνάξεως καὶ τοῦ Πατρῖου καὶ Ἀληθοῦς Δόγματος Ἀντιποιομένων [πρὸς Δημήτριον τὸν Παλαιολόγον].* It has been exhaustively discussed and analyzed by Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγή,” and Lampros had realized its importance for the history of this period; see *PkP* 2: ζ, η’.

- 10 According to Bogiatzides, “*Νέα Πηγή*,” p. 70, this speech was written about 1450, when Scholarius was a monk in the Kharsianites Monastery.
- 11 See *supra*, n. 8.
- 12 The only modern study to take this speech into serious consideration is *CF*.
- 13 *CF*, p. 301; cf. the statement of Scholarius in *PkP* 2: 53: εὐσεβείας δὲ οὕτως ἀντείχου τῆς πατρίου ἐπιμελῶς . . . τὸν ἀδελφὸν καταλιπὼν, ὄχου ἐπὶ Οὐνετιαν, καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι συγκατήμιεν, ὅτε Γεμιστὸς καὶ ἐγὼ, καίτοι οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἤρσσκε ταῦτα οὔτε τῷ Εὐγενίῳ.
- 14 *PkP* 2: 53: ἐκείθεν δὲ ἐπανεληλυθὼς τῶν πρὸς ἡμῖν παραλίῳ τοῦ Πόντου ἤρξας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ. In addition, see the discussion in Bogiatzides, “*Νέα Πηγή*,” pp. 75–77.
- 15 *PkP* 2: 57: ἔμελλε δὲ αὐτίκα καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἔργῳ πληροῦν καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐκεῖνας παραδίδοναι γραφῇ γὰρ πάλα ἐδέδοντο. Also cf. Bogiatzides, “*Νέα Πηγή*,” p. 77.
- 16 *Minus*, 24.9. Also see Syrooulos, 12.17: κατ’ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ μεγάλου σαββάτου μικρὸν πρὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας ἀπέδρα τῆς Πόλεως κῦρ Παῦλος ὁ Ἀσάν καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ συνεπαγόμενος, ἦν καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην κῦρ Δημήτριον ἀγαγὼν, εἰς γυναῖκα νόμιμον αὐτῷ συνῆξεν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν σύγχυσις ἐγγυνοῖε μεγάλη. On Paul Asen, see *PLP* 1: no. 1518 (p. 144).
- 17 *CBB* 1: 22.44 (p. 187): καὶ λαμβάνει ὁ Δημήτριος τοῦ Ἀσάνου τὴν θυγατέρα εἰς τὴν Μεσημβρίαν, παρὰ τῆς γνώμης τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ εὐλογεῖται αὐτὴν (my emphasis).
- 18 S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi 1* (Bologna, 1981), p. 280: “This was a love-match; and she shared the vicissitudes of his career to the end.”
- 19 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.32 (pp. 44, 45): τοῦ Ἀσάνεω τοῦ γαμβροῦ ἀνδρὸς μέγα δυναμένου ἐν Βυζαντίῳ καὶ δοκοῦντος συμπράξειν αὐτῷ τὰ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. On Matthaios Asen, cf. *PLP* 1: no. 1507 (p. 142); and *DGM* 1: 245 ff.
- 20 S. P. Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις,” *NH* 4 (1907): 427: Ἦγαγε δὲ τὸν Κωνσταντῖνον εἰς τοιαύτην ἀπόφασιν πιθανώτατα ἢ ἀπουσία ἄρρενος γόνου τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκογενείας τοῦ Βυζαντίου, κινδυνεύουσις νὰ ἐκλίπη.
- 21 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 17, implies that Constantine’s bride was chosen because of her family’s wealth. Sphrantzes (*Minus*, 24.7) states that Aikaterine, the selected bride, was the daughter of κυροῦ Ντωρῆ . . . τοῦ Γατελιούζη. On Aikaterine, see *PLP* 2: no. 3580 (p. 153) [*s.v.* Γατελιούζαινα, Αἰκατερίνη]. In some manuscripts “Dorino” was corrupted from Ντωρῆ (or Ντωρίνου) to Νοταρᾶ. This error by a copyist misled *VeG*: 95 (p. 63) to state that the lord of Lesbos was a Notaras Palaeologus Gattilusio. The mistake originated with a misinterpretation of a written form in the manuscript, as it was correctly understood by Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 428. On Dorino, see *PLP* 2: no. 3589 (pp. 154, 155). Notaras was related to the Gattilusi of Lesbos, as his daughter, Helene, had earlier married George Gattilusio, the lord of Ainos; see C. Maltezos, *Ἄννα Παλαιολογινα Νοταρᾶ: Μιὰ Τραγικὴ Μορφή ἀνάμεσα στὸν Βυζαντινὸ καὶ τὸν Νέο Ἑλληνικὸ Κόσμο* [Βιβλιοθήκη Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν Βενετίας 23] (Venice, 2004), p. 16; and T. Ganchou, “Le rachat des Notaras après la chute de Constantinople ou les relations ‘étrangères’ de l’élite byzantine au XV^e siècle,” in M. Balard and A. Ducellier, eds., *Migrations et Diasporas Méditerranéennes (X^e-XVI^e siècles)*. *Actes du colloque des Conques (Octobre 1999)* [Série Byzantina Sorbonensia 19] (Paris, 2002), pp. 149–229, esp. 151–154.
- 22 *Minus*, 24.7: καὶ τῇ ε^η Δεκεμβρίου τοῦ μθ^{οο} ἔτους ὀρισθεὶς ἀπῆγον εἰς τὴν νῆσον Λέσβον καὶ κατέστησα τὸ συμπενθέριον καὶ ἐποίησα καὶ μνηστειὰν γάμου μετὰ κυρᾶς Αἰκατερίνης τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐθεντὸς τῆς Μιτυληνῆς καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς κυροῦ Ντωρῆ Παλαιολόγου τοῦ Γατελιούζη. This note suggests that Sphrantzes was responsible for this match as the implied subject of the verbs κατέστησα and ἐποίησα indicates. It is more likely that Notaras was responsible for the marriage arrangement. On the Gattilusio

- family and its connection to Notaras, see T. Ganchou, “Hélène Notara Gateliousaina d’Ainos et le Sankt Peterburg Bibl. Publ. Gr. 243,” *REB* 56 (1998), pp. 141–168.
- 23 Lampros, “Ο Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος ως Σύζυγος,” p. 427, states that the wedding had been postponed because of the έλευινή διαγωγή του . . . Δημητρίου.
- 24 *Minus*, 24.10: και τή κζ^η του Ίουλίου μηνός του αυτού έτους άπλήθην εις την Μιτυλήνην μετά κατέργων βασιλικών και εύλογήθη ό αυθέντης μου δηλονότι την ρηθείσαν κυράν Αικατερίνην Γατελιουζέναν, κατετανίου όντος εις τά κάτεργα του και μετά ταύτα γεγονότος μεγάλου δουκός Λουκά Νοταρά.
- 25 *CBB* 1: 22.40 (p. 186): ό δε Δράγασις λαμβάνει γυναίκα την κόρην του αυθέντου Μιτυλήνης.
- 26 *Minus*, 24.1: και τον Σεπτέμβριον μήνα του ν^{ου} έτους καταλείψας εκείσε εις τον αυτής πατέρα την βασιλίσσαν και γυνήν αυτού ό αυθέντης μου δηλονότι, ήλθομεν εις τον Μορέαν με τά αυτά κάτεργα και τής Μιτυλήνης έτέρου ένός.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 25.1: να απέλθω εις τον δεσπότην κύρ Δημήτριον άνω εις την Μεσεμβριαν και δώσω προς εκείνον άπαντα τον τόπον, όν ό αυθέντης μου εις τον Μορέαν είχαν, αυτός δε páλιν έλθών εις την Πόλιν έχη την Σηλύβριαν και τον πρώην τόπον αυτού Μεσεμβριαν και τά άλλα έως των Δέρκων, και εις έλπίδαν είναι τής βασιλείας, ως ήγάπα ό βασιλεύς.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 25.1: τον Ίαννουάριον μήνα εις την Μεσεμβριαν άπλήθην. εκείνος δε ένεργών τά κατά τής πόλεως, ή μάλλον τά κατ’ εκείνου, απέπεμνέ με άπρακτον.
- 29 Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγή,” pp. 82–84.
- 30 *Minus*, 25.3: έμοϋ δ’ έπιστρέψαντος εις την Πόλιν και προσμένοντος όρισμῶ του βασιλέως προς τό έπιστρέψαι εις τον αυθέντην μου, τή κγ^η του Άπριλλίου μηνός του αυτού έτους έπλήλησε μετά Τουρκών και απέκλισε και έφθαρε τά τής Πόλεως ό δεσπότης κύρ Δημήτριος.
- 31 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.32 (pp. 42–45): ό δε νεώτερος τούτων άδελφός Δημήτριος ές διαφοράν τῷ βασιλεϊ άφικόμενος άφελομένῳ αυτού τά πλείω τής χώρας, ως ουδέν αυτώ των δεόντων προσεχώρει προς του άδελφου, διαπρεσβευσάμενος προς βασιλέα Άμουράτην και ζυμπαλαβών παρ’ αυτού στρατεύμα έπέλασέ τε και έπολιόρκει Βυζάντιον.
- 32 *PkP* 2: 53, 54: άλλ’ ούτως επαινεθέντι σοι και τοις οικείοις τοις τε ζένοις άρχοντι βελτίστῳ κριθέντι, ουκ εις μακράν έβάσκηνη τό δαιμόνιον και την ύπερουίαν σοι έπεγειραν τάδελφου τε και βασιλέως ουκ άνεκτήν άμύνεσθαι σε παρώξυνε. και έβούλου . . . εκείνον . . . και άκοντα έφ’ ά δίκαια έλκειν.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 54: έπει δε έφιλονείκησε προς όργην, και ήν άνάγκη μάχεσθαι άλλήλοις ως πολεμιώτατοι, ό μεν συνέκλειστο ένδον πυλών, οι δε μηδέν άδικοϋντες ήνδραποδίζοντό τε και εκτεινοντο ουκ όλίγοι, και ή χώρα εκείρετο τε και ενεπίμπρατο.
- 34 Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγή,” pp. 81, 82, infers from this statement that the peasants in the vicinity of Constantinople had turned against Demetrios. Scholaris attributes the hatred of the peasants to their inability to understand the concept of justice; see *PkP* 2: 54: αλλά σε [*sc.* τον Δημήτριον] μόνον έμισουν, ουτ’ έμελλον αυτοις [*sc.* τοις άγρόταις] περι των δικαίων. See *Maius*, 3.18 (336): επέδραμεν ό δεσπότης κύρ Δημήτριος μετά στρατου και επέκλεισε την πόλιν, φθειρας και ζημιώσας, ους εύρην έξωθεν, έχων μεθ’ έαυτου συμμάχους μέρος ικανόν εκ του των Τουρκών στρατου. A short chronicle also knows of these developments; see E. Mioni, “Una inedita cronaca bizantina (dal. Marc. gr. 595),” in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), p. 76 (entry 48): μηνι άπριλλίῳ έτους ζαγ’ ήνώθη ό δεσπότης κύριος Δημήτριος μετά του Μοράτου και έποίησαν μάχην μετά τής πόλεως.
- 35 *Minus*, 25.4: και τον Ίούλιον μήνα αυτού του έτους, έρχομένου του αυθεντός μου και δεσπότου κυρου Κωνσταντίνου εις βοήθειαν τής Πόλεως και διά Μιτυλήνης διελθόντος και λαβόντος την αυτού γυναίκα την βασιλίσσαν, εις την Λήμνον ήλθε.
- 36 *Minus*, 25.4: εις την Λήμνον ήλθε και εύρεθέντος εκείσε έπολεμήθη εις τον Κότζηνον ήμέρας πολλάς υπό του στόλου παντός των Τούρκων.

- 37 Khalkokondyles, 6.2.31 (pp. 42, 43): γενόμενον δὲ ἐν Λήμνῳ, ὡς ἔγημε τοῦ Λέσβου ἡγεμόνος θυγατέρα, ἐπιπλεῦσαι τε αὐτῷ τοῦ βασιλέως στόλου Ἀχμάτην καὶ πολιορκῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐν Κοτζίνῳ τῆς Λήμνου πόλει σὺν τοῖς μετ' αὐτόν. τὸν δὲ Ἀχμάτην ἀποβάντα ἐς τὴν νῆσον καὶ ἐπιδραμόντα πολιορκεῖν τὸν βασιλέως ἀδελφὸν ἐπὶ ἡμέρας ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι, καὶ καταβαλόντα τὸ τεῖχος τηλεβόλοις, οὐκ ἠδυνήθη βιάσασθαι, ὥστε εἰσελθεῖν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. μετὰ δέ, ὡς οὐκ ἠδύνατο ἐξελεῖν, ἀπέπλει ἐπ' οἴκου.
- 38 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 18, 19.
- 39 *RdD* 3: 2590, 2597.
- 40 Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 429.
- 41 *Minus*, 25.4: ἀπελθόντος δ' ἀπράκτου τοῦ στόλου βοηθεία θεοῦ, ἡ βασίλισσα ἀπὸ τῆς περιστάσεως ἀσθενήσασα καὶ ἐκτρωθεῖσα τὸν Αὐγουστον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους εἰς τὸ Παλεόκαστρον τοῦ αὐτοῦ νησίου τῆς Λήμνου ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη.
- 42 *Minus*, 25.6: καὶ τὸν Νοέμβριον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ὁ δεσπότης καὶ αὐθέντης μου κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος.
- 43 *CBB* 1: 29.11 (p. 216): ἐν ἔτει δὲ ρζαν', ἰνδικτιῶνος ε', ἀπριλλίῳ κγ', ἠπιλάλησαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὴν Πόλιν, συνόντος καὶ τοῦ δεσπότης κυροῦ Δημητρίου. καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔτος, αὐγούστῳ ς', πάλιν ἀπελθόντες ἐδήλωσαντο καὶ ἀγροῦς καὶ ἀμπελώνας. The exact same entry, minus the word πάλιν, is duplicated verbatim in 62.10 (p. 463). Both entries seem to be depended on *Minus*, 25.3. On the siege, see, in general, P. Schreiner, *Studien zu den Βραχέα Χρονικά* [Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia 6] (Munich, 1967), pp. 167–169.
- 44 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.32 (pp. 44, 45): μετ' οὐ δὲ πολὺ διαπρεσβευσάμενος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ βασιλέα ἦκε τε ἐς Βυζάντιον.
- 45 For the general atmosphere, see Syropoulos, 12.17 (p. 570): εἶτα ἐγένετο καὶ μάχη μετὰ τοῦ δεσπότης.
- 46 *PkP* 2: 55: ὁ βάρβαρος ἠξίω μὲν παραχωρεῖν τὰ δελφῶ τῆς χώρας, ἐδίδου δὲ ἀντ' αὐτῆς ἑτέραν οὐκ ἐλλάτω ἐν μεσογείᾳ, ὑπισχνόμενος μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον βοηθήσειν. Discussion in Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 83.
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 *PkP* 2: 56: ἐν τάξει ἰκέτου. Discussion in Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 84.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 55: discussion in Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 83.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 55: ἠδέσθη γάρ σου τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ χάριν ὠμολόγει . . . ἐφίλει μὲν οὖν σε καὶ ἐτίμα τότ' εὐθύς, τῶν δὲ πρεπόντων οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως καὶ μέχρι πλείστου ἐφείδετο . . . σὺ δὲ ἠνέχου ζυμπάσης τῆς οἰκίας ἐνδεία πιεζομένης, καὶ ταῖς εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἐλπίσι προσεῖχες.
- 51 *Minus*, 25.6: καὶ τὸν Νοέμβριον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ὁ δεσπότης καὶ αὐθέντης μου κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος καὶ τῆ αⁿ Μαρτίου ἔλαβεν ἀπὸ τὸν βασιλέα τὴν Σηλύβριαν καὶ ἀπέστειλε ἐμὲ ἐκεῖσε εἰς κεφαλὴν, ἵνα καὶ ἀπὸ τὸν ἀμηρᾶ καὶ τὸν δεσπότην κύρ Δημήτριον καὶ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν δεδωκότα βασιλέα προστάξας φυλάξαι.
- 52 There are no notices of these events in the short chronicles. Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 85, correctly counts this period as a virtual civil war that lasted until 1448, i.e., until the death of John VIII and the accession of Constantine XI.
- 53 *Minus*, 25.7: καὶ τὸν Ἰούνιον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν Φραγκόπουλος ὁ πρωτοστράτωρ καὶ ὀρισθεὶς κἀγὼ ἀπὸ τὴν Σηλύβριαν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἦλθον. καὶ συμφωνία γεγόνασιν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν δεσπότης καὶ αὐθέντης μου εἰς τὸν Μορέαν ἀπέλθῃ καὶ τὸν τόπον πάντα τοῦ δεσπότης κυροῦ Θεοδώρου λάβῃ, ἐκεῖνος δὲ εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἔλθῃ καὶ τὴν Σηλύβριαν λάβῃ ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγένετο.
- 54 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.32 (pp. 42, 43): ὁ μὲν Κωνσταντῖνος γενόμενος ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον, καὶ γνώμην ἀποδεικνυμένου τοῦ βασιλέως, ὥστε ἀφικέσθαι αὐτῷ τὸν ἀδελφόν, αὐθις ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθεῖν τε αὐτόν, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Θεόδωρον οἴχεσθαι καταλιπόντα τε τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ ἀπιόντα ἐς Βυζάντιον. τοῖσι μὲν ἐς τοσοῦτον ἐγένετο. In addition, cf. Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 86. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 19, characterizes the situation as a mere “game of musical chairs.” It was the last civil war of Constantinople.

- 55 *Minus*, 26.1: και τῆ ι^α τοῦ Ὀκτωβρίου τοῦ νβ^{ου} ἔτους μετὰ караβίου ἐξεληθόντος ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως τοῦ αὐθεντός μου και δεσπότηου και ἀπελθόντος εἰς τὸν Μορέαν, και πάλιν μετ' αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ караβίου ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Θεόδωρος τὸν Δεκέμβριον μῆνα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἀπέσωσε. και τὸν Μάρτιον παρέδωκα πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν Σηλύβριαν.
- 56 Scholarius relates that in the beginning Demetrios sided with the emperor against the unjust demands of Theodoros; then the emperor became suspicious of Demetrios and had him imprisoned; see *PkP* 2: 56, Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 86.
- 57 *PkP* 2: 56: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς . . . δεδιῶς . . . εἶργει τε ἐν βασιλείοις και φρουρὰν ἐπίστησι. Cf. Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 86.
- 58 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.32 (pp. 44, 45): μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ διαπρεσβευσάμενος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ βασιλέα ἦκέ τε ἐς Βυζάντιον, και οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον ἐάλω αὐτὸς τε και ὁ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀδελφὸς ὑπὸ βασιλείως Ἰωάννων Ἰωάννων. και ἐν φυλακῇ χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὄντε τοῦτων, ὑποτιθεμένου τοῦ Ασάνεω ἀπέδρα τε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν καταντικρὺ πόλιν τὴν Γαλατίνην, και διαπρεσβευσάμενος ἔτυχέ τε εἰρήνης και εἰς ἀρχὴν αὐτῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόντου ἀφίκετο, και ὁ γυναικαδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἀπελύθη ὑπὸ βασιλείως. Echo in Scholarius, *PkP* 2: 56 (with Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 87), even though Asen is never mentioned by name. In addition, see *CF*, p. 354.
- 59 *PkP* 2: 57: και ὁ βασιλεὺς ὤτεο μὲν δεῖν οὐδὲ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν . . . ἐν δεῖνῳ τὴν σὴν εὐδοκίμησιν ποιουμένου, ἐδίδου μὲν αὐτίκα τὰς νήσους, τὴν δὲ προτέρα ἀρχὴν ἀνέβαλε. The islands are never mentioned by name, but given the territorial situation of late medieval Greece, Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 89, has correctly concluded that they were Lemnos, Samothrace, and Imbros.
- 60 *PkP* 2: 57: ὑπακούσαντι δέ σοι και ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ὄντι.
- 61 *Minus*, 26.2: και ἐμβάντος μου εἰς караβίον τοῦ ἀπὸ τὴν Κρήτην Ἰαλινᾶ Ἀντωνίου . . . εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν ἔφθασα, πολλὰ τοῦ δεσπότηου κυροῦ Θεοδώρου ζητοῦντός με και παροτρύνοντος, ἵνα και τὴν Σηλύβριαν ἔχω και τῶν πρώτων αὐτοῦ ὑποχειρίων εὐρίσκωμαι. For documents dealing with Hyalinas, cf. *SFC*, Appendix IV: no. 99 [s.v. Hyalinas, Antonios].
- 62 *CBB* 1: 32.45 (p. 236): τῷ ζαβ' ἔτει . . . κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος δεσπότης ὁ Παλαιολόγος ἦλθεν και ἐπαράλαβε τὸν Μωρέαν και ἔκτισε τὸ Ἐξαμίλι. και ὁ κύρ Θεόδωρος, ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ, ὁ πορφυρογέννητος δεσπότης τοῦ Μωρέως εἰσηλθεν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἵνα γένῃ βασιλεὺς και ἀπότυχε τοῦ σκοποῦ. *CBB* 1: 33.48 (p. 251); and *CBB* 1: 35.8 (p. 286): ἐν ἔτει ζαβ', ἰνδικτιῶνος ζ', δεκεμβρίῳ η', ἦλθεν ὁ μακαρίτης δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν και ἐδιέβη εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ, ὁ μακαρίτης δεσπότης κύρ Θεόδωρος.
- 63 On the date of the construction, see P. A. Clement, “The Date of the Hexamilion,” in *Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas* (Thessalonica, 1977), pp. 159–164. Investigation of the remains is found in T. E. Gregory, *The Hexamilion and the Fortress* (Princeton, 1993), with topographical maps and photographic documentation.
- 64 Cyriacus Anconitanus, *Inscriptiones seu Epigrammata Graeca et Latina reperta per Illyricum a Cyriaco Anconitano apud Liburniam, designatis locis, ubi quaeque inventae sunt cum descriptione itineris* (Rome, 1747), p. xvii: *ad X K. Maia*s ad Peloponnesiacum Isthmum venimus, antiquis olim moenibus Lacedaemonum opem clausum; nobile quippe opus, sed longa temp<ore> labe collapsum, bifariam a Justiniano, atque Manuele Palaeologo Constantinopolitanis Princip<ibus> restitutum. et iterum per Achaemenidum genus dirutum. Adhuc eius non parvae ruinae conspiciuntur; I have retained the original spelling of this edition's text; these errors are tacitly corrected in Gregory, *The Hexamilion and the Fortress*, ch. 3: “Testimonia,” no. 14 (p. 20). Also see Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ,” p. 471. On Cyriacus, cf. *PLP* 6: no. 13983 (p. 90) [s.v. Κυριακός].
- 65 *Minus*, 26.3: διερχόμενος δὲ εὗρον τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον κτισθὲν παρὰ τοῦ αὐθεντός μου και δεσπότηου τῷ παρελθόντι καιρῷ τοῦ ἔαρος.
- 66 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.47 (pp. 64, 65): Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ ἐπίκλην Δραγάσης, ἀφικόμενος ἐς Πελοπόννησον και παραλαβὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ χώραν, τά τε ἄλλα και Σπάρτην

- τὴν πρὸς τὸ Ταύγετον ὄρος, καὶ σχεδὸν ζύμψασαν τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον (πλὴν γὰρ τῆς τοῦ Θωμᾶ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀδελφοῦ χώρας, τὴν ἄλλην ὑφ' αὐτῷ εἶχε παραλαβών), ἐνταῦθα ὡς ἀφίκετο, τὸ τε ἐν τῷ Ἴσθμῷ τειχίζειν παρεσκευάζετο.
- 67 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.48 (pp. 64, 65): συναγαγὼν δὲ καὶ σύμψασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐς τὸν Ἴσθμὸν εἰτείχεσεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἡδύνατο τάχιστα, συγκαλέσας αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἥς αὐτὸς ἦρχε χώρας, ζύμψαντας ἐνταῦθα μεταπεμψάμενος ἐληλάκει τὸ τεῖχος, παραδοὺς ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ, ὅσον ἐν τοσῶδε χρόνον παρέχουτο ἠκοδομημένον.
- 68 Anonymous, Lamentation /*Θρήνος*, ll. 67–79 (p. 115): καὶ τὸ Ἑξαμίλι ἔκτισες τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐκεῖνο, / διὰ τριάντα ἡμέραις τόκτισες μετὰ πολλοῦ τοῦ πόθου, / καὶ κόπον ἦβαλες πολὺν. Also cf.: *CBB* 1: 32.45 (p. 236), 33.49 (p. 251), 53.18 (p. 382), and 61.7 (p. 459).
- 69 The pertinent extracts from this letter of Bessarion were first published by Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἴσθμοῦ,” pp. 477–479. The entire text in *idem*, “Ἰπόμνημα τοῦ Καρδινάλιου Βησσαρίωνος εἰς Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον,” *NH* 3 (1906): 12–50 (Greek text: pp. 15–27); and in *PkP* 4: 32–45.
- 70 Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἴσθμοῦ,” pp. 478, 479.
- 71 *PkP* 4: 33: τειχίσας μὲν οὖν τὸν ἰσθμὸν, βασιλικώτατε ἄνερ, ἄριστα καὶ ἀξίως σαιτοῦ ἐβουλεύσω μὴ μέχρι δὲ τούτου διανοηθεῖς στῆναι, ἀλλὰ προσέτι καὶ πόλιν ἐκείσε ἰδρύσασθαι, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄξια θαύματα ἐλογίσω. καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ μὲν φυλάκων οὐδὲν ἂν ποτε δυνηθεῖεν μόνα τὰ τεῖχη φυλάκες δὲ ἄνευ παρακειμένης πόλεως τε καὶ πολιτείας οὐθ' ἱκανοί, οὐτ' ἂν μόνιμοί τε καὶ βέβαιοι εἶεν, οὐτ' ἐν ἅπασι καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καιροῖς δύναντ' ἂν ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου παρῆναι καὶ τούτου μάρτυς ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὰ προλαβόντα παθήματα. . . τῶν γὰρ ἐντὸς τῆς Πελοποννήσου σὺν θεῷ μηδὲν δεδιότων, περὶ τὸν ἰσθμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐγχνονίζειν.
- 72 *Ibid.*: σὺ γὰρ σφόδρα καὶ πρὶν ἐπεθύμεις ἡρωϊκὰ ἐπιδειξασθαι ἔργα, καὶ νῦν τε ἅμα τε ἀφορμῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπελάβου καὶ πρὸς ἔργα ἐχώρησας, θεμέλιον οὐκ ἀγεννὲς τοῖς μέλλουσι προκαταλαβόμενος πράγμασι. σοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν οἶδα πόσος ἀναφλέγει ζῆλος τῶν παλαιῶν ἐκείνων ἀνδρῶν κάκ μικρᾶς ἀφορμῆς μεγάλα διαπράξασθαι δυνηθέντων. οὐκ ἄγνοῶ οἷα καθ' ἐκάστην λογίζει, οἷα ἐπιθυμεῖς, οἷα διανοῆ, ἃ τῷ νοῦν συλλαμβάνεις καὶ ὥστε εἰς τέλος ἐξενεγκεῖν πάντα μηχανᾷ τρόπον. οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλω παραστήσεσθαι σοὶ τὸν θεὸν σύμμαχον, ἐπόπτην, συνεργόν τε καὶ βοηθόν. ἐκεῖνός τε γὰρ φιλόανθρωπος καὶ φιλάρετος, σὺ τε ἄξιος ὑπηρετῆς ἐκείνου, πολὺν τῶν ἀρετῶν ποιούμενος λόγον.
- 73 Greek text of Plethon's proposal, published in two editions: *PkP* 3: 246–265, and in *PkP* 4: 113–135. Cf. *DGM* 1: 175–180; A. Pertusi, “In margine alla questione dell'umanesimo bizantino: il pensiero politico del cardinale Bessarione e i suoi rapporti con il pensiero di Giorgio Gemisto Pletone,” *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici*, n.s. 5 (1968): 95–104; and D. M. Nicol, *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium: The Birkbeck Lectures 1977* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 114, 115. Detailed analysis in C. M. Woodhouse, *George Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes* (Oxford, 1986), ch. 6, esp. pp. 103 ff.
- 74 While most modern scholars have fallen under the spell of Plethon's contribution to philosophy and to the Italian Renaissance, they tend to forget that his social program was impractical, at best. It is to the credit of Constantine and his predecessors that no part of these idealistic utopias was ever adopted.
- 75 Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἴσθμοῦ,” pp. 472–480, discusses the various manuscripts, which report this popular prophecy. Significantly, one surviving version was written by John Dokeianos, a second by Cyriacus of Ancona, and a third version (with extensive commentary) by Cardinal Isidore; see D. A. Zakythinis, “Μανουῆλ ὁ Β' ὁ Παλαιολόγος καὶ ὁ Καρδινάλιος Ἰσιδώρος ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ,” in *Mélanges offerts à Octave et Melpo Merlier à l'occasion du 25e anniversaire de leur arrivée en Grèce*, vol. 3 [Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes 94] (Athens, 1957), pp. 45–69, esp. pp. 60–63. See E. W. Bodnar, “The Isthmian Fortifications in Oracular Prophecy,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 64 (1960): 165–171. For the text of this oracle, see Gregory, *The Hexamilion and the Fortress*, ch. 3: “Testimonia,” no. 15 (pp. 20, 21), with limited commentary. The section of this oracle that seems to refer to Constantine concludes with

- the following prediction: ἤξει δὲ καὶ τοῖς χαλκόπουσ Ἐρινὺς πολὺποὺς καὶ πολὺχειρ καὶ καταβαλεῖ μένος τούτων, ὅταν κόνις πίτυν δέξηται καὶ πίτυς λύθρον, τότε καρτερὸς γενήσεται περίβολος ἰσθμοῦ [= Hexamilion]· δίκη δ' ἐς Ἑλλήνων γένος οὐρανόθεν ἤξει τύχης μέτα, καὶ τοὺς πρὶν αὐτῶν ἀναιδέας ὑποθήσει ζεύγλι· μακάρτατος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τέταρτον ἰσθμὸν τευχίσων [= Constantine], ἐνοσίχθονος πέδον.
- 76 For this crusade as a consequence of the Council of Florence, cf., among others, the summary in *CF*, pp. 327 ff.; O. Halecki, “Angora, Florence, Varna, and the Fall of Constantinople,” in F. Dölger and H.-G. Beck, eds., *Akten des XL. Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongresses* (Munich, 1960), pp. 216–220; and *idem*, *From Florence to Brest 1439–1596* (Rome, 1958).
- 77 *Minus*, 26.4: φθάσαντός μου οὖν εἰς τὸν Μυζιθρᾶν, μετὰ τινος ἡμέρας ὀλίγας, τοῦ καρδιναλίου καὶ βιτζεκαντζελλαρίου καὶ λεγάτου καθολικοῦ τοῦ πάπα ἀπερχομένου μετὰ πολλῶν κατέργων εἰς τὴν Πόλιν διὰ τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν τοῦ ρηγὸς τῆς Οὐγγαρίας ἐξέλευσιν, ἐστάλην καὶ ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀποκρισιάρης πρὸς τε τὸν βασιλεῖα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀμυρᾶν καὶ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν ρῆγα, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὸν λεγάτον καὶ πρὸς τὸν καπετάνιον Ἀλωΐζω Λορδᾶν δι' ἀναγκαίας δουλείας, πρὸς οὐ προβῶσι τὰ πράγματα. Documents *RKOR*: no. 3507 (p. 130).
- 78 See the letter by the cardinal of St. Ange in *NE* 3: 110, which mentions the coordination of the movements of Constantine, “the brother of the emperor of Constantinople,” with the crusaders against the Turks; see *DGM* 1: 230.
- 79 *Minus*, 26.2: καὶ τῇ γ' Ἰουνίου διὰ τῆς στερεᾶς ὁδοῦ εἰς Μυζιθρᾶν ἔφθασα.
- 80 For Constantine’s earlier attempt to take over Athens and Thebes, cf. *supra*, ch. 6, sec. 1.
- 81 By the end of March 1444, Cyriacus had reached Chios; see E. W. Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona and Athens* [Latomus 61] (Brussels, 1960), p. 53. On the subsequent travels of Cyriacus in this area and for his important testimony with regard to the preliminaries to the battle of Varna, as he was able to visit John VIII and Sultan Murad, and was even present at the Porte when an important Hungarian embassy came, see the succinct account in *MCT*, pp. 28–31. On Cyriacus, see C. Mitchell, E. W. Bodnar, eds. and trans., *Vita Viri Clarissimi et Famosissimi Kyriaci Anconitani by Francesco Scalamonti* [Transactions of the American Philological Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge vol. 86, pt. 4] (Philadelphia, 1996); and E. W. Bodnar and C. Foss, eds. and trans., *Cyriac of Ancona: Later Travels* [The I Tatti Renaissance Library 10] (Cambridge, MA, 2003). Also see M. Belozerskaya, *To Wake the Dead: A Renaissance Merchant and the Birth of Archaeology* (New York and London, 2009), pp. 226–240.
- 82 Latin text in F. Pall, “Ciriaco d’Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi,” *Bulletin historique de l’Academie roumaine* 20 (1938): 60, 61; also see Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna*, p. 84; English translation of the pertinent passages in *PaL* 2: 70.
- 83 *CBB* 1: 33.49 (p. 251): τῷ ζανβ' ἔτει μηνὶ μαρτίῳ, ἔκτισε τὸ Ἑξαμίλι κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος, ὁ δεσπότης τοῦ Μωρέως, ἐπαρέλαβεν δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ Θήβας τὰς ἐπατύλους καὶ ἐκοῦρσευσεν μέχρι Λιβαδείας καὶ Ζητουρίου καὶ τοῦ τόπου τῶν Ἀγράφων.
- 84 Doukas, 32.7: ὁ γὰρ Κωνσταντῖνος δεσπότης ὢν τότε Λακεδαιμονίας, καὶ ἰδὼν τὴν ἄφιξιν τοῦ ρηγὸς καὶ τὰς τριηρεῖς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ, ἐμαντεύσατο παντελὴ ἀπόλειαν τῶν Τούρκων, καὶ ἐξελεθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου εἴλε Θήβας καὶ τὰ περίξ χωρία.
- 85 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.47, 48 (pp. 64, 65): τὸ τε ἐν Ἴσθμῳ τεῖχει παρεσκευάζετο, καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσου χώραν ἀφίστη ἀπὸ βασιλέως, τὴν τε Βοιωτίαν κατέσχε, καὶ τῶν Θηβῶν τὴν πόλιν ὑφ' αὐτῷ ποιησάμενος καὶ ξύμψασαν τὴν Βοιωτίαν κατέσχε, καὶ ὁ Ἀττικῆς τύραννος φόρον τε ἀπάγειν αὐτῷ ὑπισχυόμενος σπονδὰς ἐποιήσατο, καὶ τὸ τε Πίνδον ὄρος – Βλάχοι δ' ἐνοικοῦσι αὐτό, τῶν Δακῶν ὁμόγλωττοι τοῖς παρὰ τὸν Ἴστρον Δαξίν ὁμοίωτον – ἀφικόμενοι παρὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἡγεμόνα, παραδιδόντα σφισιν, ἐπολέμουν τοῖς τὴν Θετταλίαν οἰκοῦσι Τούρκοις, λαμβάνοντες ἄρχοντα παρὰ τοῦ Πελοποννησίων ἡγεμόνος. Λεωδορικίον τε τὸ κατὰ τὴν Λοκρῶν χώραν ὄκημένον πολίχνην, Πίνδου μέντοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν Φαναρίου πόλιν ὄκημένον, ἄρχοντά τε λαμβάνει ἀπὸ βασιλέως . . . ὡς δὲ τὸ τεῖχος τοῦ Ἴσθμοῦ αὐτῷ παρεσκευάστο, στρατόν τε ἐπεμπευ

- ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείῳς χώραν, καὶ ἐδήϊου τε τὴν χώραν καὶ πολεμῶν διεγένετο. On the term “Walachian” or “Vlach,” see D. Dvoichenko-Markov, “The Origin and the Meaning of the Term ‘Vlach,’” in *Romanian Folk Arts* (New York, 1976), pp. 57–69.
- 86 A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation: The Byzantine Period, 1204–1461* (New Brunswick, 1976), p. 179; yet, one should recall, at this point, that in 1444 Carlo was a vassal of the Porte; cf. C. Hopf, *Griechenland im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1868), pp. 119, 120; and D. M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 207, 208.
- 87 *LCB*, p. 379.
- 88 *Supra*, n. 85.
- 89 *Supra*, nn. 38 and 39.
- 90 For the Venetian part in the battle of Varna, see F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénétienne au Moyen Age. Le développement et l’exploitation du domaine colonial vénétien (XIF–XIV^e siècles)* [Ecoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome 193] (Paris, 1959), pp. 376–379; and D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 383–385. Documentation in *RdD* 3: 2686, 2623, 2659, and 2670; and *DGM* 1: 226 ff. For speculation that Macedonia also became involved in this upheaval, see A. E. Vacalopoulos, “A Revolt in Western Macedonia, 1444–1449,” *Balkan Studies* 9 (1968): 375–380.
- 91 F. Cerone, “La Politica orientale di Alfonso di Aragona,” *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane* 27 (1902): 430, 431; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 30.
- 92 *LMB*, p. 561; Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 83, realizes that Constantine was attacking Venetian possessions; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 27, 28, points out that Constantine’s offensive was directed equally against Turks and Latins in central Greece; *PaL* 2: 70, states that this campaign brought Constantine wide recognition; Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, p. 207, judges this campaign “a surprising success.” Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 179, exaggerates when he talks anachronistically of a “national resistance movement”; and *MCT*, p. 41, finds Constantine “indefatigable” and concludes that his campaign was an overall success, comparable to his victories in the Morea during the previous decade. M. C. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia, 1992), p. 118, is more reserved: “In 1444 Despot Constantine seized Athens, Thebes, and Boeotia, and he received the allegiance of the Vlachs of the Pindos mountains, whom he provided with a military commander to battle the Turkish settlers in Thessaly. Meanwhile the Albanians in the mountains north of Naupaktos came over to the Greek side.”
- 93 Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 179, with exaggeration. After all, the best regiments of Constantine consisted of Albanian tribesmen.
- 94 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 83; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 29, who adds that the local Albanians and the Walachians of Pindos accepted Constantine as their lord.
- 95 *Minus*, 26.7: τῶ δὲ αὐτῶ μηνί [sc. Νοεμβρίῳ] ἰα^η ὁ ῥήξ τῆς Οὐγγαρίας ἐσκοτώθη παρὰ τοῦ ἀμῆρᾶ εἰς τὴν Βάρναν. For Turkish sources (mostly from the chronicle *Gazavât-nâme*) on the events leading to the battle of Varna, see H. Inalcik, “Byzantium and the Origins of the Crisis of 1444 under the Light of Turkish Sources,” *Actes du XIII^e Congrès International d’Études Byzantines* 1 (1961): 159–163.
- 96 See *infra*, nn. 101, 102. *DGM* 1: 321. A further contact with the west at this time may be provided by a letter from Florence to Constantine XI, see Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 33, who erroneously cites Lampros, “Βίος Εὐγενίου Ἰωαννουλίου τοῦ Αἰτωλοῦ ὑπὸ Ἀναστασίου Γορδίου,” *NH* 4 (1907): 31, as his source (n. 21).
- 97 On John Kantakouzenos, see D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460. A Genealogical and Prosopographical Study* [DOS 11] (Washington, DC, 1968), no. 80 (pp. 196–198), and the documents listed (p. 197, n. 14); *PLP* 5: no. 10974 (p. 96); confusion in *DGM* 1: 231, 281 (repeated in *DGM* 2: 111–115).

- 98 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 29; cf. the pope's own words in one of his letters: Hofmann, *Epistolae Pontificiae*, no. 285 (p. 109). Constantine Kantakouzenos maintained his connections with the west, as in 1452 he was still corresponding with Alfonso of Naples; see Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, p. 199, n. 20. Constantine Kantakouzenos was administered the oath of fealty to the pope by Niccolò Protimo, who was destined to have the dubious honor of being the last Latin archbishop of Athens (*PaL* 2: 96) before its annexation by Mehmed II.
- 99 *Cuius* [sc. *Iohannis*] *ingenuum ac pr<a>ec<larum> f<ilium> Constant<inum> C<omitum> P<alatinum> L<ateranensem> . . . ex Pelopon<n>eso in Aetoliam Locridemve Ozoleam ac Parnaseam Phocidem . . . diu iam a barbaris occupatas liberaturum . . . nonnullas Parnaseas Dorieasque et Locreas urbes acceptas ipsa in Locride mediterranean quidem unam Lydoricam nomine, alteram vero maritimam quam primum Euanthiam dixere nunc vero ab se Cantacuzinopolim dictam aliqua ex parte moenibus arceque solertissime restituendas curasse. Entire letter in R. Sabbadini, "Ciriaco d'Ancona e la sua descrizione autografa del Peloponneso trasmessa da Leonardo Botta," in *Miscellanea Ceriani. Raccolta di scritti originali per onorare la memoria di A. M. Ceriani* (Milan, 1910), pp. 180–247, esp. p. 231 [= R. Sabbadini, *Classici e Umanisti da Codici Ambrosiani* [Fontes Ambrosiani 2] (Florence, 1933), pp. 1–52]. In the excerpt quoted in our text, I have capitalized proper and geographical names and have restored, within brackets, the missing portions of the abbreviations in the manuscript (and in the printed edition).*
- 100 Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 195: 1444: *Constantino Peloponnesi despotae trecenti milites e Burgundia auxilio missi sunt, qui martio vel aprili 1445 in Peloponnesum venere*; and Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 179.
- 101 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 83; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 29.
- 102 Exactly when this letter of Bessarion was composed is not clear but, relying on internal hints, Lampros, "Υπόμνημα," p. 28, has dated it between 1443 (i.e., after the fortification of the Hexamilion) and 1446 (the destruction of the Hexamilion by Murad). In addition, see Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 116.
- 103 *PkP* 1: 242: Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκεῖνος, καὶ τὸ ξύλινον εὐρικόως τεῖχος καὶ τὸ μέγα τρόπαιον ἐγείρας ἐν Σαλαμῖνι καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἐπανασώσας, καὶ ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος εὐνοῦς καὶ νουνεχῆς φανεῖς τῇ πατρίδι καὶ σὺν αἰσχρῆν τὸν βάρβαρον ὑποστρέψαι παρασκευάσας. οὕτω καὶ αὐτός, εὐκλεέστατε δεσποτῶν, καὶ οὐδ' ἅπας τῆς μεγάλης ταύτης πόλεως δραπέτας παρεσκευασκῶς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις ῥωμαλεᾶν καὶ εὐτυχῆ ταύτην ἀποφῆνας, δειλοὺς τε καὶ οἷον ἐκνευρισμένους ἐκεῖνος κατέστησας. Entire text in *PkP* 1: 241–246. See Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 29.
- 104 *Minus*, 27.1: Σεπτεμβρίου α^η τοῦ νέου ἔτους εὐεργετήθην τὸ κεφαλατικίον τοῦ Μυζηθρᾶ μετὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, ἦτοι Κουλαῖ, Ἑβραϊκῆς, Τρύπης, Τζεραμίου, Πακοτῶν, καὶ Σκλαβοχωρίου καὶ μετὰ πάντων εἰσοδημάτων αὐτῶν, ὡς οὐκ εἶχε ἄλλος πώποτε τὸ τοῦ Μυζηθρᾶ κεφαλατικίον.
- 105 *Minus*, 27.2: ἐγὼ δέδοκά σοι τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν εἰς κεφαλατικίον . . . καὶ ὅτι θέλω νὰ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ὡς ἡ Κόρινθος καὶ ἡ Πάτρα, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἔχει ὁ Καντακουζηνὸς Ἰωάννης, τὴν δὲ Ἀλέξιος ὁ Λάσκαρις.
- 106 *Minus*, 27.3: ἕτερον μεσάζοντα οὐδὲν θέλω ποιήσειν πάρεξ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν Εὐδαιμονιοῦ Ἰωάννην, ὃν ἔχω. The complete name of this official was Sophianos Eudaimonioiannes [= Eudaimon John], as it becomes clear in *DGM* 1: 228. The office that he held was that of the καθολικός μεσάζων. On this post, cf., among others, N. Oikonomides, "La chancellerie impériale de Byzance du 13^e au 15^e siècle," *REB* 43 (1985): 167–195; and J. Verpeaux, "Contribution à l'étude de l'administration byzantine: ho mesazon," *BS* 16 (1955): 270–296.
- 107 *Minus*, 27.6: νῦν δ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπέρχομαι πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν καλίω τοῦ Ἐξαμιλίου. Constantine left Mistra on September 8: ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον τῇ η^η τοῦ αὐτοῦ Σεπτεμβρίου μηνός.

- 108 Thus, Demetrios Gregoras (*PLP* 2: no. 4440 [p. 1234]), a member of the troublesome family of Mamonas, was granted, by the despot's silver bull (dated February 1444), a tower in Prinikos and a house in Helos; see *PkP* 4: 17, 18; however, the authenticity of this document is questionable; cf. A. Meliarakes, *Οικογένεια Μαμωνᾶ* (Athens, 1902), pp. 38 ff.; and H. A. Kalligas, *Byzantine Monemvasia: The Sources* (Monemvasia, 1990), p. 185, n. 154. For grants and appointments, see *DGM* 1: 228, 229; and *PaL* 2: 96.
- 109 *MCT*, p. 47.
- 110 Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, pp. 82, 83.
- 111 Khalkokondyles, 2.6.49 (pp. 66, 67): μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολὺν χρόνον Ὀμάρης ὁ Τουραχάνεω παῖς, παραλαβὼν τὸ Θετταλίας στράτευμα, ἐπῆλασέ τε ἐπὶ Θήβας καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν, καὶ ληϊσάμενος ἀπέλαυσε, λείαν ἀπάγων ἰκανήν. ἔνθα δὴ Νέριος ὁ Ἀθησίων τύραννος, ὡς ἔωρα τὰ Τούρκων πράγματα αὐθις ἐπανιόντα ἐς τὸ πρότερον καθεσθηκός, ἐπρεσβεῦετο ἐς τὰς θύρας [= Porte] καὶ ἤξιον αὐτῶ σπένδασθαι βασιλεῖ . . . εἰρήνην ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς βασιλεῖα. καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πυθόμενοι ἐστρατεύοντο ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας. He returns to the same subject, 2.7.17 (pp. 102, 103): ἐνταῦθα πυθόμενος ἕκαστα ὁ βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἠνέχετο, ἀλλὰ περιαιγέλλον τὸν στρατὸν αὐτῶ παρεῖναι ἐς τὰς Φερρὰς τῆς τε Ἀσίας καὶ Εὐρώπης ἐξήλανε ἀπὸ Ἀδριανουπόλεως. ἀνέγνωσε δ' αὐτὸν στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον καὶ Νέρης ὁ τῶν Ἀθησίων τύραννος, οὐκ ἤκιστα δὲ καὶ Τουραχάνης ὁ Θετταλίας ὑπαρχος.
- 112 For the controversy surrounding the abdication and the return of Murad (and for the enmity that Mehmed II conceived towards senior members of the Porte, including the vizier Halil Çandarlı, responsible for the recall of Murad), see *MCT*, pp. 42–47.
- 113 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.12 (pp. 102, 103): ὁ μέντοι Κωνσταντῖνος ὡς ἐτείχισε τὸν Ἴσθμόν, ἐνταῦθα ἐκάθητο φυλακὰς ἔχων ἢ ἐγκαθιστάς εἰς τὸν Ἴσθμόν, καὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβων ἐτύγχανεν. ἐπειτε δὲ ἐτύθετο Ἀμουράτην στρατεύεσθαι ἐπ' αὐτόν, μετεπέμπετο αὐτοῦ σύμπαντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ἄμα, ὃς ἐτύγχανε γάμον ἔχων τῆς παιδὸς αὐτοῦ. ἡμόσατο γὰρ ἤδη τῷ Τριβαλλῶ ἡγεμόνι παιδὶ Ἐλεαζάρῳ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν Ἴσθμόν, ἢ ἐπηγγέλοντο, παρήσαν, καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἐκράτουν, ἢ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρὰς ἔξειν ἀμυνομένους. This passage is echoed in the *BCIII*, 6.32: καὶ ὁ δεσπότης ἐμάζωξε ὅλα τὰ φουσσάτα τοῦ Μορέως καὶ ἔστειλε καὶ ἔκραξε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸ του, ὅπου ἦτονε εἰς τὸν δεσπότη τῶν Σερβίων, εἰς τὸ γάμον, ὅπου εἶχε δώσει τὴν θυγατέρα του τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ δεσπότη τῶν Σερβίων, διὰ νὰ ἐρθῆ εἰς βοήθειαν. In addition, cf. the information supplied by the *Minus*, 28.1: τὸν δὲ Ὀκτώβριον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἐξῆλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Γλαρέντζας ἡ θυγάτηρ τοῦ κυροῦ Θωμᾶ τοῦ δεσπότη κυρᾶ Ἐλένη, ἵνα ἀπέλθῃ εἰς τὴν Σερβίαν καὶ Λάζαρον τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ κυροῦ Γιουρῆ δεσπότη ἀνδρα λάβῃ ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. Sphrantzes adds that the emperor honored the bridegroom with the title of despot, 28.2: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ δεσπότην καὶ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν Λάζαρον ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης διὰ τοῦ Φιλανθρωπίνου Γεωργίου τετίμηκε. On the house of Serbia and Constantinople, see J. Papadriano, “Τίνας οἱ Δεσμοὶ Συγγενείας τοῦ Γεωργίου Βράνκοβιτς πρὸς τὸν Οἶκον τῶν Παλαιολόγων,” *ΕΕΒΣ* 33 (1964): 140–142.
- 114 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.12 (pp. 102, 103); by ἐτείχισε τὸν Ἴσθμόν, the historian must mean “strengthened,” since Constantine had already erected the fortifications as we know from Sphrantzes, 27.6: Constantine went πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν καλίω τοῦ Ἐξαμιλίου.
- 115 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.12 (pp. 102, 103): δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦτο στρατόπεδον κάλλιστα πάντων δὴ στρατοπέδων, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐθεασάμεθα καὶ ἀκοῆ ἐπυθόμεθα.
- 116 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 31, admits that the narrative of Khalkokondyles is vivid at this point and speculates that he received this tale from his father.
- 117 *MCT*, p. 49.
- 118 Such is the vague suggestion encountered in *ibid.*, p. 49. For the exaggerated views in connection to the Ottoman artillery and its supposed effectiveness, see M. Philippides, “Urban’s Bombard(s), Gunpowder, and the Fall of Constantinople (1453),” *BSEB* 4 (1999), n.s.: 1–67; and K. DeVries, “Gunpowder Weapons at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453,” *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries* [The

- Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453 9], ed. Y. Lev (Leiden, NY and Cologne, 1997), pp. 343–362.
- 119 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.18 (pp. 102–106): Ἀμουράτης δὲ ἐπελαύνων, συμπαραλαμβάνων καὶ τὰ στρατεύματα τῆς χώρας ὅποι γένοιτο, παρῆν ἐς τὰς Θήβας, ὅτε καὶ ὁ Νέρης αὐτῷ παρεγένετο, στρατὸν ἀγόμενος ἀπὸ Ἀθηνῶν. ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς Παγὰς ἐστρατοπεδεύετο, καὶ τηλεβόλους τε καὶ πλοκάδια παρασκευάζομενος ἐπὶ ἡμέρας τινάς, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπικαταβάς εἰς τὸν Ἴσθμόν ἐστρατοπεδεύετο ἀπὸ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν καθήκοντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου καὶ τῶν σκευῶν. He is followed closely by the anonymous *BCIII*, 6.32: τότε ἦρθε ὁ Μουράτης ἐς τὰ μέρη τῆς Θήβας καὶ ἐσμίξε μὲ τὸν δοῦκα τῆς Ἀθήνας καὶ τοῦ ἀκολούθησε εἰς βοήθειαν. Τότε ἦρθανε καὶ ἐμείνανε εἰς τόπον λεγόμενον Μίγγες, κοντὰ εἰς τὸ Ἐξαμίλι. Καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐσμίωσανε εἰς τὸν τοῖχον τοῦ Ἐξαμιλίου καὶ ἄπλωσε τὰ φρουσάτα εἰςὲς ὅλον τὸν τοῖχο, ἀπ' τὴν μία μερῆα ἕως τὴν ἄλλην, ἦγον ἀπὸ τὸν ἕνα γιὰ τὸ ἕως τὸν ἄλλον. The only difference between Khalkokondyles and the author of the *BCIII* is the variant Pagae/Mingae. E. Darkó corrected the manuscript reading Μιγγίας into Παγὰς, as he states in his *apparatus criticus*. Kaldellis restored, in his new edition, the ms. reading, Μιγγίας. The same passage finds a direct echo in the narrative of Spandugino also, p. 151: *Et vedendo questo Amurath . . . hebbe ardire di intrar nel Peloponneso et pigliar la impresa dello Examili, che era uno muro di sei miglia che andava da uno mare a l'altro*. For the sources of Spandugino, his antecedents, and an original text in Latin, see E. Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance* (Chicago and London, 1981), pp. 334, 335.
- 120 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.20 (pp. 106, 107), followed by the *BCIII*, 6.33. On this incident, see *PaL* 2: 96.
- 121 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.20 (pp. 106, 107): λέγων ὡς οὐχ ὑπομενοῦσιν ἐπιόντα αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' οἰχίθονται φεύγοντες, ἐπειδὰν τὸ πρῶτον πύθωνται ἀφικέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἴσθμόν.
- 122 *Ibid.*, 2.7.18 (pp. 104, 105): ἐνταῦθα κατάσκοπος τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὡς ὑποστρέψας ἀπήγγειλε τὸ τε πλῆθος τοῦ βασιλείως καὶ ὑποζύγια καὶ καμήλους, καὶ οὐκ ἠνέσχετο σιγῇ παρελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα ἔλεξε τοιαύδε “ὦ δέσποτα, οἷα δὴ κακὰ ἐργάσασθαι Πελοπόννησον πόλεμον τοιούτω τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀνελόμενος, ὅς τε Ἀσίαν σύμπασαν καὶ Εὐρώπην ἄγων οὐδ' ὅποι σιτίζεται ἔξει, οὐδ' εἰ διπλοῦν ὅσι τεῖχος ἐς τὸν Ἴσθμόν ἐληλαμένον εἶη. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεοῦ πρέσβεις τε πέμπε ὡς τάχιστα, καὶ ἐς διαλλαγὴν προκαλοῦ τὸν βασιλεῖα τοῦτον, ὡς ἂν μὴ κακοῦς κακῶς ἐπιτήρησιν τὸ παράπαν.” ταῦτα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ θυμωθῆναι τε τὸν ἡγεμόνα, καὶ θυμωθέντα κελεύσαι εἰς εἰρκτὴν ἀγαγεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
- 123 *Minus*, 28.3: τῆ κζ^η τοῦ Νοεμβρίου . . . ἦλθεν ὁ ἀμηνρὰς κατὰ Ἐξαμιλίου καὶ τῆ ι^η Δεκεμβρίου ἀπῆρεν αὐτό.
- 124 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.20, 21 (pp. 106, 107): καὶ ἐπέμενε τε ἡμέρας συχνάς ὡς ἐνδύσοντος διὰ ταῦτα τοῦ Πελοποννησίων ἡγεμόνος. καὶ ἐπεὶ τε παρεληλύθασιν αἱ ἡμέραι, ἐπικαταβάς ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐστρατοπεδεύετο. τῆ μὲν ὑστεραία τηλεβόλοις μακροῖς ἔτυπτε τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῦ ἡγεμόνος τῆ δὲ ἐπιούσῃ ἀπεπειρώτων τῶν ἐν τῷ τείχει καὶ προσέφερον τὰς μηχανάς. τῆ δὲ τετάρτῃ ἐσπέρας τὰ πυρὰ ἀνάμενον καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὡς πλείστα ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκηνὴν . . . καὶ τότε τὰ πυρὰ ποιησάμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο πρὸς τειχομαχίαν. τῆ δὲ πέμπτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐσπέρας τὰς μηχανάς προσέφερον . . . τότε μὲν δὴ . . . ἐπειρώντο τε αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμάχοντο.
- 125 *CBB* 1: 22.42 (p. 187), 33.39 (p. 250), 33.50 (p. 252), 34.12 (p. 258), 35.7 (p. 286), 36.18 (p. 293), 37.6 (p. 299), 38.10 (p. 304), 39.6 (pp. 310, 311), 40.3 (p. 314), 47.9 (p. 346), 53.19 (p. 382), 54.14 (p. 389), 55.12 (p. 399), 56.3 (p. 407), 58.7 (p. 419), 60.17 (p. 452), 62.6 (p. 462), 65.2 (p. 502), 66.3 (p. 513), 67.3 (p. 517), 68.2 (p. 521), 69.10 (p. 530), 69.28 (p. 533), 73.4 (p. 566), 76.3 (p. 572), 82.3 (p. 597), 101.4 (p. 654), and 102.9 (p. 657). To these notices we must add the entry added in the margin of the Paris *codex* 2005 (fol. 274^v) by the hand of Nicholas Boullotes Agallonas; the note in the *codex Ambr.* G 69, fol. 345^v, written by John Dokeianos (Δεκεμβρίου ι^η α^{ου} υ^{ου} μ^{ου} ζ^{ου} ἀπὸ τῆς χριστοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν γεννήσεως ἕάλω τὸ ἔξαμίλιον] ὄπερ ἀνέστησεν ὁ

- δεσπότης κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος); and a note supplied by Ioannikios Kartanos. These notices have been published and discussed by Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ,” pp. 482 ff.
- 126 *CBB* 1: 22.42 (p. 187), 33.39 (p. 250), 35.7 (p. 286), 36.18 (p. 293), 37.6 (p. 299), 38.10 (p. 304), 40.3 (p. 314), 53.19 (p. 382), 54.14 (p. 389), 55.12 (p. 399), 56.3 (p. 407), 58.7 (p. 419), 60.17 (p. 452), 62.6 (p. 462), 65.2 (p. 502), 66.3 (p. 513), 67.3 (p. 517), 68.2 (p. 521), 69.10 (p. 530), 69.28 (p. 533), 73.4 (p. 566), 76.3 (p. 572), 82.3 (p. 597), 101.4 (p. 654), and 102.9 (p. 657).
- 127 Thus, e.g., *CBB* 1: 68.2 (p. 521) supplies the wrong year, 1448 (in Arabic numerals), 36.18 (p. 293) and states that the battle took place on December 14, rather than on the 10th, while 65.2 (p. 502), states that December 10 was a Friday (actually, it fell on a Saturday), while 39.6 (pp. 310, 311), states that it was Saturday, December 9!
- 128 *CBB* 1: 33.50 (p. 252), 34.12 (p. 268), 33.7 (p. 286), 36.18 (p. 293), 39.6 (pp. 310, 311), and 47.9 (p. 346).
- 129 Discussion of *CBB* 1: 33.50 (p. 252), with the supplied chronology, in Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ,” pp. 480–490, whose important conclusions are overlooked in *CBB* 2: pp. 467, 468. Also cf. the long entry provided in *CBB* 1: 47.9 (p. 346).
- 130 *CBB* 1: 33.50 (252): ζᾶνε ἔτει τοῦ κόσμου, ἰνδικτιῶνος ι´, τῆς δὲ θείας σαρκώσεως αὐμς´, δεκεμβρίῳ γ´, ἡμέρᾳ σαββάτῳ, ἦλθεν μετὰ φουσσάτου χιλιάδων ξ´ Τοῦρκος ἀμηράς ὁ Ἀμουράτης, εἰς τὸ Ἐξαμίλι Κορίνθου, καὶ τῆ ἄλλῃ ἐρχομένη παρασκευῆ ἑσπέρα, ἤρξατο τοῦ πολέμου καὶ δι´ ὅλης τῆς νυκτὸς γεναμένης ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς μάχης. Also cf. Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ,” pp. 488–490.
- 131 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.21 (pp. 106, 107).
- 132 Barbaro, 48 [improved text in *CC* 1: 27]: *A di vinti sie pur de questo mexe de mazo a una hora de note, turchi se fexe per tuto el suo campo una gran luminaria de fuoghi, li qual fuoghi ogni pavion che iera in nel campo, si feva do fuoghi, i qual fuoghi si iera grandenissimi, e per grandò calor de quelli, pareva che fosse de zorno chiaro, questi teribeli fuoghi si durò in fina a la meza note; questi fuoghi el signor turco si i fexe far per el campo, per alegrà el puovolo del campo, perchè el se approssimava la destrution de la puovera zitade, per dare la dura bataia.* Leonardo, another eyewitness to the siege of 1453, also commented on this ritual (*PG* 159: 938; *CC* 1: 158): *Sicque factum est: triduo luminaria Deo accendunt, jejunant die nihil usque ad noctem gustantes.* During those final hours before the last battle and the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Constantine may have recalled the bonfires that had burned before him seven years earlier, while he was awaiting the general assault on his Hexamilion. For the bonfires at the Hexamilion, see *BCIII*, 6.33, which also specifies a period of three days before the attack: ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὴν ἄλλην μερέαν, τὴν ὄζω τοῦ τοῖχου, καὶ ἐστάθησαν εἰς τρεῖς ἡμέρας, καὶ ἐκάμανε φωτίες ὅλην τὴν νύκτα. καὶ ἐπροσκυνούσανε καὶ ἐνάλλανε τοῦ Προφήτη τους. καὶ, ὡσὰν ἀπεράσανε οἱ τρεῖς ἡμέρες, ἐφέρανε εἰς τὸν τοῖχο τὰ μάγγανα τοῦ πολέμου.
- 133 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.21 (pp. 106, 107): εἰώθασι γὰρ οὕτω τὸ γένος τοῦτο τῶν Τοῦρκων, ἐπειδὴν ἐς μάχην μέλλουσιν ἰέναι πρότριτα ἡδὴ τῆς ἡμέρας, ἢ ἐς τὴν μάχην καθίστανται, πυρὰ τε καίουσιν ἀνὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὅτι πλείστα ἑκαστος, καὶ ὕμνον τινὰ ἀναφαίνουσι τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ ἥρωϊ, δῆλον ποιούμενοι, ὡς ἂν μάχην τῆ ὑστεραία τῆς ἐπιούσης καθίστανται.
- 134 *Ibid.*, 2.7.23 (pp. 108–110): ὡς δὲ ἠῶς τε ἡδὴ ὑπέφαινε . . . ἐπήεσαν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος . . . βασιλεύς τε αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ νεήλυδες κατὰ τὸ μέσον τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ, ἥπερ ἐσκήνουν, καθίσταντο ἐς μάχην, καὶ κλίμακας προσέφερον, καὶ διορύσσοντες τὸ τεῖχος ἠγωνίζοντο ὡς ἐξαυρήσοντες, καὶ τὸς τε τηλεβολίσκους ταύτη ταξάμενος οὐκ εἶα τοὺς Πελοποννησίους προκύπτειν . . . ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν ἀδεία τε ἐγένοντο οἱ νεήλυδες, καὶ τὰς κλίμακας ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐνεγκάμενοι ἀνέβαινον, καὶ ὑπερέβησαν ταύτη, ἢ ἐθεάτο ὁ βασιλεύς.
- 135 *Ibid.*, 2.7.24 (pp. 110–113): καὶ διὰ τῶν πυλῶν εἰσερχόντο καὶ ἔτρεχον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἑλλήνων τραπόμενοι διήρπαζον τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπιπλα, ἐσθῆτάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας τραπόμενοι τοὺς μὲν

- αὐτῶν ἔφθειρον τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐζώγρουν, ἐς ἀνδραπόδων μοῖραν τιθέμενοι. καὶ φόνος τε ἦν πολὺς τῶν φευγόντων. The same information is also encountered in *CBB* 1: 33.50 (p. 252): καὶ ἐτράπησαν εἰς φυγὴν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ ἐσέβησαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι καὶ ἐδίωκον αὐτούς, καὶ οὐς μὲν ἀνεῖλον, οὐς δὲ ἠχμαλώτισαν. Also see *CBB* 1: 47.9 (p. 346): καὶ ἐσέβησαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι καὶ ἔκοσαν αὐτούς, καὶ ἐγίνεται θρῆνος καὶ οὐαὶ πολὺ εἰς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. The *BCIII*, 6.33, adds the important detail that those on foot suffered the most: καὶ ἀπὸ τοὺς ἀπεζοὺς ἐσώνασι οἱ Τοῦρκοι, καὶ ἄλλους ἐκόβγανε καὶ ἄλλους ἐσπλαβόνανε. For these events, cf. *DGM* 1: 232, 233.
- 136 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.25 (pp. 112, 113): περὶ δὲ τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνας τοιάδε ἐγένετο. ὡς γὰρ ἐώρων φεύγοντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀνά κράτος καὶ οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἐπειρῶντο μὲν πρότιστα κατέχειν, ὡς δ' οὐκ ἠδύναντο, καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγοντες ὄχοντο.
- 137 *Ibid.*: ἦδεσαν γάρ, ὡς πολιορκησόμενοι ἀλώσειντο ἐνταῦθα, τῆς τε τροφῆς ἰκανῆς οὐκ οὐσῆς ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἄλλης παρασκευῆς.
- 138 *Ibid.*, 2.7.25 (pp. 112, 113): ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν μεσόγαιον ἐπειγόμενοι ἔφθασαν γενόμενοι ἐπὶ ἄκραν τὴν Λακωνικὴν τῆς Πελοποννήσου, καταδοκῆσαντες, ἧ μέλλει χρῆσιν ὁ βασιλεὺς. αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀφιζόμενοι καὶ ὑπεκστησόμενοι τῆς χώρας αὐτῶ . . . καὶ οὐκέτι ἠλιζῶν περιέσεσθαι σφίσι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λοιποῦ, ἀλλ' οἴχεσθαι σφίσι τὰ πράγματα ἀπολλύμενα.
- 139 *Ibid.*, 2.7.26 (pp. 112, 113): Ἀμουράτης δὲ ὡς κατέσχε τὸν Ἰσθμόν, καὶ ἐπει ἐγένετο ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου, πρῶτα μὲν ἐς τριακοσίους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, οὓς ἀποφυγόντας τῆς νυκτὸς τοιαύτης ἐς τὸ ὄρος ὑπὲρ τὰς Κεγγρέας, Ὄξυ δὲ καλούμενον, κυκλωσάμενοι εἶλον ἀπάτη πάντας, εἰς ἓνα χώρον ἀπαγαγὼν κατέσφαξε. Slightly different is the account in *BCIII*, 6.33, which suggests that Murad slaughtered his prisoners in order to spread terror among the local inhabitants: τότε ὁ Μουράτης, ὡσάν ἐμπῆκε εἰς τὸν Μορέα, ἔκοψε τριακοσίους χριστιανοὺς Μοραίτες, ὅπου τις εἶχες πιασμένους, διὰ τὴν δόση φόβου τῶν ἐπιλοιπῶν Μοραίτων.
- 140 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.26 (pp. 112–115): ὠνησάμενος ἀνδράποδα ἐς ἑξακόσια θυσίαν ἀνήγεν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὶ, ἐξιλεούμενος τῷ φόνῳ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων. The same information is found in the *BCIII*, 6.33, which even uses the Turkish term *kurban* to indicate the rite: ἀκόμῃ ἔπιασε καὶ ἄλλους ἑξακόσιους Μοραίτες χριστιανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἔκοψε, λέγει, διὰ κουρουμπάνι τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ πατέρα του. For this rite, see S. Vryonis, “Evidence for Human Sacrifice among Early Ottoman Turks,” *Journal of Asian History* 5 (1971): 140–146; and *MCT*, p. 49.
- 141 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.27–29 (pp. 112–117). These events are also mentioned in *CBB* 1: 33.50 (p. 252): καὶ ἐπῆραν ἄπειρα πλήθη καὶ ἄρματα καὶ ζῶα καὶ χρήματα πολλά. εἶτα ἀπῆγαν εἰς τὰ Βασιλικά, εἶτα εἰς τὴν Βοστιτζαν καὶ ἐνέπρηνσαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἠχμαλώτευσαν. Further echoes in *BCIII*, 6.34. In addition, cf. *DGM* 1: 234, 235.
- 142 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.28 (pp. 114, 115): καὶ πρόσω ἐρχόμενος ἀφίκετο ἐπὶ Πάτρας τῆς Ἀχαΐας πόλιν . . . τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν ἐπολιόρκει καὶ τοὺς νεήλυδας ἐπεμμεν ὡς ἐλοῦντας. καὶ οὗτοι προσεβάλλον τε τῷ τείχει καὶ ὑπορυζάμενοι εἰσέπιπτον. οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ρήτινῃν καὶ πίσσαν πυρὶ ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὴν ὄπην τοὺς νεήλυδας ἐξεκρούσαντο ἀμυνόμενοι καὶ ἐκράτυνον τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Cf. *MCT*, p. 49. Also cf. *CBB* 1: 33.50 (p. 252): ὁμοίως καὶ εἰς τὴν Πάτραν, χωρὶς τὸν κουλάν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πέριξ τούτων.
- 143 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.28 (pp. 114, 115); *MCT*, p. 50. Doukas, 32.7, treats the entire campaign in one brief paragraph and attributes the rout to the treacherous nature of the despots' Albanian mercenaries: στραφεῖς δὲ ὁ Μουράτ σὺν εὐτυχίᾳ πλείστη [after his victory at Varna] στέλλει ἀποκρισιάριον, ζητῶν τὰς πόλεις αὐτοῦ, ὁ δὲ Κωνσταντῖνος οὐκ ἠθέλε. καὶ στρατείας καὶ θεῖς χάρακα ἐν τῷ Ἐξαμίλιῳ, ἦν γὰρ πρὸ τεσσάρων χρόνων οἰκοδομήσας αὐτὸ ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος, σὺν ἐξήκοντα χιλιάσιν ὧν ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ εἰσῆλθε. καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀλίγῳ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ Θωμᾶς ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ, δεσπότης ὦν Ἀχαΐας, παρεδίδοντο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀλβανῶν πλὴν αὐτοὶ τὸν δόλον ἐννοήσαντες ἀπέδρσαν. ὁ δὲ Μουράτ μέχρις Πατρῶν καὶ Γλαρέντζαν δραμῶν καὶ ἀφανισμῷ παραδοὺς πάντα τὰ ἐκεῖ, ὑπανέστρεψε χαλάσας τὸ Ἐξαμίλιον, ἐρείπιον καταλιπὼν αὐτό, αἰχμαλωτίσας

- πλήθος λαοῦ, ἐπέκεινα χιλιάδες ἐξήκοντα. Doukas' numbers are exaggerated; cf. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 116.
- 144 *PaL* 2: 95, 96; for an extract of Cyriacus' text, see *PaL* 2: 96, n. 52: *Nunc equidem contra vidimus barbaros longo ordine preda nostre quoque religionis homines et potissimum Graia ex natione captivos . . . quorum et a miseris nonnullos pientissimo ab ore certius intelligimus Murath Begh . . . Peloponnesiacum Isthmum ingentibus admotis copiis hostiliter . . . invasisse, turritis ibidem paulo ante menibus a Constantino Spartanō rege curiosissime restitutes . . . ac inde sparto milite regionem late populatam esse.*
- 145 Τοῦ Σοφοτάτου Διδασκάλου καὶ Καθολικοῦ Κριτοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων Κῦρ Γεωργίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου Ἐπιτάφιος ἐπὶ τῷ Μακαρίτῃ καὶ Αἰοδίμῳ Δεσπότη Κῦρ Θεοδώρῳ Παλαιολόγῳ τῷ Πορφυρογεννήτῳ published in *PkP* 2: 1–13. The historically important section of this piece is noted by *DGM* 1: 234, 235, with a French translation of the passage. The extract in our text: *PkP* 2: 6–8: ἐν τις ἐμέμψατ' ἂν αὐτοῦ [*sc.* Θεοδώρου] μόνον ἀβασανίστως, τὴν περὶ τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἐκείνην ὀλιγοῦριαν . . . καὶ τῶν οἰκούντων τὴν νῆσον ἐάλωσάν τε καὶ ἀπέθανον οὐκ ὀλίγοι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τις αἰτίας ἐξω τιθεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα, οὐδὲ τὰδελοῦ [*sc.* Κωνσταντίνου] φείσεται ὃς ἐτείχιζε μὲν τὸ δεῦτερον ὡς φυλάξων ᾧτο γὰρ προπολεμήσειεν τοῦ τείχους πάντας ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκεῖνο ἰδρύετο οὔτε δ' ἀποσοβῆσαι τοὺς πολεμίους, οὔτε κενοὺς ἐκπέμψαι μόνος δυνάμενος μόλις ἴσχυσε φυγῆ τὴν σωτηρίαν εὐρέσθαι . . . καὶ τείχος ἀνεσταμένον ἄρχοντος στεροῖτο δικαίως . . . τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς πονηρίας τῶν ἐντὸς ἰσθμοῦ πάντων τό τε πρότερον τό θ' ὕστερον πτώμα τοῦ τείχους καὶ αἰ μετὰ ταῦτα κατασχοῦσαι τὴν νῆσον ἅπασαν συμφοραί. καὶ . . . οὗτος ἀνίστη μὲν τὸ τείχος ἐφιστάμενος πανταχοῦ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστα, οὐκ ἴσχυσε δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα σῶσαι παρῶν.
- 146 *Ibid.*: κληρονόμους . . . τῶν ποτε Πελοποννησίων . . . νόθους.
- 147 *Ibid.*: τοῖς ἄρχουσι ἀντι δόξης δύσκληιαν φέρουσι πανταχοῦ.
- 148 There is a certain irony, when one is reminded of the ὑπόμνημα that Cardinal Bessarion sent to Constantine on the occasion of the renovation; it was then that the cardinal reminded the despot of the value of a garrison, stating that walls alone can accomplish nothing; it is the caliber of the men behind the fortifications that makes the difference; see *supra*, n. 71 (for the context): καὶ γὰρ ἀνευ μὲν φυλάκων οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε δυνηθεῖεν μόνα τὰ τεῖχη. One is further reminded of the *encomium* that John Dokeianos produced, in which he stated that Constantine, during his regency in 1438 and 1439, had demonstrated the validity of the same old adage, which he attributed to Demosthenes and to Aelius Aristides; see *PkP* 1: 230: ἀντικρυς γὰρ ἔδειξας τὸ καὶ Δημοσθένει καὶ Ἀριστείδῃ καλῶς δοκοῦν, ὡς ἄρα “οὐ λίθοι οὐδὲ ξύλα οὐδὲ τέχνη τεκτόνων αἰ πόλεις ἂν εἶεν, ἀλλ' ὅπου ποτ' ἂν ὦσι ἄνδρες αὐτοῦς . . . ἐνταῦθα καὶ τεῖχη καὶ πόλεις.”
- 149 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.19 (pp. 104, 105): ἔτυχε δ' αὐτῷ πρέσβυς ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ βασιλέα, οὐ μέντοι μέτρια ἐζήτηι γενέσθαι αὐτῷ. ἤξιον τε γὰρ τὸν τε Ἰσθμὸν ἐστηκέναι αὐτῷ, καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς χώραν τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅσῃν ὑπηγάγετο, ἔχειν αὐτόν, καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ ταῦτα δικὴν ὑπέσχεεν ὑπὸ βασιλέως, τὸν τε πρέσβυν καθεῖρξας ἐν Φερραῖς εἶχεν ἐν φυλακῇ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἤλαυνε ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον μέσον χειμῶνος. ἦν δ' ὁ πρέσβυς Χαλκοκανδύλης Αθηναῖος.
- 150 *CBB* 1: 33.50 (p. 292): δι' ὅλης τῆς νυκτὸς γεναμένης ἰσχυρᾶς μάχης τῷ πρωτῷ ἀφείθη ὁ τεῖχος παρὰ τῶν ἐπιβούλων καὶ ἐτράπησαν εἰς φυγὴν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ ἐσέβησαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι. *CBB* 1 prints the form ἀφείθη but Lampros, “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ,” p. 484, has shown that the manuscript reading ἀφηθ represents the word ἀφήθη. Doukas, 32, also speaks of a betrayal; text *supra*, n. 143. In addition, see Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 116.
- 151 *Lamentation/Θρήνος*, ll. 78–84 (pp. 116, 117): ὃ Κόρινθος πολὺθλιβος, πολὺ κακὸν τὸ εἶδες, / τότες ὅταν ἐγάλασαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὸ Ἐξαμίλι / ὄλος ὁ κόσμος ἔγεμεν ἄρματα καὶ δοξάρια, / σαγίτταις χρυσοπτέρυγαις, σπαθία κοσμημένα / κεφαλαί [metrically better would be: κεφάλαια], χέρια, σώματα 'ς τὸν κάμπον ἀπλωμένα. / ὃ Κόρινθος κακότηχος, πολὺ κακὸν ὀποῦδες, / καὶ σύ, ἀνδρειωμένε βασιλεῦ, κακὸν ρίζικὸν ὀποῦχες. The poet suggests that this point was the beginning of Constantine's mournful fate, 85–92

- (p. 117): τὴν Πάτραν τὴν πανεύμορφον εἶχες παρηγοριάν σου, / κ' οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὴν ἐκόψασιν τὴν ταπεινὴν τὴν Πάτραν, / καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐχάλασεν ὄλον τὸ ριζικόν σου / αὐτὴν τὴν Πάτραν τὴν πτωχὴν εἶχες παρηγοριάν σου, / πουγκίν σου καὶ σακκούλιν σου εἰς ὄλαις ταῖς δουλειαῖς σου, / εἰς ὄλαις σου ταῖς ὀρεῖξες κ' εἰς τὰ θελήματά σου.
- 152 On the despot as an “indefatigable” soldier, see *MCT*, p. 41, and as a “dynamic” individual, see *supra*, text with n. 92.
- 153 For this pious assessment of Constantine, see Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 32, 33. The same scholar expressed a stronger opinion in an earlier publication; see *LCB*, p. 390: “Constantine . . . in the Morea. It was there that he had shown the qualities that made him best fitted to take over the management and defense of . . . the Byzantine Empire.” The only modern assessment to suggest that, after this defeat, Constantine somehow lost his spirit can be found in *DGM* 1: 235: “Après la défaite d’Hexamilion, Constantine perdit son premier élan.” For a more recent assessment of Constantine’s “achievements” in the Morea, see Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, p. 119: “The Byzantine successes in the Morea at this time can better be attributed to the fact that they were the last to survive the battle royal of petty Morean states.”
- 154 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.28 (pp. 114, 115): ἀφίκετο ἐπὶ Πάτρας τῆς Ἀχαΐας πόλιν εὐδαίμονα. ταῦτην μὲν οὖν ἐξέλιπον οἱ ἄνδρες ἐς τὴν καταντικρὴν ἡπειρον τῶν Οὐνετῶν . . . πάντες ὄχοντο φεύγοντες. The *BCIII*, 6.34, adds that the refugees amounted to four thousand: οἱ Πατρινοὶ ἐφύγαγε τέσσαρες χιλιάδες χριστιανοὶ καὶ ἐδιάβησαν εἰς τὰ κάστρη τῶν Βενετζάνω καὶ εἰς τὸν Ἐπαχτο, ὅπου ἦτον βενέτικος. Cf. *DGM* 1: 234.
- 155 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.28 (pp. 116, 117): μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον σπονδὰς τε ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ὑπόφορον ἔσχον τὴν Πελοπόννησον τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε οἱ Ἕλληνας, μέχρι τούτου τὸ πρὶν ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν . . . ἡ δὲ ἐκτὸς χώρα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἄλωσιν προσεχώρησε τῷ βασιλεῖ, τὸ τε Πίνδον καὶ ἡ ἄλλη χώρα τοῦ βασιλέως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐς τοσοῦτον ἐγένετο.
- 156 *BCIII*, 6.33: καὶ ἐβουλήθησαν οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ Μορέως, ὅπου ἦτανε φυλαμένοι εἰς τὰ κάστρη, ὅτι ἢ νὰ κάμουνε ἀγάπη μὲ τὸν σουλτὰν Μουράτη ἢ νὰ ἐμποῦνε εἰσεῖς πλεοῦμενα νὰ φύγουνε ἀπὸ τὸν Μορέα, διατὶ ἐβλέπανε πῶς τότε χάνουσι καὶ τὸν παίρνει ὁ Μουράτης, τόσο ἐφοβήθησαν καὶ πολλὴ ἀνανδρία τοὺς ἤρθε.

8 *Animi cadunt*

The end of an era

1 A scholar from the west

While the Morea struggled to establish a semblance of order out of the chaos left in the wake of the Ottoman invasion, Constantine's court played host to the indefatigable antiquary Cyriacus of Ancona, who visited southern Greece in the summer of 1447. Cyriacus had already been told of the fall of the Hexamilion and of the devastation of the Morea when he had come across, in the neighborhood of Kallipolis, the throngs of captives who had been seized by Murad. The unfortunate victims of Constantine's delusions of grandeur were on their way to the slave markets of Asia Minor, when they met Cyriacus and lamented their cruel fate to the Italian traveler.¹ Cyriacus was deeply affected by this, but there was nothing he could do. Throughout this period, he kept a journal which supplies some information on the condition of the despotate and on Constantine. Even though, in its transmitted form, this diary contains numerous lacunas and transpositions of the original text, scholarship has managed to make some sense out of its confusion. The following extract seems to be reliable:²

From the citadel of Leontari, the territory of the illustrious despot Thomas Palaeologus in Laconia, my retinue and I came upon the Spartan hills of Mount Taygetos; at a distance of about 30 stadia from the ancient, renowned city of the Lacedaemonians, and high up on the cliffs is situated the impregnable town called nowadays the "Spartan Mountain" and "Mistra." I found that its reigning despot was the famous Constantine, also called Dragaš, a member of the Palaeologan family; in addition, one of its famous residents was my old friend and most learned Greek, who follows the Platonic teachings in his way of life [Plethon].

Cyriacus reached Mistra on July 30.³ He seems to have brought with him a copy of Strabo, which he examined and discussed with his old acquaintance, Plethon.⁴ Both individuals had a deep interest in geography. Earlier, during the imperial visit to Florence, Plethon had actually met Paolo Dal Pozzo Toscanelli, the leading geographer of the period, who later exercised considerable influence on Christopher Columbus. Before he set out, the explorer had thoroughly familiarized

himself with the work of Strabo, whose text had been recently improved through Plethon's efforts, to a large degree. The manuscript of Strabo that the Italian antiquary brought to Mistra in 1447 survives.⁵ Cyriacus further composed an abstract of Dictys Cretensis' supposed "journal" of the Trojan War⁶ that was then reviewed and corrected by the hand of the philosopher.⁷ During the present trip, Cyriacus met a student of Plethon, who impressed him with his scholarship to such a degree that he described him as "an exceptionally learned man in Latin and Greek literature."⁸ This young scholar guided Cyriacus through the ruins of ancient Sparta on August 2. It was Cyriacus' second visit to the ruins, as he had toured this site ten years earlier.⁹ On the present occasion his informed guide, "the learned" youth, was none other than Laonikos Khalkokondyles, who later became the noted historian:¹⁰

In the company of the excellent young Athenian Khalkokondyles, whom I mentioned previously, I visited the monuments of the ancient, renowned city of Sparta. I did not think that one visit would be sufficient and I found it pleasurable to spend time and see again the old, famous, and memorable Gymnasium.

Next Cyriacus embarked upon an extensive tour of the antiquities of the southern Morea:¹¹ Ithome, Corone (which he took¹² to be the Homeric Pegasus), Tainaron, Gythion, and Oitylon (Vitylo), where he was entertained by its governor John Palaeologus, a subordinate of Constantine.¹³ He made stops in Messenia and Mani, noting and recording inscriptions, monuments, and ancient remains. After his return to Mistra, he explored the ruins of Sparta once more. This time he found himself in a romantic mood:¹⁴

When I drew rather close to the city of Sparta, to the fields and banks of the River Eurotas, and to the sacred places where the memorable city of Lacedaemonians stood, with its huge remains still in evidence, I stood at some distance in awe. Thereupon, Calliope descended from heaven . . . <and> I heard her singing.

Enraptured by the idyllic scene and the picturesque ruins, Cyriacus anticipated countless Philhellenes who would find themselves similarly inspired upon seeing ancient remains in the centuries to come.

Cyriacus then composed a poem of seventeen lines in Italian.¹⁵ An unknown humanist¹⁶ subsequently paraphrased this composition into Greek prose (and did not directly translate it into a poetic form, as it is usually stated). The modern editor of this Greek paraphrase assumed that its author was Plethon.¹⁷ Another distinct possibility is that Cyriacus' *opusculum* was cast into Greek by the young scholar who impressed the antiquary with his erudition, Laonikos Khalkokondyles. Any humanist could have penned this paraphrase entitled¹⁸ *An Ode to Sparta by Cyriacus from Ancona in the Reign of Constantine Palaeologus; A Prose Translation into Greek*:¹⁹

Laconian Sparta, illustrious city, glory of Greece, example for all the world, training ground for war and common sense, shrine, mirror, and source of all

divine excellence: whenever I contemplate your constitution, your customs, and your laws about human beings together with your moral excellence and then look upon you, I suddenly cry out to the Eurotas, in the area of your honored Artemis: “Where is your good Lycurgus? Where are the Dioskouroi (the twin gods, Castor and Polydeuces)? Where are Anaxandridas, Orthryadas, and Gylippos? Where are you, Eurysthenes, Leonidas, Atreides, and Pausanias? Where are you, most illustrious lord, Lysander? Where are you Ariston, Agesilaos, and Xanthippus?” Eurotas replied: “Neither Rome nor Philip was responsible. Time together with the cowardice and neglect of our generation has transformed all this into Mistra under Constantine.”

It is possible that in the conclusion of this ode²⁰ Cyriacus meant to criticize the policies of Constantine XI, whose depressing reign he sharply contrasts with the grandeur of antiquity. Was he prompted to do so by the misery of Murad’s Moreot captives whom he had personally encountered after the destruction of the Hexamilion?²¹ While he seems to have formed a low opinion of the despot, Cyriacus found occasion to pay tribute to the modern inhabitants of Laconia, who, he noted, were worthy descendants of their ancestors.²² He further observed that the Morea was resilient and noted that, in spite of Murad’s and Turahan’s wave of terror, the annual harvest had been substantial.²³

Cyriacus’ implied criticism of Constantine might have offended the despot and his courtiers at Mistra. Perhaps in order to make amends with his hosts, on February 4, 1448, Cyriacus took time to compose an account of the Roman calendar in Greek, which he tactfully dedicated to Constantine:²⁴ *The Order of the Year’s Months by Cyriacus of Ancona, Dedicated to Constantine Palaeologus*. In this *opusculum* he names Constantine:²⁵ “To Constantine Palaeologus, born-in-the-purple and excellent king of Lacedaemon. By the hand of his most faithful, eternal slave, Cyriacus of Ancona; in Sparta by Mount Taygetos in the divinely protected citadel of Mistra at his illustrious and royal court.” He addressed the despot, whose status he elevates to “king/emperor,” wishing him, once more,²⁶ “good luck”: “And to Constantine, the most notable king of the Lacedaemonians: good fortune.” It should be added, however, that his notebook creates the impression that this traveler was not overly impressed with Constantine, whom he never befriended closely. In Constantinople, the Italian antiquary had discovered that John VIII valued westerners, whose companionship and friendship he actively encouraged. In Mistra, Cyriacus was entertained adequately, given his contacts and his personal relations with John VIII, but Mistra’s provincial court does not seem to have gone out of its way to make much of his visit, in sharp contrast to the royal treatment that he had received in the capital. His silence with regard to the hospitality that he received at Mistra stands out against his eloquence concerning the elegant treatment that he received elsewhere in the Aegean. He was so thankful for the warm reception that he met at the court of the lord of Paros, Crusino I Sommaripa, that he composed a *Soneto* in honor of his host, with praise for Parian marble (“snowy Paros of the glowing marble”).²⁷ It is probable that Crusino dazzled Cyriacus, because the latter’s interests coincided with his own: the two

individuals enthusiastically excavated Greek antiquities and stood together in awe before ancient busts and statues. Constantine at Mistra does not seem to have been an ardent admirer of antiquity.

Cyriacus spent the remaining part of the winter of 1447/48 at Mistra, copying various ancient works.²⁸ In the spring of 1448 he toured the Argolid, made excursions into Nauplion, and visited what he took to be ancient Mycenae. He collected inscriptions and made sketches of the antiquities. His tour ended at Corinth, where Constantine's lieutenant, John Kantakouzenos, apparently an old acquaintance, entertained him:²⁹

When . . . from the Spartan citadel, Mistra, I visited again the Acrocorinth, I found there John Kantakouzenos in charge of military and civil matters; he is a magnificent lord from an imperial line, who has been appointed governor of the Corinthian province by the Spartan lord Constantine. When he discovered that we were friends from Old Patras, he entertained me with extreme kindness.

Cyriacus reached Corinth on April 17, 1448;³⁰ he left the despotate of the Morea by the end of the same summer, as in September and October we find him in Arta, in the court of Carlo II Tocco, investigating the local archaeological sites.³¹ Carlo II died on September 3. Cyriacus attended his funeral and further witnessed the accession of Leonardo Tocco.³² Then he left Greece and he was back in Italy by the beginning of the winter of 1448.³³ This was his last journey to Greece, even though persistent rumors report that Cyriacus returned to the Levant and found employment in the Porte of Mehmed II, to whom he read the classics. It was even whispered that he marched, as a member of the sultan's retinue, into Constantinople on May 29, 1453.³⁴ These were only rumors. Cyriacus seems to have died in Cremona in 1452 and was erroneously identified with the actual secretary of the sultan, a renegade called Kyritzēs (whose Turkish name, upon conversion, became Yunus Beg). The similarity between "Cyriacus" (or "Kyriakos" in Greek) and "Kyritzēs" probably created the confusion.³⁵

2 The revenge of the priests

Prior to the Ottoman invasion of the Morea, Constantine had embarked upon a search for a new bride. The despot discussed his future plans with Sphrantzes:³⁶ "One more thing: when with God's help I take another wife, you will be responsible for the marriage arrangement. After the wedding, she will remain here and you will become her personal attendant." Sphrantzes states that, after the fall of the Hexamilion, he was sent on a mission to identify a potential bride for Constantine:³⁷ "In August of the same year I was sent to the City again to perform various missions, but especially to arrange a suitable marriage for my lord either with Trebizond or with Gotthia." Thus, the search for a third wife commenced while Constantine had been putting the finishing touches on his offensive to win control of central Greece.³⁸ The invasion of the Morea and the fall of the Hexamilion

intervened and the search for a suitable wife was then postponed and only resumed after Murad's withdrawal. At that time, the despot dispatched his envoys to various courts. Sphrantzes was charged with the task of locating a candidate in the lands that had been traditionally within the Byzantine sphere of influence. Constantine relied on the services of other specialists in his search for a bride in the west. Sphrantzes himself relates these diplomatic inquiries when he reviews the efforts of Constantine to save his capital. Constantine's loyal friend attributed the failure of Venice to dispatch her fleet in a timely fashion to the fact that a Venetian candidate had been eventually rejected by the Constantinopolitan court. Constantine had first entertained the possibility of marrying a daughter of Francesco Foscari, the doge of Venice. After his accession Constantine rejected this match, since, as Sphrantzes states, the daughter of the doge might have been good enough for the despot of the Morea but was socially inferior and beneath the dignity of the emperor of Constantinople.³⁹

Alvise Diedo acted as an intermediary, so that my late master, Lord Constantine, who was then the despot of the Morea, would take as his wife the daughter of the duke [doge] with a handsome dowry. My master agreed to this betrothal, not so much because of the dowry, but because his territories would be joined to those of Venice. I advised him to agree more forcefully than the others. . . . Once Constantine had become emperor and come to the City, this marriage was out of the question. What nobleman or noblewoman would ever receive the daughter of a Venetian – even though he might be the glorious duke [doge] – as queen and lady for more than a short time? Who would accept his other sons-in-law as the emperor's sons-in-law, and his sons as the brothers-in-law of the emperor? After he insisted on the marriage, this man was rejected and became our enemy.

How accurate is Sphrantzes in this delicate matter? Was one of the doge's daughters spurned by Constantinople or can this tale be reasonably attributed to Sphrantzes' bitterness, if not to actual malice? Sphrantzes implies that he alone was in charge of the delicate mission of securing a wife for the despot. Modern scholarship has refused to take this passage seriously. The arguments that are offered in the chronicle are simply not valid, as others had married western wives and no prejudice was involved. Even John VIII had earlier married Sophia of Montferat, an Italian from an area less important than Venice; Theodoros II's wife was a member of the Malatesta family from Rimini and Constantine himself had married Greco-Italian wives. Sphrantzes was carried away by grief over the failure of Venice to relieve the capital and also wished to absolve his friend from all responsibility for the fall by blaming the doge, who did little to prevent the disaster.⁴⁰ Yet there must be a slim nucleus of truth to his tale of "the Doge's spurned daughter." Sphrantzes does mention the role of Alvise Diedo, a well known Venetian active in the affairs of the Levant, who was among the valiant defenders in 1453. Diedo escaped from the sack, led the flotilla of refugees back to Venice, and presented the official account of the events of the siege and fall to the Venetian authorities

and to a stunned audience of officials and citizens.⁴¹ Sphrantzes knew of his valor and would not have included him in an obvious falsehood and in a forged tale.

Perhaps a small part of this tale may be true. It is possible that the court of Mistra considered one of the doge's daughters and that Diedo was approached and was asked to give his opinion in this matter. The fact is that Doge Francesco Foscari did have daughters, some of whom were of marriageable age at that time.⁴² Low-level negotiations between Venice and the Morea may have been held subsequently. As the matter never advanced to a more serious stage, no official note of it was ever made in Venice. Foscari himself would have ultimately dismissed this match. The doge, it was well known, did not think much of the Constantinopolitans. Sphrantzes may have heard of a vague inquiry, which involved Diedo in the initial stage. Sphrantzes' diplomatic specialty remained firmly anchored in the east and he was never privy to the diplomatic activities between Mistra and western courts. He perhaps made too much of an idea that never advanced from the planning stage.

Constantine did make tentative inquiries in the west, as he was in need of an alliance with the Latins but in this sector, he made no use of Sphrantzes.⁴³ As early as 1444, Constantine had entered into negotiations with the Orsini family. The potential bride was Isabella, the sister of the lord of Taranto, but this match failed to advance.⁴⁴ His search in the west was soon to be interrupted by the untimely death of John VIII and Constantine proved unable to resume his quest for a suitable bride.

Theodoros, Constantine's senior brother, also died. He had served as the despot of the Morea and had been Constantine's rival for the position of heir apparent:⁴⁵ "While I was waiting there [in Constantinople], Lord Theodoros the despot passed away of a contagious disease in Selybria in June 6956. His body was brought to the City and was buried in the Monastery of the Pantokrator."⁴⁶ His death is mentioned in the short chronicles;⁴⁶ one note hints at the detection of a possible conspiracy that surfaced at this time, but we know next to nothing about this incident,⁴⁷ although it must have had something to do with Demetrios and his faction, who were still forming plots. Khalkokondyles circumvents the death of the despot and begins his substantial account of the campaign of John Corvinus Hunyadi that culminated in the second battle at Kosovo. He returns to the Levant only to mention the death of John VIII in passing.⁴⁸ Similarly, Doukas moves from the fall of the Hexamilion to the accession of Constantine XI.⁴⁹ The only text to take serious note of the death of Theodoros is a eulogy composed by Scholarius, in which he mourns the despot's death as a heavy blow to scholarship. Theodoros seems to have been an accomplished scholar, in sharp contrast to Constantine:⁵⁰

He was a lover of scholarship; he learned easily and thus became a polymath. . . . Was there anyone better versed, more familiar with, and a greater expert in logic, geometry, and the so-called sciences than he? In applying his knowledge, he made numerous discoveries and fathered books; and he accomplished all this in the midst of many upheavals and disturbances. . . . His gift for rhetoric and his talent for logic and arguments could not be accidental; they can only derive from God. Who would fail to forget his misfortunes when he

happened to listen to him speak? Who failed to find pleasure? Who would not wish to listen to him through eternity, totally oblivious of daily necessities? Who could be so rude and uneducated, as to remain unconvinced by the skill of his arguments?

The death of Theodoros confirmed Constantine's position as heir apparent, given the problems and the tension between Demetrios and John VIII. Aware of his precarious position, Demetrios hastened to the city from his post in the Aegean, hoping to assert his claim, as is stated by an entry of a short chronicle.⁵¹ The death of his brother made him pluck up courage and he returned from his virtual exile.⁵²

The months that followed the death of Theodoros witnessed the campaign of Hunyadi, which resulted in the second battle at Serbia's "field of black birds," *Kosovopolje*. The earlier disaster of the Christians at Varna had disappointed and discouraged the imperial court, but the present victory of Murad over Hunyadi signaled the end of all independence for the Balkans. It became painfully evident that the days of the crusades were about to end.⁵³ Constantine played no part in this last crusade of Hunyadi. He seems to have learned his lesson at the fall of the *Hexamilion*. He made no attempt to challenge Murad's authority in Greece and remained quiet during Hunyadi's advance. Constantinople and *Mistra* remained aloof from Hunyadi's campaign.

Two entries in the short chronicles speak of the battle at Kosovo and of the defeat of the Christians.⁵⁴ One chronicle mentions the terrible losses that both sides suffered,⁵⁵ while the second states that the Christians were routed and that Hunyadi was forced to flee:⁵⁶ "1448: Janco [Janos Hunyadi] marched together with the Walachians and they were defeated by the Turks and Janco [Janos Hunyadi] escaped." *Khalkokondyles* provides a long account of this campaign.⁵⁷ *Doukas* also furnishes an overall view:⁵⁸

Janos [Hunyadi] . . . came to Kosovo. Murad was also ready with his entire army. The battle started in the evening; while it was still dark early in the morning, he rose with a few soldiers, pretending that he was making ready to launch an attack, and departed, because he knew that that the Turks had absolute numerical superiority while the Hungarians were cowering and contemplating flight. At sunrise Murad saw the disorder among the tents and the flight; consequently, he fell upon them; he took spoils and slaughtered. . . . Great was his victory while Janos suffered a defeat.

This battle was fought on October 17–19, 1448. The circumstances were more complicated, of course, than *Doukas*' summary suggests. It was indeed a long and drawn-out affair, which ended with the desertion and defection of the Walachian contingent in the course of the battle, once it saw how the wind was blowing. While the issue was still being decided, the Walachians joined the Turks. Then Hunyadi was forced to beat a hasty retreat under the cover of his German and Czech gunners.⁵⁹ In spite of *Doukas*' assertion, Hunyadi was able to make an orderly withdrawal. The battle might have had a different outcome had the troops

of the Albanian Scanderbeg arrived on time; they had been delayed and were twenty miles away from the battlefield.⁶⁰ During his retreat Hunyadi was captured by the Ottoman forces, escaped, and then fell into the hands of his Serbian enemy, George Branković, who held him prisoner for some time. The fate of the Balkans and of southeastern Europe was thus sealed.

The defeat of Hunyadi was soon followed by another blow: Emperor John VIII died on October 31, 1448:⁶¹ “On October 31, 6957 [= 1448] our emperor Lord John passed away. He was fifty-six years, ten months, and fifteen days old. On November 1, he was buried in the Monastery of the Pantokrator. He had been emperor for twenty-three years, three months, and ten days.” It is possible that John was a victim of the plague, which visited Constantinople in 1447 and 1448, as the text of the last treaty between Constantinople and Venice implies.⁶² At the end of this document it is explicitly stated that the text had been prepared in the previous year but the signing ceremony had been postponed because of the plague:⁶³ “Note: The aforementioned treaty was written in the year and day cited above [on April 21, . . . in the year 1448. . .], but because of the raging plague it was sworn in the following year.” One of the imperial witnesses could not be present because he was experiencing an unspecified illness (an indirect reference to the plague?):⁶⁴ “In the place of Lord Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos (who was not present because of an illness).” Was John a late victim of the plague, the height of which seems to have subsided by then?

The end of John’s reign is noted in several short chronicles.⁶⁵ One entry⁶⁶ observes that at the time of his death, John’s mother, Helena Dragaš, was still alive: “Their mother, Lady Helena (the nun Patience), is alive.” Demetrios Laskaris Leontaris cites the wrong month:⁶⁷

He paid his debt in the current year 6957 [1448], in the twelfth indiction, on November 31, a Thursday, in the tenth hour of the day. He was buried in the holy monastery of our Lord, God, and Savior, Jesus Christ Pantokrator, in the grave of his wife. May God include his soul among the holy emperors. Amen, amen, amen. Demetrios Laskaris Leontaris wrote these [words].

Doukas suggests that a combination of factors brought about the emperor’s death:⁶⁸

Emperor John had been suffering from gout for many years; after his return from Italy he found himself in considerable grief and in much discomfort because of the confusion surrounding the Churches and the passing away of his empress; thus, he fell ill and died a few days later. He was the last emperor of the Romans [= Greeks].

John VIII had not been in the best of health and Doukas may not be far off the mark. Indeed, pressing state problems and personal tragedies could have contributed to the emperor’s ill health, especially during the outbreak of the plague, and may have even hastened his death. The news of the disaster at Kosovo would not

have alleviated his condition. Was John informed of the outcome of the battle before his death?⁶⁹ Doukas is the only contemporary writer to speculate along these lines but he was not a member of the court and he was not a physician. Khalkokondyles reports the event in a genitive absolute construction, which comes as an afterthought on the Kosovo campaign. The historian then swiftly moves on to the reign of Constantine, overlooking all intervening events:⁷⁰ “Such were the events and the outcome of the expedition of the Paionians [Hungarians] under Hunyadi. Soon after Murad returned to his capital, he made preparations to march against Byzantium [Constantinople], as John, the emperor of the Hellenes, had died.”

John VIII died a Catholic. He had personally embraced Catholicism and had committed the Orthodox Church to the union. He had encountered countless obstacles in this goal and after his death the Orthodox clergy exacted vengeance by denying the dead emperor the customary honors and rites. While it is not clear what exactly was withheld, it is possible that John was prevented from taking monastic vows before his death and he did not die in the monastic habit, which was the prevailing custom at the time. It has been suggested that no monastery in Constantinople was willing to admit him as a monk when he was close to death.⁷¹ This view receives indirect support from Sphrantzes, who always mentions the monastic names that members of the Palaeologan dynasty took prior to death. In the case of John VIII, Sphrantzes is silent. Sometime later, after the accession of Constantine XI, John Eugenicus (the brother of Markos) attempted to justify this singular lack of compassion exhibited by the Orthodox Church. Yet, even then, when the Turks were about to lay siege to Constantinople, John Eugenicus displayed neither regret nor remorse and remained bitterly vindictive, exhibiting unmitigated hatred toward the dead emperor. He added, not without a touch of malice, that Helena Dragaš also embraced this cruel verdict of the Church and that she approved of the priests’ treatment of her dead son:⁷²

Thereupon the Church excused itself from commemorating our lord and emperor, your brother, for good reason, which was justly accepted by our empress, your holy mother herself, as she chose to accept God to the detriment of natural affection, because in Italy he had moved away from the ancient promises that had been made to the Orthodox Church and an innovation had been added.

Eugenicus’ information receives additional support from Scholarius, who states that the Church denied John VIII the customary honors precisely because of his Latinism.⁷³ Does he mean that the Church went so far as to deprive the unfortunate emperor of the last rites and of the service for the dead?

On the popular level, John VIII was remembered fondly. The anonymous author of the long lamentation on the fall of Constantinople mourned his death, which he sees as the beginning of the end for Byzantium. While he addresses Constantine, the poet mourns the death of John:⁷⁴

The sky should have been ablaze, the hour should have been incinerated,
when your saintly brother died,/the sensible, wise, Emperor Good-John;/
/

he was the root of all knowledge, the glory of the Romans [= Greeks],/the fame, decoration, and honor; a second Ptolemy he was, the sharp sword of the Orthodox faith. He was the root and light of the pious Christian Romans [Greeks]./O Emperor Good-John, you left behind such a misfortune for us the day you died./The hour of your death signaled our destruction;/the foundations of the City were then uprooted.

Yet this poet wrote some time after John's death. By then John's image had been rehabilitated. While John had been alive, he had not met with such praises. In spite of his Herculean labors to save his beleaguered state, the majority of his subjects misunderstood his policies and they met only with intransigence and indifference. His efforts went unappreciated by the clergy and by the superstitious mob, which was under the firm control of the fanatical, ill-educated monks. John failed to satisfy his subjects, who viewed him as a traitor to the ancestral faith. He also failed to make amends with the west, since he opted for procrastination in enforcing the union at home, and he never took decisive steps to deal with the instances of internal unrest; he left this thorn for his successor. Thus, neither his subjects nor the Catholic west could look upon the latter part of his reign with approval.⁷⁵ At least, at the time of his death, John was nominally the master of Constantinople. He must have been aware of the coming storm. The threat posed by the Porte had driven him to the formal acceptance of the Catholic position. The defeat of the crusaders prompted John to increase his reliance on the Venetians.⁷⁶ Prior to his death he concluded the last treaty on record between medieval Greece and a western power.⁷⁷

His disappointment over his own failure to make his subjects realize that secular salvation dictated spiritual subjugation to the pope, his own personal losses, his illnesses, and the failure of the westerners to dislodge the Turks from the Balkans broke him. The disappointing outcome of the battle at Kosovo, if indeed he had been informed of it, must have amounted to a *coup de grâce*, and death must have come as a relief. John was the last emperor to be buried in the Pantokrator. A few years later, in 1453, the imperial graves were disturbed and the remains of the emperors were scattered, while the conquerors were frantically searching for gold during the sack.⁷⁸

Large crowds had attended the funeral of John's father, Manuel II. The passing of Manuel had been an occasion for universal grief and mourning. Bessarion had pronounced the eulogy of the dead emperor.⁷⁹ John's burial was a quiet, private affair. Our sources mention no eulogies, no priests, and no crowds. Neither priest nor scholar showed any inclination to praise the dead emperor publicly. We hear of no public mourning, of no state funeral, and of no services in Santa Sophia or anywhere else in the capital. Under depressing circumstances in 1462, nine years after the conquest of Constantinople, Scholarius (who by then had already served as patriarch under Sultan Mehmed II) wrote a lamentation over the events in his life. He devoted a section to John VIII, for whom he had always felt a small measure of affection. These nostalgic reminiscences of Scholarius amount to the only grudging eulogy that John VIII received by a representative of the Orthodox Church.⁸⁰

Alas! How can I be reminded of those lectures without tears? We used to sit in the *triclinium* and the divine word would be discussed by the emperor, his brothers, the magnates, the bishops, the clergymen, the monks, the merchants, the citizens, and the foreign guests. . . . Oh, those trials, over which I presided . . . and either explained the laws myself or I allowed others to do so. . . . And he (I mean Emperor John) endured in joy and greatly contributed to my argument, without showing any irritation. . . . Oh, those daily speeches that took place during that emperor's reign; it was like a theater and I was accorded honors and his good will. Oh, the pleasure, with which they used to receive me; any day I absented myself from the palace was cause for sadness and when I returned they looked at me as if I had come back from a long journey.

At least John VIII found a resting place, unlike his ancestor, Michael VIII Palaeologus, who had also been refused all rites and was even denied a grave, because he too had committed similar "sins". Both emperors had tried to reach some religious accommodation, to the detriment of spiritual salvation, with the west in the interests of their state's secular survival.⁸¹

3 The emperor-makers

Intrigue and court strife followed the death of John VIII. Demetrios, who had earlier hastened to the capital from his "command" in the Aegean, was already in a position to begin a struggle for the throne. The deaths of his brothers, Theodoros and John, energized his ambitions. Sphrantzes tactfully alludes to his machinations in a bare summary, which skips over all embarrassing details.⁸² Scholarius is the only author to supply a connected narrative. He addressed his composition to Demetrios, whom he praised as the true champion of Orthodoxy and reviewed the events:⁸³

And so the emperor passed away; everyone advised you [*sc.* Demetrios] to claim the title [of emperor] for yourself, as it was already within your grasp . . . and argued that your father was an emperor and that your brother until recently had been an emperor . . . and with such arguments they urged you to make the attempt. Yet you made use of your own natural abilities and whenever there was need of advisors, you found the most helpful individuals and avoided those offering risky opinions.

Sphrantzes⁸⁴ states that two weeks after the death of John VIII, Thomas, the youngest Palaeologus, reached the capital. Thomas had only heard of the emperor's death while he was passing through Kallipolis. The arrival of Thomas somehow put a stop to the intrigues of Demetrios. Helena Dragaš, the queen mother, prominent members of the imperial administration, and the people, in general, opted for Constantine:⁸⁵

His [*sc.* Thomas'] arrival put an end to the intrigues of his brother Lord Demetrios, or rather to those of his agents to declare him emperor; after all, he was

not a despot, had not been born in the purple, and was not judged worthy by the Constantinopolitans. His older, capable brother was still alive and excelled in all good activities and was free from misfortune. Proper claim and justice prevailed by command of the holy empress [*sc.* Helena Dragaš], her sons the despots, and by the opinion and will of the nobility.

Scholarius naturally presents a different version: Demetrios resisted the advice of his own agents and partisans and graciously stepped aside.⁸⁶ He then states that Demetrios prevented Murad from launching an attack upon Constantinople. Thus, Scholarius portrays Demetrios as a mature individual and as a responsible statesman, who became, *de facto*, the unofficial regent and Constantinople's savior. His selfless actions secured the throne for his brother and he prevented the Porte from intervening:⁸⁷

You sent embassies on behalf of peace and bravely moved against the enemy; you guarded the walls well and kept the throne for your senior brother; you watched over the safety and protection of all and became an overseer sent by God. And even though slanderers were plotting to force you change your mind, you would not be moved; you knew well the origin of their intrigues and the goal of their plans.

These activities would have surely come after Demetrios encountered the firm opposition of Helena Dragaš, Thomas, and the nobility. In the final analysis, Demetrios assumed the role of the obedient brother, only when he realized that his cause was hopeless and doomed. It would have been totally out of character for Demetrios to have suddenly put the interests of the state above his own ambitions, especially with Theodoros and John out of his way.

Demetrios may have contributed to the momentary defense of the capital by supervising the fortifications, and he may have even persuaded Murad to abandon his plan of launching a major attack. Yet he was not altogether successful, because Murad unleashed his raiders to wreak havoc in the vicinity of Constantinople:⁸⁸

And I know full well that if you had not been prevented by the outcries and the disturbances created by the slanderers . . . you would have made a treaty with our enemy and you would have handed a healthy empire to all, including your brother and emperor who came from the Peloponnesus [Morea]; the vicinity would not have been ravaged and the islands would not have experienced the unprecedented, for our times, misfortune that fell upon them.

Thus, it may be concluded that Demetrios first tried to take over the throne; backed down when he encountered the determined opposition of Thomas, Helena, and the nobility; assumed the role of loyal regent (thus positioning himself for future gains); supervised the deployment of the troops (few, as they must have been) on the walls; and claimed credit for establishing diplomatic contacts with the Porte. He failed, however, to pacify his old ally Murad completely and the

Constantinopolitan territory was raided. Scholarius blamed Demetrios' partisans for this failure.

One may ask exactly what made a difference this time that so easily neutralized Demetrios' bid to take over the throne. It could not have been just the mere opposition of his mother and brother. In the past Demetrios had defied the combined will of his brothers and had shown little regard for his family. Sphrantzes and Scholarius allude to his adherents,⁸⁹ who either wished to make Demetrios a pawn in their own machinations (as Scholarius suggests) or were themselves abandoned by their leader Demetrios in the face of overwhelming opposition. The decisive support for Constantine must have come from what Sphrantzes called the "nobility," the influential ministers of John VIII, who had concluded that Constantine was by far the better choice.

One of those nobles was Loukas Notaras, the most influential courtier and affluent Byzantine individual of the period, who had invested his legendary fortune in Italian institutions.⁹⁰ He and Constantine knew each other at least from the time of the latter's regency. In addition, Notaras had commanded the ship that had conveyed Constantine to Lesbos for his second wedding. The ties between the two families went back at least twenty-five years and members of the Notaras family had been close to John VIII in the early part of his reign;⁹¹ Loukas himself was related, in some unspecified manner, to the imperial family.⁹² His signature was formally appended to the last recorded act of John VIII, the treaty between Constantinople with Venice; in the text of the treaty Notaras was described as⁹³ "the esteemed son-in-law [*sc.* of my majesty], Lord Loukas Notaras the interpreter." In 1448, when the treaty was concluded, Notaras had not yet advanced to the position of grand duke but only held the position of official interpreter.⁹⁴ Sphrantzes states that Notaras had become the grand duke by 1451, without informing us exactly when he advanced to this position.⁹⁵ Thus a date between the death of John VIII (late in 1448) and 1451 is indicated. There exists a Latin translation of a Greek document dated October 25, 1450. In this text Notaras' position in the court is specified by Constantine XI himself, who employs the formula we have already encountered in the treaty of 1448 and then adds a new title:⁹⁶ "The esteemed son-in-law of my majesty, the grand duke [and] interpreter Lord Loukas Notaras." Notaras' promotion and subsequent influence (to the chagrin of Sphrantzes) had something to do with the fact that the court's interpreter had firmly supported the claim of the despot of the Morea in 1448.

The only other source to make mention of Notaras' services on Constantine's behalf is the eulogy of the grand duke written by John Moskhos in 1470. It was composed in Italy, probably at the encouragement of Anna, Notaras' surviving daughter, who wished to publicize her father's services to the state. Moskhos goes so far as to imply that Constantine owed his very crown to Notaras, whose actions in support of Constantine then brought him honors and perhaps his title of grand duke.⁹⁷

After the emperor [*sc.* John VIII] departed from this world, it became necessary for his heir [*sc.* Constantine XI] to be enthroned in accordance with the laws; but the latter was in the Peloponnesus [Morea] and there were some

who formed a plot to enthrone the brother [*sc.* Demetrios] of the emperor, who was younger than the heir . . . and they made plans to advance their plot. But that brave man [*sc.* Notaras], a perennial defender of justice, opposed them without resorting to arms or verbal arguments but, as was appropriate, he made use of his great mind (with which he always rendered the mob of the City pliable and obedient) and saved the throne for the heir. The latter came, was acclaimed emperor, in accordance with our customs, and, as should be expected, he thanked this man by bestowing the highest honors upon him.

The same source adds that soon after his arrival in Constantinople, the new emperor began to rely heavily on Notaras; apparently, Notaras and Constantine worked well together. The origins of their association probably go back to the late reign of John VIII and to the regency of Constantine; then Notaras threw his total support behind Constantine and put an end to the intrigues of Demetrios' faction. According to the same source, Notaras did his best to support the emperor throughout his short reign.⁹⁸

This noble man fought until the sack and displayed his good will towards the emperor, his homeland, and his fellow citizens, as he had done in the past. . . . No one had been able to offer better advice to the emperor and no one surpassed him.

Another member of the administration of John VIII also backed Constantine: the grand domestic Andronikos Palaeologus Kantakouzenos who also witnessed the last treaty between Constantinople and Venice, in place of Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos who had been sick, according to a note appended at the end of the treaty.⁹⁹ Andronikos was also related to the imperial family.¹⁰⁰ A third supporter of Constantine was Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos, who is described in the same treaty¹⁰¹ as "the esteemed cousin of my Majesty." It is interesting to note that both the imperial and the two Venetian witnesses to this treaty (Fabruzzi Corner and Filippo Contarini) were destined to participate in the defense of Constantinople in 1453.¹⁰²

Khalkokondyles provides his own summary of these events, mentions some of these individuals by name, and further states that Sultan Murad also was of assistance, by applying pressure. In the historian's view, the Porte played a decisive part in the selection of the new emperor. Khalkokondyles names Notaras and Kantakouzenos as the main supporters of Constantine¹⁰³ and speculates as to the private motives of Notaras and Kantakouzenos in this affair. Furthermore, he is the only contemporary author to mention, in passing, that Constantine threatened to attack the capital with mercenary troops and that this impending action forced the courtiers to throw their support behind the despot of the Morea.¹⁰⁴ At that time Khalkokondyles was a resident of Mistra and was in close proximity to the court of the despot. Consequently, his information concerning Constantine's intentions and possible military intervention should not be dismissed easily.

The events at the Hexamilion had demonstrated that Constantine could not rely on his Moreot regiments. Had he subsequently established communication with

condottieri in the Latin territories? Was he serious about this imminent attack on the capital, or was it an empty threat intended to add some weight to the efforts of his mother and the partisans on his behalf? It is quite plausible that he entered into negotiations with Venetian Crete, as he seems to have been on good terms with the authorities of this island at this time. Traditionally, troops for the defense of Constantinople had been recruited in Crete:¹⁰⁵

Soon after Murad returned to his capital, he made preparations to launch an expedition against Byzantium, since John, the emperor of the Hellenes, had died and his brother Constantine was designated to be the successor. After his death, his brother Demetrios lost no time in attempting to win the throne for himself, but he was prevented from doing so by the citizens, his mother, the courtiers, the people, and the ministers Kantakouzenos and Notaras, who feared that if this man ascended the throne, Constantine would lead an army of foreigners and in the process, they would lose their influence and power.

Thus, it may be concluded, the majority of the court supported Constantine. Specific motives cannot be assigned to specific individuals. On the popular level, suspicion among the citizens over the intentions of Demetrios must have assisted Constantine's cause. Demetrios had earlier attacked the vicinity of Constantinople with his Turkish allies and had inflicted considerable damage on private property.¹⁰⁶ The absence of popular support for Demetrios and the unanimous backing of Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos, Loukas Notaras, Andronikos Palaeologus Kantakouzenos, and Helena Dragaš forced Demetrios and his party to yield. Demetrios then had no choice but to make the best out of this situation and he pretended to support Constantine.

Finally, Murad II placed his seal of approval on this selection and his verdict put an absolute end to all doubts. Murad did not hold a grudge and overlooked the fact that Constantine had challenged him in central Greece. At that time the sultan had taught the ambitious despot a lesson. Perhaps, he reckoned, Constantine would not challenge the authority of the Porte again. The sultan's estimate was correct, as Constantine remained a loyal vassal and only threatened the Turks when he mistakenly thought that he could take advantage of the youth and inexperience of Murad's successor. Murad's approval was secured through an embassy that was dispatched early in December. It is indicative that the throne was not formally offered to the despot before the Porte had been consulted in this matter. Sphrantzes adds another important detail and suggests that even at this relatively late time opposition to the selection of Constantine existed. Apparently, Demetrios' supporters and the fanatical anti-union elements were still active:¹⁰⁷ "On December 6, I set out with an embassy to inform the sultan that the empress, the brothers, right of birth, and the love and wisdom of nearly the whole population of the City chose Lord Constantine emperor. The sultan heartily approved the choice and sent me away with honor and gifts." Doukas mentions the same embassy but his chronology is confused, as he states that Constantine himself dispatched the envoys after he reached the capital.¹⁰⁸ "The Constantinopolitans summoned Constantine

to the City; he dispatched envoys to Murad; he approached him with gifts and with flattering words and made peace with him, eliminating all past scandals that had existed between them.” Thus, all obstacles were removed, and Constantine could become the last emperor of Byzantine Constantinople.

4 Emperor without a crown

A Constantinopolitan delegation headed for Mistra and offered the throne to Constantine:¹⁰⁹ “Constantine came . . . to Byzantium [Constantinople] shortly thereafter.” Doukas duplicates the information.¹¹⁰ The most detailed account is presented by Sphrantzes:¹¹¹ “In the same days lords from the City were sent to the Morea: Alexios Philanthropenos Laskaris . . . and Manuel Palaeologus Iagros who made Lord Constantine the despot our emperor at Mistra on January 6.” The verb “made,” is problematic. It must mean that these envoys offered the crown. Yet they had no authority to crown Constantine, as they were members of a secular delegation, without any religious connection. That a religious ceremony of some sort took place at Mistra is not mentioned by any surviving contemporary document or source. If it did, it must have been a very modest affair, at best, without the customary splendor associated with such occasions and could not qualify as the official coronation. The proceedings at Mistra could not have gone beyond the secular investiture of Constantine with the imperial purple and the acclamation by the local troops consisting of Albanian mercenaries and of some Moreot regiments. A ceremony in church may have followed,¹¹² amounting to a liturgy of thanksgiving but it would have excluded the actual coronation, which could only be performed by the patriarch in Constantinople’s Santa Sophia.¹¹³ One modern scholar asserts that Constantine was crowned emperor by the metropolitan of Lacedaemonia.¹¹⁴ No source supports this statement and no provincial metropolitan could perform a legitimate coronation. In time, tradition and folk belief turned this affair into a coronation and went so far as to preserve a recollection of the spot on which the last emperor “was crowned.” The spot has been shown to visitors countless times.¹¹⁵ In fact, a later derivative text goes so far as to state that Constantine was actually crowned emperor in Constantinople’s Santa Sophia:¹¹⁶ “The reign of Constantine Palaeologus: Constantine, his brother, took over the throne and was crowned in the greatest church of God’s Wisdom [Santa Sophia] by the patriarch, Lord Gregory.” That at Mistra Constantine went through a secular ceremony only is unambiguously stated by a contemporary chronicle penned by Constantine Laskaris, who concluded that Constantine had been acclaimed but had not been crowned:¹¹⁷ “After John, Constantine was summoned, who was the despot at Mistra and lord of half the Peloponnesus [Morea], but he was not crowned.”

Constantine himself may have decided to delay the official ceremony for financial reasons, as coronations were sumptuous affairs. Perhaps Constantine also wished to be crowned at the same time with his bride, yet to be selected.¹¹⁸ Upon his arrival in Constantinople, he may have realized that a unionist patriarch with allegiance to the pope could not crown him, as his action would not be accepted by the anti-unionists. Thus, the last emperor did not receive either his crown or

the sanction of the Orthodox patriarch in the most revered place of the Byzantine world, the Church of Santa Sophia. Once more Constantine was unlucky: the last emperor reigned without ecclesiastical sanction and approval.

Opponents of the union were quick to remind Constantine of this fact and used the coronation ceremony as bait in their efforts to force Constantine to renounce the union. Thus, John Eugenicus, the brother of Markos, and a confirmed anti-unionist himself, wrote a letter to Constantine after his accession; although he respectfully addressed him as “Emperor Constantine Palaeologus,” he took the opportunity to remind him that he was not actually an emperor, as there had been no coronation ceremony to render Constantine the defender of the Orthodox Church:¹¹⁹

Which Church will you, as God-approved emperor, protect and defend? What is the present condition of the Church of Christ? Where is its flock? Who is this wretch who currently pretends to be its pastor and patron? Who will be the patriarch to crown you? When on earth will he anoint you with the divine oil in the imperial manner and will thus become your dependent and confessor?

Another confirmed anti-unionist, Theodoros Agallianos, recalled the fact that Constantine had not been crowned as late as 1452, even though he refers to him as “reigning.”¹²⁰ “I wrote these [words] . . . in the reign of the very last of the Palaeologi, Constantine, in the third year of his reign, while he still remained without a crown because the Church lacked a defender.”

The contemporaries of Constantine were sharply divided on this issue. The majority seems to have accepted the legitimacy of his position. He was *de facto* and *de iure* emperor, even if the required ceremony in church had been denied to him. Most major writers of the period, including the short chronicles, were realistic enough to accept this situation: Dokeianos, Kritoboulos, Sphrantzes, and Khalkokondyles. John Argyropoulos wrote a formal address to the new emperor in which he described him as “most divine emperor,” and observed that Constantine had ascended the throne:¹²¹ “I rejoice, most divine emperor, when I perceive that you, an individual excelling in everything, have ascended the throne.” Michael Apostolis¹²² also accepted Constantine as “the most divine emperor.” Others failed to do so and they were not all anti-unionists. Thus, Doukas could never bring himself to accept the fact that the last emperor had never been formally crowned and he considered John VIII as the last individual to have properly reigned in Byzantium; but then Doukas contradicts himself by calling Constantine “the emperor.”¹²³

Constantine could have had his coronation in Santa Sophia. He could have renounced the union and could have joined the enemies of his dead brother. After all, his mother was a confirmed anti-unionist and a devout Orthodox Slav.¹²⁴ Yet Constantine remained firm in his unionist position and was unwilling to trade his brother’s accommodation with the west for his crown. Thus, the man born under an unlucky star ascended the throne informally and provisionally, but his elevation was not without opposition. But in time, after his last stand on May 29, 1453, when he was further raised to the status of a Christian martyr and of a national hero, legal formalities current in the last years of independence suddenly seemed

no longer important. By then such fine points had lost their sting and as time passed they were forgotten. Constantine became the most beloved emperor of the Middle Ages, whom future generations of conquered Greeks could recall with fondness and pride. For them, the emperor without a crown, the king without a queen, and the man without a grave had become a symbol of hope and of resurrection.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, a different controversy arose among scholars this time. Controversy seems to be a constant companion of Constantine, dead or alive. While modern scholars no longer questioned Constantine's elevation to the throne, they began to argue as to the actual number that should be attached to name of the last emperor. Was he Constantine XI, Constantine XII, Constantine XIII, or even Constantine XIV? One scholar reviewed all the evidence and concluded that that the controversy was created by the fact that a previous individual by the same name should not have been counted among the Byzantine emperors and, consequently, Constantine XI is probably the safest designation for the last emperor.¹²⁵ The majority of scholars has accepted this conclusion. Yet occasionally "Constantine XII" still surfaces and the matter refuses to die. One may even detect the occasional animosity in this otherwise harmless debate.¹²⁶ In the final analysis, the Roman numeral next to the name does not really matter. That he was not actually crowned (and therefore he claims no number) and that the number next to his name varies cannot detract from the fact that for the Greeks during the era of Turkish domination and for the citizens of modern Greece Constantine was and is the best known and the most beloved of all the Byzantine emperors. He embodies the tragedy that is encountered in Constantinople's last days. He has become the quintessential tragic emperor and hero. Powerful emotions involving national aspirations and popular feelings neutralize the force of scholarly controversy and ignore legalistic niceties.

What impressed the Greeks of the later fifteenth century was that Constantine's mother was named Helena, proving the validity of a widespread prophecy:¹²⁷ "As Constantinople was founded in antiquity by Constantine the son of Helen, it was now miserably lost by another Constantine, who was the son of another Helen." Constantine, through little action of his own, was destined to become the stuff of legend. A legend always speaks on the emotional level and assumes, in the process, a significance that bare and prosaic facts of history lack.

Notes

- 1 Cyriacus produced a virtual lamentation (quoted in *PaL* 2: 96, n. 57): *Quibus flebilibus auditis vocibus scis, vir clarissime, quantum non egre molesteve ferre non potui audire trucem et perniciosum illum Christiane religionis hostem . . . Nunc vero ignava quadam nostrorum incuria principum . . . Pelopon<n>ensiacum tam nobile et olim potentissimum Graecie regnum invadere licuisse. Proh scelus! et heu prisca nostrorum generosissime gentis nobilitas! Nam et illatam huic genti miserabilem a barbaris cladem, tametsi Grecos in homines et penas quodammodo dare merentes, non sine gravi tamen nostre religionis iactura et magna Latini nominis indignitate, tam lachrymabilem Christicolum calamitatem existimandam puto.*
- 2 E. W. Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona and Athens* [Collection Latomus 43] (Brussels, 1960), p. 57, n. 1 (I have made minor changes in the orthography and punctuation): *ex Laconica*

- Leontinaria arce illustris Thomae Palaeologi despotis comitatus famulis Spartanos Taygeti montis ad colles venimus ubi secus antiquam & olim nobilem Lacedaemonum urbem fere XXX. stadijs distantem arduis in ripis situm est inexpugnabile oppidum quod hodie Σπαρτοβούνν Μυζηθράν τε [ms.: Μυθιστράτηντε] dicunt. Ubi Constantinum cognome<n>to Dragas ex regia Palaeolog<or>um prosapia despotem inclytum regnantem inuenimus & apud eum insignem illum virum & nostro quidem aevo Graecorum doctissimum & vita moribusque & doctrina Platonicos inter philosophum.* The trip of Cyriacus is discussed in *DGM* 1: 235, 236; and S. P. Lampros, “Κυριακός ὁ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος ἐν Λακωνικῇ,” *NH* 5 (1908): 414–423; Lampros was unfortunately misled by the disorder in Cyriacus’ manuscript and concluded, with reservations, that most of the events related by Cyriacus refer to his earlier journey of 1436. For the correct chronology, cf. D. G. Kampouroglous, *Oi Χαλκοκονδύλαι: Μονογραφία* (Athens, 1926; repr.: Athens, 1996), pp. 122–126; and Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 56–65. The text of Cyriacus’ journal was published by R. Sabbadini, “Ciriaco d’Ancona e la sua descrizione autografa del Peloponneso trasmessa da Leonardo Botta,” in *Miscellanea Ceriani. Raccolta di scritti originali per onorare la memoria di A. M. Ceriani* (Milan, 1910), pp. 180–247.
- 3 *PaL* 2: 97; and Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 57.
- 4 N. G. Wilson, *From Byzantium to Italy: Greek Studies in the Italian Renaissance* (Baltimore, 1992), pp. 55, 56; and C. M. Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes* (Oxford, 1986), p. 227.
- 5 On Strabo, Plethon, Toscanelli, and their possible links to Columbus, see Wilson, *From Byzantium to Italy*, p. 56. For the complicated history of Strabo’s text in the hands of Plethon and Cyriacus, see Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 62, 63, and n. 2.
- 6 Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 61, 62, n. 1. On Dictys Crentensis and Cyriacus, see A. Diller, “The Autographs of Georgius Gemistus Pletho,” *Scriptorium* 10 (1956): 9–77.
- 7 Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 227; and Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 62, 63, n. 1.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 58: *egregie latinis atque gr<a>ecis litteris eruditum*. Cyriacus had already met Laonikos Khalkokondyles (*iuvenem ingenuum*) (Sabbadini, “Ciriaco d’Ancona,” p. 203). During another trip to the northern Aegean, Cyriacus met Kritoboulos of Imbros, who was destined to compose the famous history/biography of Mehmed II. Thus, on September 28, 1444, Kritoboulos (for whom Cyriacus supplies a first and a middle name unattested elsewhere) guided Cyriacus to the antiquities of Imbros; see *PaL* 2: 87, for an English translation: *Ad IIII Kal. Octob. ex orientali Imbre littore viro cum docto et Imbriote nobili Hermodoro Michaeli Critobulo ad occidentalem eiusdem insulae partem, ad Imbron antiquam insignemque olim et vetustissimam civitatem terrestri itinere equis devecti*.
- 9 Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 58.
- 10 The Latin text of fols. 103^v–104^r is quoted in Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 58: *vna comitatus dilectissimo Atheniense iuvene pr<a>efato Chalcocandele ad antiqua & celerrima illa Spartanae ciuitatis monumenta reuisenda venimus. cum nec equidem vidisse semel satis fuerat, iuuabat sed usque morari & primum antiquum & insigne illud suum & memorabile Gymnasium reuisi*. Father Bodnar does not seem to realize that the young Athenian scholar is the future historian Laonikos Khalkokondyles, who eventually changed his name from its Christian form “Nicholas” to the archaic “Laonikos,” on the analogy of Dorotheus-Theodoros, Timotheos-Theotimos, etc. *PaL* 2: 97, Kampouroglous, *Oi Χαλκοκονδύλαι*, and Lampros, “Κυριακός ὁ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος,” properly identified the young humanist.
- 11 Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 227.
- 12 Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 58: *Messaniaco transiecto sinu, ad antiquam Messaniacam Pylon venimus, quam longuei Nestoris memoranda extitisse patria, non nullis ab auctoribus memoratur*.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 59.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 61: *cum ad ipsam Spartanam arcem propinquius accederemus & campos Eurotaeque fluminis ripas atque verenda loca ubi Lacedaemonum ciuitas tam memoranda*

- fuera immensis adhuc undique conspersa ruinis procul attonitus aspexissem; illico collapsam e caelo Cal<D>iopen . . . canentem audiui.*
- 15 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 34, calls this composition an “epigram.” Kampouroglous, *Oi Χαλκοκονδύλαι*, p. 124; Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 227; and Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 62, 63, think of it as an ᾠδή or “ode” to Sparta.
- 16 Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 227; and Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 63, n. 2, speak of a Greek translation of the ode; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 34, n. 2: “The epigram was turned into Greek.” The Greek text provides a prose paraphrase of the Italian text. The Italian text was published by S. P. Lampros, “Ἐπίγραμμα τοῦ Κυριακοῦ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος περὶ τοῦ Μεσαιωνικοῦ Μυστρά,” *Ἐπετηρίς τοῦ Φιλολογικοῦ Συλλόγου Παρνασσῶ* 7 (1903): 41 (reprinted in *PkP* 4: 99).
- 17 It was first attributed to Plethon by Lampros, “Ἐπίγραμμα,” pp. 39–48 and repeated in *PkP* 4: 100. Without mentioning Lampros, Woodhouse, *Gemistos Plethon*, p. 227, restated this attribution. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 34, cites Woodhouse on the attribution to Plethon. Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 62, 63, n. 2, cites Lampros, to whom he gives full credit for the attribution. The suggestion, which I have adopted, that Laonikos Khalkokondyles may be, “plus probablement,” responsible for the Greek paraphrase first appeared in *DGM* 1: 236. For another attribution, see Kampouroglous, *Oi Χαλκοκονδύλαι*, p. 124, who is of the opinion that the translator was Demetrios Khalkokondyles, Laonikos’ famous kinsman destined for a brilliant academic career in Italy.
- 18 *PkP* 4: 100: *Κυριακού τοῦ Ἀγκωνίτου Ἐπίγραμμα εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην ἐπὶ Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου ἐν Πέζῃ Ἑλληνικῇ Μεταφράσει.*
- 19 *PkP* 4: 100, 101: ὦ λαμπρά πόλις λακωνικῆ Σπάρτη, κλέος Ἑλλάδος τῆς τε οἰκουμένης πάσης παράδειγμα, ὄπλων καὶ σωφροσύνης γυμνάσιον καὶ τέμενος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πάσης θείας ἀρετῆς ἔνοπτρον καὶ πηγὴ ἐὰν τὴν πολιτείαν σου καὶ ἔθῃ νόμον τε ἀνθρώπινον σὺν ταῖς ἄλλαις σου ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς διασκοπῶ καὶ ἐπειτὰ σε ὄρω, πρὸς Εὐρώταν ἐξαιφνης ἀνακράζω, πρὸς χῶρον τῆς κυδίστης σου Ἀρτέμιδος: ποῦ ἐστὶν ὁ σὸς ἀγαθὸς Λυκοῦργος, ποῦ οἱ Διόσκουροι οἱ διδυμοὶ θεοὶ Κάστωρ καὶ Πολυδεύκης, Ἀναξανδρίδας, Ὀρθρυάδας καὶ Γύλιππος; ὦ Εὐρύσθενης καὶ Λεωνίδα ποῦ διατάσθε, Ἀτρεΐδα καὶ Πανσανία, ὦ λαμπρότατε ἡγεμόν, ὦ Λύσανδρε, ὦ Ἀρίστον, Ἀγῆσιλάε τε καὶ Ξάνθιπτε. οὐ Ῥώμη, οὐ Φίλιππος, ἔφη, ἀλλ’ ὁ χρόνος ἡμετέρων γενεῶν ἢ ἀνανδρία καὶ ῥαθυμία μεταβληθῆναι παρεσκεύασεν εἰς Μυσισθρᾶν ὑπὸ Κωνσταντίνου.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 99: *Dixit, ma el secol vil nostro ad confino / Da voltò in Mysithra sub Constantino.* The concluding line includes the improvement that Lampros made, emending the ms. reading from *voltà* to *voltò*.
- 21 *Supra*, n. 3. The only modern scholar to realize that there is a negative note in the poem is Lampros, “Κυριακὸς ὁ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος,” p. 421: “ἡ κατὰ τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου μομφή.” At the time Lampros wrongly thought that this ode was composed during the previous trip of the antiquary in 1436 and attributed Cyriacus’ disapproval to slanders that Theodoros had been spreading against his own brother. Lampros then made an attempt to show that the composition of the ode could be dated to the second trip of 1447/48 but then failed to find a reason for the μομφή and concluded (p. 423) that ἡ κατάκρισις in the ode had been ἐπιπόλαια, supposing that Cyriacus, γνωρισθεὶς ἐγγύτερον μετ’ αὐτοῦ [Constantine], eventually became an admirer of the despot.
- 22 Cyriacus noted the qualities of its inhabitants; see Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 60: *natura tamen loci non penitus defecta videtur: cum ex quandoque homines gignit, suapte natura probos & ad uirtutem habiles atque idoneos . . . Spartanum quempiam vidimus iuuenem, statura proceri ac sane formosum Georgium Chirodonta scilicet Apridentem cognomine dictum.* Cyriacus goes on to cite specific examples of George’s prowess, which clearly impressed him, no doubt because they reminded him of several heroes of antiquity who had supposedly performed similar deeds; cf. Lampros, “Κυριακὸς ὁ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος,” pp. 418, 419; and Kampouroglous, *Oi Χαλκοκονδύλαι*, pp. 122–126. Scholarius (*supra*, ch. 6, text with n. 145), assumed the worst about the inhabitants of the

- Morea; see his comments in his eulogy to Theodoros, *PkP* 2: 7, 8: οὕτως βοηθεῖν οὔτε βοηθοῦντες ἀμύνειν καὶ σώζειν οἴδασι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτ' ἀπαντᾶν ἐκόντες οὔτ' ἀπαντῶντες ὑφίστασθαι τολμῶσι καὶ καρτερεῖν, ἀλλ' αἰρῶνται μᾶλλον φεύγοντες καὶ κρυπτόμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς σώζεσθαι . . . μόνης ἄρα τῆς χώρας κληρονόμους εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ποτε Πελοποννησίων τοὺς νῦν καὶ ψιλὸν τὸ τοῦ γένους ἔχοντας ὄνομα, ἀρετῆς δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων οὐδ' ὅσον εἰκός ἐστι καὶ εἰς νόθους καθήκειν μετελιηφότας.
- 23 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 35. S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), p. 84: "It was in a way fortunate that the invasion had taken place in the winter and the crops had not been harmed."
- 24 *Κυριακοῦ τοῦ Ἀγκωνίτου Μηνῶν τοῦ Ἐνιαυτοῦ Τάξις Ἀφιερωμένη εἰς τὸν Κωνσταντῖνον Παλαιολόγον*. His autograph, written in an array of colored inks (see Diller, "The Autographs," p. 32), survives in the *Cod. Marc.* 517, fols. 129–132; it was first published by G. Castellani, "Un traité inédit en grec de Cyriaque d'Ancone," *Études grecques* 9 (1896): 225–230, and was subsequently republished by Lampros, "Κυριακὸς ὁ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος," pp. 419, 420 [= *PkP* 4: 96–98].
- 25 *PkP* 4: 96: πρὸς τὸν Κωνσταντῖνον Παλαιολόγον πορφυρογέννητον καὶ πανάριστον Λακεδαιμονίας βασιλέα. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰωνίου καὶ πιστοτάτου δούλου Κυριακοῦ τοῦ Ἀγκωνίας ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ πρὸς Ταυγέτῳ τῷ ὄρει θεοφυλάκτῳ ἀκροπόλει Μυζηθρᾶ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ λαμπρᾷ καὶ βασιλικῇ αὐλῇ.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 96: καὶ τῷ Κωνσταντίνῳ ἀξιολογοτάτῳ Λακεδαιμονίων ἄνακτι τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ.
- 27 *PaL* 2: 92, 93, and n. 4: *nivea Paros di marmore candente*.
- 28 Bodnar, *Cyriacus of Ancona*, p. 61.
- 29 Latin text: *ibid.*, p. 64: *cum . . . e Spartana arce Mysethrea Acrocorinthum reuisissem, inibi Iwannem Κατακουζινὸν magnificum ac regia de stirpe virum nec non pacis bellique artis praestantem, pro Spartano rege Praconstantino, Corinthaeae prouinciae praesidem comperimus; qui cum me ex Patra Veterem nouisset amicum perquam benigne suscepit.*
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 32 *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 65.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 34 The rumors originate in a statement by the Venetian Giacomo de' Languschi (or de Langusco), a member of the papal service in 1452, who wrote an account on the fall of Constantinople, *Excidio e presa di Constantinopoli nell'anno 1453* embedded in the Chronicle of Zorzi Dolfin, *Cronaca delle famiglie nobili di Venezia*; Languschi's text has been published by G. M. Thomas, "Die Eroberung Constantinopels im Jahre 1453 aus einer venetianischen Chronik," *Sitzungsberichte der königl. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Philos.-hist. Klasse), vol. 2 (Munich, 1868), pp. 1–38, esp. pp. 1–6, and reports that Cyriacus read to the sultan the ancient classics daily: *et de altri da uno compagno d^o. Chiriaco d'Ancona, e da uno altro Italo, da questi se fa lezer Laertio, Herodoto, Livio, Quinto Curtio*. The confusion between "Kyritzes" and "Cyriacus" also led *MCT*, p. 499, astray on this point; see *PaL* 2: 71, 72, n. 113. On Cyriacus' supposed service in the Porte, see C. G. Patrinelis, "Κυριακὸς ὁ Ἀγκωνίτης: Ἡ Δῆθεν Ὑπηρεσία του εἰς τὴν Αὐλὴν τοῦ Σουλτάνου τοῦ Πορθητοῦ καὶ ὁ Χρόνος τοῦ Θανάτου Αὐτοῦ," *ΕΕΒΣ* 16 (1968): 152–160. Patrinelis concludes (p. 160) that ὁ Κυριακὸς ἀπέθανεν τὸ 1452. Θὰ ἀπαλλάξωμεν οὕτω τὸν Κυριακὸν . . . ἀπὸ τὸν ἄχαριν καὶ ἀσφαλῶς δυσάρεστον εἰς αὐτὸν ρόλον τοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ συμβούλου τοῦ σουλτάνου. In addition, cf. J. Raby, "Cyriacus of Ancona and the Sultan Mehmed II," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 43 (1980), 242–246; and C. Mitchell, E. W. Bodnar, eds. and trans., *Vita Viri Clarissimi et Famosissimi Kyriaci Anconitani by Francesco Scalamonti* (Philadelphia, 1996), 19, n. 1. On Languschi-Dolfin, see M. Philippides, "The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonardo and his Italian Followers," *VMRS* 29 (1998): 189–227. On the authorship of this document, see Davies, M. C. "An Enigma and a Phantom: Giovanni Aretino and Giacomo Languschi," *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 37 (1988): 1–29.

- 35 *Cyriacus of Ancona*, pp. 65–68; Patrinelis, “Κυριακὸς ὁ Ἀγκωνίτης,” p. 153; and *PaL* 2: 72, 73, n. 113. Leonardo Botta states: *Kyriacus Anconitanus, Cremona moritur anni domini MCCCCL secundo* (Sabbadini, “Ciriaco d’Ancona,” p. 193; and E. Jacobs, “Cyriacus von Ancona und Mehemed II.,” *BZ* 30 (1929): 197–202, esp. p. 202, n. 1; and Mitchell and Bodnar, *Vita Viri Clarissimi*, p. 19, n. 1). On Cyriacus, in general, cf. *PLP* 6: no. 13983 (p. 90) [s.v. Κυριακός].
- 36 *Minus*, 27.5: καὶ ἄλλο, ὅτι ὅταν σὺν θεῷ ἕξω καὶ γυναῖκαν, διὰ σοῦ θέλω ἕξειν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸν πλείονα χρόνον διαβιβάζειν καὶ θέλεις εἶσθην καὶ σὺ ὁ πλεόν γνώριμος αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ τῆς θεραπείας αὐτῆς. Pseudo-Sphrantzes adds the following pious sentiments, betraying his ecclesiastic background: ὅτι τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ κρίσις, δίκαιος τὸ δίκαιον διώξεται καὶ οὐκ ἄρᾳσει τῷ δικαίῳ ἄδικόν ποτε.
- 37 *Minus*, 38.4: καὶ τὸν Αὐγουστον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἐστάλην πάλιν ἐγὼ εἰς τὴν Πόλιν καὶ δι’ ἄλλας δουλείας καὶ διὰ τὴν εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα καὶ τὴν Γοτθίαν συνοικεσίου διὰ τοῦ αὐθεντός μου δουλείαν.
- 38 S. Runciman, “The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II,” in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), p. 281: “When Constantine succeeded to the Empire in 1448 it was thought that he should marry again.”
- 39 *Minus*, 36.3, 4: τοῦ Αλωΐζου Διέδου ἐκείνου μέσου γεγονότος, ἵνα ὁ μακαρίτης αὐθέντης μου κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος, δεσπότης ὢν καὶ εἰς τὸν Μορέαν αὐθέντης εὐρισκόμενος, ἐπάρη εἰς γυναῖκαν αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ δουκὸς θυγατέραν καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς προικῆς, ὁ αὐθέντης μου οὖν οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι οἰοεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ τόπος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῆς Βενετίας ἐν, συνκατέβαινε τὸ τοιοῦτον συμπενηθέριον, ἐμοῦ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων συναυνοῦντος καὶ ἀναγκάζοντος . . . ὡς δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐγεγόνει καὶ εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἀπῆλθε, κατὰ ἣν πάλιν ἀνοίκειον. τίς γάρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀρχοντισσῶν κυρίαν καὶ δέσποιναν κατεδέξατο Βενετικῶν θυγατέραν, ἐνδόξου μὲν ἴσως καὶ δουκῆς, ἀλλὰ προσκαίρω; ἢ τοὺς γαμβροὺς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτοῦ ὡς συγγάμβρους ἢ τοὺς υἱοὺς ὡς γυναικαδέλφους τοῦ βασιλέως; λοιπὸν τοῦτο γυρεύσαντος ἀπεπέμφθη καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐχθρός.
- 40 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 32, simply dismisses this match as “a tale . . . later put about . . . There is surely no truth in it.” Nicol expressed the same view in *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 386, 387, but was more cautious in *LCB*, p. 393, when he held the opinion that “in Venice the daughter of the Doge Francesco Foscari was considered.” Runciman, “The Marriages,” does not discuss this “proposal” but mentions it in *FC*, p. 51: “A Venetian ambassador suggested that a daughter of the Doge . . . might be available.” I believe that the view expressed in *FC* is probably closer to the truth: a mere inquiry, which was never taken seriously by the Venetians. The only modern scholar to have considered this possible match seriously and to have discussed it extensively is S. P. Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις,” *NH* 4 (1907): 431–433, who relies on the information of Sphrantzes and Pseudo-Sphrantzes and accepts the view that the daughter of the doge was not a proper match for Constantine, because the doge belonged to a lower social level than the emperor of Constantinople.
- 41 On Diedo, see Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453,” where evidence is gathered to indicate that Diedo probably composed an authoritative account of the siege of 1453, as he had been in charge of the Venetian defenders; his report vanished long ago. Diedo was proud of his contribution to the defense in 1453, as it is recorded in his surviving tomb in Venice. This important monument and its imagery have been discussed briefly in P. Fortini Brown, *Venice and Antiquity: The Venetian Sense of the Past* (New Haven and London, 1996), pp. 236, 237, (with two black-and-white photographs of Diedo’s tomb slab, pp. 262, 263). The complete tomb inscription reads as follows: *Ludovicus Diedo X. vir / opt. Bizantio capto / ex Britannia filio rei / p causa in vinculis re/licto Venetorum classem per medios hostes tuto in patriam erexit tam/ em iacere praetor morta/les edocuit pulcrum esse pro re p mori / sibi et suis*. The following documents pertain to Diedo’s activities: Leonardo, *PG* 159: 934 [= Languschi-Dolfen, fol.

- 20]; Barbaro 8 [CC 1: 12], 14, 15, 22, 28, 29 [CC 1: 19], 33, 38, 39, 57, 58 [CC 1: 35]; Stefano Magno, *Cronaca* (in *NE* 3: 298); and *Minus*, 36.4, in addition, to archival material: *Archivio di Stato, Sen. Secr.* 19, fol. 203^v [*TlePN*, p. 9] of July 5, 1453; *Archivio di Stato, Sen. Mar.* fol. 198^r, 199^r [*TlePN*, pp. 6–9] of July 23, 1453; *NE* 3: 301; *RdD* 3: 108 (no. 2931); and *SFC*, Appendix IV, no. 55 (p. 639).
- 42 Lampros, “Ο Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 432, n. 1, lists the names of Foscari’s daughters: Camilla, Bianca, Paola, and Maria; we do not know which one would have been the candidate in question. Eventually, all of them, with the exception of Maria, found husbands but we do not know exactly when they were married. Lampros considers Maria as the most likely choice.
- 43 Constantine had apparently written to Florence, as a response from the community survives, dated *die III, Maii MCCCCXLVI*, and states: *Itaque, ut brevi concludamus, sciat vestra Celsitudo, nos semper paratos esse ad omnia que ad illius gloriam et amplitudinem pertinerent*. The entire letter has been published in *PkP* 4: 31, and not in *NH* 4 (1907): 31, as Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 33, n. 21, states.
- 44 Lampros, “Ο Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 431; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 35.
- 45 *Minus*, 28.5: καὶ προσμένοντός μου ἐκεῖ, τὸν Ἰούνιον τοῦ νου^{ου} ἔτους ἀπέθανεν ἀπὸ λοιμώδους νοσήματος εἰς τὴν Σηλυμβρίαν ὁ δεσπότης κύρ Θεόδωρος καὶ φέροντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Πόλιν ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Παντοκράτορος μονῇ. Throughout this section of the *Minus* we encounter chronological difficulties reasonably attributed to a careless copyist. On the condition of the various manuscripts of Sphrantzes and Pseudo-Sphrantzes, cf. R. Maissano, “Il Manoscritto Napoletano II. E. 25 e la Storia della Tradizione dello Pseudo-Sfranze,” *Ἱταλοελληνικά: Rivista di cultura greco-moderna* 2 (1989): 121–135.
- 46 *CBB* 1: 9.51 (p. 99); 33.22 (p. 246); 34.13 (p. 268); and 35.10 (p. 287).
- 47 *Ibid.*, 9.51 (p. 99). Discussion in P. Schreiner, *Studien zu den Βραχέα Χρονικά* [Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia 6] (Munich, 1967), p. 177; and M. Philippides, “Some Prosopographical Considerations in Nestor-Iskander’s Text,” *Macedonian Studies* 6 (1989): 41–43. The death of Theodoros can be reasonably attributed to the plague; thus, the λοιμῶδες νόσημα of Sphrantzes can be combined with the evidence indicating an outbreak of the plague at this time. In addition, see E. Trapp, “Τὰ Τελευταῖα Χρόνια τοῦ Θεοδώρου Β΄ Παλαιολόγου,” in *Δώρημα στὸν Ἰωάννη Καραγιαννόπουλο* [= *Βυζαντινά* 13] (Thessalonica, 1985), pp. 957–964. On Theodoros II, in general, see *PLP* 9: no. 21459 (p. 88).
- 48 Khalkokondyles, 2.37–62 (pp. 126–159) followed by J. Held, *Hunyadi: Legend and Reality* [East European Monographs 178] (New York, 1985), pp. 130–134. For Varna and Constantinople, cf. O. Halecki, “Angora, Florence, Varna, and the Fall of Constantinople,” in F. Dölger and H.-G. Beck, eds., *Akten des XL. Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongresses* (Munich, 1960), pp. 216–220; *idem*, *From Florence to Brest 1439–1596* (Rome, 1958); and I. Theodorides, “The Stand of the Byzantine Emperor on the Battle of Varna,” *Études Balkaniques* 23 (1987): 107–119.
- 49 Doukas, 32.7–33.1.
- 50 *PkP* 2: 8: ἦν φιλομαθής, εὐμαθής καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πολυμαθής . . . λογιστικὴν δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰς καλουμένας συντάξεις τίς ἄμεινον καὶ ἀκριβέστερον ἢ θεθεώρηκεν ἢ μετεχειρίσειεν; ὅς γε καὶ πολλὰ ἐξεύρεν ἐνδέοντα ταῖς μεθόδοις ταύταις καὶ βιβλίων πατῆρ γέγονε, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐν θορύβοις καὶ πραγμάτων ὄχλοις πολλοῖς . . . δρόμον δὲ γλώττης καὶ χάριν ἐπανθοῦσαν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ νοημάτων δεινότητα οὔτε μετὰ τέχνης οὔτ’ ἄνευ ταύτης οἶμαι τῶ τῶν ἀπάντων οὕτω συμβῆναι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀφίχθαι παρά θεοῦ. τίς ἀκούων ἐκείνου δημηγοροῦντος οὐκ ἂν ἐπελάθετο συμφορᾶς εὐθύς, οὐκ ἂν ἐτέρφθη, οὐκ ἂν εὐξάτο μέχρι παντός οὕτως ἀκούειν ῥέοντος, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐς ὅσον οἷός τ’ ἦν ἐπιλεησμένος; τίς οὕτως ἄλογος ἦν ἢ τὴν γνώμην ἀτεγκτος καὶ σιδήρεος, ὥστε μὴ πεισθῆναι πείθειν ἐπιχειροῦντι.
- 51 *CBB* 1: 9.52 (p. 100): καὶ τῶ αὐτῷ ἔτει καὶ μηνὶ ἦλθεν ὁ δεσπότης ὁ κύρ Δημήτριος ὁ Παλαιολόγος, τοῦ βασιλέως ὁ ἀδελφός.

- 52 Cf. I. K. Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγή Βυζαντινῆς Ἱστορίας (1437–1450),” *NH* 18 (1934): 89–93, who makes extensive use of the composition of Scholarius.
- 53 Held, *Hunyadi*, pp. 130–134; *PaL* 2: 99, 100; *MCT*, pp. 54–56; N. Iorga, “Du Nouveau sur la Campagne turque de Jean Hunyadi en 1448,” *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen* 3 (1926): 13–27; F. Pall, “Les Relations entre la Hongrie et Scanderbeg,” *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen* 10 (1933): 127–131; and D. J. Geanakoplos, “Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453,” in H. W. Hazard, ed. (gen. ed.: K. M. Setton), *A History of the Crusades, vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, (Madison, 1975), pp. 98, 99.
- 54 *CBB* 1: 29.16 (p. 217), and 82.5 (p. 597).
- 55 *Ibid.*, 29.16 (p. 217).
- 56 *Ibid.*, 82.5 (p. 597): αὐμῆ ἐπέρασεν αὐθις ὁ Ἰάγγος μετὰ τῶν Βλάχων καὶ ἠττήθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων καὶ ὁ Ἰάγγος ἀπέδρα.
- 57 Khalkokondyles, 2.37–62 (pp. 126–159).
- 58 Doukas, 32.6: ὁ Ἰάγγος . . . ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸν Κόσσοβαν. καὶ ὁ Μουράτ σὺν πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ αὐτοῦ ἔτοιμος. καὶ δὴ πολεμήσαντες ἀφ’ ἐσπέρας, πρῶτ’ σκοτίας οὐσίς ἐγείρεται σὺν μερικοῖς στρατιώταις, καὶ ὡς δῆθεν ἐτοιμάσων πρὸ ὥρας τὸν πόλεμον αὐτὸς διέδρα οἶδε γὰρ τὴν στρατιάν τοῦ Τούρκου ὑπερέχουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον καὶ Οὐγγυροῦς δειλιῶντας καὶ εἰς φυγὴν μελετῶντας. τότε ὁ Μουράτ ἡλίου ἤδη ἀνγάζοντος ὁρῶν τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν Οὐγγυρῶν διεσκεδασμένας καὶ εἰς φυγὴν, βλέποντας ἐπέπεσεν ἐπ’ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐσκύλευε τοὺς δὲ κατέσφαξεν . . . καὶ ἐγένετο μεγάλη νίκη Μουράτ καὶ ἦτα τοῦ Ἰάγγου.
- 59 *PaL* 2: 100; and *MCT*, p. 56.
- 60 Held, *Hunyadi*, p. 133.
- 61 *Minus*, 28.7: καὶ τῇ λαⁿ τοῦ Ὀκτωβρίου μηνὸς τοῦ νζ^{oo} ἔτους ἀπέθανε καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Ἰωάννης χρόνων ὑπάρχων νς[’] καὶ μηνῶν ι’ καὶ ἡμερῶν ιε’. καὶ ἐτάφη τῇ αⁿ Νοεμβρίου εἰς τὴν μονὴν τοῦ Παντοκράτορος, αὐτοκρατορήσας χρόνους κγ’ καὶ μῆνας γ’ καὶ ἡμέρας ι’. For the problems in the chronology presented by this section of the *Minus*, see *supra*, n. 45.
- 62 The Greek and Latin texts of this treaty were first published by F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana*, vol. 3, pp. 216 ff., which included many errors. Lampros counted ninety-two errors and was compelled to issue a new edition of the Greek and Latin text, with exhaustive discussion; see S. P. Lampros, “Συνθήκη μεταξύ Ἰωάννου Η’ τοῦ Παλαιολόγου καὶ τοῦ Δουκὸς τῆς Βενετίας Φραγκίσκου Φόσκαρη,” *NH* 12 (1915): 153–197.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 170: σημειῶσαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ προειρημμένοι τρέβαι [= *treguae*] ἐγράφησαν ἐν ἔτει τε καὶ ἡμέρα τῇ ἀνωτέρω γεγραμμένη [= τῇ εἰκοστῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ Ἀπριλλίου μηνός, . . . ἔτει χιλιοστῷ τεσσαρακοστῷ τεσσαρακοστῷ ὀγδόῳ . . .], ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ἀκμάσαντα λοιμὸν ὠμόθησαν ἐν τῷ ἐπακολουθήσαντι χρόνῳ.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 170: ἀντὶ κύρ Δημητρίου Παλαιολόγου τοῦ Καντακουζινοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρὴν νόσῳ τινὶ κωλυθείς.
- 65 *CBB* 1: 22.46 (p. 187); 34.14 (p. 269) follows the *Minus* almost verbatim and adds that John died on November 1, due to a confusion with the day of his burial; 35.11 (p. 287) states that John died in January; *CBB* 1: 62.47 (p. 462) repeats the information presented in 34.14 (p. 269) and in Sphrantzes and makes a slight change in the number of days that John reigned (twelve, instead of ten); *CBB* 1: 97.6 (p. 640) is hopeless; *CBB* 1: 98B.2 (pp. 646, 647) adds nothing new; and *CBB* 1: 105.3 (p. 664) states that John died in November, without assigning a specific date. Another entry in a short chronicle supplies the essentials; see E. Mioni, “Une inedita cronaca bizantina (dal Marc. gr. 595),” in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), no. 50 (p. 77): μηνὶ ὀκτωβρίῳ λα’ ἔτους .αζ’ ἐκοιμήθη καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς κύριος Ἰωάννης ὁ καὶ ζ’ Παλαιολόγος.
- 66 *CBB* 1: 22.46 (p. 187): ζῆ δὲ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῶν κυρὰ Ἐλένη, Ὑπομονὴ μοναχί.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 98.2 (pp. 646, 647): ἦν δὲ ὅτε ἀπέτισε τὸ χρεῶν τρέχον ἔτος εζαγς’, ἰνδικτιῶνος ιβ’, μηνὶ Νοεμβρίῳ λα’, ἡμέρα ε’, ὥρα ι’ τῆς ἡμέρας. καὶ ἐτάφη ἐν τῇ σεβασμίᾳ μονῇ τοῦ

- κυρίου και θεοῦ και σωτηρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Παντοκράτορος εἰς τὸν τάφον τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, και ὁ θεὸς τάξει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἁγίων βασιλέων. ἀμήν, ἀμήν, ἀμήν. ὁ γράφας ταῦτα Δημήτριος Λάσκαρις ὁ Λεοντάρης. Another translation can be found in J. Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus: A Character Study,” in *‘Silloge Bizantina’ in Onore di Silvio Giuseppe Mercati* (Rome, 1975), p. 170 [= J. Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964), p. 124].
- 68 Doukas, 33.1: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης ποδαλγία πιεζόμενος ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, και μετὰ τὴν ἐπάνοδον ἀπὸ Ἰταλίας πολλαῖς θλίψεσι και δυσφορίαις ὧν πῆ μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ταραχὴν πῆ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐκδημίαν τῆς δεσποίνης, κατέλαβεν αὐτὸν νόσος, και ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐτελεύτησεν, ὕστατος βασιλεὺς χρηματίσας Ῥωμαίων.
- 69 One wonders how soon after the battle the news of the defeat of Hunyadi reached the capital. The sultan had been momentarily incapacitated, as his army had also suffered enormous losses; see *MCT*, pp. 55, 56. His victory could not be described as an absolute triumph; news of the outcome may have been slow to reach Constantinople.
- 70 Khalkokondyles, 2.761 (pp. 156, 157): και περὶ μὲν τὴν τῶν Παιδίων ἐστρατείαν ἡγουμένου τοῦ Χωνιάτου τοσαῦτα ἐγένετο και ἐν τέλει τούτῳ ἔσχετο Ἄμουράτης δὲ ὡς ἐπανήκει ἐς τὰ βασιλεια, οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον ὄρμητο μὲν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον στρατεύεσθαι, τελευτήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἑλλήνων βασιλέως Ἰωάννου.
- 71 *CF*, p. 370, n. 5.
- 72 *RKP* 1: 125: ἐντεῦθεν και τὸν αὐθέντην ἡμῶν και βασιλέα, τὸν σὸν ὁμαίμονα, ἡ ἐκκλησία μνημονεῦειν εὐλόγως παρητήσατο, ἥ και αὐτὴ ἡ ἁγία μήτηρ, ἡ θειοτάτη κυρία ἡμῶν και δέσποινα δικαίως ἠκολούθησε, στοργῆς φυσικῆς προτιμήσασα τὴν ἀποδοχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅτι τὰ πάλοι θεῶ και τῆ ὀρθοδόξῳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὑπεσχημένα ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ σεσάλευκε και καινοτομίᾳ προσέθετο.
- 73 This work of Scholarius is quoted and discussed briefly in *CF*, p. 370.
- 74 *Lamentation/Θρήνος*, ll. 94–104 (pp. 118–120): νᾶχεν ἀνάψειν ὁ οὐρανός, νᾶχεν καγῆν ἡ ὥρα, / τότες ὅταν ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἅγιος ἀδελφός σου, / ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ φρόνιμος, σοφός ὁ Καλοϊωάννης, / ἡ ρίζα τῶν φρονήσεων, ἡ δόξα τῶν Ῥωμαίων, / κλέος και κάλλος και τιμὴ, δεῦτερος Πτολεμαῖος, / τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως σπαθὶν ἀκονισμένον, / ρίζα και φῶς τῶν εὐσεβῶν, Χριστιανῶν Ῥωμαίων. / ὁ Καλοϊωάννη βασιλεῦ, πολλὰ κακὸν τὸ ποῖκες, / τότε ὅταν ἀπέθανες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν / ἡ ὥρα τοῦ θανάτου σου ἦτον ὁ χαλασμός μας, / τῆς πόλης τὰ θεμέλια τότε ἔξερριζωθῆκαν.
- 75 Gill, “John VIII Palaeologus,” p. 169 [= *Personalities*, p. 123]; and *CF*, pp. 371, 372.
- 76 *LCB*, p. 385.
- 77 *RKOR* 5: 3516 (pp. 131, 132); *RdD* 3: 2726; *NE* 8: 43; and S. Lampros, “Συνθήκη,” *NH* 12 (1915): 152–170 (text); discussion, pp. 171–197; a photograph of the signature of John VIII: p. 171. For the negotiations leading to this treaty, see C. A. Maltezos, *Ὁ Θεσμός τοῦ ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Βενετοῦ Βαίλου (1268–1453)* (Athens, 1970), pp. 190 ff.; in addition, see Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 388, who points out the old-fashioned character of this document.
- 78 For the fate of the Pantokrator (Zeyrek Camii, in the Ottoman era) during the sack, cf. *MP*, p. 550; and A. G. Paspates, *Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται Τοπογραφικαὶ καὶ Ἱστορικαὶ* (Constantinople, 1877, repr.: Athens, 1986), pp. 309–313 (with a drawing of the building as it was in the nineteenth century, facing p. 309). In *The Garden of the Mosques*, the translator of this work into English notes, p. 132, n. 1001: “Zeyrek Molla Mehmed Effendi (d. 1506), Turkish ulema of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries . . . is particularly remembered for a prolonged disputation on religious matters with the famous scholar Molla Hocaçade in the presence of Sultan Mehmed II.” In addition, cf. J. Freely and A. S. Çakmak, *Byzantine Monuments of Istanbul* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 211–220; and R. Ousterhout, Z. Ahunbay, and M. Ahunbay, “Study and Restoration of the Zeyrek Camii in Istanbul, First Report, 1997–98,” *DOP* 54 (2000): 265–270.
- 79 On Bessarion’s eulogy, see *supra*, ch. 4, text with n. 112.
- 80 The work is entitled *Γενναδίου Θρήνος Ἰουνίου κ^α Ἰνδικτιῶνος Ὀγδόης ἐν τῷ Ὄρει τοῦ Μενουκίως ἐν τῇ Μονῇ τοῦ Τιμίου Προδρόμου*: L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridis, and M. Jugie, *Oeuvres complètes de George Scholarios*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1928): 283–294, under the title

- “Lamentation de Scholarios sur les malheurs de sa vie (1460);” the extract in our text is cited on pp. 288–290: οἴμοι και πῶς ἔχω μνησθῆναι τῶν ἀκροατηρίων ἐκείνων ἐπισκόπων, τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κλήρου, τῶν μοναχῶν, τῶν ἐξ ἀγοράς, τῶν ἀστών, τῶν ξένων, οἷς ἐν τρικλινίῳ προκαθημένοι τὸν θεῖον λόγον ὠμίλου; . . . ὃ τῶν δικῶν ἐκείνων, ἐν αἷς προκαθήμενος . . . ἐξηγούμενος νόμους, ἄλλοις ἐξηγεῖσθαι χώραν διδούς; . . . ὁ δὲ ἔφερε χαίρων, πειρώμενος, οὐκ ἐνοχλῶν, ὡς ἑώκει, φημί δὲ ἐκείνον τὸν Ἰωάννην, ὃ τὰ ἡμέτερα συναποτεθῆκει πάντα δευνῶς . . . ὃ τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν δημηγοριῶν ἐπὶ τε τοῦ βασιλείως αὐτοῦ και χωρὶς ἄλλον ἄλλο τι προβαλλομένων καθάπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ πάντων ἀποδιδομένης ἡμῖν εὐνοίας τε και τιμῆς. ὃ τῆς ἡδονῆς μεθ’ ἧς ἡμᾶς προσεδέχοντο, ἀνέορτον ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν ἧ ποτε τῶν βασιλείων ἀπῆμεν, και ὡς ἐκ μακρᾶς ἀποδημίας ἦκοντα μετ’ ἐκείνην.
- 81 D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282: A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations* (Cambridge, 1959, repr.: Hamden, 1973), pp. 370–371; and C. Head, *Imperial Twilight: The Palaiologos Dynasty and the Decline of Byzantium* (Chicago, 1977), p. 26. It seems that the successor of Michael VIII was afraid that his own subjects would exact a terrible vengeance on the corpse of his predecessor and he hastily buried his father in secret; his remains were later exhumed and quietly interred in an obscure monastery in Selybria; see D. M. Nicol, “The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons, 1274,” in G. J. Cumming and D. Baker, eds., *Studies in Church History*, vol. 7 (Cambridge, 1971): 113–146 [reprinted in D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium: Its Ecclesiastical History and Relations with the Western World* (London, 1972)].
- 82 *Minus*, 29.2–3.
- 83 *Ibid.*: 57, 58: ὄχητο μὲν γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς σοὶ δὲ πλὴν ὀλίγων ἅπαντες συνεβούλευον τὴν μείζω λαμβάνειν προσηγορίαν ἐν χερσὶν οὖσαν . . . σοὶ δ’ ἔφασκον βασιλεὺς μὲν ὁ πατήρ, ἀδελφὸς δὲ ὁ πρὸ μικροῦ βεβασιλευκῶς . . . και τοιουτοῖς τισὶν ἠρέθιζόν σου τὴν γνώμην φανερώς ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς μείζοσι. ἀλλὰ σύ γε τῆ σαυτοῦ φύσει μᾶλλον χρησάμενος, εἰ δὲ ἔδει τι και συμβούλων, οὐ τοῖς ῥησοκινδύνους τούτοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς σωφρονεστάτους προσεσηκῶς. Also cf. Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” pp. 90–93.
- 84 *Minus*, 29.2.
- 85 *Ibid.*, 29.3: ἐκείνου δὲ ἐλθόντος [sc. τοῦ Θωμᾶ] ἔπαυσαν πολλῶ πλέον, ἄπερ ὁ δεσπότης κὺρ Δημήτριος ἦ μᾶλλον οἱ αὐτοῦ σφετεριζόμενοι ἐνεργοῦσαν, ἵνα βασιλεύσῃ, τὸν οὐχὶ και δεσπότην και πορφυρογέννητον παρὰ τῶν Κωνσταντινουπολιτῶν ἄξιον ὄντα κρίνεσθαι, ζῶντος τοῦ πρώτου και τοιουτου ἀδελφοῦ, τοῦ και ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς πρωτεύοντος ἄνευ τοῦ δυστυχῆς εἶναι. ὁμοιως τὸ πρέπον και δίκαιον ἴσχυσαν ὀρισμῶ τῆς ἀγίας δέσποινας [sc. τῆς Ἐλένης] και τῶν υἱῶν αὐτῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν και ἀρχόντων βουλή και γνώμη.
- 86 *PkP* 2: 58; Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 91.
- 87 *PkP* 2: 58: πρὸς βουλομένους δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἀντεπεξίω δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις γενναίως και τῶν τεχνῶν ἐπιμελούμενος φυλακῆς και τῷ μείζονι τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὴν βασιλείαν συγκατακτώμενος, ὡσπερ ἐπίτροπος τῆς τῶν ὄλων σωτηρίας και φυλακῆς τῆ πόλει καταστάς ἐκ θεοῦ. καιτοι συνέπλαττον μὲν οἱ συκοφάνται πολλά, ταραξία τὴν σὴν γνώμην βουλόμενοι, ἀλλὰ σύ γε ἀκλόνητος ἦσθα: οὐ γὰρ σε ἐλάνθανεν ὄθεν αὐτὰ ἐσπείρετο και ὅτου χάριν.
- 88 *Ibid.*: και οἷδα πάνυ καλῶς, ὡς εἰ μὴ τῶν συκοφαντῶν αἱ βοαὶ και προσενοχλήσεις ἐκόλλουν . . . συνθήκας τε ἐποιεῖς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἡμῖν και ὑγαινοῦσαν τοῖς ὅλοις ἀπεδίδους ἂν ἦκοντι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου τὰδελφῶ και βασιλεῖ, και οὐτ’ ἂν ἡ περιουκὶς ἐκείρετο πᾶσα, οὐτε ταῖς νήσοις ἂν τὸ δεινὸν ἐπῆει ἐκεῖνο, οὐδέποτε αὐταῖς ὁμοίως ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἐπεληλυθός. Also see Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγῆ,” p. 92.
- 89 *PkP* 2: 58.
- 90 On Notaras, see, among others, *PLP* 8: no. 20730 (p. 185); S. A. Koutibas, *Oi Notarades stin Yphreasia tou Ethnous* (Athens, 1968), esp. pp. 23–39; K.-P. Matschke, “The Notaras Family and Its Italian Connections,” *DOP* 49 (1995) [*Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries*], pp. 59–72; and *idem*, “Personengeschichte, Familiengeschichte, Sozialgeschichte. Die Notaras im späten Byzanz,” in L. Balleto, ed., *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna. Studi in onor di Geo Pitarino* (Geneva, 1977), pp. 787–812.
- 91 *Supra*, ch. 3, n. 21.

- 92 S. Runciman, “Lucas Notaras, ‘Γαμβρός τοῦ Βασιλέως,’” in P. Wirth, ed., *Polychronion: Festschrift Franz Dölger zum 75. Geburtstag* (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 447–449; Runciman points out that in Greek the word γαμβρός means “son-in-law” and rarely can it be taken to mean “father-in-law” (but in Latin translations of Greek documents γαμβρός is regularly rendered by *gener*). Runciman suggests that Loukas Notaras had married an unknown daughter of John VII. There exists one more piece of evidence that has not been taken into account by modern scholarship thus far: in 1470 in Italy, John Moskhos wrote a eulogy of Notaras. This piece of rhetorical hagiography must have been composed under the auspices (if not by the direct commission) of Anna Notaras; this belated funeral speech reviews, under favorable light, the life of Notaras and his activities. For the Greek text, see É. M. Legrand, “Ἰωάννου τοῦ Μόσχου Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος ἐπὶ τῷ Λουκᾷ Νοταρᾷ,” *ΔΙΕΕ* 2 (1885/86): 413–424. In this composition, Moskhos does not mention any connection between Notaras’ wife and the imperial family and only states that Anna’s mother was the daughter of a prosperous nobleman, p. 416: ἡδὲ καὶ πρὸς τελειότεραν ἡλικίαν προβάς, καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ καλοῦντος, γήμιας τῶν εὐ γεγονόταν θυγατέρα τινὸς καὶ πλοῦτῳ θαυμαζομένου. Had there been a direct imperial connection Moskhos would have made much of it, even though such statements would weaken the view that Anna Notaras was the *quondam sponsa* of Constantine. If indeed the families were closely related, Constantine XI could not have considered Anna as a candidate for his wife/queen. On this speech, cf. A. E. Bakalopoulos (Vacalopoulos), “Die Frage der Glaubwürdigkeit der ‘Leichenrede auf L. Notaras’ von Johannes Moschos (15. Jh.),” *BZ* 52 (1959): 13–21; and E. A. Zachariadou, “Τὰ Λόγια καὶ ὁ Θάνατος τοῦ Λουκᾷ Νοταρᾷ,” in *Ροδωνία: Τιμὴ στὸν Μ. Ι. Μανούσασκα* (Rethymno, 1996), pp. 135–146.
- 93 Lampros, “Συνθήκη,” pp. 168, 170: τοῦ περιποθήτου γαμβροῦ αὐτῆς [*sc.* τῆς βασιλείας μου] κυροῦ Λουκᾷ διεμνηνευτοῦ τοῦ Νοταρᾷ. This phrase was rendered in the accompanying Latin translation as *dilecto genero eiusdem [sc. imperii nostri] domino Luca Notara dierminephi*.
- 94 An inscription found in the nineteenth century and embedded in the remains of the walls of Notaras’ home mentioned the fact that he was the “interpreter;” see A. D. Mordtmann, *Belagerung und Eroberung Constantinopels durch die Türken im Jahre 1453 nach dem originalquellen bearbeitet* (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1858), pp. 142, 143, n. 27. On the position of διεμνηνευτής/dragoman in the imperial court, see N. Oikonomides, “La chancellerie impériale de Byzance du 13^e au 15^e siècle,” *REB* 43 (1985): 167–195, esp. pp. 172 ff.).
- 95 *Minus* 33.4: ὅτι νᾶ μηνύση τὸν μέγαν δοῦκαν τὸν Νοταρᾶν. On the post of the grand duke, see, among others, R. Guillard, *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 542–551.
- 96 See the abstract with short extract of this document in *NE* 3: 257–258. Iorga in this publication misread the manuscript’s *Dierminephi* for *Dierminesti*.
- 97 Moskhos, p. 420: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένου τοῦ βασιλέως ἔδει τῇ ἀρχῇ εἰσαχθῆναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους διάδοχον, ὁ δὲ ἦν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, ἔνιοι τὸν μετὰ τὸν διάδοχον τοῦ βασιλέως ἀδελφὸν διανοηθέντες λάθρα εἰς τὸν βασιλικὸν θρόνον ἀναγαγεῖν . . . ἐσκέπαιτο πῶς ἂν εἰς πέρας πράξαιεν τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἡδὴ μελετηθέν. ἀλλ’ ὁ γενναῖος ἐκεῖνος καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀεὶ προιστάμενος, οὐχ ὄπλοις ἐκεῖνους ἀντιφερόμενος, οὐδὲ λόγοις διαμαχόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἦν προσῆκον, τῇ ἐκείνου μεγαλονοίᾳ, ἧ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς Πόλεως πειθόμενον εἶχεν αὐτῷ ἡρέμα, τῷ διαδόχῳ ἐτήρησε τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅς ἀφικόμενος καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀναγορευθεὶς, ὡς ἔθος, ἦγε μὲν, ὡς εἰκός, ἐν μεγίσταις τὸν ἄνδρα τιμαῖς.
- 98 Moskhos, p. 421: μέχρι καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πολιορκίας ὁ γενναῖος οὗτος ἠγωνίστο τὴν αὐτὴν εὐνοίαν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῷ τε βασιλεῖ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς πολίταις ἦν περ καὶ πρότερον . . . οὔτε γὰρ τάμεινω λυσitelεστοτα συμβουλευῶν τῷ βασιλεῖ ἦττον ὠφθη τινός.
- 99 The addendum stating that Andronikos signed for Demetrios appears only in the Greek text of the treaty, just above the signature of John VIII but is omitted in the accompanying Latin translation; cf. Lampros, “Συνθήκη,” p. 170: ἀντὶ κυρ Δημητρίου Παλαιολόγου τοῦ Καντακουζινοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρῆν νόσφ τινὶ κωλυθείς, ὁ μέγας δομέστικος κυρ Ἀνδρόνικος Παλαιολόγος ὁ Καντακουζηνός. On the position of the grand domestic, see, among others, Guillard, *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines*, pp. 405–425.

- 100 On Andronikos Palaeologus, cf. D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460* [DOS 11] (Washington, DC, 1968), no. 68 (pp. 179–181), and *PLP* 5: no. 10957 (p. 91); his son, whose first name remains unknown, had married one of the daughters of Loukas Notaras; see Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, no. 69 (p. 181).
- 101 Τοῦ περιποθῆτου ἐξαδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, κυροῦ Δημητρίου Παλαιολόγου, rendered into Latin as *dilecto consaguineo imperii nostri Demetrio Palaeologo Catacussino*. On Demetrios Palaeologus Kantakouzenos, cf. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, no. 75 (pp. 192, 193); *PLP* 5: no. 10962 (p. 92); and *VeG*: no. 170 (p. 90); because of a misreading in the treaty with Venice, some scholars are under the impression that Demetrios' daughter was the wife of Loukas Notaras; see, e.g., *VeG*: no. 170 (p. 90): “die andere [sc. Tochter] verheiratete mit dem Megas Dux der Flotte, Lukas Notaras.” For this error, see Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, pp. 194, 195, n. 7.
- 102 Lampros, “Συνθήκη,” p. 180: τῶν ἀνωτέρω μαρτύρων τοὺς . . . Λατίνους δὲν γινώσκομεν ἄλλοθεν, μανθάνομεν δὲ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συνθήκῃ ἀποδιοδομένου εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐπιθέτου εὐγενῶν, ὅτι ἦσαν Βενετῶν εὐπατριδῶν. This is a rare occasion in which Lampros is in error. In fact, two of the Venetian witnesses are well-known residents of Constantinople. Thus Filippo [or Felipo/Felippo] Contarini is mentioned in Barbaro's *Giornale dell' Assedio di Costantinopoli* a number of times; he was one of the defenders in 1453, was captured in the sack, and was eventually ransomed: his name is included in one of Barbaro's lists (pp. 61, 62): *vinti nuove nobeli da Venexia, i qual fo prexonni in man del turco, tuti tornò a Venexia, i qual tuti si ave taia, chi ducati doamilia, chi ducati mille, e chi ducati otozento, in men de uno ano tuti fo fo tornadi a Venexia*. The same person is mentioned in Magno's chronicle, *NE* 3: 298: *Rimansero in quella* [sc. *Constantinopoli*]: *Felippo Contarini, camerlengo*. The second witness, Fabruzzi Corner, was also a notable defender in 1453; Barbaro refers to him a number of times (cf. e.g., pp. 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 59–61, 63, and 65); he, too, was captured in the sack and was ransomed within one year; in addition, Ubertino Pusculo, who was present in Constantinople in 1453, also names him twice in his poem (4.169–172, 4.939–951); see, e.g., 4.169–172: *Charsaeam* [sc. *portam*] *servans L<e>ontarius gente Briena / gaudet scio clara de gente Fabruci, / Cornaria. Hic Venetus Cretem generosus habebat*. Pusculo is followed by Languschi-Dolfin, p. 17: *A la porta carsea Leonardario Brion cum Fabricio Cornero Candioto*. For the evidence on Corner and Contarini, see *SFC*, Appendix IV: no. 48 and no. 41, respectively.
- 103 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.61 (pp. 156, 157): ὄρμητο μὲν . . . Δημήτριος ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, διεκωλύθη δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ μεσιτῶν καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν μεσαζόντων, Καντακουζηνῶ τε καὶ Νοταρᾶ. This historian does not specify whether this Kantakouzenos was Andronikos or Demetrios. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, no. 785 (p. 193), assumes it was Demetrios.
- 104 In January 1449 Constantine was corresponding with Antonio Diedo, the Venetian duke of Candia, in friendly terms; cf. *RKOR*: 3520 (p. 132), and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 40.
- 105 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.61 (pp. 156, 157): Ἀμουράτης δὲ ὡς ἐπαμῆκει ἐς τὰ βασίλεια, οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον ὄρμητο μὲν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον στρατευσθεῖσαι, τελευτήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἑλλήνων βασιλέως Ἰωάννου, καὶ ἐπὶ Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐχώρησεν ἡ βασιλεία. ἐπεὶ τε γὰρ ἐτελεύτησεν, ὄρμητο ὁ μὲν ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ Δημήτριος ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, διεκωλύθη δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ μεσιτῶν καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν μεσαζόντων, Καντακουζηνῶ τε καὶ Νοταρᾶ, δεδιότων μὴ ἀφικομένου ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν τούτου ἐπαγάγῃ ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος στρατὸν ἐπήλυδα, καὶ σφίσις ἀπόλοιτο ἡ ἀρχὴ τε καὶ τὰ πράγματα. Before John VIII departed for Italy, he left the capital to the care of Constantine, who had been reinforced with a group of crossbowmen recruited in Crete; it is not impossible that the despot had maintained connections among those mercenaries who had been present in the capital during his regency.
- 106 Demetrios and his Turkish allies had raided the countryside during the 1442 rebellion against John VIII (Bogiatzides, “Νέα Πηγὴ,” pp. 80, 81); that raid had made an impression on the Constantinopolitans and its memory could have worked against Demetrios

- at this time. See *CBB* 1: 34.15 (p. 269): ὁ δὲ δεσπότης ὁ κῦρ Δημήτριος ἐργάστη ἴνα ἀρπάξῃ τὴν βασιλείαν. A paraphrase is then repeated: ὁ δὲ κῦρ Δημήτριος, ὁ δεσπότης, διεργάζετο λαβεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν.
- 107 *Minus*, 29.2: τῆς ἑ^α τοῦ Δεκεμβρίου ἀπήλυθον ἐγὼ ἀποκρισιάρης εἰς τὸν ἀμυρᾶν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ καὶ τὸ πρωτεῖον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη τῶν ἐν τῇ Πόλει σχεδὸν ἀπάντων τὸν κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνον εἰς βασιλεία κρῖνουσι, καὶ νῦν ἐπίσταται τοῦτο κάκεινος δὴ ὁ ἀμυρᾶς, ὅπερ ἔσπερξε καὶ ἀπεδέξατο καὶ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δώρων κάμει ἀπέπεμψε.
- 108 Doukas, 33.1: τὸν δὲ Κωνσταντῖνον πέμψαντες οἱ τῆς Κωνσταντίνου ἡγάγον αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ Πόλει, καὶ πρέσβεις στεῖλας εἰς τὸν Μουράτ καὶ δεξιῶσας αὐτὸν σὺν δώροις καὶ μελιχίοις λόγοις εἰρήνευσεν αὐτόν, ἄρας ἐκ μέσου πάντα παρεληλυθότα σκάνδαλα.
- 109 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.62 (pp. 158, 159): ἀφικομένου δέ . . . ἐς Βυζάντιον οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου.
- 110 Doukas, 33.1 (text *supra*, n. 108).
- 111 *Minus*, 29.4: τὰς αὐτὰς δὲ ἡμέρας καὶ ἄρχοντες ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν Μορέαν ἐστάλησαν Ἀλέξιος Φιλανθρωπῆνός ὁ Λάσκαρις . . . καὶ Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγος ὁ Ἰαγρός καὶ βασιλέα πεποιήκασιν εἰς τὸν Μυζηθρᾶν τῆς ἑ^α Ἰαννουαρίου τὸν δεσπότην κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνον. A slightly different version is presented in the *Maïus*, which speaks of a coronation, 3.1 (p. 348): ἀπεστάλη ὁ ῥηθεις Ἀλέξιος ὁ Φιλανθρωπῆνός μετὰ Μανουὴλ τοῦ Παλαιολόγου τοῦ λεγομένου Ἰαγροῦ εἰς Πελοπόννησον, ἵνα εἰς βασιλέα στέψωσι τὸν δεσπότην κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνον . . . ὁ καὶ ἔπραξεν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ τῆς ἑκτη Ἰανουαρίου.
- 112 I. K. Bogiatzides, “Τὸ Ζήτημα τῆς Στέψεως Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου,” *Λαογραφία* 2 (1923): 449–456, remains the definitive investigation. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 37, 38, repeats the same information as Bogiatzides, then cites the wrong volume (p. 38, n. 4) for *Λαογραφία*, alters the year of the journal’s publication, and further cites its title in his Bibliography (p. 134) as *Laographica*. On this troubling issue of the coronation, cf. A. Christophilopoulou, “Ἐκλογή, Αναγόρευσις καὶ Στέψις τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος,” *Πραγματεῖαι τῆς Ἀκαδημίας Ἀθηνῶν* 22 (1956): 199–201; *eadem*, “Περὶ τὸ Πρόβλημα τῆς Αναδείξεως τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος,” *Επιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς Φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν* 13 (1962/63): 393–399; M. G. Carroll (Klopf), “Constantine XI Paleologus: Some Problems of Image,” in A. Moffatt, ed., *Maistor: Classical, Byzantine and Renaissance Studies for Robert Brownling* (Canberra, 1984), pp. 329–343, who speculates, p. 337, that Constantine may have postponed his coronation until he found a consort; and M. Kordoses, “The Question of Constantine Palaiologos’ Coronation,” in R. Beaton and C. Roueché, eds., *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies Dedicated to Donald M. Nicol on His Seventieth Birthday* (London, 1993), pp. 137–145.
- 113 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 37, suggests that a simple ceremony took place, perhaps duplicating the events surrounding the investiture and acclamation of John VI Kantakouzenos on October 26, 1341.
- 114 *FC*, p. 52, states that Constantine was crowned by “the local Metropolitan,” led astray by Pseudo-Sphrantzes, who mentions a “coronation” at Mistra; see *supra*, n. 111. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 85, repeats the same information in elaborated form.
- 115 The ceremony could have taken place either in the metropolitan Church of Saint Demetrios or in the smaller Church of Saint Sophia; see Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital*, p. 85. A ceremony of this type does not justify the bold (and incorrect) statement in *RKOR*, p. 132: “Konstantinos XII. Palaiologos als Kaiser anerkannt 1448 okt. 31, gekrönt 1449 jan. 6.” A short chronicle identifies Constantine as “despot,” on his arrival in Constantinople on March 12, 1449; see Mioni, “Une inedita cronaca,” no. 51 (p. 77): ὁ δεσπότης κύριος Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος. For information on the erroneous impression that Constantine XI was crowned at Mistra persists, see e.g., J. Freely and A. S. Çakmak, *Byzantine Monuments of Istanbul* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 183: “When the news arrived at Mistra, Constantine was acclaimed as emperor. It was

decided that the coronation should be carried out there rather than in Constantinople; and so on 6 January 1449 he was crowned as Constantine XI in the Church of St. Demetrius in Mistra.”

- 116 This is included in a version of Pseudo-Dorotheos, preserved in a manuscript in Paris; see S. P. Lampros, “Δωροθέου Βιβλίον Ἱστορικόν,” *NH* 16 (1922): 137–190, esp. p. 186: βασιλεία Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου. τότε ἔλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν Κωνσταντίνος ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ στεφθεὶς ἐν τῷ παμμεγίστῳ ναῷ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου Σοφίας παρὰ πατριάρχου κύρ Γρηγορίου. See also Bogiatzides, “Τὸ Ζήτημα τῆς Στέψεως,” p. 456. Nothing of this sort is included in the main transmission of Pseudo-Dorotheos, which found its way into the printer’s hands: *Βιβλίον Ἱστορικὸν Περιέχον ἐν Συνόψει Διαφόρων καὶ Ἐξόχους Ἱστορίας τοῦ Κυρίου Δωροθέου* (Venice, 1631); p. φμε’, reads: ἔλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν ὁ αὐτὸς Κωνσταντίνος καὶ ἐκάθησεν εἰς τὸν βασιλικὸν θρόνον ὡς βασιλεὺς καὶ ἐπροσκύνησαν αὐτὸν οἱ ἄρχοντες καὶ ὁ λαὸς ὅλος διὰ βασιλέα. *The Lamentation/Θρήνος* also speaks of a coronation in Santa Sophia in Constantinople; see ll. 114–116 (p. 120): νᾶχεν ἄστράψειν οὐρανός, νᾶχεν καγῆν ἢ ὦρα / ὅταν ἐδόθη ἡ βουλή ’ς τῆς Πόλης τὸ παλάτιν, / καὶ βασιλέα σ’ ἔσπεσαν εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν Σοφίαν.
- 117 S. P. Lampros, “Ἀνεκδότος Σύνοψις Ἱστοριῶν,” *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρίς: Ἐθνικὸν Πανεπιστήμιον* 3 (1906/07) (Athens, 1909): 150–227, esp. pp. 226, 227: μετὰ τὸν Ἰωάννην ἐκλήθη ὁ Κωνσταντίνος δεσπότης ὢν ἐν Μυζηθρᾷ καὶ ἄρχων τῆς ἡμισείας Πελοποννήσου καὶ οὐκ ἐστέφθη.
- 118 Manuel II, the father of Constantine had also taken the opportunity to have himself crowned after his wedding to Helena Dragaš, so that his bride could be crowned with him; see *MP*, pp. 102 ff.
- 119 *PkP* 1: 123–134, esp. p. 125: τῆς ποίας οὖν ἐκκλησίας ἐκδικητῆς ἐστί καὶ ὑπέρμαχος ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ βασιλεία σου, καὶ πῶς ἔχει νῦν αὕτη ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ποῦ ταύτης θρέμματα καὶ τίς ὁ ποταπὸς ὁ ταύτης δοκῶν ποιμὴν καὶ προστάτης καὶ τίς ὁ στέψων σε πατριάρχης ὁδεδήποτε καὶ τῷ θεῷ μύρω χρίσων βασιλικῶς, καὶ τὴν σὴν εὐεργεσίαν καὶ ὁμολογίαν δεξόμενος; For analysis, cf. Bogiatzides, “Τὸ Ζήτημα τῆς Στέψεως,” pp. 451–453.
- 120 *CBB* 2: 7 (p. 636): γέγραπται ταῦτα . . . βασιλεύοντος τοῦ ὑστάτου τῶν Παλαιολόγων Κωνσταντίνου τρίτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ, ἔτι ἀστεφοῦς ὄντος διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μὴ ἔχειν προστάτην. A longer extract, in an English translation, of the same chronicle can be found in Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 58. The fact that Constantine had not been crowned was not entirely forgotten, in spite of the hagiographical lore that accumulated around his name; thus, an entry in a short chronicle reported the fact that he was still a despot at the time of his death; see *CBB* 1: 69.39 (p. 535): καὶ πάλιν ἐσέβησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ τῆς Ἄγαρ καὶ ἐπῆραν αὐτὴν ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου δεσπότη, ἀστέπτου ὄντος, ὁ σουλτᾶν Μειμέτης, ἐν ἔτει ςζξα’, μαίψ κθ’.
- 121 For this προσφώνημα, cf. *PkP* 4: 67–82 (wrongly assigned to Michael Apostolis); in addition, see Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 39, n. 6 and n. 7. Argyropoulos also composed a formal essay on kingship, which he presented to Constantine at this time; Greek text in S. P. Lampros, *Ἀργυροπούλεια. Ἰωάννου Ἀργυροπούλου Λόγοι, Πραγματεῖαι, Ἐπιστολαὶ* (Athens, 1910), pp. 8–47; in addition, see A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation 1204–1461: The Byzantine Period* (New Brunswick, 1970), pp. 180, 181. *PkP* 4: 67: χαίρω μὲν, ὃ θεϊότατε βασιλεῦ, ὁρῶν σε τὸν πάντ’ ἄριστον ἐπὶ τοῦ βασιλείου θρόνου καθήμενον.
- 122 Θειότατον βασιλέα. See *PkP* 4: 83–87.
- 123 For discussion of the contradictory position adopted by Doukas in Bogiatzides, see “Τὸ Ζήτημα τῆς Στέψεως,” p. 449.
- 124 On the Serbian Helena Dragaš and her Orthodoxy, see *supra*, n. 72.
- 125 S. P. Lampros, “Κωνσταντίνος IB’ ἢ ΙΓ’,” *NH* 9 (1912): 449–452. Lampros was under considerable pressure to solve this puzzle, as, at that time, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Greece was also named Constantine and the appropriate numeral had

to be assigned to his name, since the Greeks continued to count their kings from the medieval period, without paying attention to the interruption precipitated by the Ottoman interlude. See Lampros' conclusion on this matter, p. 452: "Ἄρα ἀκριβὲς εἶνε νά διδῆται εἰς τὸν Κωνσταντῖνον Παλαιολόγον ὁ ἀριθμὸς ΙΑ' καὶ εἰς τὸν σημερινὸν βασιλέα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁ ἀριθμὸς ΙΒ'." The same ground was later covered in a book notice by F. Dölger, *BZ* 52 (1959): 445.

- 126 Nineteenth-century scholars sometimes counted Constantine as the fourteenth emperor of that name; cf., e.g., V. Langlois, "Notice sur le sabre de Constantine XIV, dernier empereur de Constantinople, conservé à l'Armeria Reale de Turin," *Revue archéologique* 14 (1857): 292–294; and *idem*, "Mémoire sur le sabre de Constantine XIV Dracosès, dernier empereur grec de Constantinople," in *Revue del'Orient et de l'Algerie et des Colonies* (Paris, 1858): 153–165. A. Pertusi in *CC* 1 and *CC* 2, prefers Constantine XII. A. G. K. Savvides has attempted to revive the controversy in "Morea and Islam 8th–15th Centuries: A Survey," *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* 2 (1990): 47–75 [= A. G. K. Savvides, *Βυζαντινοτουρκικά Μελετήματα: Ανατύπωση Ἀρθρῶν 1981–1990* (Athens, 1991), pp. 297–327], esp. p. 66 [316] and n. 153: "the last Palaeologus still appears as Constantine XI in *PLP* 9, 99, 100, no. 21500." Savvides seems to be embracing the eccentric views of B. Sigonowitz, "Ueber das byzantinische Kaisertum nach dem vierten Kreuzzuge (1204–1205)," *BZ* 45 (1952): 346–356, who posits the existence of an emperor Constantine Laskaris, thus making Constantine Palaeologus the twelfth emperor by that name; Sigonowitz's position has been criticized by I. A. Papadrianos, "The Marriage-Arrangement between Constantine XI Palaeologus and the Serbian Mara (1451)," *Balkan Studies* 6 (1965): 131, n. 1.
- 127 It is encountered in a letter by Cardinal Isidore soon after the fall of Constantinople (July 6, 1453); for the complete text, see *CC* 1: 6: *quae* [*sc. Constantinopolis*] *ab ipso Constantino, Elenae filio, fuit tunc fundata, ita nunc ab isto altero Constantino, alterius Elenae filio, miserabiliter est amissa*; in Spandugnano, pp. 153, 154: *et permisse Iddio che cosi come Constantino figliolo di Helena Constantinopoli fu edificata, cosi etiam dio nel tempo di un altro Constantino figliolo di Elena si perdette per forza*; and in Nestor-Iskander, an eyewitness of the siege of 1453, 77 (pp. 86, 87), who retains part of the prophecy and disregards Helena: Избытсья реченное: Ко[н]стянтиномъ създася и паки Ко[н]стянтиномъ и скончася. For a Greek formulation of the same notion, see *CBB* 1: 115.1 (p. 684). Also see *SFC*, pp. 219, 220.

9 *Dies irae*

The crown of martyrdom

1 The emperor's diplomatic activities

According to the sixteenth-century elaborator of Sphrantzes,¹ Constantine was “crowned” emperor at Mistra on January 6, 1449. Before proceeding to Constantinople, Constantine issued a chrysebull, dated “in the month of February of the current twelfth indiction in the year 6957,” bestowing the village Phanari(on) upon Plethon. The original document also included the formal signature of Constantine XI as emperor, inscribed between crosses:² “Constantine Palaeologus, in Christ the God, faithful king and emperor of the Romans.” It was late in the season for a sea passage but he consulted the Venetians in correspondence marked by pleasantries, and one Venetian vessel was engaged as an escort.³ The bulk of Constantine’s vessels came from his former adversaries over Glarentza, the Catalans, who conveyed the last Byzantine emperor to Constantinople. One short chronicle⁴ seems to share the same source with Pseudo-Sphrantzes and duplicates its information. A second notice⁵ cites the wrong year: “The same man, Lord Constantine, went away to Constantinople, in the year 6958 [1448 A.D.] [*sic*], after he became emperor.” The correct date of Constantine’s arrival is supplied by another chronicle.⁶ Yet another chronicle⁷ records: “On March 12 of the same year the despot Lord Constantine Palaeologus came to the city on board a ship and took over the throne.”

Constantine dispatched his envoys to Murad and formally embraced the existing treaty, whose terms included, in addition to Constantinople, the Morea. With its ratification, a major source of anxiety was removed. Constantine no longer worried about overt hostile action by the sultan over the Morea and focused his attention on his own brothers. Constantine brought about a reconciliation between his younger brothers, sometime in August, prior to the departure of Thomas for the Morea:⁸ “On September 1, <69>58 [1449 A.D.], Lord Demetrios, the despot born in the purple, also left for the Morea. Earlier a reconciliation took place in the presence of their saintly mother (the queen), the emperor, and ourselves, the chosen nobles; they [Demetrios and Thomas] took oaths.” The terms of the “reconciliation” are enumerated by Khalkokondyles:⁹ “Shortly after he [*sc.* Constantine] arrived in Byzantium [Constantinople], they divided the Peloponnesus [Morea] among themselves and confirmed the agreement with oaths, which bound them to one another; and so, the division was effected.”

Evidently, Thomas was meant to be a counter-weight to the ambitions of Demetrios and he seems to have taken up this role with remarkable eagerness. A series of conflicts began between the two brothers, which weakened the Morea even more and invited eventual annexation. Thomas hastened to the Morea in order to forestall his brother, to gain an advantage, to make his preparations, and to commence hostile action against Demetrios, who, in turn, took up the challenge eagerly and sought to eliminate his younger brother. Sphrantzes deplored their rivalry.¹⁰ The early phase of their quarrels is effectively summarized by Khalkokondyles:¹¹

The younger brother [Thomas] was the first to arrive by ship in the Peloponnesus [Morea] and, in violation of his oaths, he incited the cities in the Peloponnesus [Morea] to join his side; he enrolled the Peloponnesians [Moreots] to his cause and began a war against his brother Demetrios.

Thus, while Constantine managed to remove the immediate threat to his power from the vicinity of Constantinople, the Morea now became the stage for a virtual civil war. In addition, by dividing the despotate between his unruly brothers, Constantine ultimately deprived himself of any assistance that could be sent to his capital when the major threat materialized. The immediate danger of unrest was removed to the detriment of long-term security and actual survival. While it is true that the Morea alone could not have saved Constantinople from the Turkish army in 1453, the defenders of the capital came very close to repelling the enemy in the critical moments of the morning of May 29; additional troops from southern Greece might have made a difference, after Constantine's Genoese band of *condottieri* abandoned the fortifications.

Another concern of the emperor must have been the religious chaos, since the death of his brother had left the era's burning question unresolved. Constantine followed John's policies advocating religious union with the Catholic west. There was to be no change from the course that had been planned by his predecessor, even though the anti-unionists in Constantinople clearly hoped that Constantine would renounce the union. The reigning patriarch was a supporter of the union but he faced major hostility. The anti-unionists were so confident that they convened their own local assembly, designed as a synod against the patriarch. A declaration emerged, and was forwarded to Constantine by its author, John Eugenicus, the chief anti-unionist in the capital. This contentious manifesto asserted that the gathering of the malcontents represented a united Orthodoxy and implied that opposition from any quarter, including the emperor and his court, stemmed from a heretical minority, which had placed itself outside the Orthodox Church¹² ("the Orthodox community"). Its conclusion once more demonstrated militant intransigence and arrogance:¹³

We cannot tolerate, within our community, those who remain under anathema, as decreed by the orders of the synods, on account of their offensive addition [of *filioque* to the creed]. Therefore, on account of these and other similar [considerations], we conclude and announce that we are unable to find a way to unite, so long as the Latins continue to hold their current beliefs.

In spite of the fact that such declarations were conceitedly designed to foment rebellion and could be reasonably interpreted as high treason, Constantine avoided a confrontation with the fanatics. A *modus vivendi* was established, in which the anti-unionists were given free rein to vent their anger and publicize their inflammatory views. Constantine demonstrated remarkable restraint when he failed to discipline these dissenters and agitators and thus ensured that no martyrs were created. Yet his permissive attitude prompted some of his western supporters and allies to conclude that he was weak and that he should not have allowed his opponents such license, especially during the siege, when they persisted in their militant views, proudly paraded their endless prejudice, and boasted of their hatred towards the western defenders of Constantinople. After all, their actions could have been interpreted as those appropriate to a fifth column:¹⁴

If the emperor had discarded his weakness, he would have cleared himself from this appearance of paying lip service to the union. Had those individuals been dealt with firmly, they would not have spread their pestilential disease. But something was missing here (I know not what): either the emperor or the judges who had the authority to apply the righteous rod; yet there were some threats here and there.

Constantine failed to silence his opponents. On the other hand, by condoning their presence and by allowing them free rein to express their discontent, he avoided the creation of martyrs. In time, long after his death, the Orthodox Church conveniently overlooked his Catholicism and declared that Constantine had been a champion of Orthodoxy. In the early days of his reign, the anti-unionists took advantage of their emperor's leniency, of his unwillingness to apply force, and of his failure to establish discipline and felt free to concentrate their attacks upon the unionist patriarch, who was finally forced to flee to Rome in August of 1451.¹⁵

The only occasion that brought the anti-unionists and Constantine together was the death of Constantine's mother, Helena Dragaš, a resolute champion of Orthodoxy. She died on March 23, 1450. Constantine had been close to his mother¹⁶ and had been the only one of her sons to make use of her family name, adding it to his patronymic. In time,¹⁷ he expressed his deep regret over her death, as he had been deprived of the services of a valuable advisor. Helena's death was recorded in a short chronicle:¹⁸ "The emperor's mother, Lady Helena, also died." Sphrantzes provides an obituary note:¹⁹ "On March 23 of the same year [1450], our memorable holy empress, who had taken the veil under the name Patience and had become a nun, passed away and was buried next to her late husband, our memorable emperor, in the Monastery of the Pantokrator." Numerous prominent individuals,²⁰ including Scholarius, Plethon, and John Eugenicus, composed literary lamentations in her honor. She had outlived her husband, Manuel II, by twenty-five years. Thus, the queen mother and nun, the Serbian Helena Dragaš, was the last empress of medieval Greece.

Constantine renewed his search for a queen, which had been initiated while he was still the despot of the Morea. In time Sphrantzes was dispatched to Trebizond and to Georgia with a large retinue, with great pomp and ceremony:²¹

On October of the same year [1449], I was dispatched to the *mepes* – that is king – of Georgia, King George, and to the emperor of Trebizond, Lord John Komnenos, with remarkable gifts and a great, impressive retinue consisting of young nobles, soldiers, celibate priests, singers, physicians, and musicians who also brought an organ; the Georgians had heard of its name but had not seen it before and wished to see it and hear it. And for this reason, so that they could hear it, they came from the farthest parts of Georgia.

While Sphrantzes was at the court of Trebizond, Sultan Murad II died. The reaction of Constantinople's court to the death of the sultan is not known. Soon after the enthronement of Mehmed II the Constantinopolitan court renewed the treaty that had been concluded earlier between Murad and Constantine:²² “Mehmed, the son of Murad, took over the realm . . . and concluded a treaty with the Hellenes, to whom he granted the shore region of Asia.” Perhaps this notable concession by the new sultan encouraged the imperial court to become more aggressive, as it may have created an unjustified impression that the young man would not pose a serious threat. A similar opinion seems to have prevailed among the various European courts at this time.²³

Constantine intensified his diplomatic initiative in Europe to remind the western Christians of the Ottoman threat. In April 1451, within two months after Mehmed's accession, Andronikos Bryennios Leontaris was directed in search of aid²⁴ to Venice, Ferrara, Rome, and Naples. Leontaris was not Constantine's sole emissary to the west by any means and his other ambassadors fanned out to all directions.²⁵ Constantine courted Alfonso of Naples and overlooked the fact that the latter still nurtured hopes of revitalizing his old claim to the throne of Constantinople.²⁶ Alfonso had earlier served as an intermediary in Constantine's endless search for a bride and had directed Constantine to Portugal. Accordingly, Constantine's emissaries had made inquiries about Beatrice, the daughter of Peter and Isabella of Aragon,²⁷ but, for unknown reasons, this match also failed and the diplomatic service soon thereafter concentrated all its efforts on a possible match in the east, abandoning all western candidates, provided that the narrative of Sphrantzes presents reality and has not been doctored by its author who perhaps wished to make his role more prominent in this quest than it actually was. A bride who would bring a substantial dowry and a notable alliance was needed but never came.

2 Imperial finances

An anonymous author blamed the fall of Constantinople in 1453 on the financial situation:²⁸ “The emperor was at a loss, as he lacked two necessities: time and florins.” In an attempt to mitigate this urgent situation, Constantine tried to impose a tax on Venetian merchandise, mainly on wine and imported hides. Predictably, his tariff did not prove popular with the Venetians and the emperor encountered enormous resistance.²⁹ Complaints surfaced in 1450, when the Venetians protested through their envoy Nicolò da Canale and even threatened to abandon Constantinople.³⁰ The plain truth is that they presented a legitimate complaint, as the treaty

signed late in the reign of John VIII had limited the number of Venetian establishments, which sold wine in Constantinople.³¹ Back then, the Venetians had been upset over this restriction. So, the imposition of a new toll added insult to injury.³² The Venetian protests had their intended effect. Venice reminded Constantine of the impossible sum that the crown owed to Venice, which still held the Byzantine crown jewels in pawn. The treaty of 1448 had attempted to arrange a payment plan but not a single penny had been paid and it would have been unrealistic for the Venetians to expect remuneration. The emperor could ill-afford any friction with his major Italian ally.

In October of 1450 Constantine expressed his total conformity to the treaty of 1448, adding that the new tax was not intended as an attempt to re-write the treaty. He pointed out his state's financial exigencies and stated that his treasury was empty.³³ His original letter to the doge, written in Greek, has perished, but its Latin translation (dated October 23, 1450) has survived.³⁴ Constantine explained that his imposition of the tax was *pro utilitate urbis*, "for the welfare of the city," and outlined his actions to rectify numerous excesses, about which the Venetians had expressed concern.³⁵ The emperor's clarifications, explanations, and concessions did not pacify Venice. Leontaris eventually put an end to this controversy by declaring that the emperor would not impose this tax, after all. Constantine had been defeated and had been humiliated by his own ally. In spite of his retraction, the Venetians fired off one last protest with yet another envoy.³⁶

So, Constantine failed to make any progress in his attempt to enhance the revenues of his capital. He could not contemplate taxing his own impoverished subjects. The city's prosperity had long ago passed into the hands of the Italians³⁷ and the very few wealthy citizens of Constantinople had preferred to invest their fortunes in Italy; after the fall, they were accused of failing to contribute to the defense. Later authors claimed that the loss of the city to the Turks was largely due to the fact that these wealthy noblemen denied their wealth to their homeland.³⁸ During the siege, the financial problems were so compounded that the emperor was left with no other choice but to "borrow" from churches and from dedicatory offerings. Moved by the emperor's pathetic actions, an eyewitness justified the emergency measures by appealing to ancient precedents. Thus, Leonardo speaks of Constantine's attempts to raise hard cash during the siege by raiding the churches of the capital and reminds the pope and his readers of the measures that had been taken in antiquity during times of stress. A western audience steeped in humanistic values would have appreciated his analogy:³⁹

The emperor was at a loss and did not know what to do. He sought the advice of his noblemen. They persuaded him not to burden the citizens with the problems of the times and to turn his attention to the churches. And, as the Romans had done in times of necessity, he ordered the removal of the sacred vases from the churches of God, to be melted down for coins intended to pay the salaries of soldiers, diggers, and laborers, who were interested in their own affairs and not in the public good and refused to work unless they received pay.

A note by the hand of Marco Barbaro, known as *il genealogista*, supplied similar information in a note appended to the celebrated *Giornale dell'assedio di Costantinopoli* written by his relative, the physician Nicolò Barbaro, an eyewitness to the siege.⁴⁰

The emperor was extremely poor and asked his noblemen to lend him money, but they excused themselves on the grounds that they had none; but the Turks discovered a great deal of money; in fact, one of the noblemen was found to have 30,000 ducats; the emperor was advised not to raise taxes in such confusing times but to confiscate the silver from churches; he did so.

This lack of funds in the reign of Constantine XI is reflected in the fact that few coins from his reign survive. Until recently there was only one known coin dated to the regime of Constantine: a silver quarter-*hyperperon*, which had surfaced in 1974. It depicts the bust of a bearded, nimbate emperor, wearing crown and *maniakon* and holding a scepter in his left hand; in addition, an abbreviated inscription, preceded by a cross, securely identifies the reign: †ΚΩΝΝΤ ΠΑΛ “†Const<antine> Pal<aeologus>.” The reverse depicts a bust of Christ with the abbreviated inscription IC XC, “J<esu>s Ch<risto>s.” A few other, illegible copper coins may go back to Constantine’s reign also.⁴¹ Then a hoard of silver coins was discovered under enigmatic circumstances, amounting to 158 silver coins from the reign of John V; among them were ninety coins of Constantine XI: thirty-five *stavrata*, five half-*stavrata* (or quarter-*hyperpera*, a rather rare denomination) and fifty eighth-*stavrata*. While this hoard curiously materialized in the hands of coin dealers and individual coins were, and still are, being sold for exorbitant prices, its origins are not clear and it has been rumored that it had been recovered under dark circumstances. In all likelihood, this hoard had been stored and hidden before the sack. Evidently, its owner had hoped to come back and recover it after the turmoil was over. He did not do so and his property finally surfaced⁴² in 1990, adding fuel to the Turkish folktale that the “treasure” of Constantine XI still remains undetected⁴³ under the pavement of Santa Sophia. The hasty decoration and legends of these coins confirm Leonardo’s statement that drastic measures were taken and that church silver had been melted down for cash. Numerous coins from this hoard bear unmistakable signs of hasty production. Some were stamped twice, while others were only stamped on the obverse. In addition, one coin of John VIII was restamped on the obverse, at this time presumably, as it was found along within this hoard. The evident haste in the production of these coins suggests that they were minted and stamped under pressure and under extraordinary circumstances.⁴⁴

Leonardo states that Constantine faced difficulties in rendering financial assistance to the impoverished and famished population during the siege. The average Constantinopolitan confronted the horns of a dilemma: either he could go to work to feed his family and neglect his duty on the fortifications or he could guard the walls and witness the starvation of his relatives. Leonardo speaks of the plight of the residents but claims that the natives had been too cowardly to fight and they simply used this situation as an excuse to seek safety within the city. Undoubtedly,

there was some truth in the arguments presented by the beleaguered citizens, as there were also legitimate grounds behind the complaints voiced by Leonardo's biased pen:⁴⁵

Often did the terrified Greeks decline to perform their assigned tasks on the walls, obliged to tend their vineyards or vines, or because they sought pleasure. Even those who appeared serious claimed that they had to take care of their families; others blamed it on poverty, which compelled them to seek employment and earn money. When I accused those who were absent, saying that they were endangering themselves and all other Christians, they responded: "If poverty besieges our families, what can we do about the walls?" And so, the greatest force had to be applied to bring them back to guard the walls.

Constantine XI attempted to alleviate the circumstances of his impoverished citizens:⁴⁶ "Accordingly, after this [occurrence] an order was given to distribute bread equally among the families so that they would not excuse themselves and abandon the walls; in addition, the people would not now fear starvation more than the [enemy's] sword." Abuses persisted and Constantine proved powerless in eradicating criminal acts:⁴⁷

Those thirsty for human blood hoarded grain or raised prices. . . . The emperor was not firm and applied neither the whip nor the sword on those who showed no discipline. Every man did as he pleased and soothed the emperor's anger with the usual flatteries. That good man was mocked by his own subjects and preferred to pretend that he took no note of the insults.

In contrast to these abuses, which ultimately stemmed from the severe lack of funds in the imperial treasury, there were a few individuals who selflessly contributed to the defense of the capital. Among them was Cardinal Isidore, the Greek papal legate, who with his modest funds from the pope and with his own private resources paid for repairs to the fortifications, as Leonardo noted carefully:⁴⁸ "At least a few individuals made selfless contributions. The cardinal [Isidore], by Herakles, in his enthusiasm to assist, repaired the wall and towers." Similarly, the brave brothers Bocchiardi had volunteered to guard a critical section of the walls and paid their men out of their own pocket, as it must have been clear that the emperor was in no position to meet their company's expenses.⁴⁹

Constantine failed to raise adequate funds for the defense. Neither his citizens nor the alien residents seem to have gone out of their way to supply the needed sums. A notorious incident, involving lack of cash and the new technology of gunpowder demonstrates the imperial impotence. A Hungarian, or Transylvanian, by the name of Orbanus or Urbanus was employed in the arsenal as a master craftsman, who could manufacture bombards.⁵⁰ Orban's specialty was the casting of monstrous artillery pieces,⁵¹ a new weapon in the Balkans. He petitioned Constantine for a higher salary, but the treasury could not meet his modest request. Orban was then compelled to seek employment at the Porte:⁵²

An engineer came from the city, who knew how to construct stone-throwing engines; by race he was a Hungarian and a most capable engineer. This man had come to Constantinople long ago and had revealed his skill to the court's officials, who, in turn, had brought it to the emperor's attention. The emperor assigned him a salary that was not commensurate with his skills; in fact, he was given less than a worthless and nominal sum. Consequently, in despair this man left the city one day and hastened to the barbarian [sultan]. He received him gladly and generously gave him food, clothes, and a salary; had the emperor awarded him one fourth of this, he would not have run away from Constantinople.

Sphrantzes complains bitterly about the failure of other Christian powers to render assistance and stated that no financial aid came from anywhere. He was particularly bitter about the failure of Serbia to provide any help. After all, there existed numerous ties with the house of Serbia. Constantine's own mother had been a Serb and his niece had married the son of the Serbian despot. Even so, nothing came from the Serbs, from the Greeks of Trebizond, from Walachia, from Russia, or from Georgia, the neighboring Christian powers:⁵³

Although it was possible for [the despot of] Serbia to send money secretly from many places and, similarly, men, did anyone see a single penny? On the contrary, they provided huge financial aid and many men to the sultan who was besieging the City. Thus, the Turks were able to boast in triumph that even Serbia was against us. Which of the Christians, the Trebizondian emperor, the Walachians, or the Georgians contributed a single penny or a single soldier to our defense, openly or secretly?

The failure of Georgia to contribute to the treasury of Constantinople must have been another sore point. Georgia seems to have become Sphrantzes' specialty and he had advised Constantine to select the princess from Georgia as his bride, if one unquestionably accepts the account in Sphrantzes' narrative about his primary role in the quest for selecting Constantinople's queen.

3 A bride for the emperor

Sphrantzes was dispatched to Trebizond and to Georgia to search for a potential bride and a dowry for Constantine. While Sphrantzes was at the court of Trebizond, the news of Murad II's death and of Mehmed II's accession arrived. Even though Sphrantzes seems to have lamented the passage of Murad, he was realistic enough to understand that the recent developments presented a new possibility in the diplomatic horizon. Murad's widow, the Serbian Mara, was about to return to her parents, with her stepson's blessing. Thus, the widow of the sultan could become the bride of the emperor. Sphrantzes saw advantages in this match. Accordingly, he sent a letter to Constantine and urged him to pursue this course. A faction of the Greek court had already begun work towards the same goal. The

widow of the court's *protostrator* was extremely vocal in support of this match, since she was a relative of Mara. Loukas Notaras refused to commit himself to one match or the other and only looked after his own personal interests; Sphrantzes preserves the emperor's observations:⁵⁴

After the sultan died and this matter with the daughter of the despot of Serbia developed, our *protostrator's* wife came to me and talked about this matter; she pledged gifts and attractive promises for the future, which seemed to me numerous, useful, sincere, and advantageous for many reasons. . . . Notaras publicly and secretly maintains that no other affairs matter, except his own, and leaves no stone unturned, as the saying goes. . . . My grand domestic is an enemy of Serbia and made an agreement with John Kantakouzenos; they continuously urged me to accept the Trebizondian match.

The sultan's widow soon became the court's favorite candidate. An embassy was dispatched to Serbia, but once more, Constantine proved unlucky: this advantageous match was turned down by Mara herself, even though the Serbian despot and his wife, George Branković and Eirene Kantakouzene, had been elated by the possibility of having their daughter become the queen of Constantinople.⁵⁵ The Trebizondian match did not advance either. The historical record has not preserved details about a third, weighty faction at court, headed by Loukas Notaras. What does Sphrantzes mean when he portrays Constantine stating that "Notaras publicly and secretly maintains that no other affairs matter, except his own, and leaves no stone unturned, as the saying goes"? Why did Sphrantzes eventually form such a low opinion of Notaras after the ascension of Constantine XI? Part of the answer may lie in the fact that Notaras stood in the way of Sphrantzes, who wished to be promoted in the court hierarchy. Notaras, who had immediate access to the emperor, seems to have wanted the court position coveted by Sphrantzes for his own sons.⁵⁶ There can be no doubt that Constantine XI found such petty squabbles in his court tiresome. In fact, he seems to have spent a great deal of time trying to keep the peace among his own courtiers. The emperor was forced to award posts, which could not be acknowledged publicly, in order to maintain order in his own court.⁵⁷

Apparently, Sphrantzes was not the only person to dislike the last grand duke so intensely. Leonardo also held a low opinion of him; he reported that Notaras and Giustiniani bitterly quarreled on the eve of the final assault in 1453. In the conclusion of his narrative Leonardo reports that Notaras, immediately after the fall and sack, tried to befriend the sultan by informing on the Porte's Greek sympathizers and by placing all blame for the persistent resistance of the Greeks on the Italian defenders and allies of Constantine.⁵⁸ Needless to say, the "followers" of Leonardo, such as Languschi-Dolfin,⁵⁹ Pseudo-Sphrantzes, and Francesco Sansovino, perpetuated this negative portrayal.⁶⁰ One Italian source, written within twenty years after the fall of Constantinople, accuses Notaras of treason.⁶¹ Even in the Greek literature of the period, Notaras is painted in dark colors. Thus Doukas⁶² has created a powerful, although inaccurate, image of the last grand duke as an

intransigent anti-unionist, uttering the famous words, “it is by far better to see the Turkish turban reigning in the middle of the city than the Latin tiara.” Doukas wrongly associated Notaras with the fanatical anti-unionists. Notaras seems, in fact, to have been a middle of the road personality, a practical man, who had prudently invested his fortune in Italy and in Latin institutions. In fact, he even attempted to calm the temper of one of the chief anti-unionists by pointing out that the struggle against the union had become counter-productive and that the name of the pope had to be commemorated in the liturgy.⁶³ Anna, Loukas’ surviving daughter in Italy, engaged John Moskhos, as she wished to counteract all the “bad press” that had been accumulating and in all probability she commissioned the only positive picture of the grand duke in the literary record, a long time after the events.⁶⁴ Sphrantzes and Leonardo produced the earliest accounts to cast Notaras into the role of a melodramatic villain. In the case of Sphrantzes, there must have been a specific incident that turned the courtier and future annalist against the grand duke. Sphrantzes belonged to a lower social stratum and would not have moved in the circle of Notaras’ family. The origins of his dislike must have involved something other than superficial rivalry for court honors. Can we assume that Notaras had played a part in the search that was concerned with the selection of a bride for Constantine?

So, we return to the cryptic comment that Sphrantzes puts in the mouth of Constantine, to the effect that Notaras had only his own advantage in mind.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, he gives no further explanation, but this comment is embedded in the context of the search for a bride. Notaras supported neither the Trebizondian match nor the Serbian faction. There is indirect evidence to suggest that Notaras’ “candidate” for queen of Constantinople was none other than Anna, his daughter. Accordingly, Notaras must have done his best to oppose all other competitors, including Sphrantzes’ candidate. Sphrantzes was away, but he had been forwarding his views and his analysis of the situation from Georgia and from Trebizond. If this view is correct, the enmity of Sphrantzes towards Notaras finds a plausible explanation.

Years later, long after the sack and conquest of Constantinople, Anna Notaras who had emigrated to Italy and enjoyed a comfortable life on her late father’s investments in Italian institutions, normally signed official documents as:⁶⁶ “Anna Palaeologina, the daughter of the illustrious late grand duke of the Romans [= Greeks].” But in an official document Anna is addressed by the Siense authorities with the following “titles”:⁶⁷ “Lady Anna Palaeologina of Constantinople, formerly fiancée of the emperor of the Romans [= Greeks] and of Constantinople and daughter of the late, illustrious prince [and] grand duke of the Romans [= Greeks], Lord Loukas.” Once more the Siense (July 22, 1472), addressed her⁶⁸ as *Signora Anna Pale[olo]gina, già sposa dell’ex imperadore dei Greci* and two years later⁶⁹ as *Anna, sposa già dell’Imperadore*. Anna only recalled the titles that had been bestowed upon her father and sometimes signed her name as⁷⁰ *Palaeologina Hermineutina* (ἑρμηνευτινα, i.e., “[daughter] of the ἑρμηνευτής,” utilizing the title of court interpreter/dragoman borne by Loukas Notaras, even though such titles were not inherited in the Greek court).

It is quite possible, if not probable, that the name of Anna Notaras was suggested as a candidate for a match with Constantine XI. Perhaps this is the meaning behind Sphrantzes' cryptic comment that Notaras was only interested in "his own affairs." For whatever reasons, the proposed match between the emperor and the daughter of the grand duke failed. In the process, Sphrantzes and Notaras did not endear themselves to one another. It is generally thought that Loukas sent his daughter Anna to Italy to spare her the danger and discomfort of the upcoming siege. As he had made numerous investments in Italy, she was assured of a comfortable life. Perhaps one of the considerations for his decision to send Anna away was not so much fear of the upcoming war but the fact that she had not been selected as the consort of Constantine XI. Other members of the Notaras family were not sent away. His youngest son remained in the city during the siege. Had he been sent with Anna, he would have been spared enslavement and eventual confinement in the sultan's seraglio after the execution of his father.⁷¹ Notaras' wife and two older sons were also taken alive in the sack of 1453. The grand duke's wife died shortly thereafter, while Notaras himself and his older two sons were executed. Anna had been sent away, at some time before the beginning of the siege.⁷² More than simple considerations of safety must have dictated her flight from Constantinople. Perhaps one of the reasons that Anna was sent away before the beginning of the siege was the humiliation that she had not been the successful "finalist" in the imperial search for a bride.

It should further be stated that a recent view supports the supposition that Anna was the betrothed of Constantine.⁷³ One of the individuals associated with Anna in Italy was Frankoulios Servopoulos,⁷⁴ who, before the fall, had been a judge in Constantinople and had also served as a notary of the Venetian *bailo*. He had found refuge in Rome after the sack. In a letter directed to the authorities of Siena, Servopoulos called Anna⁷⁵ "the illustrious lady . . . daughter of the late illustrious grand duke of the Romans [= Greeks] and the betrothed of the emperor." Servopoulos knew the family of Notaras and he should not have made a mistake, unless, of course, he wished to raise the social status of Anna, who had been involved with the authorities of Siena in real estate transactions. The strongest argument against the view that Anna had been the selected bride of the emperor comes from the signature of Anna herself: she never claimed that title, *olim sponsa imperialis*, for herself and never added it to her signature.⁷⁶ Moreover, if one accepts this view, that Anna had been selected to be the consort of the last emperor, one will have to disregard the testimony of Sphrantzes, who states that the Georgian princess had been selected.⁷⁷ Did Sphrantzes falsify the historical record or was Servopoulos exaggerating or lying? If indeed Sphrantzes falsified the historical record, for whatever reason, there are serious implications, as his *Minus* can no longer be trusted, unless its testimony is backed by other reliable authors.

In Italy, Anna never married but assumed the role of patron/protector of Greek émigrés and exiles. She also became a champion of Greek culture. She was always treated with respect by the Italian authorities and all sorts of privileges were extended to her in Venice. She played the part of a *de facto* queen in exile. After all, she was the last living link with the Greek court of Constantinople, whose

ministers and courtiers had been systematically exterminated by Mehmed II after the sack. The assertion that she had been Constantine's betrothed, was, of course, an exaggeration but there is nothing to prevent us from entertaining the possibility that her name had been submitted in an early list of candidates by her father and that in due time she had been eliminated from consideration for unknown reasons. There would have been considerable advantages to this match. Loukas Notaras was one of the wealthiest individuals in the Levant. Anna's dowry would have provided Constantine and his treasury with much-needed cash.

Sphrantzes would have us believe that eventually his views and choice prevailed in this matter of choosing a bride for the emperor. Sphrantzes' candidate, after the negotiation for the hand of Mara failed to advance, was a princess from Georgia. Sphrantzes did visit Georgia and eventually produced an account of his dealings with the ruler of the region,⁷⁸ George VIII (1446–1476). The two individuals settled on the significant matter of a dowry: the princess from Georgia would bring to Constantinople a considerable amount of financial aid:⁷⁹ "I pledge to give to my daughter . . . 36,000 florins and an annual income of 3,000 for her donations to the churches, to the poor, and to whomever she wishes." Sphrantzes was promised a generous reward for his services. The king pledged that the future queen of Constantinople would take Sphrantzes' daughter under her wing and find a suitable husband for her, and, more immediately, Constantine's emissary would be granted four loads of fine silk, whose value was estimated at two thousand florins, upon his next trip to Georgia,⁸⁰ "when you return, if such is the will of God, to take her away." George VIII thus assured himself of an ardent ally in the court of Constantinople. Sphrantzes would become his representative in this match and would advance his cause.

Sphrantzes concludes his account of the search, by stating that Constantine readily accepted his recommendation in favor of the Georgian match, as soon as Mara turned the Greek proposal down:⁸¹ "With God's help, let us conclude a marriage alliance with the king of Georgia." The diplomat goes on to supply a summary of the conclusion of the formalities, thus painting for us his last picture of Constantine appending his signature on a state document.⁸²

Sphrantzes was never given the chance to bring the princess to the capital (or to collect his promised reward), as the siege and sack intervened and his world came to a thunderous end. Presumably, the bride's dowry never reached the treasury of Constantine. Very little is known about this Georgian princess. In a certain way, this section of Sphrantzes' narrative is not typical of his style and its tone is reminiscent of folk tales. While one should not go so far as to question Sphrantzes' veracity about this Iberian-Georgian match, it seems rather strange that no other documents exist and no other contemporary author, Greek or Georgian, ever mentioned this marriage alliance that never came to its proper conclusion. Were Constantine XI and his court so desperate as to look for a bride and for such an unprecedented alliance in distant Georgia? If we recall that Sphrantzes states that the daughter of the doge of Venice was not a good match for the emperor, as she was "inferior" in status for the Greek court, are we to assume that the princess from Georgia was more qualified and more acceptable than the daughter of the doge of Venice?⁸³

The fact is that the last Greek emperor did not have a wife. It was only in legend that the Constantine XI was given a wife during the siege of 1453, who, the tale relates, preceded him in death, when she and her children, the mythical imperial princes and princesses, were executed by Constantine's order in order to avoid capture. The tale⁸⁴ circulated widely in the sixteenth century and was even believed by one scholar, who lamented the fact that the name of the last queen of Constantinople had not been preserved and went so far as to compose Greek epigrams in her memory.⁸⁵

4 The fortress of doom

While Europe was still under the impression that Mehmed was an incompetent youth, the sultan turned his attention to a problem in the east and led an expedition into Anatolia to suppress the rebellious Ibrahim Beg of Karamania.⁸⁶ In his absence from Rumeli, the Greek court decided to revive the game of inventing contenders to the Ottoman throne. Under Constantine this old ploy proved counter-productive. Probably in order to gain funds for Constantinople's empty treasury, Constantine and his court decided to blackmail the sultan. In the care of the Greek emperor was Orhan, a distant relative of Mehmed II.⁸⁷ When Mehmed ascended the Ottoman throne, he approved the annual payment of 300,000 aspers, the revenues from Orhan's estates in the vicinity of the Strymon River, for his relative's expenses in Constantinople.⁸⁸ While Mehmed was trying to put down Ibrahim Beg's rebellion, the Greek court took the opportunity to apply pressure.⁸⁹ It was bad timing, as Ibrahim Beg was about to conclude a peace treaty with Mehmed. Doukas states that the embassy of the Greeks forced Mehmed to conclude a hasty peace with Karaman:⁹⁰

Mehmed became very angry when he heard of this [demand] and did not know what to do; he made a pact with Karaman . . . and responded to the emperor's envoys as follows: "Presently I will return to Adrianople; once I am back report to me all the needs of the emperor and of the city and I will be ready to grant all petitions."

The sultan took decisive action:⁹¹ "Mehmed . . . entered Adrianople and immediately dispatched one of his slaves to the villages by the Strymon, and discontinued the grant assigned to the emperor; he chased away the imperial overseers; thus, the emperor collected only one year's revenues."

Mehmed spent the following winter making frantic preparations to tighten the noose around Constantinople and to inflict some damage on the Italian trade in the Levant. In addition, he wished to ensure that no aid whatsoever would come to the Greek capital from the north by sea, neither from Trebizond nor from Georgia, once he decided to invest the city. His objective was to erect a castle on the European side of the Bosphorus, across from the fort that had been built by Bayezid I on the Asiatic side in 1395 (known Anadolu Hisar, "the castle of Anatolia"). An additional incentive was provided by the attempt of Christian ships to block his passage to Europe during his recent withdrawal from Anatolia. At that time, he

had proved unable to cross by the straits of Kallipolis⁹² and had been forced to march a long distance to the north, to the passage guarded by Anadolu Hisar, as his father had done before the battle of Varna. It was probably on this occasion that Mehmed decided to fortify the European side of the straits and thus secure a reliable, controlled, and safe passage from Asia into Europe, which no Christian fleet could ever dispute.⁹³

Kritoboulos enumerates the strategic considerations dictating the erection of the castle; he invokes historical precedent and lists advantages. Mehmed spent the winter gathering workmen and supplies for the erection of his castle on the European side. Doukas furnishes similar information, without speculation about the sultan's motives, but cites numbers, which may or may not be reliable.⁹⁴ His preparations caused a great deal of anxiety and trepidation in Constantinople. Coming in the wake of the expulsion of the Greek tax collectors from the Strymon area, news of the imminent construction of a fortress must have seemed equivalent to a declaration of war. Doukas remarks that panic and terror ruled the day.⁹⁵

And then the Romans [= Greeks] heard this bitter news; the Christians of Constantinople, of the entire Asia [Minor], of Thrace, and of the islands felt fear and were in shock. They could find no words or expressions except "the end of the City is approaching." . . . Similar were the lamentations of the Christian inhabiting the east, the islands, and the west.

Constantine renewed his appeals for help to the west and gave a full report of the sultan's movements.⁹⁶ The reaction of the Venetian Senate shows that Constantine's alarm bell was not taken seriously;⁹⁷ Venice elected to concentrate on her own problems in Italy, displaying little interest in the Levant. The *Signoria* did, however, authorize some provisions for Constantinople.⁹⁸ Constantine also sent an embassy to the Porte, in a futile attempt to dissuade the sultan from erecting his fortress. Kritoboulos implies that the envoys were sent before the beginning of the spring, i.e., while the sultan was still in Adrianople. Doukas also speaks of a Greek embassy.⁹⁹ Both authors must refer to the same occasion and they put similar arguments (with varying degrees of sophistication) into the mouths of the emperor's ambassadors. The agreement found in both texts suggests that the gist of Constantine's message to the sultan must have been widely known. According to Kritoboulos,¹⁰⁰ the Greek emperor first reminded the sultan of all treaties that had been negotiated between their fathers and grandfathers, and then asked Mehmed to cease his preparations, to discontinue the mobilization of his army, and to refrain from committing acts of injustice. Doukas provides a longer version of the same arguments.¹⁰¹ While Kritoboulos offers matter of fact arguments, Doukas, as usual, supplies a more elaborate and dramatic version:¹⁰²

Mehmed responded: "I am not depriving the City of anything. He [Constantine] controls and possesses nothing beyond his moat. If I wish to build a fortress at the Sacred Mouth, he has no right to hinder me. The entire

region is under my control; the cities east of the Mouth, inhabited by Turks, belong to me; the uninhabited western regions are also mine; the Romans [= Greeks] are not allowed to live there. Do you not remember the distress and the danger faced by my father when the king of the Hungarians launched his expedition? They advanced by land, while the triremes of the Franks [western Europeans] sailed to the Hellespont and blockaded the straits, denying passage to my father? . . . Back then he survived numerous dangerous situations and swore that he would build a fortress on the western shore, across from the one situated in the east [Anadolu Hisar]. He did not live to accomplish it. I will do it, with God's help. Why are you trying to stop me? Am I not allowed to do as I please in my own territory? Go tell your king [emperor]: the present lord does not resemble his predecessors. He will easily accomplish what they failed to achieve; he eagerly wishes to succeed in what they proved unwilling to do. I will skin alive any man who dares to talk to me of this matter in the future."

According to Kritoboulos, Mehmed blamed the Greeks for the violation of the existing treaty and concluded his speech with the following words:¹⁰³ "This region, in which I will build the fortress, is mine. . . . I am not breaking the treaty, nor will I do so, provided that you remain in your region and refrain from interfering and meddling in our affairs."

The sultan's ominous reply was brought back to Constantinople and the Greeks felt defenseless. Kritoboulos describes the imperial impotence:¹⁰⁴ "There was nothing for them to do (the situation seemed terrible to them, as indeed it was) and they unwillingly kept quiet." Doukas is more graphic in his details, paints a picture of despair, and gives a foretaste of the sack:¹⁰⁵

Then all the citizens felt despair and fear and addressed each other as follows: "This is the man who will enter the City, who will destroy and seize the inhabitants, who will trample over the sacred [vessels], who will wipe out the precious churches, and who will scatter the surviving remains of God-minded men and martyrs throughout the squares and the cross-roads. Alas! What are we to do? Whither are we to flee?" With such and other, similar words the unfortunate people bewailed their lives.

This climate of despair is also described in the poem of Ubertino Pusculo, who was a resident in Constantinople at that time.¹⁰⁶

In the beginning of spring¹⁰⁷ Mehmed marched to the straits and began the construction of a castle:¹⁰⁸

He [Mehmed] occupied a cliff below Sosthenion, which had been long ago named "Phoneus"; there he ordered the foundations to be arranged in the shape of a triangle; after this was done he named the castle *Başkesen*, which can be rendered into Greek as "Head-cutter"; across from it was the fortress [Anadolu Hisar] built by his grandfather [Bayezid Yıldırım].

Khalkokondyles adds that the site was called “Throat-cutter,”¹⁰⁹ while Kritoboulos digresses into the mythology of the place.¹¹⁰ “The ancient Greeks . . . named this place ‘Clashing [Rocks]’; they said that Herakles was the first to cross and after him [came] Jason with the Argonauts.” In time, the place came to be popularly known as Neokastron, “New Castle.” A note by Agallianos makes it clear that as early as 1453 this name had already been in circulation.¹¹¹ The layout of the fortress, the strength of the walls, and the speed with which it was completed impressed all contemporaries.¹¹² There is evidence to suggest that at long last Venice took notice and her Levantine spies made sketches of Mehmed’s fort.

Constantine proved unable to restrain his devout subjects, who became so outraged when the Turks appropriated the ruins of the local Christian shrines and incorporated them into the fortifications that they took matters into their feeble hands.¹¹³ “And they [the Turks] transported some columns from the ruins of the Church of Michael Taxiarkhes; some people from the City were moved by religious zeal and came out to stop the Turks; they were all apprehended and were put to the sword.” All the Greek court could do was to dispatch yet another embassy to the sultan and attempt to placate him with gifts.¹¹⁴ While Mehmed agreed to provide nominal protection for the Greek peasants, there were other incidents and the local population suffered. On one known occasion forty individuals were massacred.¹¹⁵ Pusculo mentions an attack on Constantinople’s environs, which was launched after the completion of Rumeli Hisar’s walls (but before the erection of its towers, which were reinforced and roofed later on in the summer). He may be referring to the incident that culminated in the slaughter of the Greek peasants. The sultan unleashed his raiders in the neighborhood of the Greek capital.¹¹⁶ On this occasion the emperor decided to arrest all Turks in his capital; some were officials of the Porte and personal attendants of the sultan.¹¹⁷ The members of the Porte apparently asked for an audience with the emperor and stated that if they were not back by sunset Mehmed would condemn them to death. Moved by pity, Constantine released them.¹¹⁸ Quite different was the Turkish perspective of this incident: a Turkish source suggests that the Greeks had been unduly alarmed and had over-reacted by closing their gates. Tursun Beg claims that the incident was only a scuffle between shepherds and Ottoman soldiers; he speaks of the sultan’s “commanders” detained by the *tekvur*, the Greek emperor. Tursun Beg admits that they were treated well and were soon released with the emperor’s apologies. He then adds that Mehmed took this opportunity to issue an ultimatum to the emperor, demanding the surrender of Constantinople.¹¹⁹

The Porte officials had been touring the city on leave or had been collecting intelligence information on the defenses and on the garrison. They may have been buying provisions for their laborers and workers at Rumeli Hisar. One eyewitness bitterly complained about the Greek and Italian merchants who were dealing with the Turks for profit and was further upset by the fact that food was sent to the Turkish camp regularly by the Greek court and the Genoese of Pera.¹²⁰ Constantine made a last attempt to approach the Porte:¹²¹

Since you have chosen war and I can persuade you neither by flattery nor by your sworn treaty, do as you please. I will seek shelter with God; if it be His

will to hand this city to your hands, who will be able oppose Him? If again He inspires peace in your heart, I will gladly welcome it. For the time being, take back your treaty and your sworn statements. From this point on I will close the gates of the city and I will provide protection to the inhabitants. Continue your oppressive rule until the Righteous Judge will deliver His just verdict to each man, to you and to me.

Unmoved, the sultan lost no time in declaring war upon the Greeks.¹²² “When the barbarian [the sultan] was informed of this [message], he did not even consider a justification of his actions but without delay he ordered the public declaration of war.”

The drama moved on to its inevitable conclusion. The castle was completed at some time in the middle of the summer.¹²³ Upon its completion, Mehmed led his forces to the vicinity of Constantinople, penetrated the neighborhood without any opposition, and inspected the ancient fortifications. He was certainly taking notes for the upcoming siege. Any doubt still remaining in the minds of the Greeks about the sultan’s intentions must have evaporated.¹²⁴ “When the erection of the castle had been completed, he left on August 31, and attacked the fortifications of the City. On September 3 . . . he departed for Adrianople; for two days he had been apparently securing his castle and its position.” Puscuro relates that the emperor held a council of war,¹²⁵ which decided to issue yet another appeal to western Christendom. Messengers were directed to Hungary and to Italy.¹²⁶

It is possible that another emissary left for Rome at this time. Apparently, Pope Nicholas V was irritated with Constantine’s lukewarm efforts on behalf of church union. Constantine’s letter has not survived but we have the pope’s reply (dated September 27, 1451).¹²⁷ The pope demanded that the union be enforced and expressed his displeasure at the unpardonable delay. Then he demanded the restoration of the unionist patriarch who had abandoned the Greek capital and had fled to Rome. The conclusion of the letter provides the pope’s essential conditions for substantial western aid:¹²⁸ “See to it that the patriarch of Constantinople is reinstated . . . that the name of the pope of Rome is entered in the sacred diptychs and that the entire Greek Church prays for him, as his name is being commemorated.” The pope’s letter was couched in threatening prose and it included a warning to Constantine himself and the pontiff’s concern over the ultimate salvation of Constantine’s soul. Puscuro alludes to the papal admonition in his description of the death of Constantine. He seems to think that Constantine paid a price for failing to heed the pope’s warning.¹²⁹

Beyond the strategic and tactical advantages that the sultan gained with the erection of his fortress, his most important victory was scored in the psychological sector. Rumeli Hisar became a most important pawn in his campaign of psychological terror. The Greeks became convinced that the end was drawing near. His monstrous bombardments on the castle gave a hint of Armageddon. It is no wonder that Greeks surrendered themselves to their fate, as they formed the impression that their fate was sealed, as it was expressed in a note by Theodoros Agallianos. His sentiments, recorded at this time, seem to reflect the view of the majority. Agallianos mentions the fortress and goes on to describe the psychological state that

prevailed in the capital. As survival was rapidly becoming questionable, he and others placed their hopes in God, realizing that to oppose the sultan, without aid from the west, amounted to a Herculean labor. Despair and even resignation seem to have reached a climax after the erection of the fortress of doom, as Agallianos noted, in religious terms:¹³⁰

After the aforementioned impious man [the sultan] built and secured the castle at Anaplous, he attacked the City on his way back to Adrianople; he fell upon the environs of the City, remained in the vicinity three days, destroyed the vineyards, plundered the suburbs . . . murdered many people, and spilled as much blood as possible both on this occasion and a little earlier (and God, alas! allowed him to do so because of my sins). Then he went away in order to make preparations, it has been said, to lay siege to the City next spring (or even before the spring) with every imaginable piece of artillery and siege engine . . . the City can expect help neither from within nor from without; neither funds nor men are available, as the City has been tortured for a long time by its great poverty, by lack of men, by the attacks of the enemy, and by fear and bitter reckoning of what is in store for us. Our only hopes are placed upon the merciful and compassionate God (should He return, spare, and defend us) and upon the all-pure, eternal virgin Mother of God . . . to prevail upon her Her son (conceived without seed, beyond nature and logic), so that He should listen to Her entreaties, to have pity, to show mercy upon us (overlooking my countless sins in the process), and to save us from bitter slavery to the impious [Turks], as He delivered the Israelites and drowned the men of the Pharaoh.

Notes

- 1 *Maius*, 3.1 (pp. 348, 350): ἵνα εἰς βασιλέα στέψωσι τὸν δεσπότην κύρ Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν αὐθέντην μου, ὃ καὶ ἐπραξάν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ τῇ ἕκτῃ Ἰαννουαρίου. This statement does not derive from the authentic *Minus*, 29.4, which only reports καὶ βασιλέα πεποιήκασιν εἰς Μυζηθρᾶν τῇ ς^ῃ Ἰαννουαρίου τὸν δεσπότην κύρ Κωνσταντῖνον. On this point, cf. *supra*, ch. 8, n. 111. This statement is also encountered in *CBB* 1: 35.15 (p. 269). A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation 1204–1461: The Byzantine Period* (New Brunswick, 1970), p. 181, erroneously states that Constantine was crowned emperor at Mistra; the same error is repeated in *DGM* 1: 240: “Son successeur, le despote Constantine, fut couronné à Mistra le 6 janvier 1449”; and in *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* 1 (New York and Oxford, 1991), p. 505 (s.v. “Constantine XI Palaiologos”).
- 2 Κατὰ μῆνα Φευρουάριον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης Ἰνδικτιόνης [*sic*] δωδεκάτης τοῦ ἐξάκις ἑννεακοσιοστοῦ πεντηκοστοῦ ἐβδόμου ἔτους. Text in *PkP* 4: 19–22; a transcript (*cod. Allatiana* 196.28 in the Vallicelliana Library in Rome) by Leo Allatius, with his comments, survives. On Allatius, see T. I. Papadopoulos, *Λέων ὁ Ἀλλάτιος (Χίος 1588 – Ρώμη 1669): Σύμμεικτα Ἀλλατιανὰ* (Athens, 2007). The signature of Constantine follows the formula employed by both Manuel II and John VIII: †Κωνσταντῖνος ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος†. Also cf. S. Kougeas, “Χρυσόβουλλον Κωνσταντῖνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου,” *Ελληνικά* 1 (1928): 371–400; and *DGM* 1: 240.
- 3 G. Hofmann, “Nuove fonti per la storia profana ed ecclesiastica di Creta nella prima metà del secolo XV,” in *Πεπραγμένα Θ' Διεθνoῦς Βυζαντινολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου Θεσσαλονίκης*,

- vol. 2 (Thessalonica, 1955), pp. 462–469. On Constantine and Venetian Crete, cf. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 40.
- 4 *CBB* 1: 34.15 (p. 219).
- 5 *CBB* 1: 35.9 (p. 287): και πάλιν ἀπῆλθεν ὁ αὐτὸς κύρ Κωνσταντίνος ἐν τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, ἐν ἔτει ςζνγ', γεγονῶς βασιλεύς.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 98A.1 (p. 646): ἐν ἔτει ςζνζ', ἰνδικτιῶνος ιβ', μηνί μαρτίῳ ιβ', ἦλθεν ὁ βασιλεύς κύρ Κωνσταντίνος ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου και παρέλαβεν τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ αἰοιδίμου και τρισμάκαρος κραταιοῦ και ἀγίου ἡμῶν αὐθέντου και βασιλέως, κυροῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἐβδόμου τῶν Παλαιολόγων.
- 7 E. Mioni, "Une inedite cronaca bizantina (dal Marc. gr. 595)," in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), no. 51 (p. 77): τῇ ιβ' τοῦ μαρτίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἦλθεν ὁ δεσπότης κύριος Κωνσταντίνος ὁ Παλαιολόγος διὰ νηὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν και ἐπέλαβετο τῆς βασιλείας.
- 8 *Minus*, 29.7: και τῇ α^η Σεπτεμβρίου του νη^{ου} ἔτους ἐξῆλλε και ὁ δεσπότης και πορφυρογέννητος κύρ Δημήτριος και ἀπῆλθε κάκεινος εἰς τὸν Μορέαν, εἰς τὴν Πόλιν συμβιβασθέντων ἔμπροσθεν τῆς κυρίας και ἀγίας μητρὸς αὐτῶν και τοῦ βασιλέως και ἀδελφοῦ και ἡμῶν τῶν ἐκκρίτων ἀρχόντων και ὄρκους πεποιηκότων. The *Maius*, 3.1 (p. 350), specifies the conditions of the "reconciliation": ἴνα μηδεὶς τοῦ ἑτέρου τοὺς τόπους και ὅρια ὑπερπῆδᾷ και ἀρπάξῃ, ἀλλ' εἰρηνικῶς διάγειν. Cf. S. Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), pp. 86, 87; *DGM* 1: 242, 243; and A. G. Mompherratos, *Oi Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* (Athens, 1913), pp. 75, 76.
- 9 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.62 (pp. 158, 159): ἀφικομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐς Βυζάντιον οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου, διείλοντο σφίσι τὴν Πελοπόννησον, και ὄρκα ἐπὶ τῇ νομῇ ταύτῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐτάμοντο, ἐμπεδοῦντες τὴν διανομήν.
- 10 *Minus*, 29.7 (repeated, with *amplificatio*, in the *Maius* 3.1 [p. 350]).
- 11 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.62 (pp. 158, 159): ὁ μέντοι νεώτερος ἀδελφὸς πρότερος ἀφικόμενος νῆϊ ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἀφίστα τε τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν παρὰ τοὺς ὄρκους, και προσλαβόμενος τοὺς Πελοποννησίους συναφεστῶτας ἐπολέμει πρὸς Δημήτριον τὸν ἀδελφόν.
- 12 The text of this manifesto (*Ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Κοινότητος τῶν Ὁρθοδόξων Ἀπολογία πρὸς τὸν Βασιλέα τοῦ Νομοφύλακος Ἰωάννου Διακόνου τοῦ Εὐγενικοῦ*): *PkP* 1: 151–153.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 153: τοὺς ὑπὸ ἀνάθεμα και κανόνα τῶν συνοδικῶν ὄρων διὰ τῆς προσθήκης τόλμαν εἰς κοινωνίαν οὐ παραδεχόμεθα. ὥστε ἐκ τούτων και τῶν ὁμοίων συνάγομεν και ἀναφέρομεν, ὅτι τρόπος ἐνωτικὸς ἡμῖν οὐχ εὐρίσκεται, μενόντων τῶν Λατίνων ὡς μένουσιν.
- 14 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 930: *nam si pusillanimitatem imperator excussisset, hanc fidei illusionem vindicasset . . . Coercendi quidem illi erant, qui si fuissent, morbum pestiferum non propagassent. Sed ignoro, utrumne imperator, aut iudices damnandi quibus correctionis virga, quanquam minae intercessissent, aberat.* The *BC111* states that the emperor became the object of derision and that his only recourse was to pretend that he did not hear the insults hurled at him by his own subjects, 7.17: ἀλλὰ μηδὲ διὰ τὸν βασιλέα δὲν ἐκάμασι και τότε ὑβρίζανε ὁμπρὸς του και αὐτὸς ἐκαμωνέτονε πὼς δὲν τὰ ἠκοῦει.
- 15 *Minus*, 31.12: τὸν δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔτους Αὐγουστον διεβῆ ἀπὸ τῆς Πόλεως ὡς φυγὰς και ὁ πατριάρχης κύρ Γρηγόριος.
- 16 See *supra*, ch. 1, sec. 1.
- 17 *Minus*, 32.7: τίνα οὖν νὰ ἐβουλεύομην; ἡ κυρά μου ἡ δέσποινα και ἀπέθανεν.
- 18 *CBB* 1: 22.48 (p. 188): θνήσκει δὲ και ἡ μήτηρ τοῦ βασιλέως, κυρά Ἑλένη.
- 19 *Minus*, 30.3: τῇ κγ^η Μαρτίου μηνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους τέθνηκεν ἡ ἐν μακαρία τῇ ληξεί γενομένη αἰοιδίμος και ἀγία δέσποινα, ἡ διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ και ἀγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθεῖσα Ὑπομονὴ μοναχὴ και ἐτάφη εἰς τὴν μονὴν τοῦ Παντοκράτορος πλησίον τοῦ μακαρίτου και αἰοιδίμου βασιλέως και ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς. Mioni, "Une inedite cronaca," no. 52 (p. 77): μηνί μαρτίῳ κδ' ἔτους ςζνζ' ἐκοιμήθη ἡ μήτηρ τῶν αὐτῶν βασιλέων ἡ εὐσεβεστάτη Αὐγούστα κυρία Ἑλένη, ἡ διὰ θεοῦ και ἀγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθεῖσα Ὑπομονὴ μοναχὴ.

20 *Supra*, ch. 1, sec. 3.

21 *Minus*, 30.1: τῆ γὰρ ἰδ^η τοῦ Ὀκτωβρίου μηνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἐστάλην ἐγὼ εἰς τε τὸν τῆς Ἰβηρίας μέγην, ἤγγουν βασιλέα Γεώργιον, καὶ τὸν βασιλέα Τραπεζοῦντος κύρ Ἰωάννην τὸν Κομνηνὸν μετὰ χαριτῶν ἀξιολόγων καὶ παρασκευῆς ὅτι πολλῆς καὶ καλῆς, μετὰ ἀρχοντοπούλων καὶ στρατιωτῶν καὶ ἱερομονάχων καὶ ψαλτῶν καὶ ἰατρῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν κρατούντων καὶ ὄργανον οἱ καὶ ἤκουον ὄνομα μὲν αὐτό, τί δὲ ἐστίν, οὐκ εἶδον καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσαν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι οἱ Ἰβηρες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συνέτρεχον ἐκ τῶν περάτων αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς Ἰβηρίας, ἵνα ἀκούσωσιν αὐτοῦ.

22 Khalkokondyles, 2.7.65 (pp. 160, 161): ὁ Μεχμέτης ὁ Ἀμουράτεω ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καθίστη . . . καὶ τοῖς τε Ἑλλήσι σπονδὰς ἐποιεῖτο καὶ δέδωκεν τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας παράλιον.

23 Cf. *MCT*, pp. 67–70; and *SOC*, pp. 150 ff. Francesco Filelfo urged the king of France, Charles VII, to take up the cross, precisely because, in his opinion, Mehmed II was incompetent. The accession of Mehmed even encouraged Alfonso of Naples to revive his imperial aspirations to the throne of Constantinople. Europe was ready to divide the Ottoman lands among its own potentates, without even trying to mount an expedition to the Balkans.

24 On Leontaris' mission, cf. *PaL* 2: 108; *CF*, pp. 377–380; R. Guiland, "Les Appels de Constantin XI Paléologue à Rome et à Venise pour sauveur Constantinople (1452–1453)," *BS* 14 (1953): 226–244, esp. pp. 231 ff.; and C. Marinesco, "Le pape Nicolas V (1447–1455) et son attitude envers l'empire byzantine," in *Actes du IV^e Congrès International des Études Byzantines* (Sofia, 1935), pp. 332, 333. For Venetian documents, cf. *PaL* 2: 108; in addition, cf. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 49. The Latin translation of Constantine's letter to Borso d'Este, the marquis of Ferrara, "in the month of March, of the 14th indiction," has been preserved in the *R. Archivio Stato* of Modena (*PkP* 4: 26, 27) and bears the menology in red ink by the hand of Constantine: μηνὶ Μαρτίῳ ἰνδικτιῶνος ἰδ'.

25 See the *Expugnatio Constantinopolitana* composed by Antonio Ivani in 1453–1454 (in *TiePN*: 150); Dragas, *Graecorum imperator, interea ratus hostem novo tempore reversurum, ad summum Pontificem Imperatoremque Romanum atque regem Alfonso et Venetos nonnullosque alios principes oratores mittit, qui nuntient nisi ei auxilientur, sese Teucrorum conatibus nequaquam obsistere posse*. For Constantine's appeals to Rome and Venice, see Guiland, "Les Appels." For his appeals to Genoa, to Hungary, to Aragon, and to Germany, see *idem*, "Αἱ πρὸς τὴν Δύσιν Ἐκκλησίαις Κωνσταντινίου ΙΑ' τοῦ Δράγαση πρὸς Σωτηρίαν τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως," *ΕΕΒΣ* 22 (1952): 60–74.

26 On Constantine and Alfonso, see Guiland, "Αἱ πρὸς τὴν Δύσιν Ἐκκλησίαις."

27 S. P. Lampros, "Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις," *NH* 4 (1907): 433–438.

28 *BCIII*, 7.20: καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς δὲν εἶχε τί νὰ κάμῃ, ὅτι τοῦ ἐλείπανε δύο ἀναγκαῖα πράγματα: καιρὸς καὶ φλωρία. Cf. M. Marinescu, "Contribution à l'histoire des relations économiques entre l'Empire byzantin, la Sicile et royaume de Naples de 1419–1453," *SBN* 5 (1939): 209–219; and D. S. Cirac Estopañan, *La Caída del Imperio Bizantino y los Españoles* [Bizancio y España] (Barcelona, 1954), pp. 41–82.

29 Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 390–392.

30 *NE* 8: 67, 68; for the documents of the period August 2–17, 1450, see *RdD* 3: 2830 and 2831. Nicolò da Canale was destined to play a prominent role in Levantine affairs and was eventually held responsible for the fall of Negroponte/Khalkis/Euripos to the Turks. On da Canale, see M. Philippides, *Mehmed the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Texts and Testimonies*, pp. 30–34, 221 (with n. 18).

31 Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 388; J. Chrystostomides, "Venetian Commercial Privileges under the Palaeologi," *Studi Veneziani* 12 (1970): 267–356.

32 The article of the treaty, which Constantine seems to have disregarded, reads, in its Latin version: *in quibus tabernis ordinatis sui Veneti possint vendere vinum cuiuscumque manierei ad minutum in quacumque quantitate, sine ulla gravitate* (Lampros, "Συνθήκη

- μεταξὺ Ἰωάννου Ἡ' Παλαιολόγου καὶ τοῦ Δουκὸς τῆς Βενετίας Φραγκίσκου Φόσκαρη," p. 157). The last phrase, *sine ulla gravitate*, which is rendered in the Greek text as χωρὶς τινος βάρους, seems to constitute the nucleus of the complaint that enraged the Venetians. Constantine must have been in violation of this phrase, when he attempted to levy a tax on the Venetian residents.
- 33 Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 391.
- 34 *NE* 3: 257, 258, provides the pertinent extract from the document.
- 35 *Ibid.*: *datum quod dabant pro sclavis capit<aneo> et portaticum sclavorum, portaticum aliarum rerum, exitum vini Venetorum, ut sit liber; scribaniam vegetum Jud<a>eorum Venetorum, medium <hy>perperum, quod exigebat co<m>mercium noster ex quolibet vegete Jud<a>eorum, et quod de cetero Jud<a>ei Veneti non dent factionem aliquam in tempore necessitatis, ut ceteri Jud<a>ei; pro pellis et saumis et cariatricum, cum esset difficile nobis respondere, peti<v>it nos dilectus gener imperii mei, magnus dux Luchas Diermineftis Notara, ut transeat hoc in suo proprio salario et quod non petatur, donec veniat orator noster.* Translation into English in S. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium 1204–1453* (University, 1985), doc. no. 134 (pp. 312, 313; discussion: p. 176); cf. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 391.
- 36 *NE* 8: 77, 78; *RdD*: 2856 and 2863; and *RKOR*: 3527 (p. 134).
- 37 Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 391.
- 38 *BC111*, 7.12: ὁ Ρωμαιοὶ φιλάργυροι, δημηγέρτες, τραδιτόροι, ὅπου ἐτραδίρετε τὴν πατρίδα σας, ὅπου ὁ βασιλέας σας ἦτονε πτωχὸς καὶ σᾶς ἐπαρακάλει μὲ τὰ δάκρυα ἔς τὰ μάτια νὰ τοῦ δανείσετε φλωρία διὰ νὰ δώση καὶ νὰ μαζώξη πολεμιστάδες ἀνθρώπους νὰ βοηθήσωσι καὶ νὰ πολεμήσουνε, καὶ σεῖς ἀρνίεστε μεθ' ὄρκους πὼς δὲν ἔχετε καὶ εἰστε πτωχοί! ἀμμή ὑστέρου, ὅπου σᾶς ἐπήρε ὁ Τοῦρκος, εὐρέθητε πλοῦσοι καὶ σᾶς τὸ πῆρε ὁ Τοῦρκος καὶ ἔκοψε καὶ τὸ κεφάλι σας. Identical sentiments are expressed in the narrative of Languschi-Dolfin (which might be the immediate source of the *BC111* and which depends, to a large extent, on the Latin text of Leonardo); see Languschi-Dolfin, 18: *Et fu grande impieta de quelli baroni greci auari direptori de la patria. De li quali piu uolte el pouero Imperator cum lachrime domandaua, prestasseno denari per condur prouisionati. Et quelli iurauano esser poueri disfatti, che dapoi presi el Signor Turcho quelli trouo richissimi.* Also see *BC111*, 7.33, which seems again to be depended on Languschi-Dolfin, 31: *et tutti li absconditi perueniano in man de Turci, o Greci miseri et miserabili che fingeui esser poueri. Ecco che sono uenuti in luce li uostri tesori, li quali teneui, et negaui uoler dar per subsidio de la citade.*
- 39 *CC* 1: 146 provides an abbreviated extract of this passage; the complete passage in *PG* 159: 93: *Quid autem imperator perplexus agat, ignorat. Consulit barones: suadent non molestari cives angustia temporis, sed recurendum ad sacra. Auferrī igitur et conflari iussit ex sacris templis sancta Dei vasa, sicuti Romanos pro necessitate temporis fecisse legimus, exque eis pecuniam insigniri darique militibus, fossoribus constructoribusque, qui rem suam, non publicam, attendentes, nisi ex denario convenissent, ad opus ire recusabant.* An echo in Languschi-Dolfin, 18, 19: *Al incontro lo Imperator non sa quello se debbe fare et consigliasse, lo confortano i baroni attento la angustia de tempi non molestar li ciatani, ma ricorrer a li beni de le chieste, unde fece i uasi d argento, croce, chalici, turriboli, e fece batter moneta per pagar soldati, et offosori, et constructori, li qual tamen attendendo a le cose priuate, et non ale publiche, ricusauano lauorar se non erano pagati.* Not surprisingly, the same passage is encountered in the *Maius*, 3.5.7 (p. 401); the elaborator followed Leonardo but changed the classical precedents into Biblical references: ἐπειδὴ καὶ χρημάτων ἐσπάνιζον τὰ βασίλεια διὰ τὸν μισθὸν τῶν στρατιωτῶν, προσέταξεν ὁ βασιλεὺς λαβεῖν τὰ ἐκκλησιῶν σκευὴ ἅγια καὶ ἀφιερωμένα τῷ Θεῷ καὶ χρήματα ἐποίησαμεν. καὶ μὴ τις ἐγκαλέσειεν ἡμᾶς ὡς ἱεροσύλους ἔνεκεν τοῦ καιροῦ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ὡς ὁ Δαβὶδ πεπονθὼς πεινάσας τοὺς ἄρτους τῆς προθέσεως ἔφαγεν. Another Greek paraphrase, more faithful to its ultimate source in the *BC111*, 7.13: διατι ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶχε μεγάλην σύγχυσι καὶ δὲν ἤξερε πλεο τὸ τί νὰ κάμη καί, ἐπειδὴ δὲν τοῦ εἰδίδανε φλωρία οἱ πλοῦσοι, δὲν εἶχε τὸ τί νὰ κάμη καὶ ἐπήρε ἀπὸ τις ἐκκλησίαις

- καὶ ἀπὸ τὰ μοναστήρια τὰ ἀσημικὰ τοὺς καὶ τὰ ἔκαμνε μονέδα, ὡς καθὼς τὸ ἐκάμασι παλαιὰ οἱ Ρωμῶνοι ἐς τὴν Ρώμα, καὶ ἐπλήρωνε τοὺς δουλευτάδες ὅπου ἐδουλεύαν εἰς τὰ τεῖχια.
- 40 Barbaro, 66 [not included in the selections printed in *CC* 1]: *L'imperador essendo poverissimo, dimandò imprestido a suoi baroni di denari, loro si escusarono non ne avere, et poi Turchi trovarono assai denari, et a tal di quelli gentilhomeni fu trovato ducati 30^m, e fu consigliato l'imperatore non mettere angarie in quelli tumulti, ma torre le argenterie de le chiese, et cosi si fece.*
- 41 S. Bendall, "A Coin of Constantine XI," *Numismatic Circular* 82 (1974): 188, 189. A short description (and a drawing) of this coin can be found in S. Bendall and P. J. Donald, *The Later Palaeologan Coinage 1282–1453* (London, 1979), pp. 176, 177, who further supply speculation with regard to copper coins that may or may not date back to Constantine's reign. An example of the debased coinage of Constantine XI, a silver half-stavraton from Dumbarton Oaks is illustrated in *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1577)*, ed. H. C. Evans (New Haven and London, 2004), no. 12G (p. 39); the coin bears the inscription IC XC (obverse) and (with restoration) <ΔΕCΠO>THCOΠIΔA<AIOAIOΓOC> (reverse) and portrays the frontal bust of a nimbate emperor, a generic image, on the reverse. The obverse bears a frontal bust of Christ carrying a gospel.
- 42 Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 70, 71. For a study of the hoard, see S. Bendall, "The Coinage of Constantine XI," *Revue Numismatique* (VI^e série) 33 (1991): 134–142, with plates XIII–XVII.
- 43 Rumors were circulating in the summer of 1990, which stated that the (legendary and mythical) "treasure" of Constantine XI under the pavement of Santa Sophia is still waiting to be discovered by speculators. Did these rumors have anything to do with the sudden appearance of the hoard in the hands of coin dealers?
- 44 Bendall and Donald, "The Coinage of Constantine XI," pp. 140–142. Loukas Notaras seems to have gone out of his way to secure loans for the emperor in 1453 and, after the sack, numerous individuals tried to recuperate their losses. Cf. G. Olgiati, "Angelo Giovanni Lomellino: Attività politica e mercantile dell'ultimo podestà di Pera," *Storia di Genova* 9 (1989): 139–196; and K.-P. Matschke, "The Notaras Family and Its Italian Connections," *DOP* 49 (1995) [= *Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries*], pp. 59–72, esp. p. 65, n. 32: "The role played by Loukas Notaras in obtaining loans for Byzantium during the last weeks and months of the empire's independent existence needs to be studied in more detail . . . apparently, within a short period the Byzantine emperor was granted several loans, by different . . . persons, on varying terms." In the beginning of the siege, Notaras was still trying to secure loans on behalf of the emperor, offering imperial jewels as security.
- 45 *PG* 159: 935 [not included in the selections offered in *CC* 1]: *quo saepenumero territi Graeci postes, nunc agris nunc vineis colendis, nunc voluptatibus laxati, ex industria declinabant. Fingebant quidem rei familiaris curam, etiam qui graves videbantur: alii inopiam accusabant, qua ad opus lucrandi gratia, cogebantur. Quos cum absentes corripuissem, periculum non modo sed omnium Christianorum allegans, respondebant: Quid nobis cum castro, si penuriam sustinet domus nostra? ita quod magna vis erat reducendi eos ad muri custodiam.* The same passage in the vernacular in Languschi-Dolfin, 20 [omitted in the few extracts of Languschi-Dolfin's text published in *TiePN*]: *Expettando el constituto zorno de la battaglia zenerala a la qual piu uolte Greci pauriti uscua hora a i campi, hora al conzar de sue uigne, hora per pigliar qualche laxamento, fenzeuano alcuni, etiam di mazori hauer bisogno proueder alla inopia de la famiglia doue erano constretti de aguadagnar li quali uegniano represi, perche partiuano da le sue statione cum periculo suo et de christiani. Respondeuano, et che zoua a mi deffender la cita et caxa mia more da fame, et gran faticha era a ridur questi tali a le garde de sue statione.* The *BCIII*, 7.17, paraphrases this passage. Barbaro observes that the citizens had reached such a point of penury that they simply refused to work on behalf of the defense unless they were paid in advance. He reports a specific incident, which he

- observed and which took place on May 28, the day before the Ottoman general assault, 50 [not in CC 1]: *e misser lo bailo [Girolamo Minotto] fexe comandamento a griexi che portasse questi prestamente a le mure, e mai griexi non i volse portar se prima i non fosse pagadi, e stete in contrasto quaxi sera per muodo, che nui venitiati convegnissemo pagar de borsa a chi i porta, e griexi nula si volse pagar; e quando che i manteleti fo zanti a le mure, el iera la note, e quelì non podessemo conzare ai merli per la bataia, e si stesemo senza, e questo fexe l'avaritia de lor griexi.*
- 46 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 935 [not included in the selections printed in CC 1]: *ordo perinde ex hoc datus est ut panis per familias aeque distribueretur: ne illius curandi gratia, uti se excusabant, a castro recederent; neque famem potius populus, quam gladium, expavesceret*, Languschi-Dolfin, 21, echoes this passage [not included in the selections in *TlePN*]: *Poi fu dato ordine chel pan fusse dato dal imperator per tutte le stationi, acio niuno se partisse da le defese doue faceuano la guarda, si come se scuxauano per andarsi trouar pan, acio chel populo piu non temesse la fame che la spada*. The *BC111* provides a free paraphrase, 7.17.
- 47 *PG* 159: 936 [not included in CC 1]: *humanum sanguinem sitiennes, vel occultato frumento, vel aucto pretio praetendebant . . . severitas a principe aberat; nec compescebantur verbere aut gladio, qui neglexissent obediendum. Idcirco quispiam suis efferebantur voluptatibus, blandimentisque ex natura demulcebant iratum imperatoris animum; delusus improbe a suis, bonus ille dissimulare malebat injurias*. Languschi-Dolfin, 21 [not included in *TlePN*] repeats this passage and at the end adds his own adjective for Constantine XI (*effeminato*). Greek paraphrase in *BC111*, 7.17.
- 48 *PG* 159: 934 [CC 1: 146]: *a paucis nihilominus quaedam ultronea oblatio facta est. Cardinalis hercle omne studium habuit in ferenda ope, in reparanda turribus et muro*. Leonardo is paraphrased by the *BC111*, 7.12: ἀμμή κάποιοι φοβούμενοι τὸν Θεὸ τοῦ ἔδανείσανε ὀλίγα, καὶ ὁ γαρδενάλες ὅπου εὐρέθη ἐκεῖ καὶ ἔκαμε καὶ ἔδυναμώσανε τὴν χώρα. Elsewhere, Leonardo is more specific and states that the cardinal paid for the repairs on the famous stronghold of Anemas, in the vicinity of the imperial palace, *PG* 159: 935: *et turres quas Aveniades [= Ἀνεμάδες] vocant, impensis cardinalis reparatas*. This is also repeated in Languschi-Dolfin, 20 [not included in *TlePN*]; and in the *BC111*, 7.15: καὶ τὶς πύργους ὅπου τὶς κράζουσε Ἀβενιάδους [= Ἀνεμάδες], ὅπου ἦτανε μετακαμωμένοι καὶ τὶς ἐμπυλώνανε μὲ ἔξοδο τοῦ γαρδενάλε. This information is suppressed in the *Maius*, 3.5.5 (398), as Pseudo-Sphrantzes simply reports that the cardinal guarded the area of Kynegesion.
- 49 *PG* 159: 934 [CC 1: 148]: *Paulus, Troilus, Antonius de Bochiardis fratres in loco arduo Miliandri, quo urbs titubat, aere proprio et armis*. On the Bocchiardi brothers in Constantinople and for their adventures in the next decade, see the documents cited in *SFC*, Appendix IV, nos. 15, 16, and 17 (p. 635).
- 50 The bombard, of course, was already going out of fashion and was considered outmoded in western Europe, which had opted for the smaller cast iron mobile artillery piece; on this point, see K. DeVries, “Gunpowder Weapons at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453,” in Y. Lev, ed., *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries* [The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453, no. 9] (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1997), pp. 343–362.
- 51 On Orban and Ottoman artillery, see M. Philippides, “Urban’s Bombard(s), Gunpowder, and the Fall of Constantinople (1453),” *BSEB* n.s., 4 (1999), pp. 1–67; and *SFC*, pp. 413–429.
- 52 Doukas, 35.1: ἐξῆλθεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως εἰς τεχνίτης ὁ τὰς πετροβολιμαίους χῶνας κατασκευάζων, τὸ γένος Οὐγγρος, τεχνίτης δοκιμώτατος. οὗτος πρὸ πολλοῦ ἐν τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει ἐλθὼν καὶ σημάνας τοῖς μεσάζουσι τῷ βασιλεῖ τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ ἀνέφερον τῷ βασιλεῖ. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς γράψας αὐτῷ σιτηρέσιον οὐκ ἄξιον πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μηδαμινὸν καὶ εὐαριθμητὸν εἰδίδοσαν τῷ τεχνίτη. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπογνοὺς καταλιπὼν τὴν πόλιν μᾶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τρέχει πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον. καὶ αὐτὸς ἀσπασίως ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τροφὰς καὶ ἐνδύματα φιλοτιμήσας αὐτὸν δίδωσι, καὶ ρόγαν τὴσιν ὄσιν εἰ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸ τέταρτον εἶδεν, οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδίδρασκε

- τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως. Khalkokondyles, 2.8.6 (pp. 176, 177) supplies his name: τηλεβολιστῆς δ' ἦν τοῦ βασιλέως, τοῦνομα Ὀρβανός, Δαξ τὸ γένος, καὶ πρότερον παρ' Ἑλλησι διατρίβων. καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀπολιπὼν δεόμενος βίου, ἀφίκετο παρὰ τὰς θύρας τοῦ βασιλέως ὃς τότε δὴ μεμισθωμένος πολλοῦ παρεσκευάζετο τοὺς τηλεβόλους.
- 53 *Minus*, 36.7, 8: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σερβίας δυνατοῦ ὄντος νὰ ἀποστείλῃ χρήματα καὶ κρυφίως ἀπὸ πολλὰ μέρη καὶ ἀνθρώπους ὁμοίως δι' ἄλλου τρόπου, εἶδε τίς ἓνα ὀβολόν; ναί, ἀληθῶς ἔστειλαν πολλὰ καὶ χρήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους εἰς τὸν ἀμηρᾶν πολιορκοῦντα τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἐθριάμβευσαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι καὶ ἔδειξαν, ὅτι “ἰδοὺ καὶ οἱ Σέρβοι καθ' ὑμῶν εἰσι.” τίς τῶν χριστιανῶν ἢ τάχα τοῦ βασιλέως τῆς Τραπεζούντος ἢ τῶν Βλαχῶν ἢ τῶν Ἰβήρων ἀπέστειλαν ἓνα ὀβολόν ἢ ἓνα ἀνθρώπον εἰς βοήθειαν φανερώς ἢ κρυφίως; The same passage is repeated in the *Maius*, 4.2.4 (p. 472). In Europe, the general public had also been exasperated with its leaders' failure to contribute to the defense. See Pope Pius II in his *Commentarii*, 1.26.1: *Triste id nuntium Christianis fuit – maxime vero Nicolao Quinto pontifici Romano and Federico Tertio imperatori, quorum tempora hoc tanto Christianae religionis opprobrio non modica notata sunt ignominia. Nam quae clamatis temporum non principibus imputatur? Quaecunq̄ue accidunt mala negligentiae rectorum ascribuntur. 'Poterant,' inquit vulgus, 'pereuntii Graeco prius opem ferre quam caperetur. Neglexerunt. Indigni sunt qui rei publicae praesint.'* See M. Meserve and M. Simonetta, *Pius II Commentaries*, vol. 1 [The I Tatti Renaissance Library 12] (Cambridge, MA and London, 2003); the passage in question: pp. 126, 127, Latin text and English translation, respectively.
- 54 *Minus*, 32.6, 7: ὡς ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀμηρᾶς καὶ τὸ τῆς θυγατρὸς δεσπότης Σερβίας οὕτως παρηκολούθησεν, ἐλθοῦσα ἢ πρωτοστρατόρισσα συνέτυχέ μοι περὶ τούτου καὶ πολλάς δόσεις καὶ ἐπαγγελίας εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὠφελίμους ἔταξεν, ἅπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ πολλῶν αἰτιῶν ἐνόμισα καὶ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ συμφέροντα . . . ὁ Νοταρᾶς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, φανερώς καὶ ἀφανῶς λέγει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελούσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνο το ἔκεινον, καὶ πάντα λίθον κινεῖ, ὡς ὁ λόγος . . . ὁ μέγας δομῆστικός καὶ διάκειται ἐχθρωδῶς εἰς τὰ τῆς Σερβίας. καὶ ἰδοὺ μετὰ Καντακουζηνὸν Ἰωάννην ὁμονοήσαντες ἀεὶ παροτρύνουσί με εἰς τὸ Τραπεζούντος. The *Maius*, 3.2.8 (pp. 364, 365), repeats the same statements.
- 55 *Minus*, 31.10–11: καὶ εὐθὺς οἰκονομῆσας Μανουῆλ τὸν Παλαιολόγον, τὸν ἀνεψιὸν Καντακουζηνῆς τῆς πρωτοστρατορίσσης, ἔστειλεν εἰς τὴν Σερβίαν καὶ ἐδοκιμάσθη περὶ τούτου καὶ ἤκουσαν οἱ γονεῖς αὐτῆς ἠδέως τὸν λόγον καὶ ἐτοιμῶς εἶχον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον. ἀλλ' εὐρέθη, ὅτι ἡ ἀμηρίσση ἐδεήθη τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἔταξεν, ἵνα, εἰ διὰ τινος τρόπου ἐλευθερώσῃ αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀσπίτιον τοῦ τάχα ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς, ἄνδρα ἕτερον εἰς ὅλην αὐτῆς τὴν ζωὴν νὰ μὴδὲ ἐπάρῃ, ἀλλὰ νὰ μὲν ἐλευθέρῃ καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν θεραπεύουσα τὸν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῇ δωδκότα. ἐναπέμεινε οὖν διὰ ταύτην αἰτίαν τὸ περὶ τούτου ἀργόν. The *Maius* changes the wording of this passage but has nothing of import to add.
- 56 *Minus*, 33–35. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 47: “There was in fact much jostling for position among the leading courtiers.”
- 57 *Minus*, 34.8, 9: ἰδοὺ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς θυμοῦ πνέων καὶ ὀρίζει πρὸς ἐμέ· εἶδές τον – καὶ παραλείπω τὴν ὕβριν – τὸν μεσάζοντά σου· σὺ ἐζήτησας τὸ ὀφίκιον τοῦ μεγάλου κοντοσταύλου καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι τοῦτο οὐτε αὐτόν οὐτε ἄλλον τινὰ θέλω δώσειν . . . καὶ σήμερον ἔστειλε τὴν προβατῖναν τὸν πατᾶν Ἀντώνιον, ὅτι ἐπεὶ ζήτησεν, ἵνα τιμησόμεν τὰ μουσκαράκια του, ζητεῖ, ἵνα ποιήσωμεν τὸν πρότον μέγαν λογοθέτην καὶ τὸν δεῦτερον μέγαν κοντόσταυλον . . . λοιπὸν λέγω σοι, ὅτι ἐκείνους, ἂν θέλῃ, θέλω τοὺς δώσειν ἄλλα μικρότερα ὀφίκια, ἃ ἀκόμη θέλουν εἰσθεῖν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τους· σὺ δὲ ἔχε τὸ τοῦ μεγάλου λογοθέτου. τοῦτο δὲ μόνον σε ζητῶ, ὅτι διὰ πολλὰ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῶν αἰτία νὰ μὴδὲν με προσκυνήσῃς εἰς παράστασιν ἑορτῆς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ἀμὴ νὰ σε τὸ γράψῃ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς . . . πάντας οὓς μέλλει γράφειν, ὅτι ἔρχεται αὐτοῦ ὁ μέγας λογοθέτης . . . καὶ θέλεις τὸ βάλλειν εἰς τὸ στόμα τους καί, ἂν τοὺς φανῇ δριμὺ ἢ πικρόν, τέλος θέλουν τὸ καταπιεῖν. On the office of λογοθέτης, see A. Semenov, “Ueber die Ursprung und Bedeutung des Amtes der Logotheten in Byzanz,” *BZ* 19 (1910): 440–449; on the μεσάζων, see J. Verpeaux, “Contribution à l'étude de l'administration byzantine: ho mesazon,” *BS* 16 (1955): 270–296; and N. Oikonomides, “La Chancellerie impériale de Byzance du 13^e au 15^e siècle,” *REB* 43 (1985): 167–195, esp. p. 169 ff.

- 58 Leonardo on Giustiniani and Notaras: *PG* 159: 936 [CC 1: 152]; for analysis cf. M. Philippides, “Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani, the Genoese *Condottiere* of Constantinople in 1453,” *BSEB* n.s., 3 (1998): 13–54, esp. pp. 52 ff. On Notaras and Mehmed II after the sack: *PG* 159: 942, 943 [short extract in CC 1: 146]. It is in this last passage that Leonardo expressed his own intense dislike for the grand duke, evident in the terms that he chose to describe Notaras’ actions: *Chirluca* [= Κῆρ Λουκάς], *qui cogitaverat ejus gratiam captare, adversus Perenses Venetosque . . . culpam retorquere curavit . . . Calibasciam* [= Halil Pasha] . . . *accusavit; epistolas servatas in fide regi praesentavit.*
- 59 Languschi-Dolfin, 32 [not in *TlePN*]: *Alhora Chirluca che cerchaua mettersi in gratia del Signor, et in disgratia Uenetiani et Genoesi di Pera . . . Callibassa* [= Halil Pasha] . . . *accuso esser amico de Greci . . . et el sue lettere saluate in fede de questo apresentatione al Turcho.* Both Leonardo and Languschi-Dolfin are followed closely by the *BC111*, which is very explicit about Notaras, 7.35: ὁ τὸν κακότοχο ὁποῦ ἤθελε νὰ κάμη φιλίαν μὲ τὰ νέματα εἰς τὸν σουλτάνο, ὁποῦ αὐτὸς ὁ κῆρ Λουκάς ὄλην του τὴν ζοῖην ἤτονε διαστρεμμένος ἄνθρωπος. καὶ τὸ περισσότερο, ὁποῦ ἐκατάδωσε καὶ τὸν Ἀλῆ πασᾶ [= Halil Pasha]. On these narratives, see M. Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonard and the Greek Accounts,” *GRBS* 22 (1980): 287–300; *idem*, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonardo Giustiniani and his Italian Followers,” *VMRS* 29 (1998): 189–227; *idem*, “Rumors of Treason: Intelligence Activities and Clandestine Operations in the Siege of 1453,” in M. Arslan and T. Kaçar, eds., *Byzantion ‘dan Constantinopolis’ e Istanbul, Kuşatmaları* (İstanbul, 2017), pp. 403–444; and *SFC*, pp. 152–191.
- 60 Pseudo-Sphrantzes, *Maius*, 3.11.3, 4 (p. 435; pp. 132, 133, and n. 68, in my translation), is even more hostile and adds “new” details reminiscent of a folktale relating the capture of Baghdad by the Tatars in 1258, in Marco Polo’s narrative; see *The Travels of Marco Polo*, trans. R. Latham (Harmondsworth, 1978), pp. 52, 53. For a collection of relevant passages dealing with the execution of Loukas Notaras and for some observations, see *SFC*, Appendix II.
- 61 The most hostile contemporary author is the Genoese Adamo di Montaldo, who wrote his *De Constantinopolitano Excidio ad nobilissimum iuvenem Melladucam Cicadam* some time between 1456 and 1475 (but I believe that it was written before 1470; as it was in 1470 that Moskhos wrote his eulogy/defense of Notaras, partly in order to refute such charges). Di Montaldo’s report: C. Hopf, P. A. Déthier, and C. Desimoni, “Della Conquista di Constantinopoli per Maometto II nel MCCCCLIII,” *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 10 (1874): 289–354; a few extracts in *TlePN*: 188–209, with Italian translation; no English translation exists, but cf. *SFC*, pp. 604–607, for the Latin text and for an English translation of several pertinent passages on the death of Notaras). In his narrative, di Montaldo is explicit about Notaras’ role in the siege, 28 (p. 339) [*TlePN*: 198]: *Lucas, Magnus Dux cognomento honoris dictus, quem proditionis infamia reum fecit.* On Di Montaldo’s *opusculum*, see *SFC*, p. 46.
- 62 Doukas, 37.10: κρειττότερόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πόλει φακιόλιον βασιλεῦον Τούρκων ἢ καλύπτραν Λατινικῶν. For this remark that was inappropriately associated with the grand duke, cf. H. Evert-Kappesowa, “La tiare ou le turban,” *BS* 14 (1953): 245–257, esp. pp. 245–248; A. E. Vacalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation 1204–1461: The Byzantine Period* (New Brunswick, 1970), pp. 192, 193; and D. R. Reinsch, “Lieber der Turban als war? Bemerkungen zum Dictum des Lukas Notaras,” in C. N. Constantinides, N. M. Panagiotakes, E. Jeffreys, and A. D. Angelou, eds., *Φιλῆλλην: Studies in Honor of Robert Browning* (Venice, 1996), pp. 377–391.
- 63 That Notaras was not an anti-unionist has been concluded in A. N. Diamantopoulos, “Γεννάδιος ὁ Σχολάριος ὡς Ἱστορικὴ Πηγὴ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἄλωσιν Χρόνων,” *Ἑλληνικά* 9 (1936): 285–308. Scholarius thought that Notaras was on the side of the unionists; cf. his comments in *Oeuvres complètes* 4: 496, 497: τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον ἐκεῖνο ἔφερον [*sc.* ὁ Νοταρᾶς] εἰς μέσον, τὸν πάντων ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνακηρύττεσθαι δεῖν.
- 64 This speech by Moskhos has been evaluated by A. E. Vacalopoulos, “Die Frage der Glaubwürdigkeit der ‘Leichenrede auf L. Notaras’ von J. Moschos (15 Jh.),” *BZ* 52

- (1959): 13–21, esp. pp. 16, 17; and E. Zachariadou, “Τὰ Λόγια καὶ ὁ Θάνατος τοῦ Λουκά Νοταῶ,” in *Ροδωνιά: Τιμὴ στὸν Μ. Ι. Μανούσσο* (Rethymnon, 1996), pp. 135–146.
- 65 *Minus*, 32.7. Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 443, comments: Εἶνε λυπηρόν, ὅτι ὁ Φραντζῆς δὲν ἔκρινεν ἀναγκαῖον νὰ μεταδώσῃ καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀναγνώστας τοῦ Χρονικοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅσα ἐγίνωσκε περὶ τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ μεγάλου δουκός.
- 66 Maltezos, *Ἄννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταῶ*, p. 42, and n. 50: *Anna Paleologina filia quondam illustris magni ducis Romeorum*.
- 67 *Archivio di Stato di Siena, Consiglio Generale, Deliberazioni*, n. 235, fol. 243^v–245^v: *domine Anne Paleologine Constantinopolitane, olim sponse imperatoris Romeorum et Constantinopolis et filie quondam illustris principis domini Luce, magni ducis Romeorum*. On this document, see C. N. Sathas, *Τουρκοκρατούμενη Ἑλλάς: Ἱστορικὸν Δοκίμιον περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀποτίναξιν τοῦ Ὀθωμανικοῦ Ζυγοῦ Ἐπαναστάσεων τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνους (1453–1821)* (Athens, 1869; repr.: 1985), pp. 52–54, n. 2; *idem*, *Μνημεῖα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας: Documents Inédites Relatifs à l’Histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge* 9, p. vi; and Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” pp. 455–466. For a modern perspective, see Maltezos, *Ἄννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταῶ*, pp. 27–47, and for the agreement between Anna and Siena, *ibid.*, document 2, pp. 66–79, with photographs of the document; for the paragraph in question, see *ibid.*, p. 70: *infrascripta erit petitio facta pro parte illustris domine [domine] Anne Paleologine Constantinopolitane, olim sponse imperatoris Romeorum et Constantinopolis et filie quondam illustris principis domini Luce, magni ducis Romeorum et super eius petitione tractatus habitus cum civibus per magnificos dominos Senenses ad hanc praticam electos*.
- 68 Sathas, *Μνημεῖα*, 9, document II, p. xxiv.
- 69 *Ibid.*, p. xxxvii.
- 70 Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” p. 463.
- 71 The execution of Notaras and the fate of his sons are recounted in Leonardo, *PG* 159: 943; in the *BC111*, 7.35; and in Pseudo-Dorotheos, *Δωροθέου Βιβλίον Ἱστορικόν* (Venice, 1781), p. 418, who, however, neglects to mention the name of the grand duke’s youngest son: καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου Δουκὸς τοὺς υἱοὺς ἔσφαξε ἔμπροσθεν του, τὸν δὲ μικρότερον υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἔβαλεν εἰς τὸ Σεράγιον, καὶ εἰς ὀλίγον καιρὸν ἔφυγε καὶ ὑπήγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀδριανούπολιν καὶ ἐθάθη. καὶ ἔμαθαν ὕστερον πῶς ἦτον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην εἰς τὴν ἀδελφὴν του. We can follow the young man’s steps after he came to Italy: one letter (*data Janue die VI Januari 1468*); cf. Hopf, Déthier, and Desimoni, “Della Conquista di Constantinopoli,” pp. 299, 300, n. 1, document II entitled *Pro Domino Jacobo Notara: Non ignari sumus quam amice cum genuensibus versatus sit clarus olim et magnificus vir dominus Lucas Notara constantinopolitanus et tunc magnus dux romeorum . . . decernimus et statuimus quod magnificus item eques prefati domini Luce filius, dominus Jacobus Notara*. Jacob/Giacomo controlled a small business in Venice for the rest of his life. For members of the Notaras family active in the siege, see *SFC*, Appendix IV, nos. 148–153 (pp. 651, 652).
- 72 Regarding Anna’s two sisters, Maria and Theodora (eventual monastic name: Theodoxia), who were married and whose husbands were executed by Mehmed II after the fall, a new theory (Ganchou, “Le rachat des Notaras,” pp. 149–229, esp. pp. 176 ff.) suggests that they were conducted to Adrianople as captives. It has further been suggested that Anna did not go directly to Italy from Constantinople but that she had been residing with another sister, Helen (eventual monastic name Euphrosyne), the widow of George Gatilluso, the lord of Ainos, in Thrace. After the fall Anna may have traveled to Adrianople where she ransomed her sisters and then proceeded to Italy. However, doubts remain about this supposition. If indeed it is so, Anna failed to ransom and rescue her young brother Jacob who had been taken to the harem of the sultan. Is it possible that Anna had gone, after all, to Italy, and that, from the safety of Italy, she was trying to ransom members of her family (including her sisters and brother Jacob)? For the monetary constrictions that Anna may have faced at that time, see T. Ganchou, “Hélène

- Notara Gateliousaina d' Ainos et le Sankt Peterburg Bibl. Publ. Gr. 243," *REB* 56 (1998), pp. 141–168, esp. p. 145.
- 73 See Maltezoú, *Άννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταρά*, pp. 40, 41.
- 74 On Servopoulos and his career in Italy, see *ibid.*, pp. 40–44.
- 75 G. Cecchini, "Anna Notaras Paleologa: Una Principessa greca in Italia e la politica Senese di ripopolamento delle Maremma," *Bollettino Senese di storia patria* 9 (1938), doc. 3 (pp. 27, 28): *illustris domina . . . filia quondam illustris magni ducis Romeorum sponsa imperialis* (discussed in Maltezoú, *Άννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταρά*, pp. 43–44).
- 76 As Nicol has astutely observed in "Anna Notaras Palaiologina, Died 1507," in D. M. Nicol, ed., *The Byzantine Lady: Ten Portraits 1250–1500* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 96–110, esp. pp. 108, 109: "Had there been any question of his [*sc.* Constantine's] marrying the daughter of Loukas Notaras, Sphrantzes would surely have recorded it . . . the Sienese government . . . had probably been misled by the rumors, persistent in Italy . . . Never does she [*sc.* Anna] recall her alleged betrothal."
- 77 Maltezoú believes that Servopoulos is correct and claims, without additional evidence, that the princess of Georgia had been rejected, see p. 44: *καί μετὰ ἀπό ἀποτυχημένη προσπάθεια νὰ συνάψει γάμο μὲ ἀρχόντισσες τῆς Γεωργίας ἢ τῆς Τραπεζούντας, ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος . . . εἶχε ἀρραβωνιαστῆί τὴν κόρη τοῦ μεγάλου δουκὸς Λουκᾶ Νοταρά*. Maltezoú does not discuss the serious historiographical complications her view creates for the testimony of Sphrantzes.
- 78 *Minus*, 30.1, 32.1–4. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family*, p. 173, n. 27; in general, see C. Toumanoff, "The Fifteenth-Century Bagratids and the Institution of Collegial Sovereignty in Georgia," *Traditio* 7 (1949–51): 169–221. See *RKOR*: 3525 (p. 133), for a summary of this embassy. That Anna had been betrothed to Constantine was generally accepted as a historical fact in the nineteenth century: scholars who embraced this view include Sathas, *Τουρκοκρατούμενη Ἑλλάς*, p. 54; *idem*, *Μνημεῖα* 9: vi ff.; C. Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes Inédites ou Peu Connues* (Paris, 1873; repr.: 1966), Table 12 (p. 536): "fiancé à Anne, fille de Luc Notaras"; É. Legrand, *Bibliothèque hellénique ou description raisonnée des ouvrages publiés en grec par des Grecs au XV^e et XVI^e siècles* 1 (Paris, 1885): cxxvi–cxxvii; and Mijatovich, *Constantine Palaeologus*, p. 98, who repeats Sathas' speculation that the Serbian Mara withdrew her name from consideration "for the feelings of her cousin, Anna, the abandoned fiancée of Constantine." Lampros, "Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος," pp. 455 ff., argued that Anna was never betrothed to Constantine. S. Runciman, "The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II," in *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*, vol. 1 (Bologna, 1981), p. 281, states that Constantine did select Anna to be his future bride but that the marriage did not take place because her father sent her to Venice for safety. This view simply overlooks all the passages of the *Minus*, in which Sphrantzes states that Constantine selected the daughter of the king of Georgia. Are we to assume that Sphrantzes was so blinded by his jealousy of the grand duke that he falsified the record and substituted another princess in the place of Anna Notaras? Moskhos, in his attempt to elevate Notaras to respectability, would have mentioned that Anna was destined to be the queen of Constantinople. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 96, 97, follows Lampros' conclusions. Maltezoú in her monograph on Anna Notaras, accepts the view that Anna had been betrothed to the emperor (and ignores Sphrantzes' statement that the princess of Georgia had been selected); see Maltezoú, *Άννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταρά*, p. 44: ἡ βυζαντινὴ ἀρχόντισσα [Anna Notaras] ἦταν *sponsa imperialis* . . . Ὁδηγοῦμαστε ἔτσι στὸ συμπέρασμα ὅτι ἡ Άννα ὑπῆρξε ἀρραβωνιαστικιά τοῦ Κωνσταντῖνου Παλαιολόγου. Furthermore, Maltezoú infers that Anna refused to marry for the rest of her long life precisely because no match could have ever equaled her earlier betrothal to Constantine, see p. 54: [Anna] ἐπέλεξε νὰ μείνει ἄγαμη, ἀφοῦ μετὰ τὴν μνηστεία τῆς μὲ τὸν Κωνσταντῖνο Παλαιολόγο δὲν ἦταν εὐκόλο νὰ παντρευτεῖ κάποιον ποῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην θὰ ἦταν κατώτερος κοινωνικὰ ἐνὸς αὐτοκράτορα. Yet one hesitates to accept this betrothal as an undisputed fact in the face of the statements in Sphrantzes' chronicle.

If indeed Anna had been the official “winner” then why did she leave the capital before the siege? Moreover, why was there no wedding before the siege? Was Sphrantzes so embittered that he went so far as to falsify the record and invent even a ceremony in which the emperor himself signs his name to a document, agreeing to the Georgian match, which he then dispatches to Georgia’s court with Georgia’s official envoy? Perhaps an answer may come from the archives of Georgia if an official document from Constantinople regarding this matter ever surfaces.

- 79 *Minus*, 32.2: και δίδω την θυγατέρα μου . . . φλωρία χιλιάδες λς΄ και νὰ ἔχη και κατ΄ ἔτος χιλιάδας γ΄, διὰ τὸ νὰ δίδῃ εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας και πτωχοῖς και ὅπου ἂν φανῆται αὐτῇ. The *Maius*, 3.2.5 (p. 362), inflates the amount and raises the dowry to νοῦμια χιλιάδας πεντήκοντα και ἔξ.
- 80 *Minus*, 32.4: ὅταν ἔλθῃ σὺν θεῷ νὰ τὴν ἐπάρῃς. The *Maius* changes the phraseology of the *Minus* but adds nothing else.
- 81 *Minus*, 32.8: λοιπὸν σὺν θεῷ τελέσωμεν τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως τῆς Ἰβηρίας.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 32.9: και γεγονότος χρυσοβούλλου και ὑπογραφέντος, ὅτι ἐκείνου μὲν ἡ θυγάτηρ νὰ ἐνὶ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ και δέσποινα τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως οὗτος δὲ νὰ ἐνὶ ἀνὴρ ἐκείνης εἰς τὰς συμφωνίας, ἄς μετ΄ ἐμοῦ ἔστησεν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς Ἰβηρίας. και κληθεῖς ὁ αὐτὸς σταλεῖς μεθ΄ ἡμῶν ἐκείνου ἄρχων . . . ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ ὁ βασιλεὺς και αὐθέντης μου οικειοχείρωσ σταυροὺς τρεῖς μετὰ κινναβάρεως εἰς τὸ ἄνωθεν μέτωπον τοῦ χρυσοβούλλου εἰς βεβαίωσιν . . . και λαβὼν τὸ χρυσοβούλλον ἀπὸ τῆς χειρὸς αὐτοῦ και ἀκούσας “ἰδοὺ οὗτος,” δεῖξας ἐμέ, “ὅς σὺν θεῷ τὸ ἐρχόμενον ἔαρ ἔρχεται μετὰ κατέργων, ἵνα ἐπάρῃ αὐτήν,” προσκυνήσας ἀπῆλθεν. For this document, cf. *RKOR*: 3538 (p. 136); and G. Kolias, “Constantine Paléologue le dernier défenseur de Constantinople, 1453–1953,” in *Le cinq-centième anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople* [L’Hellenisme Contemporain, 2. série] (Athens, 1953), pp. 41–54, esp. pp. 47 ff.
- 83 *Supra*, ch. 8, text with nn. 39–42.
- 84 Is it perhaps the case that some residents of Constantinople had seen Constantine in the company of a woman (an otherwise unknown mistress?) and had assumed that she was the “queen” of Constantinople? Is this impression responsible for misleading Nestor-Iskander, who mentioned the “escape” of the empress at the conclusion of his narrative before the section of his *vita*? See Nestor-Iskander, 83 (pp. 92, 93): ο цесарицѣ же бывшу велики испытанию, сказаша султану, яко великий дукась и великий domestikъ и анактось, и протостраторовъ сынъ Андрей н братаничъ его Асанъ Фома Палеологъ и епархъ гра[д]цкiй Николай, отпустнша цесарицу въ караби. И абиеповелъ нхъ истязавъ посъщи.
- 85 Typical examples of scholars who accepted the existence of a queen in 1453 include the learned Theodosios Zygomalas and Martinus Crusius; see their correspondence and the Greek epigrams (with their Latin translations) composed by Crusius. Theodosios Zygomalas assisted Crusius in his fruitless quest to identify the last empress. On the learned family of Zygomalas, see S. Perentides and G. Steires, eds., *Ιωάννης και Θεοδοσίος Ζυγομαλάς: Πατριαρχεῖο–Θεσμοί–Χειρόγραφα* (Athens, 2009).
- 86 *MCT*, p. 70; *PaL* 2: 108; *FC*, p. 64; *LCB*, p. 395; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 51.
- 87 Orhan is thought to have been a grandson of Suleyman I, according to *MCT*, p. 70; *LCB*, p. 395; *FC*, p. 56; and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 52. Khalkokondyles, 2.8.22 [pp. 196, 197: Ὁρχάνην τὸν Μουσουλμάνεω [Suleyman?] υἰδοῦν. Doubts expressed in Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, Table 24, n. 16.
- 88 *FC*, p. 56; and *MCT*, p. 70.
- 89 Doukas, 34.2: ἡ γὰρ μερὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων συναγωγῇ ἐσκέψατό τινα ματαίαν βουλήν, στείλασα πρὸς αὐτὸν πρέσβεις, λέγουσιν . . . “ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὴν κατ΄ ἔτος ἀσπρῶν τριακοσίων χιλιάδων ποσότητα οὐ καταδέχεται. και ὁ γὰρ Ὁρχάν, ὃς ἐστὶ και αὐτὸς υἱὸς τοῦ Ὁθμάν καθὰ και ὁ ὑμέτερος ἀρχηγὸς Μεχεμετ, ὑπάρχει τέλειος ἄνδρας τῇ ἡλικίᾳ και καθ΄ ἐκάστην συρρέουσι ὅτι πλείστοι πρὸς αὐτὸν κυριωνομοῦντες και ἀρχηγὸν ἀγορεύοντες. αὐτὸς δὲ θέλων φιλοτιμῆσαι και δωρήσασθαι οὐκ ἔχει που τὰς χεῖρας ἀπλῶσαι, αἰτῶν τὸν βασιλέα, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς οὐκ εὐπορεῖ τοῦ δοῦναι τόσον ὅσον αἰτεῖ. ἐκ τῶν δύο οὖν ἐν αἰτοῦμεν, ἡ τὴν πρόσοδον διαπλασιάσεται, ἡ τὸν Ὁρχάν ἀπολοῦμεν.”

- 90 Doukas, 34.3: ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ Μεχεμέτ καὶ θυμὸς πλησθεὶς οὐκ εἶχε τί ποιῆσαι, καὶ τῷ Καραμᾶν συνεσπείσατο . . . τοὺς δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως πρέσβεις ἀπεκρίνατο ὡς “ἤδη συντόμως ἐν Ἀδριανουπόλει μέλλομεν εἶναι, κάκει ἐλθόντες ἅπαντα τὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ τῇ πόλει ἀναγκαῖα ἀναγγεῖλάτέ μοι, καὶ ἐτοιμῶς ἔχω τοῦ δοῦναι πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον.”
- 91 Doukas, 34.4: ὁ δὲ Μεχεμέτ . . . ἐν τῇ Ἀδριανουπόλει εἰσελθὼν, παρευθὸς στεῖλας ἕνα τὸν δούλων αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν Στρυμόνα χωρίοις ἐκάλυψε τὴν πρόσοδον τὴν εὐεργετηθεῖσαν τῷ βασιλεῖ, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβλέποντας καὶ οἰκοδομοποιεῦντας ταύτην ἐδίωξε, τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον μόνον γευσάμενος.
- 92 *MCT*, p. 72.
- 93 Khalkokondyles, 2.8.1 (pp. 168, 169): τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίησε ὥστε ἀσφαλῆ αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν διάβασιν, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐσπερίους δύνασθαι ἐπιόντας τριήρεσι κωλύειν αὐτῷ τὴν διάβασιν καὶ καινοτομεῖσθαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ αὐτῷ πράγματα. Kρίτοβουλος, 1.6.1; and *ibid.*, 1.6.3: οὐ ταῦτα δὲ μόνον ἐνήγην αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον οἱ σκοπὸν καλῶς ἔχειν ἐδόκει τὸ φρούριον τειχισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅσον μελετωμένην πολιορκίαν τῆς Πόλεως ἐπιτειχισμὸν ἐνόμιζεν ἰσχυρότατον ἀποκλείειν αὐτῇ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἠπειρούς Ἀσίαν τε καὶ Εὐρώπην, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὰς θαλάσσας ἀμφοτέρας, ἄνω μὲν τὸν Εὐξείνιον Πόντον διὰ τοῦ Βοσπόρου, κάτω δὲ τὸν τε Αἰγαῖον καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θάλασσαν διὰ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου. Also see Puscuro, 3.96–101 (pp. 45, 46); and 3.140–144 (p. 46).
- 94 Doukas, 34.5: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἐτέρου ἤγματο λίαν ἐπιζημίου καὶ θανασίμου κατὰ Ῥωμαίων. χειμῶνος γὰρ ἠρξάμενος προστάγματα καὶ διαλαλίας ἔν τε δύσει ἔν τε ἀνατολῇ ἐν ἐκάστη ἐπαρχίᾳ τοῦ ἐτοιμαῖσαι οἰκοδόμους τεχνίτας χιλίους καὶ ἐργάτας κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τῶν τεχνιτῶν καὶ ἀσβεστοκαύστας καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν καὶ παρακομιδὴν, τοῦ εἶναι ἐτοιμοὺς ἐν ἔαρι εἰς κατασκευὴν κάστρου.
- 95 *Ibid.*: τότε οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀκούσαντες τὴν πικρὰν ταύτην ἀγγελίαν, καὶ οἱ ἐν Κωνσταντίνου διαὶ οἱ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καὶ Θράκῃ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις οἰκοῦντες Χριστιανοὶ ὑπερήλγησαν, ἐξηράνθησαν. οὐκ ἦν ἀλλήλοις γλῶσσα ἢ διαλαλία πλὴν “νῦν τὸ τέλος ἤγγικεν τῆς πόλεως”. . . ταύτην γὰρ τὴν φωνὴν σὺν κλαυθμῷ οὐ μόνον οἱ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τῆς ἀνατολῆς σποράδην οἰκοῦντες Χριστιανοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ δύσει τὸ αὐτὸ μετὰ κλαυθμοῦ ἐβόων. In addition, cf. *FC*, p. 66.
- 96 Cf. Guiland, “Les Appels,” pp. 238, 239; M.-M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, “L’action diplomatique et militaire de Venise pour la défense de Constantinople (1452–1453),” *Revue romaine d’histoire* 13 (1974): 247–267; *PaL* 2: 110; Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 393; and *RKOR*: 3539 (p. 136).
- 97 Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 393.
- 98 Published as an Appendix in Barbaro’s *Giornale*, Doc. 1 [= Sec. Sen. T. 19, fol. 122’], 67, dated, *more Veneto*, 1452 [= 1451 A.D.], February 14: *Contulit se ad nostram presentiam, unus orator Serenissimi domini Imperatoris Constantinopolis, qui explicavit nostro dominio, apparatus qui fiunt per imperatorem turchorum, tam exercitus maximi terrestris, quam etiam classis maritime, ut se conferrat ad expugnationem civitatis Constantinopolis, que non est dubium, nisi provideatur de favore et presidio, magno periculo submissa est . . . Et quum idem orator, sicut nobis retulit, iturus est Florentiam, et successive Romam ad Summum Pontificem, et ad alias potentias Itali . . . Et quum etiam petit favores nostros, respondemus, quod sicut bene intelligi posset, res nostre, multe restricte sunt in partibus Lombardie, ita ut difficilimum nobis nobis sit, complacere domino suo . . . Circa partem salnitrii, et coraciarium, quas petiit prefatus orator, respondetur sibi, quod contenti sumus complacere eidem Serenissimo Imperatori, de quantitate quam postulavit . . . Quod salnitrium ipsum, et coracie emantur, et mittantur ad manus baiuli nostri Constantinopolis. Echoed in Ivani’s *Expugnatio*, *TePN*: 150, 151: *Deinde tela, missilia atque omne genus armorum quae ad propellendum hostem defendendamque urbem opportuna sunt ex omnibus locis devehit [sc. imperator] atque mirabili lignorum strue a Constantinopoli Peram usque portum claudit turresque ligneas complures super struem ad repellendum hostem munitissimas edidit, quae facile hostium naves a transitu obhercere poterant.* Additional documents in *PaL* 2: 109, 110, n. 6. For the situation, see Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 393.*

- 99 Doukas, 34.6: ὁ δὲ Μεχεμιὲτ ἤδη τοῦ ἔαρος ἀρξάμενον ἔστειλεν ἀπανταχοῦ, τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἐργάτας συνάγων. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς δὲ στείλας ἐν Ἀδριανουπόλει πρέσβεις, οὐχ ὅτι ζητήσαι τι τῶν ὧν ἠβούλετο.
- 100 Kritoboulos, 1.7.3: οἱ δὲ [πρέσβεις] ἀφικόμενοι λόγοις τε παντοίοις ἐχρῶντο τῶν τε ξυνηκῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναμνησκοντες καὶ ὡς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς προγενημέναις τε καὶ ἀναγεγραμμέναις αὐτοῖς σπονδαῖς ἐπὶ πάππων καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ, παντάπασιν ἀπειρητο μηδένα κτίζειν ἐν τῶνδε τῷ χώρῳ μήτε φρούριον μήτε ἄλλο τι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν βουλευόμενον ἢ ὅλως ἐπιχειρήσοντα καὶ ἀμφοτέρους κωλύειν τρόπῳ παντὶ καὶ διεσώθη ἐξ ἐκείνου μέχρι καὶ νῦν, “ὁ χώρος ἐλεύθερος, ἢ διάβασις δὲ μόνον ἀπλῶς,” ἔφασαν, “τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατευμάτων τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀποσκευῶν ἐξ ἠπείρου εἰς ἠπειρον.”
- 101 Doukas, 34.6.
- 102 *Ibid.*: ὁ δὲ Μεχεμιὲτ ἀπεκρίνατο· ἐγὼ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως οὐ λαμβάνω τι. ἐκτὸς τῆς τάφρου οὐκ ἔχει οὔτε κέκτηται τι. καὶ γὰρ ἠθελον κτίσαι ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ Στόματι φρούριον, οὐκ εἶχε δίκαιον τοῦ κωλύειν με. πάντα γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐμὴν ἐξουσίαν εἰσὶν καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀνατολὴν κείμενα τοῦ Στομίου φρούρια, καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν Τοῦρκοι κατοικοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ δύσει ἄοικα ἐμά εἰσι. καὶ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐπ’ ἀδείας τοῦ οἰκήσαι, ἢ οὐκ οἶδατε ἐν ποίᾳ στενοχωρίᾳ ὑπέστη καὶ δεινῇ περιστάσει ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ, ὅταν τοῖς Οὐγκροῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς συνετέθη, καὶ διὰ ζηρᾶς ἐλθόντες ἐκείνοι, διὰ θαλάσσης τὰς τῶν Φράγκων τριῆρεις ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ Ἑλλησπόντῳ ἠγάγετο, καὶ τὸν Καλλιουπόλεως πορθμὸν ἀποκλείσαντες οὐκ ἐδίδουν πορείαν τῷ ἐμῷ πατρί; . . . τότε ὁ ἐμὸς περάσας μετὰ πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὥμοσε τοῦ ποιῆσαι καταντικρῶ τοῦ φρουρίου κειμένου πρὸς ἀνατολὴν ἕτερον φρούριον πρὸς δύσιν. ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἔφθασε τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο μέλλω ποιῆσαι θεοῦ ἀρωγῶντος. τί με κωλύετε; ἢ οὐκ ἔξεστι ποιῆσαι ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς ὁ βούλομαι; ἀπέλθατε, εἴπατε τῷ βασιλεῖ ὁ νῦν ἠγεμὸν οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρώην ὄμοιος ἄ οὐκ ἠδύναντο ἐκείνοι ποιῆσαι, οὗτος ὑπὸ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ εὐκόλως ἔχει τοῦ πρᾶξαι, καὶ ἂ οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ἐκείνοι, οὗτος θέλει καὶ βούλεται, καὶ ὁ ἐλθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἔνεκα τῆς ὑποθέσεως ταύτης ἀφαιρεθήσεται τὴν δοράν. Kritoboulos provides the sultan’s response in 1.8, 9. On this embassy, see *RKOR*: 3542 (p. 137). For the various embassies at this time, in general, see M. Caroll (Klopf), “Notes on the Authorship of the ‘Siege’ Section of the Chronicon Maius by Pseudo-Phrantzes, Book III,” *Byz* 41 (1971): 28–36, but one should be cautious of the views that this scholar holds about the nature of the *Maius*; apparently, Caroll persists in the erroneous notion that eyewitness observations, perhaps by Sphrantzes himself, are to be found in the siege section of Pseudo-Sphrantzes.
- 103 Kritoboulos, 1.8.5, 6: ὁ δὲ χῶρος οὗτος, ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρούριον μέλλω τειχιζειν, ἡμέτερός τέ ἐστιν . . . σπονδᾶς δὲ οὔτε λύω οὔτε βουλήσομαι μενόντων καὶ ὑμῶν κατά τὰ χῶραν καὶ μηδαμοῦ τὰ ἡμέτερα πολυπραγμονοῦντων μηδὲ περιεργάζεσθαι βουλομένων.
- 104 *Ibid.*, 1.9.2: οἱ δὲ (καὶ γὰρ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς τὸ πρᾶγμα σφόδρα δεινόν, ὥσπερ δῆτα καὶ ἦν) μὴ ἔχοντες μέντοι γε ὁ τι καὶ δράσειεν καὶ ἄκοντες ἡσυχίαν ἦγον.
- 105 Doukas, 34.6: τότε οἱ τῆς πόλεως ἅπαντες ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ φόβῳ συνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλοῦντες ἔλεγον, “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μέλλων εἰσέλαι τῇ πόλει καὶ φθεῖραι καὶ αἰχμαλωτῆσαι τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ καταπατήσαι τὰ ἄγια καὶ ἀφανῖσαι τοὺς τιμίους ναοὺς, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ κείμενα λείψανα θεοφρόνων ἀνδρῶν καὶ μαρτύρων ἐν ταῖς πλατείαις καὶ τριόδοις ἐναπορρῖναι. οἴμοι, τί πράξομεν; ποῦ φύγομεν;” ταῦτα καὶ ἕτερα οἱ δυστυχεῖς κλαίοντες τὴν ζωὴν αὐτῶν ἐταλάνιζον.
- 106 Puscuro, 3.204–207 (p. 46): *Tum timor audita Machmetti mente fatigat / Constantini urbem, plebem, senatumque / Invadit stupor horrendus; casusque maligni / Corda repercutiunt.*
- 107 Kritoboulos, 1.10.11: ὡς ἔαρ ὑπέφαιναν ἤδη. Doukas, 34.7, cites the beginning of April: ἡδὴ ἔαρος ἀρξάντος καὶ Μαρτίου μηνὸς ἡδὴ παρεληλυθότος.
- 108 Doukas, 34.7: καὶ δὴ καταλαβὼν μίαν ραχίαν κάτωθεν τοῦ Σωσθενίου καλουμένην ἔκπαλαι Φονέαν, ἐκεῖ ὡς ἐν τριγώνῳ σχήματι τὸν θεμέλιον ὀρίσατο πηγνύναι, ὃ καὶ γενόμενον τὴν κλῆσιν τοῦ κάστρου Πασχεσὲν [*Başkesen*] ἐκέλευσε καλεῖσθαι,

- ἐξελληνιζόμενον δὲ ἐρμηνεύεται κεφαλοκόπτης, ἔχον ἀντικρὺ καὶ τὸ φρούριον [*Anadolu Hisar*] ὃ ἐδείματο ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ.
- 109 Khalkokondyles, 2.8.1 (pp. 168, 169): Μεχμέτης . . . φκοδόμει . . . πολίχνην Λαιμοκοπίην καλουμένην.
- 110 Kritoboulos, 1.10.3: καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων . . . Συμπληγάδας τὸν χῶρον ὠνόμασαν καὶ Ἡρακλέα τε πρῶτον ἔφασαν διαβῆναι ταύτας καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον <ξὺν> τοῖς Ἀργοναύταις Ἰάσονα.
- 111 This note was signed by ὁ δικαιοφύλαξ διάκονος Θεόδωρος ὁ Ἀγαλλιανός. See S. Eustratiades, “Ἐκ τοῦ Κώδικος τοῦ Νικολάου Καρατζᾶ,” *Ἐκκλησιαστικὸς Φάρος* 6 (1910): 200–206, esp. p. 206. The text of this note has also been included in *CBB* 1: Appendix 6 (pp. 635, 636), but not its *marginalia*. For the ultimate fate of this manuscript, cf. C. G. Patrinelis, *Ὁ Θεόδωρος Ἀγαλλιανός Ταυτιζόμενος πρὸς τὸν Θεοφάνην Μηδείας καὶ οἱ Ἀνέκδοτοι Λόγοι Αὐτοῦ. Μία Νέα Ἱστορικὴ Πηγὴ περὶ τοῦ Πατριαρχείου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως κατὰ τοὺς Πρώτους μετὰ τὴν Ἄλωσιν Χρόνους* (Athens, 1966), p. 59, n. 2: ὁ κώδιξ ἀνήκε τότε εἰς τὸν Εὐστρατιάδην, ἤδη δὲ ἀγνωστος ἡ τύχη του. On Agallianos, see *PLP* 1: no. 94 (p. 8). That the Rumeli fortress was known as “New Castle” in the sixteenth century is confirmed in the *EX*, 27: κτίζει οὖν ἄνωθεν τοῦ Φάρου εἰς τόπον λεγόμενον Φονέαυ ὄπερ νῦν ἴσταται τὸ Νεόκαστρον, and in Hierax, II. 568, 569: τοῦτο μέχρι τῆς σήμερον Νεόκαστρον καλεῖται / τὸ πρὸς τὸν Εὐξείνου πορθμὸν ἐν δυτικῷ τῷ μέρει. As early as 1453 Filippo da Rimini calls this fortress *novum castellum*, which, in view of the present discussion, should perhaps be printed as *Novum Castellum*.
- 112 Kritoboulos devotes a large section to the Rumeli castle (1.11.1–7). Its architect was Muslih ed-Din, “*molto probabilmente un rinnegato*” (*CC* 1: 345, n. 3). This fortress was accented by fourteen towers. On modern scholarship on this castle, cf. A. Gabriel, *Châteaux turcs de Bosphore* [Mémoires Institut Français d’Archéologie Stamboul 6] (Paris, 1943), 29–75; *MCT*, p. 77; *FC*, p. 66; A. G. Paspates, *Πολιορκία καὶ Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ὑπὸ τῶν Ὀθωμανῶν ἐν ἔτει 1453* (Athens, 1890), pp. 80, 81; and *SFC*, pp. 397–413.
- 113 Doukas, 34.8: καὶ τινες κίονας μετακομίσαντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρειπίων τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ Ταξιαρχου Μιχαήλ, τινὲς τῆς πόλεως ζήλω κινούμενοι ἐξήλθον τοῦ κωλύσαι τοὺς Τούρκους, καὶ δὴ συλληφθέντες πάντες διὰ μαχαίρας ἀπέθανον.
- 114 *Ibid.*, 34.9: ὁ βασιλεὺς οὖν ἰδὼν ὅτι εἰς τέλος προχωροῦσι τὰ τοῦ τυράννου βουλευόμενα, τὴν ἄλλην ἐτρέπετο, καὶ δὴ πέμψας ἀποκρισιαρίους ἐζήτηε τινὰς δεφένσοντας τοῦ δεφενδεύειν τοὺς εἰς κώμας τῆς πόλεως Ῥωμαίους, ἵνα μὴ οἱ Τούρκοι διερχόμενοι λυμήνουσι τὴν αὐτῶν γεωργίαν . . . στείλας αὐτῶ καὶ διάφορα δωρήματα καὶ τροφὴν καὶ πόσιν, καθ’ ἑκάστην φιλοτιμῶν τὸν ἀνήμερον δράκοντα.
- 115 Doukas, 34.10: ἔλθων γὰρ ἐξαίφνης πρωΐ, καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ ἐξεληθόντες εἰς τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοῦ θερίζειν, ἐπισπεσόντες οἱ Τούρκοι πάντας κατέσφαζαν, τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὡς τεσσαράκοντα. Sphrantzes, 35.2, seems to allude to the same events in the month of June: τὸν Ἰούνιον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτους ἀπεσκεπάσθη ἡ μάχη καὶ πηλαλήσαντος φωσάτου, οὗς ἐξῶθεν εὗρεν, ἀπῆρε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπέκλεισε. Elaboration in the *Maius*, 3.3.5 (378).
- 116 Pusculo, 3.291–296 (p. 47): *Machmettus muros castelli ut struxerat, arva / Urbis qui vastent equites jubet ire, ducique / Mandat agris praedam ducat, miserosque trucidet / Agricolas, quoscumque vagos offenderet. Atri / Principium belli hoc statuit Martis cruenti / Primitias*.
- 117 Doukas, 34.11: τότε ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσας τὸ γεγονός ἐκλείσει τὰς θύρας τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσους ἔτυχε εὗρων ἐντὸς Τούρκους πάντας δεσμῆσας ἐν φρουρᾷ ἔθετο. καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέρας τρεῖς πάλιν ἀπέκλεισε. τί γὰρ εἶχε τοῦ δρᾶν.
- 118 *Ibid.*: ἔτι ἐν τοῖς εὐρεθεῖσι Τούρκοις ὑπῆρχον ἐκ τοῦ παλατιοῦ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος εὐνουχόπουλοι, οἱ καὶ παρασταθέντες τῷ βασιλεῖ εἶπον, “εἰ μὲν ἀπολύσεις ἡμᾶς ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸ τοῦ ἡλίου κλίνας πρὸς δυσμᾶς, χάριν εἰσομεν σοι εἰ δὲ μετὰ δύσιν ἡλίου μὴ εὐρεθῆντες ἐνώπιον τοῦ ἡγεμόνος, γνῶθι τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπολυθῆναι οὐκ ἔσται ἡμῖν πρόσχαρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν θανάσιμον. διὸ ποιήσον εἰς ἡμᾶς ἔλεος, καὶ ἀπόλυσον τῇ

- ῥρα ταῦτη, εἰ δ' οὐ μί, κέλευσον ἀποτμηθῆναι τὰς κεφαλὰς κρεῖττον γάρ παρ' ὑμῶν τεθνάναι ἢ παρὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλέθρου.” ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐκάμφθη τῇ γνώμῃ, καὶ ἀπέλυσεν αὐτοὺς τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐκείνῃ.
- 119 *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg*, trans. H. Inalcik and R. Murphy (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978), p. 34. For a partial Italian translation of Tursun Beg, see CC 1: 310, 311. For another Turkish account, see *The Capture of Constantinople from the Ta-j-utveva-ri-kh* [“The Diadem” of Histories”], *Written in Turkish by Kho-ja Sa'd-ud-Di-n* (Glasgow, 1879), trans. E. J. W. Gibb, which also speaks of this fortress on p. 12.
- 120 Pusculo, 3.243–250 (pp. 46, 47): *At Danai ex urbe, et Genuenses omnia vectant / Ex Galata Phrygibus, victum caecicie ministrant / Hostibus, atque palam, castris ne copia desit. / Tantus numerorum mentes intraverat ardor: / Certatim ratibus plenis frumenta vehe-bant, / Et varias terrae fruges: quin putida dona / Hordea multa capit laetus Machmettus utroque / a populo, et vestes pretiosas.* Also cf. Doukas, 34.11; and Barbaro, 2 [CC 1: 9]: *L'imperador che temea el suo nemigo, che gera el Turco, ogni zorno mandava prexenti al Turco che fabricava el castelo, e mandava imbararie ogni zorno, e tutto questo l'imperador feva per paura.*
- 121 Doukas, 34.11: ἐπεὶ τὰ τῆς μάχης ἥρετισώ, καὶ οὔτε ὄρκους οὔτε κολακαεῖας πεισθῆναι ποιῆσαί σε ἔχω, ποιεῖ ἃ βούλει. ἐγὼ γάρ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καταφεύγω, καὶ εἰ θελητὸν αὐτῷ ἔστι τοῦ δοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ταύτην εἰς χεῖρας σου, τίς ὁ ἀντιπεῖν δυνάμενος; εἰ δὲ πάλιν ἐμφυτεύσει εἰρήνην ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, καὶ τοῦτο ἀσπασίως ἀποδέχομαι. πλὴν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν λάβε σου τὰς συνθήκας καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους. ἐγὼ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν τὰς πύλας τῆς πόλεως κεκλεισμένας ἔχω καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον φυλάξω. σὺ δὲ καταδυναστεύων δυνάστευε, ἕως ὁ δίκαιος κριτὴς ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοί, τὴν δικαίαν ἀπόφασιν.
- 122 *Ibid.*: ταῦτα ἐνωτισθεῖς ὁ βάρβαρος, καὶ μηδὲ τὸ οἰονοῦν εἰς νοῦν μελετήσας ἀπολογία, παρευθὴ ἐκέλευσε διαλαλίαν μάχης γενέσθαι.
- 123 Barbaro, 2 [CC 1: 9]: *E quando fo compido el castelo che fo del mexe d'avosto del 1452.* Khalkokondyles (2.8.1 [pp. 168, 169]): ὡς δ' ἐπιτείχιστο ἕς τρεῖς μῆνας.
- 124 *Minus*, 35.2, 3: καὶ τελέσας τὸ κάστρον, τῇ λαⁿ τοῦ Αὐγούστου ἐγερθεῖς ἀπ' ἐκεῖ, ἐλθὼν ἔπεσεν εἰς τὰς σούδας τῆς πόλεως. καὶ τῇ γⁿ τοῦ Σεπτεμβρίου μηνός . . . διέβη εἰς τὴν Ἀδριανούπολιν, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τὰς δύο ἡμέρας αὐτὰς ἵνα κρυφίως ἴδῃ τὸ κάστρον καλῶς καὶ τὰ τοῦ κάστρου. Pseudo-Sphrantzes provides slightly different dates, and drastically changes the last section, *Maius*, 3.6 (p. 380): καὶ τῇ κηⁿ τοῦ Αὐγούστου ἐγερθεῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐλθὼν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τὰς σούδας τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ Σεπτεμβρίου μηνός . . . διέβη εἰς τὴν Ἀνδριανούπολιν, ὡς φαίνεται, ἵνα ταῖς δύο αὐτὰς ἡμέραις ἴδῃ τὰ τεῖχη τῆς πόλεως καὶ τάφρους καὶ εἴ τι ἔτερον αὐτὸς ἐλογίζετο.
- 125 Pusculo, 3.306–310 (p. 48): *Casu rex pressus iniquo / Constantinus agit secum, dubiosque volutat / Bellorum eventus primisque in tecta vocatis / Civibus, in lacrymis oculus suffusus abortis, / Et grave suspirans moesto sic pectore fatur.*
- 126 *Ibid.*, 3.321–336 (p. 48): *geminos placet ire per orbe: / Alter in Italiam tendat, regesque fatiget / Italiae fessis nostris succurrere rebus: / Pontificem et Romanum adeat, . . . / Pannoniumque alter dominum petat; isque Joannem / Ductorem belli regis fulmenque superbos / Terribile in Teucros roget, ut non ferre moretur / Auxilium nobis perituris clade cruenta.*
- 127 Text in G. Hofmann, *Epistolae Pontificiae ad Concilium Florentinum Spectantes*, vol. 3: *Concilium Florentinum ad Documenta et Scriptores*, Series A.1 (Rome, 1946), no. 304, pp. 130–138; and in Déthier, *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*, vol. 22, Part I, pp. 567–576. Greek translation by Gaza in *PkP* 4: 49–63. On this letter, cf. *RKOR*: 3534 (p. 135); *CF*, p. 376; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 49, 50; and W. K. Hanak, “Pope Nicholas V and the Aborted Crusade of 1452–1453 to Rescue Constantinople from the Turks,” *BS* 62 (2004): 239–250. The Latin text of this document was translated into Greek by the humanist, Theodore Gaza, as mentioned by the Dominican Georgius, who composed the *Vita Nicolai Quinti Pontificis Maximi* (Rome, 1742), pp. 99, 100; noted in *PkP* 4: 51: *Opem etiam et auxilia adversus Turcas a Pontifice*

petitum Romam legatum miserat Andronicum Bryennium Constantinus, graecorum imperator; Constantino vero satis longam et gravem epistolam die Xi Octobris Pontifex rescripsit, quam graece verti fecit per Theodorum Gazam.

- 128 *PkP* 4: 61, 62: πρᾶττε ὅπως ὁ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως πατριάρχης εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπανάξει θρόνον . . . τοῦνομα τοῦ τῆς Ῥώμης ἀρχιερέως ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γεγράφθω διπτύχοις, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ μνημονευομένου εὐχέσθω ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἅπασα ἐκκλησία.
- 129 *Pusculo*, 4.1019–1024 (p. 81): *Heu nimium de te vates Nicolaus hoc ipsum / Antistes cecinit summus: dum saepe vocaret / Te, sibi praedixit, tempus patriaeque tibi / Hoc fore; cum lacrymans: “Vereor ne numen Achivis, / Dixit, opem neget.” Auxilium deus ipse negavit.*
- 130 Eustratiades, “Ἐκ τοῦ Κώδικος τοῦ Νικολάου Καρατζᾶ,” p. 206 [= *CBB* 1: 635, 636]: ὀλέθρῳ πόλεως πεσὼν καὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας προσμένων καὶ τὰς ἀμπέλους ἐκτεμὼν καὶ τὰ προάστεια διαφθείρας . . . καὶ πολλὸν φόνον ἀνθρώπων εἰργασάμενος καὶ ὅτι πλείστον αἶμα ἐκχέας καὶ τότε καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου, ἀνεχομένου φεῦ! τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας μου, εἶτα ἀπῆλθε παρασκευασόμενος, ὡς εἶρηται, ἅμα ἔαρι ἢ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, σὺν παντοῖα μηχανῇ καὶ ἐλεπόλει πρὸς πολιορκίαν . . . τῆς Πόλεως μήτ’ ἐξ οικείων, μήτ’ ἐξῴθεν τὴν οἰανοῦν κεκτημένην βοήθειαν, μήτε ἀπὸ χρημάτων μήτε ἀπὸ σωμάτων ἀπειρηκίας δὲ ἤδη τῇ μακροχρονίῳ τλαιπωρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ πολλῇ πενίᾳ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῇ ἐπιθέσει τῶν ἐχθρῶν, καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι τρόμῳ καὶ πικρῷ λογισμῷ· μόνην δὲ τὴν εἰς τὸν εὐσπλαγχνον καὶ οἰκτίρμονα Θεὸν ἐλπίδα κεκτημένης εἰ ἐπιστρέψει καὶ φείσεται καὶ ρύσεται ἡμᾶς, καὶ εἰς τὴν πάναγνον καὶ ἀειπάρθενον Θεοτόκον . . . εἰ ταῖς λιταῖς αὐτῆς καὶ ἱκεσίαις, ὃ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀσπόρως καὶ ὑπὲρ φύσιν καὶ λόγον τεχθεῖς, ἐλεήσει ἡμᾶς σπλαγχνισθεῖς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἀπιδὼν τὰ ἀναρίθμητά μου πταίσματα, καὶ τῆς πικρᾶς ἀσεβῶν δουλείας ρύσεται ἡμᾶς, ὡς τοὺς Φαραωνίτας καταποντίσας τοὺς Ἰσραηλίτας.

10 *De mortuis nihil nisi bonum*

Judgments

1 The emperor and the cardinal

Cardinal Isidore, a Greek by birth who may have been related to the imperial family,¹ arrived in Constantinople in the fall of 1452. After Florence, Isidore, invested with papal authority, returned to Russia but was promptly arrested and was imprisoned for having committed apostasy. Eventually he escaped, or he was allowed to escape, and managed to find his way to Poland and to Italy, where he was rewarded by the pope for his efforts on behalf of the union with the cardinal's hat.² In the spring of 1452, Pope Nicholas V engaged Cardinal Isidore to represent him as the Vatican's official legate to Constantinople with instructions to formalize the union. Isidore proceeded to the Aegean, attempting to recruit mercenaries at all ports of call. At Chios he recruited Bishop Leonardo, who was destined to compose one of the most influential accounts of the siege. Leonardo thought the world of Isidore and eagerly accepted his invitation.³ Barbaro notes their arrival⁴ and gives the number of Isidore's recruits:⁵ "And he came with two hundred men (gunners and crossbowmen) to help the city of Constantinople." To the fanatical anti-unionists, however, this token band of Latin mercenaries led by a Greek cardinal, a fugitive from Orthodox Russia, in the service of the pope, may have looked more like a police contingent, ready to apply pressure and demand the conclusion of the union by force of arms.

It is possible that Isidore also brought with him a personal gift for the emperor, a sword, which, some scholars have felt, survived and is housed in the collection of the Armeria Regia in Turin.⁶ Its blade bears a poetic inscription, two lines in the fifteen-syllable meter, the poetic form of Greek folk poetry: "You invincible King, almighty Word of God, [and] ruler of all/To the lord and faithful master Constantine." As it stands, it represents the "stitching together" of two lines from a poem (whose complete text is known from elsewhere). Aside from the grammatically flawed text of the inscription, the Turin sword belongs to the category of the Levantine scimitar carried by janissaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁷ Perhaps it even goes back to the fifteenth century but there is no proof that Constantine ever handled it.

We encounter no citation of this blade in any surviving source from the *quattrocento*. The first modern scholar to make mention of the cardinal's "gift" was

Paspates, who states that Isidore presented it to the emperor either before or after the celebration of the union of the Churches in Constantinople.⁸ Paspates quotes the following four (and not two) poetic lines that were etched on the blade, which preserve both the grammar and the integrity of the meter:⁹ “You invincible King, all-mighty Word of God, [and] ruler of all:/grant victorious trophies against our enemies to/the lord and faithful master Constantine,/as You once did to Emperor Constantine the Great.” Another Greek scholar investigated this matter and concluded that in the nineteenth century there were several swords in existence, all claiming the honor of being the legitimate article. In his opinion, they were all forgeries.¹⁰ The Greek community of Constantinople bought one of these swords and presented it to Constantine (XII), the crown prince of Greece, on December 1, 1886.

The arrival of Isidore and his contingent made it clear that, at long last, the union had to be enforced. The various factions gathered around Constantine, pushing their agendas, and pressure was applied from all sides. Sphrantzes proposed his own solution, which was never embraced by the court:¹¹

The cardinal of Russia [*sc.* Isidore] happened to be in the City and I argued, as his intermediary, to my late lord, the emperor, that he should be appointed patriarch in the hope that various advantages would come from him and the then pope, or at least that the name of the pope should be commemorated.

In November Constantine ordered the leaders of the anti-unionists to assemble and begin discussions.¹² The anti-unionists remained recalcitrant and militant in their repudiation:

Then the [papal] legate [Isidore] came to the city; while he was there, he compelled the emperor to do something about the union; and so the following people convened on a number of occasions, by imperial decree, in the so-called Palace of Xylalas, and gave an answer to the emperor with their signatures appended to it.

On the other hand, the court supported Constantine and sought a solution to this problem. Contrary to the prevailing notion in modern scholarship, Notaras himself labored on behalf of the union and parted company with his old friend Scholarius.¹³

Scholarius retired (as he had been urged and encouraged to do by the court) and confined himself to a monastery. It had been made clear to him that he had become a *persona non grata* at the court. From his cell in the Pantokrator Monastery the indignant Scholarius directed an unyielding campaign, agitating and polarizing the mob by a steady stream of proclamations. His most famous and most powerful manifesto appeared on November 27, some time after the convention of the anti-unionists at the Palace of Xylalas but before the formal celebration of the union.¹⁴ In his headstrong text Scholarius sought to justify his actions and stubbornly insisted that he was loyal to his emperor and to his homeland, at least in his Orthodox way.¹⁵

After the union had been formally celebrated in the capital, Scholarius wrote a letter to his friend and ally, Despot Demetrios in the Morea, in which he attempted to explain why he felt compelled to publish this manifesto¹⁶ of November 27. Scholarius alluded, with pride, to his resources and to his acolytes who labored to prepare and distribute copies of his autograph. His motives, actions, and general attitude demonstrate that the monk had gone beyond piety and was treading upon grounds of secular treason, even though he would have undoubtedly preferred to see himself as a true champion of the Church and as a victim of political persecution. One may even infer, from his statements, the existence of a fifth column within the walls of Constantinople, operating without serious opposition from the court. Scholarius and his accomplices took this opportunity to thunder against their emperor and condemned his efforts to gain aid.¹⁷

I decided not to remain completely silent in the midst of temptations and for this reason I wrote a short piece of advice, which I addressed to the City; it was in the form of a protest-apology over my silence. In it I listed the opinions of the most pious individuals. On November 27, I distributed this letter in the palace itself, in the market places, and in all the monasteries of the City (numbering as many as the days of that month); I chose the genre of an apology to explain my supposed silence. But really was there a time that I was silent? I had been loudly protesting the injustice suffered by our faith.

Constantine persisted in his refusal to silence the anti-unionists by force. This apparent indecision, lack of discipline, and refusal to crack the whip were interpreted by Leonardo as the actions of a weak individual, who pretended to espouse Catholicism purely for secular and mercenary reasons.¹⁸ Constantine did not seem to embrace the concept of the militant and triumphant Church, as he consistently avoided coercion and inquisition but only advocated conversion through persuasion.

The celebration of the union finally took place in Santa Sophia, the most sacred cathedral of Orthodox Christianity, on December 12, 1452. Barbaro, who undoubtedly attended the festivities, devoted a few sentences to the ceremony, even though he cited the wrong date for the occasion:¹⁹

On December 13, the union was concluded in the Church of Santa Sophia with great solemnity by the clerics; present were the reverend cardinal of Russia (dispatched by the pope), the most serene emperor with his barons, and the entire population of Constantinople; on that day, there were great lamentations in this city. This union meant to unite them as we Franks are and to have no more schisms in the Church.

Leonardo devoted one sentence to the celebration, but he was disappointed and had grave reservations about the sincerity of the participants:²⁰

The lord cardinal's [Isidore's] energy and goodness saw to it that that the sacred union was confirmed and celebrated with the consent of the emperor

and the senate (provided that it had been genuine) on the second day of the Ides of December, on the feast day of Saint Spirid*on*, the bishop.

Pusculo's narration in his third book²¹ supplies the last description of Santa Sophia in a Christian setting²² and the last occasion, on which a Byzantine emperor and a cardinal, the official emissary of the pope, celebrated mass and liturgy. The days of Christian Santa Sophia were numbered, as it was destined to be converted into a mosque and eventually be transformed into a museum:

There was an ancient church [Santa Sophia], built in the middle of the city; this dignified monument of former emperors was universally revered and was marked by columns of various colors. Curved like a tortoise, its high dome shone above with golden and multi-colored mosaics. Tall, enormous columns of red and green stone supported the structure; bright marble shone; purple and yellow slabs illuminated the wide walls. The stone pavement, cleverly marked in color, greeted the eyes of visitors. Three huge double doors dressed in bronze, marked by relief-work, thundered as they were opened wide and turned around on their hinges to reveal a large interior vestibule, with the same number of doors decorated in a similar, amazing fashion. To the central gate of the church the emperor was conveyed on his high throne; he was sitting on a coverlet and was surrounded by throngs of Greek nobles. After he arrived, they shook hands and greeted each other with the peace extended by the pope, Lord Nicholas. With the salutations over, the legate [*sc.* Isidore] sat on a small, low seat, which had been prepared for him.

According to Pusculo, Isidore rose and addressed the emperor. In this speech, which takes up fifty lines of Pusculo's hexameters,²³ Isidore states that he was moved by patriotism to return to Constantinople, in spite of his advanced age;²⁴ he alludes to the Council of Florence; and announces that Pope Nicholas V was ready to send aid. Pusculo also recorded the response of the emperor:²⁵

Such were the words of the legate [Isidore]. The emperor appeared concerned and kept his eyes fixed on the ground. Then he said a few words: "It is not solely up to me to join the pope nor can I compel my people. They must do so willingly. It is up to you to use all your cunning to covert the monks and the high clerics. I would be delighted to find any way to avenge myself upon the Turks and to wipe them out. Try to convert my people, who have been numbed by the impending danger. Meanwhile, let us ask the senate to find out what needs to be done and I will issue orders to implement it."

Pusculo may not have been blessed with Virgil's talent but he was an eyewitness and he gave poetic embellishment to Isidore's speech and to Constantine's response. The very least that can be said is that both the cardinal and the emperor spoke during the ceremony. The emperor believed that it was up to the pope's representatives to convert his subjects. To the chagrin and embarrassment

of Leonardo, Constantine expected the pope's legate to do his part and convert his subjects through argumentation and persuasion.

For the next two months²⁶ Isidore seems to have turned his attention to various theological arguments in his efforts to gain converts. He focused his attention on the Greek clergy, monks and abbots, who had been the ferocious opponents of all attempts to come to terms with the west. Yet his labor was in vain:²⁷ "He instructed people at all times. He urged and begged them to unite themselves with the highest lord of the Christians so that they would not willingly perish abandoned by all." Isidore proved helpless in the face of ancient prejudice and intransigent refusal on the part of the anti-unionists to realize that the real threat to the city's survival came from the Turks and not from the Catholic west:²⁸ "He argued but proved unable to convert either a citizen or a monk or to change the emperor's mind." The Latins in the capital began to feel frustrated and demanded action. Leonardo states that, at his suggestion, the emperor finally decided to do something about the opposition, but his actions amounted to mere cosmetic measures.²⁹

It was too late to make converts. As Pusculo observed,³⁰ "the unfortunate people divided themselves into two factions." Riots and demonstrations continued:³¹ "Such strife turned the entire city upside down." The unionist camp counted among its members, in addition to Constantine XI, a small number of prominent ecclesiastics and intellectuals. Among the individuals who strongly supported the union, Pusculo cites the humanists John Argyropoulos and Michael Apostolis.³² Pusculo's statement finds confirmation in Leonardo's narrative, which further adds another member of the imperial family to the unionist circles:³³ "Argyropoulos (the teacher of liberal arts), Theophilus Palaeologus, certain few hieromonks, and other lay members."

Constantine had done all he could to satisfy the west and his own disobedient subjects. The Orthodox Church had formally accepted and celebrated the union, even though the anti-Catholic and ill-educated monks continued to rouse the populace against the emperor and to impede his efforts to defend his capital. Constantine hoped for aid from Europe. Yet the crusade that the Byzantine leadership had been expecting never materialized. As Sphrantzes bitterly put it, in spite of the fact that the union had been celebrated,³⁴ "six months later we had received as much aid as had been sent to us by the sultan of Cairo." So the native citizens were angry with the Latins. The Latins had contempt for the natives.

2 The emperor and his allies

As soon as the union was celebrated, Constantine pressed his western allies for concessions. The defense of the harbor would be of crucial importance for Constantinople to survive the siege. Unlike his predecessors, Mehmed was building up his naval forces, causing consternation to his potential victims, who surely remembered that the crusaders in 1204 had fought their way into the city through the sea walls.³⁵ The preparations of Mehmed II to create the first notable Ottoman armada were publicized.³⁶

Immediately after the celebration of the union, Constantine felt strong enough to press his demand upon the Venetians in Constantinople.³⁷ In the precinct of Santa Sophia the imperial administration formally requested that the Venetian authorities detain all their ships in the harbor for its defense:³⁸ “Present there [in Santa Sophia] were the emperor, the cardinal of Russia [Isidore], the [arch]bishop of Mytilene [Leonardo], all the barons of the emperor, all merchants of the nation, and most of the people of the city; they all spoke with one voice.” The Venetians were not ready to yield to Constantine’s demands and the debate went on for some time. Constantine indicated his displeasure and adjourned the meeting.³⁹

Important decisions were made in a sequestered meeting on the following day. According to Barbaro, Isidore, Leonardo, and a group of Constantinopolitan noblemen held a meeting with the *bailo* of Venice, Girolamo Minotto, and with his captain general, Gabriel Trevixan. Over dinner Isidore repeated the demand. The *bailo* consented and urged the captain general to stay in Constantinople. Trevixan did not wish to make any commitments and threatened to depart on that night. Minotto consulted with the merchants and decided, on his own authority, to detain the galleys.⁴⁰ In yet another council Minotto’s action received the formal approval of a vote. The Venetian ships were detained and were eventually deployed within the Golden Horn, even though fears were expressed that the captains would disregard the order and depart. Accordingly, measures were taken to prevent them from leaving without proper authorization.⁴¹ A few days later the Venetian residents formally and urgently asked Venice for help and dispatched three separate messengers, by different routes to ensure delivery, to the *Signoria*:⁴²

An attempt was made to inform our most illustrious *Signoria* of Venice in every way and manner that we were kept here with the galleys and with our possessions; so the council of the twelve was convened in the Church of Santa Maria in Constantinople and concluded that we should dispatch Zuan Diusnaigi to Venice with his ship to carry letters of the *bailo*, of Messer Aluvixe Diedo (the captain of the galleys from Tana [Don]), and of Messer Chabriel Trivixan (the vice-captain of two light galleys); these letters explained the situation to our illustrious *Signoria* of Venice; this was done on December 17.

In addition to Diusnaigi, Barbaro states that other messengers were also sent, hoping to pass undetected through Ottoman territory.⁴³

The Greek court wished to unload and impound the Venetian cargo in order to ensure the cooperation of the galley crews. The *bailo* seems to have sided with the imperial authorities in this matter but the commanders of the Venetian galleys remained adamant and would not part with their merchandise. The debate over this matter took up most of January and it was not settled before the end of the month. On January 26, the Venetians appeared before Constantine⁴⁴ and argued that they should keep their goods on board.⁴⁵ Constantine feared that the Venetians would depart as soon as they had secured their merchandise. The Venetians loudly protested that they would stay on and fight provided that they were not prevented from doing so by the authorities in Venice.⁴⁶ A compromise was reached when the

emperor politely requested an oath to the effect that his wishes would be respected and that no Venetian ship would depart from the Golden Horn without his permission. The Venetian captains acceded to this demand.⁴⁷

There were defections, as Constantine had anticipated. One month later seven ships escaped from the harbor, weakening the defense of the sea walls.⁴⁸ Nor was the accommodation of January 26 the absolute end of this debate. The cargo stored aboard the galleys remained a sore point between Greeks and Venetians throughout the siege. The Venetians resisted all frequent requests and entreaties to unload their ships. Even in the middle of the siege, on May 8, when an attempt was made to unload the Tana galleys by their own authorities, the Council of the Twelve, a virtual mutiny by the crews prevented this action.⁴⁹

In spite of the defections, in January Constantine managed to gain the appearance of a victory over his allies and the protection of the harbor became the responsibility of the Venetians. On January 26, a company of Genoese soldiers arrived on board two large ships. Together with the troops recruited by Cardinal Isidore, they were destined to become the nucleus of the defense:⁵⁰ “On that day, still January 26, Giovanni Giustiniani came to Constantinople . . . because he became aware of the need that plagued Constantinople, and for the welfare of Christendom, as well as for worldly honor.” This was by far the most notable contribution to the defense.⁵¹ Constantine must have been elated. January 26 was a rewarding day, as he had extracted an oath of loyalty from the Venetians and had welcomed a notable Genoese *condottiere*. He may have felt that all was not lost and that Constantinople had not been totally abandoned. Constantine was quick to realize the importance of this contingent. Soon after his arrival Giustiniani was placed in charge of the land operations:⁵² “And a few days later gave this Giovanni Giustiniani a galley . . . and appointed him captain of his land forces, to stand guard on the walls and watch for the army of Mehmed Beg the Turk.”

3 Heavenly wrath

After the arrival of the Genoese contingent responsibility for the land defense was placed in the hands of the valiant Giustiniani.⁵³ From that point on Constantine was only marginally involved with daily military activities. He does not seem to have routinely participated in the actual fighting at the walls. While he remained within the vicinity of the Achilles’ heel in the periphery, the Saint Romanus sector, i.e., the modern neighborhood of *Sulu Kule*, his role seems to have been restricted to the ceremonial sphere, showing himself during major attacks in order to inspire his troops and mercenaries. His turn to participate in actual hand-to-hand combat only came in the morning of May 29, after he was abandoned by his Genoese *condottiere* and his regiment.

It is very likely that the fiasco in the Morea during the previous decade, when his unsuccessful campaign against the Ottomans in Greece collapsed at the Hexamilion with lightning speed, had indicated to him that there were limits to his military talents. Had he then wisely concluded that he was not a military general that could equal Hannibal? His largely ceremonial role during the siege of 1453

argues that this was the case. Pusculo, an eyewitness, observed that the emperor took it upon himself to assume the role of morale officer in 1453. We hear of no engagements, other than the final assault on May 29, in which Constantine actively participated. We hear of no operation that he planned, supervised, or directed himself. No such activity is noted in our primary or derivative sources. Venetian officers supervised the naval engagements at the harbor.⁵⁴ The defense of the land walls and the military command of the critical sector of Saint Romanus were in the hands of Genoese, of Venetian, and of professional officers.⁵⁵ Officially the emperor was in nominal command of the entire periphery and Constantine had selected the critical area in the vicinity of Saint Romanus to erect his headquarters but he had been assigned no specific sector to defend by himself. He seems not to have interfered with the plans and deployments drawn up by his Genoese warlord and by other capable military directors.

This is not the appropriate place to produce another account of the siege of Constantinople. The story has been often told in various degrees of detail.⁵⁶ It will be sufficient to state that throughout the siege Constantine associated himself and the survival of his capital with his western allies and that he took every opportunity to accommodate the wishes of his Italian associates, while he tried to make it clear to the Turks that they were also fighting against European contingents. Thus, during the siege Constantine established his headquarters in the most critical and most dangerous sector of the land fortifications. Pusculo noted the location of his headquarters and further observed that Constantine remained in close proximity to his general, Giustiniani, and his troops:⁵⁷ “He [the emperor] placed his tent by the walls of [the gate of] Saint Romanus, in between the two lines of fortifications.” Barbaro also adds:⁵⁸

On April 6, the most serene emperor moved out of his palace and went to take his place on the land walls by a gate called Cressu [= Kharseia?, i.e. Adrianople/Edirne].⁵⁹ This was [the] weakest land gate; together with the most serene emperor was a sizable crowd of his barons and his knights to keep him company and to give him good cheer.

This last comment suggests that Barbaro had some reservation about the attitude of the emperor. Had Constantine somehow betrayed his anxiety over the state of the defense, the condition of his fortifications, and his uncertainty about the effectiveness of his own troops?

Constantine was eager to demonstrate to the sultan that his janissaries were about to engage European forces. Thus, on the same day that Constantine erected his tent in the neighborhood of the *Sulu Kule* sector, he asked his Venetian allies to parade their crews on the land walls in full view of the Turkish regiments. He was making a point to the Ottoman army: the sultan was waging war upon Venice also.⁶⁰

And from the five galleys one thousand men disembarked; they were in full armor and in good order, as anyone could wish . . . and the captains and crews

presented themselves to the most serene emperor and asked him to issue whatever orders he pleased to the crews of the galleys. The emperor commanded them to make a round of the land walls so that the treacherous Turk, our enemy, could observe their good order and so that the Turks would note the presence of numerous forces in the territory. After they had completed one circuit of the city walls, or only that part of the land where the [enemy] camp was (a stretch of six miles), all contingents returned to their galleys.

So, the battle lines were drawn. On one side stood the emperor, who had apparently been psychologically scarred by the events of the previous decade and had good reason to be despondent, as he was vastly outnumbered and lacked confidence in the ability of his soldiers to resist the assaults and the expected bombardment. On the other side, enjoying immense numerical superiority and the benefit of heavy bombards, were the disciplined janissary regiments and the regulars and irregulars comprised of various nationalities and renegade Christian adventurers.

The first heavy attack tested the skill of the defenders:⁶¹ “On April 18 a great multitude of Turks came to the walls; it was around the second hour of the night; many Turks perished in this attack. When the Turks came to the walls, it was dark and they unexpectedly engaged our side.” Evidently, the sultan was probing the defenses and did not expect to take the city by assault. The emperor formed the impression that all was lost. It seems that the specter of the Hexamilion had reared its ugly head and Constantine expected his troops to melt away as his Moreot regiments had disintegrated under slight pressure. During the present assault Constantine lost his spirit and began to chant what another time and another place would have termed his “death song.” He was certainly premature, as he had underestimated the skills of his professional *condottieri* who put up a disciplined, well-organized, and effective defense:⁶²

And in this great upheaval, the sad, grieving emperor began to wail, since he feared that the Turks were about to launch a general assault that night and because we Christians were not prepared to resist a general assault by the Turks; accordingly, the emperor had conceived great sorrow.

Barbaro is probably not exaggerating when he described the turbulent psychological state of Constantine in dark tones. Nestor-Iskander also noted similar behavior.⁶³ If Barbaro is to be believed, the attitude of Constantine did not improve subsequently, in spite of the numerous military successes against the Turkish army. When Constantine and his retinue observed a mobile siege tower that had hastily been erected by the Turks on May 18, their immediate reaction was marked by panic:⁶⁴ “Without delay the emperor came with his entire retinue to see this wonderful thing [the tower]; after they saw it, they were all mortified, no doubt on account of fear.”

The despair of the emperor seems to have reached its peak toward the end of the siege, when it became evident that no aid from the west would be forthcoming. A ship was dispatched to the Aegean in search of the expected Venetian fleet

on May 3. Twenty days later its crew sailed back to report that they had advanced as far away as the entrance to the archipelago but had sighted no western ships.⁶⁵

Various “signs from heaven” (meticulously recorded in contemporary literature) lowered the morale of the emperor, the court, and the population.⁶⁶ In that superstitious age the emperor could not remain untouched by the numerous omens of doom that seemed to herald the end and the beginning of the age of the anti-Christ. Circulating widely, numerous prophecies declared that the end was drawing near and that Constantinople, founded by a Constantine, the son of Helen, was destined to be lost by another Constantine, the son of another Helen. Barbaro alluded to this popular prophecy a number of times in his narrative.⁶⁷ In addition, pious Catholics believed that God was angry with the Orthodox, who were not sincere when they had supposedly renounced their schismatic ways. Pusculo felt that Constantine met his doom because of the obstinate ways of his subjects and because he failed to listen to the pope’s prophetic warnings.⁶⁸

The anti-unionists, on the other hand, insisted that God’s wrath was about to destroy the city precisely because Constantine had betrayed the ancestral faith. Both sides sought justification for their claims in the heavenly signs that seemed to be multiplying. According to Barbaro, one of the most discouraging signs of the wrath of heaven was the lunar eclipse of May 22, which affected the emperor most seriously:⁶⁹

On the same day of May 22, at the first hour of night appeared a miraculous sign in the sky to tell the respectable emperor of Constantinople that his respected empire was approaching its end, which, in effect, came to pass. This sign had the following appearance and shape: that evening, at the first hour of the night, the moon rose; as it was full, it should have been a complete circle; but this moon rose as if it were a three-day moon: little of it appeared, even though the atmosphere was calm, like a clear, polished crystal. The moon persisted in this form for about four hours and then, little by little, it completed its full circle; by the sixth hour of the night it had formed its complete circle. When we the Christians and the heathen saw this miraculous sign, the emperor of Constantinople conceived great fear (as did his entire retinue of barons), because the Greeks knew of a prophecy which declared that Constantinople would always endure provided that the moon, in its full circle, did not give a sign in the sky; this was the reason for the terror that came upon the Greeks. But the Turks celebrated a great festival throughout their camp, out of joy for this sign, because it predicted victory for them, which turned out to be true.

Everything appeared to be going against Constantine. It was not just the anti-unionists with their fifth column, demonstrating and cursing their Latin defenders, while they resisted the court by creating endless obstacles. The population, unionists and anti-unionists alike, must have sensed that the end was near and that the city that had survived for over eleven hundred years was about to collapse in the reign of Constantine XI Palaeologus, the emperor of the woeful countenance. These prophecies, as Barbaro observed a number of times, were being gradually

fulfilled. The signs multiplied and affected the population even more. Yet nothing was more frightening than the lunar eclipse or Saint Elmo's fire enveloping Santa Sophia's dome. One week after the lunar eclipse, Constantine XI Palaeologus met his doom in the vicinity of the Pempton, just north of the Gate of Saint Romanus/*Top Kapı*.

4 Verdicts: the emperor under siege

His contemporaries viewed Constantine differently. Tetaldi refers to Constantine only once in his text, in connection with the last battle and the circumstances of his death, which he heard from others. He has nothing to offer with regard to Constantine the individual.⁷⁰ Two other refugees, who eventually reached Germany, left a short account of the siege, which was given a German dress, after the original report went through a number of translations:⁷¹ "This information was presented by Lord Thomas Eperkus [Eparkhos?], a count from Constantinople, and Joseph Deplorentz [Diplovatatzes?], the son of a count. Thutro [Demetrios?] of Constantinople translated it into Walachian [Rumanian?]. Dumita Exswinnilwacz and Mathes Hack from Utrecht translated it from Walachian into German." These refugees repeated gossip that we encounter elsewhere, without passing judgment on his character or his abilities as an emperor.⁷²

Item: when the emperor of the Greeks saw this [the departure of Giustiniani], he cried out loudly: "O Lord, I have been betrayed." He joined his people and urged them to stand their ground and fight; but so great was the flood that went through the gate that the emperor himself and 90,000 men were slain by the Turks and the traitors.

Latin authors, who knew the last emperor personally, or had at least seen him on state occasions and in a military or ceremonial capacity by the walls, employed various adjectives to characterize Constantine. Thus, Barbaro most commonly uses the phrase *el serenissimo imperador*, which happens to be the formal title by which the Venetians addressed the Byzantine emperors and so we cannot read much into this formal appellation. Barbaro departs from this formula and characterizes Constantine as *el dolente e meseruelo imperador*, "the wailing and wretched emperor," during his description of the first major assault, when Constantine felt that all was already lost.⁷³ This description implies personal observation by this author. The image of a wailing emperor is powerful and must have occasioned pity in the Venetian physician, who proceeded to use this term, "wretched" or "pitiable" to characterize Constantine. Once more, in the context of the lunar eclipse, Barbaro calls Constantine *degno imperador de Costantinopoli* and applies the same adjective to the "empire." What he means by *degno* is not quite clear, as this word commands wide range of meanings such as "worthy," "dignified," "deserving," or "respectable." Probably Barbaro intended to convey the dignity of the office of the emperor and his own respect for the age of Constantinople.⁷⁴

Without supplying distinctive adjectives, Barbaro mentions Constantine in his report of the last battle of May 29. When the emperor realized that the Turks were gaining the upper hand, he had the military alarm bell rung throughout the city to summon every available defender to the walls and to alert the population of the imminent danger:⁷⁵ “Our side, the Christians, conceived great fright; the most serene emperor had the military bell sounded throughout the entire city and also at the stations by the walls.” Barbaro refers to Constantine indirectly one last time in his narrative, when he narrates how he and his fellow defenders at the harbor discovered that the battle had been lost:⁷⁶

The Turks furiously advanced to the square. . . . Without delay, some of the Turks climbed up a tower where the standard of Saint Mark and the standard of the most serene emperor had been raised; the aforementioned heathen immediately cut down the standard of Saint Mark and took away the standard of the most serene emperor; on the same tower, they then raised the standard of the Turkish lord.

Leonardo conversed with the emperor at least on one occasion.⁷⁷ His view was that Constantine had been too lenient and perhaps exceedingly patient in his treatment of the anti-unionists. The emperor’s forbearance encouraged the anti-unionists to disregard the union, which was never taken very seriously in Constantinople. In Leonardo’s view, Constantine could and should have corrected this situation, but lacked resolve:⁷⁸ “If the emperor had put away his timidity, he would have removed the simulation of [adhering to] the faith . . . those individuals should have been punished; had that been the case, they would not have spread their poison.” Yet Leonardo had some affection for Constantine:⁷⁹ “What am I to say? Am I to blame the emperor, who always showed me the greatest respect and special honor? I realized that he had faith in the Roman Church, except when he was overcome by timidity.” Leonardo’s overall impression of the last emperor is not the most favorable, as Constantine is portrayed as a weakling and as a pathetic figure floundering helplessly and indecisively in a sea of confusion generated by the anti-unionists, the emperor’s adversaries, whom Constantine failed to silence:⁸⁰ “The emperor was perplexed and did not know what to do.” By contrast, a note of sympathy is detected when Leonardo describes the emperor as a victim of circumstances:⁸¹ “The emperor was besieged by necessity . . . and had lost spirit because his defenders were so few.” A similar note of personal sympathy surfaces elsewhere, when Leonardo points out that Constantine’s own subjects had neither regard for him nor respect for the dignity of his office. Once more Leonardo charges the emperor with excessive leniency:⁸²

The emperor lacked firmness; those who refused to obey were checked by neither word nor sword. Consequently, each man was ruled by his own pleasure and they soothed the emperor’s angry heart . . . with flattery. He was improperly mocked by his own men and that good man preferred to pretend that he had not been insulted.

During the last battle, as his narrative reaches its climax, Leonardo concludes that the last emperor was *infelix*, “unhappy, luckless, wretched,” echoing Greek notions that Constantine had been born under an unlucky star. In his description of Constantine’s death, Leonardo grants him a dignified title,⁸³ *princeps patriae*, “prince of the fatherland.” This portrait of Constantine is, in the final analysis, ambiguous and even contradictory, as the Italian archbishop was torn between two extreme images and characterizations. Leonardo felt pity for him, because of the abuse that the emperor had repeatedly received in the hands of his own subjects. Clearly, in his view, Constantine had deserved better. Yet the emperor had been weak and had done little to oppose the fifth column within his own city.

Cardinal Isidore included no characterization of Constantine. He spoke of the emperor’s genuine Catholicism and was willing to reserve a place for him among the saints and martyrs who had suffered for the faith. He passed no judgment on his religious policies and did not record any personal observations or evaluations of Constantine’s military activities during the siege. Isidore may have been a relative of Constantine XI; if indeed he was his kinsman, the subject might have been too painful for him. Alternatively, if he found the emperor lacking in anything, he refused to state so in writing. His tendency to keep hints of disapproval to himself and avoid to note them in writing is also observed in his treatment of Giovanni Giustiniani: unlike other writers, Isidore refused to charge the Genoese warlord with inappropriate behavior, with cowardice, or with unbecoming conduct, even though he evidently disapproved of Giustiniani’s sudden, unauthorized withdrawal and implied that he had a great deal more to say on this subject but he would only do so in person and not in writing.⁸⁴ In the case of Constantine, one forms the impression that the cardinal respected the emperor and admired his death, which turned Constantine into a Christian martyr perhaps meeting a fate that Isidore felt it should have been his own. Even though by avocation the crown of martyrdom belonged to him, Constantine finally claimed it.⁸⁵ In fact, Isidore is one of the earliest writers to paint Constantine with the pious tones of martyrdom and to place him in the midst of ecclesiastics who suffered for the faith, when he wrote of his adventures in a letter to Pope Nicholas V.⁸⁶

On that day the soul of the aforementioned Constantine, the last emperor of the Romans, who has earned the crown of martyrdom, flew to Heaven, along with the huge multitude of Christians who were killed by the impious [Turks]; among them, believe me, most blessed father, were numerous respected clerics and many other indigenous and foreign individuals (famous for their way of life and high morals).

Similar sentiments within an identical Christian setting are also encountered in a contemporary Catalan elegy on the fall of Constantinople:⁸⁷ “The noble emperor, in great agitation, with his knights, resisted them, saying that he preferred to die for God than to live in dishonor.” In Nestor-Iskander’s narrative, Constantine is already elevated to the status of an Orthodox martyr. The Russian eyewitness

emphasizes the Orthodoxy of the emperor and insists that the emperor died defending “the true faith [Orthodoxy]”. He describes his death with following words:⁸⁸

He [Constantine] went into the Gate but was not able to pass through, against the many troops. And again, a multitude of Turks encountered them; they fought until nightfall. And so, the Orthodox emperor Constantine suffered for the Church of God and for the true faith [= Orthodoxy] in the month of May on the twenty-ninth day.

Greek short chronicles declared Constantine a martyr who suffered for his city and the “empire.” A group seeks canonization for the luckless emperor.⁸⁹ One chronicle is explicit and echoes Isidore’s opinion:⁹⁰

He [Constantine] was then killed by them [the Turks] within the ruins that had been created; both he and almost all his nobles [were killed]; and he won the crown of martyrdom, as he was not willing to hand over to the lawless [the Turks] his capital; nor was he willing to escape the danger, even though it had been possible for him [to do so].

Identical is the verdict found in another chronicle:⁹¹ “And our holy master, a martyr equal to the apostles, Lord Constantine Palaeologus, the emperor, was killed.” A third entry repeats the same opinion,⁹² while another chronicle⁹³ applies the adjective “pious” to Constantine and directly contrasts him with the contemptuous appellation that the Byzantines reserved for the Turks: “impious.” It is noteworthy that in the short chronicles no mention is made of the “bad luck” or the “unhappiness” that dogged the last emperor, a notion that in time spread through anonymous popular poems and through the historians of the era.

An Italian poet and an eyewitness of the events avoided excessive Christian sentimentality and saw Constantine as a victim of his own irresolute policies towards church union. Thus, Ubertino Pusculo interpreted Constantine’s fate as divine punishment, because the emperor chose to disregard the pope’s numerous warnings about the schismatic ways of the native population. The poet thus reduced Constantine’s fate to the classical level of the hubristic hero who meets his nemesis, turning Constantine into a tragic figure worthy of the ancient Attic stage. Pusculo lamented his fate and assigned blame to his advisors for the ruinous religious policies that invited God’s wrath; in his humanistic terms he envisions the ancient personification of Nemesis as the agent who eliminated the last emperor.⁹⁴ In this context he described the emperor as *egregius*, “distinguished,” and *felix*, “happy/fortunate,” in sharp contrast to Leonardo’s adjective for the emperor, *infelix*, “unhappy/unfortunate.”⁹⁵ The emperor’s good fortune was overwhelmed by his stubborn, hubristic refusal to force his flock back to the Catholic fold and his failure to heed the admonitions of Pope Nicholas V, who thus played the role of Teiresias in this scholarly rendition of Constantinople’s drama. In this view, Constantine, like the Sophoclean Oedipus, becomes⁹⁶ “blind in ears, in mind, and in eyes.”

Sphrantzes attempted to exonerate his dead emperor from all blame for the fall. The responsibility for the loss of the capital Sphrantzes placed squarely on the Europeans, who, in his interpretation, had been too slow to act and had proven too unwilling to contribute funds, weapons, and soldiers to confront the expansion of the Ottomans into the Balkans.⁹⁷ Other writers, who were not present in the siege, fall, and sack, assigned a heroic death to Constantine but offered no judgment on his character.

The most detailed characterization of Constantine was provided by Kritoboulos, who had never met him. He entitled this section of his work “Funeral Speech on Emperor Constantine.” Kritoboulos summarized the last emperor’s qualities and produced the most detailed literary portrait of Constantine to have come down to us:⁹⁸

Emperor Constantine also died . . . in battle. He was thoughtful and modest throughout his life; he was very wise and virtuous; he held his own among well-trained scholars; he was not surpassed in the field of politics and administration by any previous emperor. He was especially sharp in assessing needs and even sharper in devising remedies. He was a competent speaker; his specialty was the evaluation of the situation at hand; he could analyze accurately its demands (someone said that he was better than Pericles at this), and he was able to foresee, for the most part, future exigencies. He always chose to act and suffer, on behalf of his homeland and his subjects. He had foreseen, with his own eyes, the imminent danger for the City; even though it had been possible for him to save himself (and was implored to do so by many people), he declined and chose to die together with his homeland and his subjects (or rather before them, so that he would not have to witness the seizure of his homeland and the cruel slaughter, ugly enslavement, and abduction of her people). When he realized that he was being pressed by his attackers, who, in high spirits, were pouring through the collapsed walls into the city, he is said to have sighed greatly and to have uttered his last words: “Is it possible that the City is being captured and I am still alive?” And so, he pushed into the midst of the enemy and was cut to pieces. He was a good man and a protector of the commonwealth. And yet throughout his life he was unhappy; most unhappy was he in death.

There is exaggeration here. Constantine was certainly no Pericles. He was not sharp in foreseeing danger. Far from being able to avoid dangerous situations, he often invited disaster. On the other hand, Kritoboulos is justified in stating that Constantine could have left his capital and could have saved himself but chose to remain in his city. Other writers also praise Constantine for remaining within the City and for suffering for his throne, his homeland, and the Christian faith.⁹⁹ The concluding statements of this assessment by Kritoboulos are quite accurate. Constantine was neither Caligula nor Nero. The negative qualities associated with this emperor derive from his personal circumstances: he was unhappy, luckless, and unfortunate, as popular poems of the period also declared.

A fascinating example of the genre of the popular poetic lamentation that appeared in the Greek-speaking world soon after the fall is provided by an anonymous *lamentatio*, or dirge.¹⁰⁰ It was not only in the Levant that such lamentations were composed. Specimens of this genre can be found in the west as well and two representative examples will be discussed presently. All poems of this nature share a similar structure. First, they emphasize the importance of Constantinople and its position in Christendom. Next, they move on to deal with the fall. Then they invariably conclude with a call to arms to deliver Constantinople. Accordingly, the anonymous poet takes the time to summon various powers in Europe: “famous Venice,” “the wise Genoese,” “most honored, renowned France [and] French warriors,” “the wisest Englishmen,” “Frenchmen, Englishmen, Spaniards, and Germans,” and concludes with an appeal to “the lord, duke and master of Burgundy, the great soldier.”¹⁰¹

The same arrangement is encountered in an anonymous Venetian poem,¹⁰² which expresses admiration for the beauties and grandeur of Christian Constantinople, examined the events of the siege and the carnage of the sack, and then voiced an appeal to the European powers. It addresses the pope (*O Sommo Pontifice*), the “worthy king of France” (*O degno Re de Franza*), “the sacred crown of Hungary” (*sacra corona/De Ongaria*), “the king of England” (*O re de Ingheltera*), “the king of Aragon” (*re de Ragona*), “the noble king of Spain” (*nobile re di Spagna*), “the worthy king of Poland” (*degno re de Polana*), “the king of Portugal” (*O tu re de Portugale*), “the sacred king of Naïvarre” (*sacro re de Navara*), “the duke of Burgundy” (*duca de Borgogna*), “noble Venice” (*Venesia gentile*), “famous Genoa” (*Zenoa famosa*), “the duke of Milan” (*duca de Milano*), “noble Florence” (*gentile Fiorenza*), “the lord of Walachia” (*sir de Valachia*), and “the despot of Serbia” (*Dispoto di Servia*).¹⁰³

A Catalan elegy speaks of the marvels of Constantinople, of the siege, and of the death of the Christian emperor Constantine before the anonymous poet turns to the subject of a future crusade and to an exhortation to take up arms against the Turks. It bears similarities, in structure, to the Venetian poem, as the same notables are addressed: the pope (*Santo Pastor*), the Holy Roman emperor (*Emperador*), “the mighty Hungarians” (*hungaros fuertes*), “the great Poles” (*grandes polacos*), “the king of the French” (*rey de los francos*), “the grand duke of Burgundy” (*gran duque de Borgoña*), “the valiant king of . . . Castille” (*valiente rey . . . de tierra castellana*), “the spirited kings of Portugal and Navarre” (*reyes animosos de Portugal y Navarra*), “the English king” (*rey inglés*), “the king of Scotland” (*rey de los escoceses*), “the king of Aragon” (*rey de Aragón*), “the duke of Milan” (*duque de Milán*), the Venetians, the Florentines, the Genoese, and the Catalans.¹⁰⁴

In such western poems Constantine emerges as a noble figure, a Christian martyred for his faith, as the Catalan elegy explicitly states. The Venetian poem¹⁰⁵ treats Constantine’s death with respect, laments the fate of the last emperor, and praises his courage. The same sentiments are repeated elsewhere in the same poem and Constantine is mentioned by name again.¹⁰⁶ It is significant that the western poets were not familiar with the opposition that Constantine XI had faced in his own capital or with the fact that many of his subjects anathematized him.

Consequently, they did not color their narratives with the dimension of the “unfortunate” or “luckless” emperor that we encounter in Greek tradition.

The anonymous author of the Greek lamentation on the fall of Constantinople¹⁰⁷ describes Constantine as “the destitute emperor, wretched Constantine,” who was a victim of circumstances and of deception: “And the poor man was deceived and lost his life.”¹⁰⁸ He introduces Constantine in his poem in ominous terms:¹⁰⁹ “Oh Emperor Constantine, how evil was your destiny/a ruinous fortune, a most luckless fate/[which was] both dark and treacherous, as well as marked by lightning.” He traces Constantine’s “ill-starred luck” to his alleged destruction of Glarentza,¹¹⁰ and then characterizes Constantine’s tenure as the despot of the Morea with the same formula several times:¹¹¹ “Oh Emperor Constantine, evil was your destiny.”

Throughout the poem the same sentiments are repeated and Constantine’s “bad, evil luck” becomes a leitmotif. Thus, we encounter “and you brave emperor: evil was your destiny”; “oh all-wise emperor, evil was your destiny”; “oh Emperor Constantine, what was your wretched fortune”; “oh Emperor Constantine, you brought about such misfortune”; “oh Constantine Dragaš, how evil was your fortune”; “oh Emperor Constantine, how heavy was your fortune”; “oh Emperor Constantine, evil was your fortune”; and “oh Emperor Constantine, how evil was your fortune” (four times).¹¹²

Any evaluation of Constantine’s career must carefully distinguish between Constantine the soldier and Constantine the emperor. They were not the same person. Often good soldiers make incompetent emperors, while poor generals sometimes make effective administrators. As a military leader Constantine failed to motivate the soldiers under his command. This manifest failure became evident while he was still the despot of the Morea. His troops at the Hexamilion were not motivated but broke rank and fled as soon as they came under attack and there was nothing that Constantine could do to rally them. Perhaps he expected too much of his men and his staff. He was even harsh with them, especially in his role as despot of the Morea, when he had formulated impossible, unrealistic dreams that could not be implemented. One is reminded of the incident at the Hexamilion, prior to the Turkish assault, when Constantine lost his temper and failed to appreciate an honest report delivered by his own intelligence officer, whom he proceeded to berate and imprison, as he was not appreciative of his honest report. Constantine made no distinction between the messenger and the negative message that he brought. As regent in Constantinople for his absent brother, as despot of the Morea, as a military commander, and as a warlord against the Turks, Constantine seems to have learned something from past experiences, failures, blunders, debacles, and fiascoes. By the time he came to the capital as the emperor, he had realized that his role in the upcoming siege would best be restricted to the ceremonial level, while someone else, more capable than he, had to be placed in charge of the defense operations and of the overall strategy. Giovanni Giustiniani and the Venetian *bailo*, Girolamo Minotto, appear to have been the effective commanders of the weak sectors of the land fortifications and Constantine did not oppose, perhaps he even welcomed, the fact that they assumed effective control of the critical periphery.

As an emperor, he found himself in the midst of factionalism, which he had not created and for which he was not responsible. He tried to satisfy everyone by taking no action. When was pressed to deal with his fiercely Orthodox subjects and with the fanatical mob, he elected to do nothing, condoning, in effect, the presence of a fifth column which would rather see the Turkish turban in the city than the Latin miter or Constantine's imperial crown. His tolerance fostered arrogance, rudeness, and even malevolence on the part of the very individuals that he sought to pacify and even protect. His Italian allies blamed him for this situation and saw in him a weakling. Catholic ecclesiastics wished he had been firmer with the anti-unionists while the anti-unionists were disappointed with their emperor's Catholicism. Both Catholics and Orthodox found the emperor seriously lacking in Catholicism and in Orthodoxy, respectively.

While contemporary Greek and Latin authors drew divergent portraits of the last Greek emperor, they all found some common ground and agreed that his death had been worthy of an emperor and of the ancient dignity of the Greco-Roman empire. One of the last eulogies on Constantine XI was pronounced by Nicholas Sekoundinos, who had served as the official interpreter and simultaneous translator at the council of Florence. Born and brought up in Greek territories, Sekoundinos subsequently spent a great deal of time in Italy and became a Venetian citizen. He intimately knew members of the Greek imperial family and he may have even met Constantine.¹¹³ In addition, Sekoundinos was probably one of the earliest westerners to visit Constantinople after the conquest, as he served as a member (probably in the capacity of interpreter) of the Venetian delegation that hastened to Mehmed soon after the sack, seeking to open diplomatic channels with the Porte.¹¹⁴ Sekoundinos was thus in a position to hear some of the earliest tales that were circulating among the conquerors, the enslaved Greeks, and the survivors of the sack. After his return to Italy, he was afforded an opportunity to speak publicly on the siege and on the death of the Greek emperor. Sekoundinos composed a Latin oration, in which he treated these events. He reserves a section of his speech for his eulogy on Constantine XI. Sekoundinos delivered his speech in the court of Alfonso V of Aragon, a champion of Christianity and a leader of the European monarchs, on January 25, 1454. Sekoundinos assigns a major section of his speech to the death of Constantine and to a characterization of the last emperor:¹¹⁵

The emperor saw that the enemy had already occupied the ruined fortifications and that there was no doubt about the outcome [of the battle]. He did not wish to be captured alive but he did not have the heart to kill himself with his own hands, which would be a crime and a religious sin for a Christian potentate; so he began to urge his men (the few who were around), to kill him. When no one was willing to commit such a foul deed, he took off and discarded his imperial insignia (so that he would not be recognized by the enemy); he advanced, like a common soldier, with drawn sword, so that he would die fighting . . . he was finally killed.

The death of Constantine, which no survivor apparently witnessed, became, in time, inseparably connected with the death of the millennial empire, which, in the pervading humanism of the west, was further associated with the irreparable loss of antiquity's repository of wisdom and heritage. In the sack of Constantinople, it was generally held, precious manuscripts dating back to the end of antiquity were vandalized, destroyed, or lost forever. Here then was a loss, which, in intellectual circles, was as lamentable as the tragic destruction of the Museum and the Library of Alexandria. Soon after the sack of Constantinople, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (the future Pope Pius II) bewailed the destruction of ancient wisdom. In one of his letters that he devoted to this subject, Aeneas Sylvius remembered the special role that Constantinople had played for western humanists, as the Greek city had stood for so long as a living bridge to the fountain of ancient wisdom:¹¹⁶

No Latin seemed sufficiently educated, unless he had studied in Constantinople for some time. The same position that Athens held while Rome flourished was held by Constantinople in our time. From there returned to us Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Xenophon, Thucydides, Basil, Dionysius, and Origen; many works by others also appeared in our days and we were hoping that many others would also appear in the future. . . . But now this will be the second death of Homer, Pindar, Menander, and all the illustrious poets. This will be the final passing of all the Greek philosophers.

Elsewhere, the future pope lamented the loss of countless ancient manuscripts:¹¹⁷

What am I to say about the countless books that were there, not yet known to the Latins? Alas, will the names of many great men perish? This is the second death of Homer, the second passing for Plato. Where are we to seek brilliance in philosophy and poetry? The fountain of the Muses is dry.

Thus Constantine, in the eyes of humanists, perished in precious company. His death and the loss his throne severed the only living link to Greco-Roman antiquity with the present. The death of Constantine signified to humanists the triumphal enthronement of the anti-Christ and the beginning of a new dark age. Constantine died at the gate of the storehouse of antiquity's ancient wisdom, defending, not so much a city, but a way of life. The death of Constantine became inseparably connected with powerful emotions. Accordingly, his shortcomings as a strategist, as a soldier, and as an administrator were forgotten or overlooked and, if they were ever recalled, they were attributed to his bad luck. He became the luckless emperor in charge of a hapless city.

He could have earlier fled his city under the pretext of seeking aid in Europe, as his father had earlier done under different circumstances. He was indeed repeatedly urged to do so by his own advisors. Yet Constantine was not Manuel II and Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani was neither Marshal Boucicaut nor Jean de Chateaumorand. Above all, Mehmed II was not Bayezid Yıldırım. And history would not repeat itself; no *deus ex machina* materialized. Constantine must have realized that

a voyage in search of aid elsewhere would have amounted to an act of desertion and dereliction of duty. To his credit he remained at his post and refused to surrender. Perhaps he even sought death actively in the confusion of the final moments. Had he surrendered his ancient city at any time during the siege or during the last stand, his image in history and posterity would have been tarnished. Other potentates in the Balkans surrendered to Mehmed II but only managed to extend their lives by a short time, as the sultan executed his prisoners in due course, taking care to eliminate systematically all potential claimants to his newly conquered territories.

Constantine avoided the convenient, easy, dishonorable, path of surrender. His death assured him of immortality, as he refused to die in the minds of his former subjects, who became another religious minority in the Ottoman empire for the next four hundred years. Constantine's moment of death brought him immortality and secured for him an honorable position in the annals of Greek history. Sekoundinos concluded his portrait of the slain emperor with the following remarks:¹¹⁸ "The emperor, who deserved immortality . . . joined his imperial corpse to the ruins and to the fall of his empire." Can there be a better epitaph for an individual who rose to the status of a national hero at his death and in death went on to become an immortal?

Notes

- 1 Isidore's early career is enveloped in mystery before Isidore achieved prominence in the ecclesiastical circles of Constantinople. On the controversy regarding scholarly speculation over Isidore's youth and on an attempt to turn him into the metropolitan of Monemvasia from 1412/1413 to 1430, see D. A. Zakythinos, "Μανουήλ Β' ὁ Παλαιολόγος καὶ ὁ Καρδινάλιος Ἰσιδωρος ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ," in *Mélanges offerts à Octave et Melpo Merlier*, vol. 3 (Athens, 1957), pp. 45–69; Zakythinos' proposal is rejected by V. Laurent, "Isidore de Kiev et la métropole de Monembasie," *REB* 17 (1959): 150–157; an overview of this scholarly debate can be found in *Pal* 2: 3, 4, n. 5; and in *MP*, Appendix 22, pp. 525, 526. An assessment speculates that Isidore may have been related to the imperial family (perhaps, it is hypothesized, he was a bastard of Theodoros I and was forced, at an early age, to become a monk in order to eliminate any possible claim he might have to the throne of Constantinople). Thus, this view makes Isidore a close relative, a cousin, of Constantine XI; see H. A. Kalligas, *Byzantine Monemvasia: The Sources* (Monemvasia, 1990), pp. 96–98, esp. n. 98. A study of his writings in G. Mercatti, *Scritti d'Isidoro il cardinale Ruteno e codici a lui appartenuti che si conservano nella Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana* [ST 46] (Vatican City, 1926). In addition, cf. J. Gill, "Isidore, Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia," *Unitas* (Eng. edit.) 11 (1959): 263–275 [= J. Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York, 1964), pp. 65–79]; *PLP* 4: no. 8300 (pp. 130, 131); and M. Philippides and W. K. Hanak, *Cardinal Isidore (c. 1390–1462): A Byzantine Scholar, Warlord, and Prelate* (London and New York, 2018).
- 2 Isidore returned to his see in Russia, bearing the additional Latin title (granted to him by the pope) of *legatus de latere*, which extended his authority beyond Russia into Lithuania and Livonia. The firm contacts that Isidore established for himself in Italy rewarded him with Venetian citizenship by 1443: N. Iorga, "Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XV^e siècle," *Revue de l'Orient latin* 7 (1899/1900): 104–106. For his later career in Italy and his connections, see M. I. Manousakas, "Ἡ Πρώτη Ἄδεια (1456) τῆς Βενετικῆς Γερουσίας γιὰ τὸ Ναὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς Βενετίας καὶ ὁ Καρδινάλιος Ἰσιδωρος," *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας*

- 1 (1962): 109–118. For his adventures in Russia and his eventual escape to Italy, see Gill, *Personalities*, pp. 72–75; in Russia Isidore was imprisoned but he escaped in March 1442; in June 1443, he arrived in Venice. He never returned to the Slavic world. In July 1443, he was invested with the cardinal's hat. For details on his life, cf. Philippides and Hanak, *Cardinal Isidore*.
- 3 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 925 [CC 1: 125–127]: *cum igitur reverendissimus pater, dominus cardinalis Sabinensis, pro unione Graecorum legatus, in eius famulatum me ex Chio vocasset, egi summa cum animi mei diligentia ut fidem sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae fortiter constanterque, uti debitum exigit, defensarem*. Leonardo became a close associate and friend of Isidore. Barbaro noted that they appeared together on several occasions; see, e.g., Barbaro, 4 [CC 1: 11]: *e li ve iera l'imperador, el gardenal de Rosia, el vescovo de Metelin* [Leonardo].
- 4 Barbaro, 3 [CC 1: 10]: *Hor da poi pasadi ver quanti zorni, l'azonse una nave che vignia da Zenova, de Zenovexi, de portada de cantara trenta sie millia con el gardenal del Rosia, che manda el papa per dover far la union*.
- 5 *Ibid.*: *e dusse con si homeni 200 fra scopetieri e balestrieri per secorso de questa zitade de Costantinopoli*.
- 6 V. Langlois, “Notice sur le sabre de Constantine XIV, dernier empereur de Constantinople, conservé à l'Armeria Reale de Turin,” *Revue archéologique* 14 (1857): 292–294; and *idem*, “Mémoire sur le sabre de Constantine XIV Dracosès, dernier empereur grec de Constantinople,” in *Revue de l'Orient et de l'Algerie et des Colonies* (Paris, 1858), pp. 153–165. In addition, cf. X. A. Siderides, “Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Θάνατος, Τάφος, και Σπάθη,” *Η Μελέτη* 2 (1908): 143–146; and D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 90, 91. The inscription: *σὺ βασιλεὺ ἀήττητε, Λόγε Θεοῦ παντάναξ, τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ πιστῷ αὐθέντη Κωνσταντίνῳ*.
- 7 A drawing of the Turin sword/scimitar appears in G. A. Soteriou, “Τὸ Λεγόμενον Ξίφος τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου,” *Κιβωτὸς* 17/18 (1953): 240.
- 8 A. G. Paspates, *Πολιορκία καὶ Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ὑπὸ τῶν Ὀθωμανῶν ἐν Ἐτει 1453* (Athens, 1890; repr.: Athens, 1986), p. 94: ὁ Ἰσίδωρος ἐλθὼν ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει ὡς ἱεράρχης καὶ πολέμαρχος προσέφερε τῷ Παλαιολόγῳ ξίφος εὐρεθὲν μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε ἐν Βυζαντίῳ σωζόμενον.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 94: *σὺ βασιλεὺ ἀήττητε, λόγε Θεοῦ παντάναξ, / νίκης βραβεῖα δώρησε κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων / τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ πιστῷ αὐθέντη Κωνσταντίνῳ, / ὥσπερ ποτὲ τῷ βασιλεῖ μεγάλῳ Κωνσταντίνῳ*.
- 10 Siderides, “Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Θάνατος, Τάφος, καὶ Σπάθη,” p. 146: Πόθεν ἔλαβεν ὁ Πασπάτης τὴν εἰδήσιν ταύτην δὲν γνωρίζομεν, οὐδ' ἐμάθομεν ποῦ εὐρίσκετο [sc. τὸ ξίφος] ἐν ἔτει 1890, ὅτε οὗτος ἔγραφε, οὔτε νῦν [sc. 1908] ποῦ εὐρίσκεται, ἐὰν ἔτι σώζηται.
- 11 *Minus*, 36.5: εὐρεθέντος καὶ γὰρ τοῦ καρδηναλίου Ῥωσσίας εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, μέσος ἐγὼ παρ' αὐτοῦ γέγονα εἰς τὸν αἰοιδίμον καὶ μακαρίτην αὐθέντην μου τὸν βασιλέα, ἵνα γένηται πατριάρχης καὶ τὰ καὶ τὰ γέγονται παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τότε πάπα, ἢ κὰν ἐκ δευτέρου νὰ μνημονευθῇ ὁ πάπας. *The Maius*, 4.3 (p. 472) paraphrases the same text into the spoken idiom of the sixteenth century.
- 12 *CF*, p. 384, states that it was November 15, but cites no source for this date.
- 13 *CF*, pp. 178, 376.
- 14 Scholarius, *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 3, pp. 171–174.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 172: εἰ μὴ ποθῶ τὴν εἰρήνην τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοια τῶν χριστιανῶν ἀπάντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀληθινήν καὶ πνευματικὴν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικὴν δικαίαν καὶ σωτήριον, μὴ εἰρηνευθεῖ μοι ἡ ζωὴ. εἰ μὴ πληροφορεῖ με τὸ συνειδὲς ὅτι ὀρθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδέκαστον πρὸς τε τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ ὑμᾶς πάντας καὶ ἰδίως ἕκαστον ἐν ἀγάπῃ εἰλκρινεῖ, μὴ συγχωρήσαί μοι τὰς ἀμαρτίας ὁ Κύριος.
- 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 174–178. Doukas, 36.3, speaks of those days and of the events that compelled Scholarius to publish his manifesto: τότε τὸ σχηματικὸν μέρος ἐλθὼν ἐν τῇ μονῇ τοῦ Παντοκράτορος ἐν τῇ κέλλῃ τοῦ Γεναδίου, τοῦ ποτε Γεωργίου Σχολαρίου, ἔλεγον

- αὐτῶ “καὶ ἡμεῖς τί ποιήσομεν;” αὐτὸς δὲ ἐγκλεισθεὶς καὶ χάρτην λαβὼν καὶ γράψας τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ διὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἐδήλου καὶ τὴν συμβουλὴν. Scholarius’ activities against the government did not end with this manifesto. Even during the siege Scholarius and his circle continued their opposition to the court and to the defense; see Doukas, 37.8.
- 17 Scholarius, *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 3, p. 177: σιωπήσαι δὲ παντελῶς οὐδ’ ἐν μέσοις τοῖς πειρασμοῖς ἔκριναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συγγράφω τῇ πόλει πάση συμβουλὴν τὴν συντομον ἐν σχήματι διαμαρτυρίας καὶ ἀπολογίας ὑπὲρ τῆς σιωπῆς τὰς τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων γνώμας συνέξουσιν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοεβρίου μηνὸς εἰκοστὴ καὶ ἑβδόμη τοῖς τε βασιλείοις αὐτοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄγοραῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει μοναῖς ἀπάσαις τὸ γράμμα ἐκεῖνο διέσπειρον τοσαῦτις ἐκγεγραμμένον σχεδόν, ὅσαι δὴ καὶ τοῦ μηνὸς αἱ ἡμέραι καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ γράμματος, ἀπολογία γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῆς δῆθεν σιγῆς ἦν, καίτοι ποῦ τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον ἐσίγων; ἔβρων μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς πίστεως.
- 18 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 925 [CC 1: 126], names few prominent converts to Catholicism: *Intellexi plane, praeter Argyropilum [= John Argyropoulos], artium magistrum, Theophilum Palaeologo hieromonacosque quosdam paucos et alios laicos, quod ambitio ita Graecos quasi omnes captivasset, ut nemo esset qui zelo fidei vel salutis suae motus primus videretur fieri velle suae quasi opinionis et pertinaciae contemptor.* On Theophilus Palaeologus, cf. *PLP* 9: no. 21446 (p. 90). Leonardo states that Theodoros Karystenos (*PLP* 5: no. 11297 [p. 135]) was also a good Catholic in the same company with Theophilus Palaeologus, *PG* 159: 934 [CC 1: 148]: *Theodorus Caristino, senex sed robustus Graecus, in arcu doctissimus, Theophilusque Graecus, nobilis Palaeologo, et ambo catholici.* On Theophilus, see *SFC*, Appendix IV, no. 158 (p. 652). See Philippides and Hanak, *Cardinal Isidore*, ch. 4.
- 19 Barbaro, 4, 5 [CC 1: 11]: *adi 13 dezembrio fo fatto la union in la giexia de Santa Sofia con grandenissima solenitate de chierixie, en etiam ve jera el reverendo gardenal de Rosia, che jera mandà per el papa, etiam ve jera el serenissimo imperador con tuta la sua baronia, e tutto el populo de Costantinopoli; e in quel zorno ve fo de gran pianti in questa zitade, e questa union si se intende, che i sia unidi come nui Franchi, e non aver più sisme in la giexia.*
- 20 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 925 [CC 1: 125–127]: *actum est industria probitate praefati domini cardinalis [sc. Isidori], ut sacra unio, assentiente imperatore senatūque – si non ficta fuit – firmaretur celebrareturque secundo Idus Decembris, Spirid<i>onis episcopus sancti die.*
- 21 Pusculo, 3.481–646 (pp. 51–55), not included among the selected passages of improved text in CC 1.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 3.596–625 (p. 52): *Templum erat antiquum, media constructus in urbe, / Relligione ingens regum monumenta priorum / Excelsus servans, variisque insigne columnis. / Convexum coeli forma testudine fulget / Auratis desuper, pictisque coloris lapillis / Coelesti. Ingentes subeunt immane columnae / Rubrae, opus extractum, viridesque, et candida signant / Marmora; porphyraeque tabulae, fulvaeque relucet / Parietibus latis. Distincta coloribus arte / Strata oculos stringunt pavimenta intrantibus. Aere / Tres valvae insignes bullis, pulchro aurichalco / Ingentes duplices latae sonuere volutae / Cardinibus latum ante ipsam porrigitur aedem, / Vestibulum, foribus totidem, et simili ornament / Insigne. Hic solio se rex componitur alto / Ad portam templi mediam, stratoque resedit / Quem circum Graji proceres funduntur. Ad illum / Ut venit, dextras jungunt, mutuisque salutant / Vocibus a summo Nicolao principe dicta / Pace: salutato et legatus rege recumbit / Sede humili, parva, fuerat forte parata.*
- 23 *Ibid.*, 3.529–587 (pp. 52, 53).
- 24 *Ibid.*, 3.531–534 (p. 52): *nec tantos ferre labores / Auderem senior: non tunc tua limina adirem. / Sed me communis patriae sors aspera movit / Rursus adire lare patrios.*
- 25 *Ibid.*, 3.589–600 (pp. 53, 54): *Talia dicta dabat legatus. Corde premebat / Rex curas, fixosque oculos tellure tenebat. / Tunc sic pauca refert: Mihi non est copia soli / Pontifici adjungi summo, nec cogere dignum / Est populum: placido fiant haec corde necesse est. / Sed tu si qua potes primum scrutare per artes / Tentamenta animos monachum primosque sacrati / Ordinis explora; placeat si foedere tali / Hacque via ulcisci Teucros; et*

- morte levare; / *Et conare tamen populum allectare periclo / Attonitum. Interea cunctum explorare senatum / Quid sit opus facto, hunc et maturare jubebo.*
- 26 Puscuro, 3.641 (p. 54): *Jam mensis abit nam unus, et alter.* For details cf. Hanak and Philippides, *Cardinal Isidore*, ch. 4, sec. 4.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 3.636–638 (p. 54): *nunc hos, nunc instruit illos. / Hortatur, suadet, capiti se adjungere summo / Christicolum: soli pereant ne sponte relict.*
- 28 *Ibid.*, 3.645, 646 (p. 54): *tantum verba habet, ac nullum deflectere civem, / Aut monachum potuit, nec regis flectere mentem.*
- 29 Leonardo, PG 159: 930 (not included in CC 1): *Adversus enim legatum [sc. Isidorum] multi invidia clanculo torquebantur. Ergo dixi: Paterisne, o imperator! ut haec ambitio scindat Ecclesiam, ut hujus rei gratia divina ira magis magisque merito accendatur? Cur non e medio pertinaces illi tolluntur? Acquiescere imperator visus, metropolitansque Scholarium, Isidorum, Neophytum complicesque, judices constituit, verbo quidem, non facto.*
- 30 Puscuro, 3.650, 651 (p. 55): *geminum se dividit omnis / Infelix populus.*
- 31 *Ibid.*, 3.657, 658 (p. 55): *talis discordia miscet, / Totam urbem.*
- 32 *Ibid.*, 3.662–667 (p. 55): *Carus Musis, et Palladis arte / Insignis, plures docuit, dictisque retorsit / Esse pios papaeque fidem servare, deoque / Argyropulus ea tunc tempestate Joannes. / Hunc sequitur tanto dignus doctore Michael / Byzantinus: erat cognomen Apostolus illi.*
- 33 Leonardo, PG 159: 925 (not included in CC 1): *Argyropilum artium magistrum, Theophilum Palaeologum, hieromonachosque quosdam paucos, et alios laicos.* In addition, cf. *CF*, p. 384, n. 5.
- 34 *Minus*, 36.6: διέβησαν ἰδοῦ μῆνες ἕξ καὶ τοσοῦτον λόγον ἐποιήσαντο ὑπὲρ βοηθείας, ὅσον ἐποιήσατο ὁ σουλτᾶνος τοῦ Κάρεως.
- 35 For 1204 and the defense of the harbor, cf. E. Pears, *The Fall of Constantinople Being the Story of the Fourth Crusade* (New York, 1886), pp. 350, 351; and D. E. Queller, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople 1201–1204* (Philadelphia, 1977), pp. 144–146.
- 36 Kritoboulos, 1.19.21: πρὸ πάντων δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐπεμέλετο τριήρεις τὰς μὲν ἐκ νέου ναυπηγούμενος, τὰς δὲ . . . ἀνορθῶν . . . ἔτι δὲ πλοῖα μακρὰ κατεσκευάζε, τὰ δὲ καὶ κατάφρακτα, καὶ ταχειάς ναῦς, τριακοντόρους τε καὶ πεντηκοντόρους . . . πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ναυτικὸν συνέλεγεν ἐκ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ παραλίας Ἀσιανῆς καὶ Εὐρωπαϊας.
- 37 Barbaro dates this event on December 13 and states that it took place on the same day as the celebration of the union but the Venetian physician has already made an error with regard to this date, as the union had been celebrated on December 12; so perhaps the date of the council also fell on December 12; See Barbaro, 5 [CC 1: 11]: *Adì 13 pur dezembrio fo praticado de retignir le galie grosse de marcavo per conservation de Costantinopoli, e questa pratica fo fatta in la giexia de Santa Sofia.*
- 38 *Ibid.*: *e li vera l'imperador, el gardenal de Rosia, el vescovo de Metelin, e tuti i baroni del imperador, e tuti mercadanti de la nation, e la più parte del populo de questa zitade, e tuti digando per una vox.*
- 39 *Ibid.* [CC 1: 11, 12]: *e in questo raxonamento l'imperador si andò a disnar con tuti li suo baroni, e cusì fexe ognomo, e in questo zorno non fo fatta altra pratica, salvo raxonamento asai.*
- 40 Barbaro, 5 (not included in CC 1): *poi parla misser lo bailo digando: misser lo capetanio, io ve so confortar, perima per l'amor de Dio, e poi per honor de la cristianitade, e per honor de la signoria nostra de Venexia, che vui dobiè romagnir qua in Costantinopoli a obedientia de l'imperador, e questo perchè la nostra signoria de Venexia si l'avrà forte a bene de la romagnuda vostra.*
- 41 *Ibid.*, 6 (not included in CC 1): *Come misser lo bailo con i marcadanti intexe la opinion de misser lo capetanio, che el iera al tuo disposto de partirse in la dia hora, misser lo bailo con i marcadanti andò in terra, e li fexe conseio de retegnir le galie a defension de Costantinopoli, prima per l'amor de Dio, e può per honor de la cristianitade, in nel qual conseio fo reignude le galie.* Yet the Venetian authorities in Constantinople did not feel that this decree would prove a powerful deterrent and eventually posed a

- heavy financial penalty on anyone caught attempting to depart without authorization; see Barbaro, 7, 8 (not included in CC 1): *Abiando fato el conseio, che le galie dovesse romagnir in Costantinopoli, non resta che i capetanii ad ogni modo voiano partirse, e pagar la pena de ducati 3000 per zascaduno, e però i marcadanti per prevalerse lor con sue mercadantie, convene far uno protesto, e protestar i capetani che non se partisse.*
- 42 *Ibid.*, 11 [CC 1: 12]: *e però l'achade per ogni via e muodo de dar notitia ala nostra illustrissima Signoria de Venexia del retegnir nostro de qui con le galie, e nostro aver, e però nui fessemo el conseio di dodexe in la giexia de Santa Maria de Costantinopoli, de dover mandar a Venexia Zuan Diusnaigi con la sua nave, e portar lettere de misser lo bailo, e de misser Aluvixe Diedo capetanio de le galie de la Tana, e de misser Chabriel Trivixan vizo capetanio de le do galie sutile, le qual letre de dovesse aprentar a la nostra illustre Signoria de Venexia, azò quella avesse avixo si fo fato adì 17 dezembrio.* See D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 395–397. Barbaro states that other messengers were also sent, hoping to pass undetected through Ottoman territory, 11 (not included in CC 1): *Prexo che fo per parte, che Zuan Diusnaigi andasse a Venexia, no se resta de far uno altro conseio, fo adì 19 pur dezembrio, per mandar letre per tera per tute vie posibele, e ancora per la via da Sio, pur per dar avixo a la prefata nostra Signoria del retegnir nostro; ancora in questo mese fo adì 22 fesemo conseio di dodexe per spazar uno messo pur a Venexia per la via de la Turchia, pur per dar avixo de questo nostro retegnir; in nel qual avixo fo fato tre brieveselli che se drezava pur, a la nostra signoria de Venexia, azochè l'avesse più tosto avixo del retegnir nostro, e questi tre brieveseli, fessemo azochè i no fosse stadi trovadi adosso de color, che i portava a Venexia, perché si Turchi avesse trovà quelli, i vignia a saver tute le nostre provixion, che nui avemo fatto.* These messages created excitement in Venice and the authorities were moved to action; see Languschi-Dolfin, 3 (not included in *TiePN*): *Per mouimento delle qual cose a di 19. Febrer fu decreto far capitano de mar di 15. gallie et armar 2 naue 800 botte in suxo per mandar in auxilio de Costantinopoli. Et a di 20. in gran conseio fu dessegnato capitano da mar Ser Jacomo Loredan, fo de ms. Piero procurator cum uoce de esser capitano general. Et 4. soracomiti Zuane Mathio Contarini, Domenego Michiel Rombo, Zuan Mudazo, Jacomo Marcello de S. Christofalo. Fu armado la naue de ser Carlo Pisani di 1200. botte, patron Aluise Longo.* For documents, see the Appendix to Barbaro's text, "Documenti," pp. 67–82; especially pertinent are Documents 6 and 7 (pp. 72, 73). In addition, see *PaL 2*: 109.
- 43 Barbaro, 11 (not included in CC 1): *Prexo che fo per parte, che Zuan Diusnaigi andasse a Venexia, no se resta de far uno altro conseio, fo adì 19 pur dezembrio, per mandar letre per tera per tute vie posibele, e ancora per la via da Sio, pur per dar avixo a la prefata nostra Signoria del retegnir nostro; ancora in questo mese fo adì 22 fesemo conseio di dodexe per spazar uno messo pur a Venexia per la via de la Turchia, pur per dar avixo de questo nostro retegnir; in nel qual avixo fo fato tre brieveselli che se drezava pur, a la nostra signoria de Venexia, azochè l'avesse più tosto avixo del retegnir nostro, e questi tre brieveseli, fessemo azochè i no fosse stadi trovadi adosso de color, che i portava a Venexia, perché si Turchi avesse trovà quelli, i vignia a saver tute le nostre provixion, che nui avemo fatto.* These messages created excitement in Venice and the authorities were moved to action; see Languschi-Dolfin, 3 (not included in *TiePN*): *Per mouimento delle qual cose a di 19. Febrer fu decreto far capitano de mar di 15. gallie et armar 2 naue 800 botte in suxo per mandar in auxilio de Costantinopoli. Et a di 20. in gran conseio fu dessegnato capitano da mar Ser Jacomo Loredan, fo de ms. Piero procurator cum uoce de esser capitano general. Et 4. soracomiti Zuane Mathio Contarini, Domenego Michiel Rombo, Zuan Mudazo, Jacomo Marcello de S. Christofalo. Fu armado la naue de ser Carlo Pisani di 1200. botte, patron Aluise Longo.*
- 44 Barbaro, 11 (not included in CC 1): *Adì 26 Zener andò misser lo bailo con tuti do i capetani de le galie, e con tuti nostri marcadanti ala prexentia del serenissimo imperador, e a lui imperador do domandato de gratia per misser lo bailo, che nui fossemo in libertà de dover cargar le nostre mercadantie in le galie nostre.*

- 45 *Ibid.*: *Quando l'imperador ave intexo el parlar di capetaniij, e de misser lo bailo, che pur del tuto i voleva le marcadantie in le galie, in quella fiada l'imperador con tuti li suo baroni si se strense a uno, e conseiosse insembre, e come i ave ben parlato fra loro, l'imperador, come homo pasionado si respoxe humanissimamente a misser lo bailo, e ai do capetani.* See *PaL* 2: 110, 111, and esp. n. 9.
- 46 *Barbaro*, 12 (not included in *CC* 1): *Serenissimo imperador, nui si ve imprometemo sor l'onor de quelli da Venexia, e soar de nui e de le nostre teste, che siando carghe le galie nostre, che mai non se leveremo con le galie nostre de questo vostro porto de Costantinopoli, salvo se dal vostro imperio n'abiamo bona lizentia de partirse da vui, o veramenteche n'abiamo comandamento de partirse, da la nostra Signoria de Venexia. In quela fiada l'imperador si respoxe e dise: Ti capetanio de le galie grosse, non sono più segure le vostre mercadantie in la mia tera, cha in le tue galie? Ma veramente me ne accorzo molto bene che tu fai, per scampar par una note, e lassarme mi mixero dolente contra el perfido turco, cordial mio nemigo.*
- 47 *Ibid.*, 12 (not included in *CC* 1).
- 48 *Ibid.*, 13 (not included in *CC* 1): *adi zorno 26 fevrer de note, scampa fuora del porto de Costantinopoli, Pietro Davanzo con la sua nave . . . e ancora in quela note si scampò nave sie de Chandia . . . carghe de pessàmi . . . e queste tal sete nave si era retignude per el conseio di dodexe, come tera le galie nostre . . . e con quele nave si scampò assai persone da fatti, fo persone zerca 700.*
- 49 *Ibid.*, 37, 38 (not included in *CC* 1): *A di oto pur de mazo, fesemo conseio di dodexe, e si fo prexo per parte de dover descargar tute le marcadantie in Costantinopoli, le qual se truova a esser in le galie da la Tana, e quele tal tre galie meterle a fondi in l'arsenada de l'imperador, e quando che fo prexa questa parte de dover descargar queste tal galie, quando che i volse començar a descargar, subito le zurme si saltò con le spade a le porte de le galie . . . E tanto fexe queste ciurme, che i otene sua intencion de star in le galie, sì che in quela fiada el capitano de le galie sise fexe forte, e romaxe in le sue galie arente l'apalizada de Pera, cun tute le sue ciurme.*
- 50 *Ibid.*, 13 [*CC* 1: 12]: *in questo zorno, pur di 26 zener, vene in Costantinopoli Zuan Zustignan Zenovexe . . . perchè l'intendeva la nezesitate che have Costantinopoli, e per benefito de la christianitade, e per honor del mundo.*
- 51 *Nestor-Iskander*, 22 (pp. 40, 41): *Единъ токмо Зиновьянинъ князь, именовъ Зустанья прииде цесарю на помощь на дву кораляхъ и на двухъ катаргахъ вооруженныхъ, имья съ собою 600 храбыхъ. On Giovanni Guglielmo Giustiniani Longo and his role during the siege, cf. M. Philippides, "Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani, the Genoese *Condottiere* of Constantinople in 1453," *BSEB* 3 (1998): 13–54; and *SFC*, Appendix IV, no. 86 (pp. 642, 643).*
- 52 *Barbaro*, 13 [*CC* 1: 12]: *e de li ver quanti zorni l'imperador donò a questo Zuan Zustignan una galia . . . e felo capetanio de le sue zente de tera, per star a le mura da tera per aspetar l'exerzito de Machomet bej turco.*
- 53 It has already been observed that Constantine does not seem to be active in the defense and seems to have vanished from the military operations during the siege; see M. Balard, "Constantinople vue par les témoins du siège de 1453," in C. Mango and G. Dagron, eds., *Constantinople and Its Hinterland* (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 169–177. One must go beyond this observation and attempt to understand this notable absence. Was it because of his previous failures as a warlord that Constantine decided to remain an observer and place the defense in the hands of his capable Italian mercenaries, until the early hours of May 29? Moreover, is this the reason that Sphrantzes remains silent, in his authentic work, on the operations of the siege, as probably there were no notable activities of the emperor in the defense theater to speak of?
- 54 For the harbor operations, see *SFC*, pp. 429–475.
- 55 *Ibid.*, pp. 475–547.
- 56 Discussion, evaluation, and criticism of the numerous studies that have appeared so far, see *ibid.*, *passim*.

- 57 Pusculo, 4.306, 307 (p. 67): *ad muros ponit tentoria divi / Romani, medius inter gemina moenia.*
- 58 Barbaro, 18, 19 (not included in CC 1): *a di 6 ditto pur de april, el serenissimo imperador si se mosse dal suo palazzo, e andò a star a le mure de la banda da tera a una porta qual se chiàma Cressu. In qual porta si è più debele cha porta niuna de la tera, etiam qual se iera a presso del serenissimo imperador bona parte li suo baroni e di suo cavalieri per farli compagnia, e darli bun conforto.* Cornet, the nineteenth century editor of Barbaro, thought that by *Cressu*, the Venetian meant the Golden or Khryse (*Aurea*, in Latin) Gate located at the southern end of the land fortifications, as is indicated in n. 2: "*Aurea porta?*" It is more likely, I believe, that Barbaro's *Cressu* indicates the Byzantine Kharseia [= Adrianople/Edirne] Gate, which is the next civil gate, north of the Gate of Saint Romanus, a short distance northward from the critical Pempton. The imperial palace had been abandoned by Constantine and became the official residence of the Venetian *bailo*. See Barbaro, 19. For a survey of the land walls and the assignments of the various commanders, cf. *SFC*, pp. 297–359; W. K. Hanak, "The Constantinopolitan *Mesoteikhion* in 1453: Its Topography, Adjacent Structures and Gates," *BSEB*, n.s. 4 (1999): 69–98; and *idem*, "Sultan Mehmed II Fatih and the Theodosian Walls: The Conquest of Constantinople 1453, His Strategies and Successes," in S. Atasoy, ed., *Istanbul Üniversitesi 550. Yil Uluslararası Bizans ve Osmanlı Sempozyumu (XV. Yüzyıl) 30–31 Mayıs 2003. 550th Anniversary of the Istanbul University. International Byzantine and Ottoman Symposium (XVth Century) 30–31 May 2003* (Istanbul, 2004), pp. 1–13.
- 59 What Barbaro means is that the emperor's tent was north of the Gate of Saint Romanus but south of the Kharseia, i.e., the Adrianople/Edirne Gate. This statement places Constantine near the Pempton, the small gate halfway between the Gate of Saint Romanus and the Adrianople Gate, squarely in the middle of the modern *Sule Kule* neighborhood. This fateful gate still retains a memory of its significance, as the local inhabitants refer to it as *Hücum Kapı*, "the Gate of the Assault." For the topography, see *SFC*, pp. 337–344.
- 60 Barbaro, 19, 20 (not included in CC 1): *et tuti quanti de quele cinque galie che iera homini mile si muntò in tera tuti armadi e ben in ordine de quello i bexognava, . . . e i diti capetani con quele zente si se apprexento a la prexentia del serenissimo imperador, domandandoli quello che i piaxea comandar de quale tal zente de le galie. L'imperador si i comandò, che i dovessenadar a torno le mure da la banda da tera, azochè el perfido Turco nemigo nostro, podesse veder quelli cussi ben in ordine, e azò a Turchi se desse ad intender che el fosse zente assai in la terra. Come i ave dado una volta atorno le mure de la zitade, pur solamente da la banda da tera dove che iera al campo, che sun mia sie, tuta la zente tornò in galia.*
- 61 *Ibid.*, 23 [CC 1: 15, 16]: *a di diexedoto pur de questo mexe de april, vene gran multitudine de Turchi a le mure, e questo si fo zerca a hore do de note, e durò la scaramuza fina a ore sie de note, e in questa scaramuza ne fo morti asai Turchi, e quando questi Turchi vene a le mure, era scuro, e però i vene per asaltar a l'improvixa i nostri.*
- 62 *Ibid.*: *e in questo gran cridor; el dolente e mesernelo imperador si comenzò a pianzer dubitando che questa note i non volesse lor Turchi dar bataja zeneral, e perché nui cristiani non eremo ancora provisti de aspetar bataja zeneral da lor Turchi, e però questa si son la gran doia che avea l'imperador.*
- 63 Nestor-Iskander observes that the emperor and members of his staff became emotional and that the emperor also shed tears when he spoke with his advisors; see, e.g., 31 (pp. 48, 49): Цесарь же на долгъ часъ умльча, испущая слезы, and again 66 (pp. 78, 79): Царю же приспѣвшу, срѣте Зустунѣа еще жива суца, и восплакася о немъ горько. On the details in this Slavonic narrative that derive from personal observation, cf. M. Philippides, "Some Prosopographical Consideration in Nestor-Iskander's Text," *Macedonian Studies* 6 (1989): 35–50; C. Head, *Imperial Twilight: The Palaiologos Dynasty and the Decline of Byzantium* (Chicago, 1977), does not realize how frequent these outbursts of emotion were, but assumes, with some cultural bias, that they were the normal behavior of a Mediterranean individual and that Constantine was moved to

tears through his own contemplation of the relentless march of history; see, e.g., p. 163: “The Byzantines had always been an emotional people who saw no reason why a man need to be ashamed to weep in times of sorrow. Constantine Palaiologos was a strong man. . . . Yet . . . when he watched his nation failing and the reality of the role in which history had cast became increasingly clear, the emperor’s eyes would often fill with unashamed tears.”

- 64 Barbaro, 42 [CC 1: 25]: *subito l'imperador si se mosse con tuta la sua baronia, e vene a veder questa mirabel cossa, e quando i l'avè visto, tuti si romaxe come morti, dubitando de paura*. Different was the reaction of westerners; thus Tetaldi described this event as one of the highlights of the siege but he did so in a business-like tone, avoiding all emotional outbursts; see Tetaldi, *Caput VI: Praefatus autem Sangambassa* [Zaganos Pasha?] *feri constituit fortalium castri lignei, magni, ampli, firmi & alti: adeo ut murorum civitatis celsitudinem excedere videretur* [= French version, 14 (col. 1821): *Le dit Sengamps* [Zaganos Pasha?] *fist ung chastel de bois si hault & si frant, qu'il seignourissoit le mur*.
- 65 Barbaro, 35 (not included in CC 1): *Zonto i fo a la zitade, i referi al serenissimo imperador quello che i fexè, e che i non avea trovado armada niuna de i venetiani; in quella fiada el serenissimo imperador si comenzò fortemente a lagrimar da dolor, che quelli da Venexia non i mandava secorso; vedando l'imperador questo, el se deliberò de meterse in le man del nostro mixericordioxo misser Jexu Cristo, e de la sua madre madona santa Maria, e de misser santo Constantin confalon de la so zitade, e lor vardasse la zitade, da poi che la universa cristianitade, non me a voiudo dar secorso contra questo perfido turco nemigo de la cristianitade*. It was at this time that Constantine was urged to leave the city (on the precedent of his father during the blockade by Bayezid Yıldırım) and personally apply for help abroad, if Nestor-Iskander is to be believed; see 49 (pp. 64, 65): Патриархъ же паки начать крѣпко увѣщавати цесаря, да нзыдетъ изъ града, такоже и боляре всѣ, глаголюще ему.
- 66 For analysis of the portents during the siege, see *SFC*, pp. 214–231.
- 67 E.g. Barbaro, 51 [CC 1: 29]: *L'altra profetia che dixè, quando che el troverà uno imperador che abia nome Costantin, fio d'Elena, soto, quello imperio imperio el se perderà Costantinopoli*. The prophecy was indeed widespread, as we find it cited in a letter penned by Cardinal Isidore (CC 1: 60): *quae [Constantinopolis] sicut ab ipso Constantino, Elenae filio, fuit tunc fundata, ita nunc ab isto altero Constantino, alterius Elenae filio, miserabiliter est amissa*. Nestor-Iskander also reports the same prophecy, 77 (pp. 86, 87): И збытъся реченное: Ко[н]стянтиномъ сздася и паки Ко[н]стянтиномъ и скончася. A short chronicle alludes to this prophecy; cf. *CBB* 1: 115.1 (p. 684): γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς βασιλέως κυροῦ Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου. ὑπὸ γὰρ Κωνσταντίνου ἐκτίσθη, τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ εὐσεβοῦς βασιλέως, καὶ ἔμεινεν ἐς δεῦρο ἀνάλωτος προστασία τῆς θεομήτορος, ἐπὶ δὲ Κωνσταντίνου πάλιν ἠχμαλωτίσθη διὰ πλήθη ἡμετέρων ἀμαρτημάτων.
- 68 Pusculo, 1017–1024 (p. 81): *Heu nimium de te vates Nicolaus hoc ipsum / Antistes cecinit summus; dum saepe vocaret / Te, sibi praedixit tempus patriaeque tibi que / Hoc fore; cum lacrymans: Vereor ne numen Achivis, / Dixit, opem neget*.
- 69 Barbaro, 46 [CC 1: 26, 27]: *Pur ancora in questo zorno de vintido de mazo, a una hora de note el parse uno mirabel segnal in zielo, el qual segno fo quello che dè ad intender a Costantin degno imperador de Costantinopoli, che el suo degno imperio si se approssimava al finimento suo, come con efeto è stato. Questo segnal si fo de questa condition e forma: questa sera a un hora de notte levò la luna et havea hozi el suo tondo, levando questa luna la dovea levar tuta tonda, ma questa luna si levò come quela avesse abudo tre zorni, la qual puoco pareva, e iera l'aiere sereno come uno cristalo neto e mundo; questa luna si durò a questo muodo zerca hore quatro, e poi a puoco quela si se andò fazando el suo tondo, e a ore sie de note, tuta si fo compida de far el suo tondo. Abiando noi tuti cristiani, e pagani, aver bisto questo mirabel segno, l'imperador de Costantinopoli forte se spaurì de questa cosa, e cusì feze tuta la sua baronia, e questo*

perché Griexi avea una profetia, che dicea, che Costantinopoli mai no se perderia per fina tanto che la luna non mostrasse segnal in zielo in nel suo tondo, sì che questa si iera la paura che avea Griexi. Ma Turchi fexe una gran festa per el suo campo per alegreza de questo segnal, perché a lor i pareo aver vitoria, si come fo anche ben el vero. Nestor-Iskander also witnessed this eclipse and indirectly alluded to the phenomenon and to others (which can be reasonably understood as manifestations of Saint Elmo's Fire); see Nestor-Iskander, 47 (pp. 62–64): Въ 20 же первый день Маia, грехъ ради нашихъ, бысть знаменіе страшно въ градъ: нощи убо против пятка освятися градъ весь, и видѣвши стражи, течаху видѣти бывшее, чааху бо Туркы зажгоша градъ, и вскрикаше велиимъ гласомъ. Собравшимъжеся людемъ мнозъмъ, видѣша у великія церкви Премудрости божіа у верха нзъ воконъ пламеню огненну велию изшедшу, окружившу всю шею церковную на длгъгъ часъ. И собрався пламень въ едино пременися пламень, и бысть, яко свѣтъ неизреченный, и абіе взятыся на небо. Онѣмъ же зрящимъ начаша плакати гръко въпліюще: Господи помилуй! Свѣту же оному достигшу до небесъ, отверзошася двери небесныя, и пріаше свѣтъ, паки затворишася. Other authors, who were not eyewitnesses, also spoke of these “signs from heaven” which further lowered the morale of the defenders. A typical example is provided in the narrative of Kritoboulos, 1.45–47, who does not include, among his θεοσημεῖα, the lunar eclipse but speaks of a strange darkness, 1.46: τῆ δ' ὕστερατὰ ἔωθεν νέφος βαθὺ τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν περιεκάλυπεν ἀπὸ προΐας βαθείας ἕως ἑσπέρας. τοῦτο πάντως ἐδήλου τὴν ἀποδημίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀναχώρησιν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν τελείαν αὐτῆς ἐγκατάλειψιν καὶ ἀποστροφήν.

- 70 Tetaldi, *Caput 20: interea rex Constantinopolitanus ad extrema devolutus mortem invenit, narrantibus de illo quibusdam, quod capitis detruncatione vitam finiverit, aliis vero dicentibus quod in transitu portae dum fugere tentaret hostibus occurrentibus, morte praeoccupatus defecerit.* The equivalent French text reads as follows, col. 1823: *Le cardinal de Russie mourut en la presse, aussi mourut l'empereur. Aucuns dient qu'il eust la teste taillée, ou qu'il mourut en la presse, s'en voulant s'yffir l'un & l'autre, peutêtre qu'il fut mort en la presse, & que puis les Turcs luy eussent taillé la teste.* Latin and French texts and English translation of the Latin version with commentary: M. Philippides, *Mehmed II the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Views and Testimonies* (Tempe, 2007), ch. 5 (Latin version and translation) and Appendix 1 (French version). Rumors of this type seemed to have reached the ears of the future Pope Pius II; cf. *Commentarii* 2, 1.3 (p. 209 for English translation): *sedente Nicolao Quinto pontifice maximo, Mahumetes Turchorum imperator obsidione cinxit [sc. Constantinopolim] et deiecta moenium parte . . . vi cepit atque diripuit, Constantino eius nominis ultimo imperatore obruncato sive, ut fama est, inter equitum turmas oppresso.*
- 71 *NE* 2: 514–518 [Italian translation in *CC* 1: 234–239]: *disse Ding hat gesagt Her Thomas Eperkus, ein Graf auss Constantinopel, und Joseph Deplorentatz, eins Grafens Sun, und Thutro de Constantinopel, der ir Krichisch in Welisch prach hat, und Dumita Exswinnilwacz, und Mathes Hack von Utrecht, der ir Welisch in Teutsch hat pracht.* On Eparkhos and Diplovatatzes, see *SFC*, p. 32, no. 8. In addition, see J. Harris, *Greek Émigrés in the West (1400–1520)* (Camberley, Surrey, 1995), p. 23, n. 57; and *idem*, “Publicising the Crusade: English Bishops and the Jubilee Indulgence of 1455,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 50 (1999): 35–37. Harris has studied the career of Thomas Eparkhos who in 1455 was attempting to raise funds in England to ransom his wife and children captured in the sack of 1453.
- 72 *Ibid.*, pp. 516, 517 [Italian translation in *CC* 1: 239]: *item, do daz der Keisser von Kriechen sach, do schrei mit heller Stimm: “O Herr, ich pin verratten,” und zoch mit seinem Volk und rief, man solt stil sten und solt sich weren; do liss man daz Gattertor schissen, und daz Gedreng ward so gross von der Flucht also, daz der Keisser da selbst mit 90.000 Manen erslagen ward, von den Turcken und von den Verraten.*
- 73 *Supra*, n. 62.

- 74 J. R. Melville-Jones, *Nicolò Barbaro, Diary of the Siege of Constantinople 1453* (Jericho, NY, 1965), p. 56, translates *degno imperador de Costantinopoli* as “the worthy Emperor of Constantinople” and *el suo degno imperio* as “his proud empire.” In her modern Greek translation of Barbaro’s journal, V. A. Lappa translates *degno imperador de Costantinopoli* as τον τιμημένο αυτοκράτορα τῆς Κωνσταντινούπολης [= “the honored emperor of Constantinople”] and *el suo degno imperio* as η ἔνδοξη αυτοκρατορία του [= “his glorious empire”]: *Η Πόλις Εάλω: Το Χρονικό της Πολιορκίας και της Άλωσης της Κωνσταντινούπολης* (Athens, 1993), p. 177.
- 75 Barbaro, 54, 55 [CC 1: 32, 33]: *i nostri cristiani avea una gran paura, fexe sonar el serenissimo imperador campana martelo per tuta la zitade, e cusì a le poste de le mure*. That the emperor had bells and tocsins sounding during assaults to encourage the defenders receives confirmation in Nestor-Iskander, 26 (pp. 44, 45): И яко слышаша люди звонъ церкви божьихъ, абие укрѣпишася и охрабришася вси и бяхуся съ Туркы крѣпчае перваго.
- 76 Barbaro, 55 [CC 1: 34]: *vignando i Turchi furioxamente verso la piazza . . . subito quelli de lor Turchi si montò suxo una tore dove che iera levado san Marco e l’insegna del serenissimo imperador, e i diti pagani subito i taiò zoxo l’insegna de san Marco e tirà poi via l’insegna del serenissimo imperador, e poi suxo quella tore medema si levò l’insegna del signor Turco*.
- 77 *Infra*, n. 79.
- 78 Leonardo, PG 159: 930 (not included in CC 1): *nam si pussillanimitatem imperator excussisset, hanc fidei illusionem vindicasset . . . Coercendi quidem illi erant, qui si fuissent, morbum pestiferum non propagassent*. Cf. *supra*, ch. 8, n. 64.
- 79 Leonardo, PG 159: 936 (not included in CC 1): *at quid dicam arguamne principem, quem semper praecipuo honore veneratus sum: cujus fidem erga Romanam Ecclesiam intellexi, nisi pusillanimitate vinceretur?*
- 80 *Ibid.*, 934 [CC 1: 146]: *quid autem imperator perplexus agat, ignorat*. Cf. *supra*, ch. 8, text with n. 14.
- 81 Leonardo, PG 159: 934 [CC 1: 146]: *Angustia igitur afflictus imperator . . . paucitate suorum diffidens*.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 935 (not included in CC 1): *severitas a principe aberat; nec compescebantur verbere aut gladio, qui neglexissent obedientiam. Idcirco quispiam suis efferebatur voluptatibus, blandimentisque . . . demulcebant iratum imperatoris animum; delusus improbe a suis, bonus ille dissimulare malebat injurias*. In PG 159: 930 (not included in CC 1), Leonardo is even more specific: *Sed ignoro, utrumne imperator, aut iudices damnandi quibus correctionis virga, quanquam minae intercessissent, aberat*.
- 83 *Ibid.*, PG 159: 941 [CC 1: 162]: *at imperator infelix, ut vidi capitaneum [sc. Giovanni Giustiniani] desperatum*; and PG 159: 941 [CC 1: 164]: *Quibus innixus imperator cadens atque resurgens, relabitur, et compressione princeps patriae e vita demigrat*.
- 84 See, e.g., his letter (dated July 6) to his friend Cardinal Bessarion, CC 1: 74: *erat autem cum imperatore illo [sc. Constantino] ductor quidam nomine Iohannes Iustinianus, quem multi incusant primam fuisse causam tantae captivitatis et excidii; sed omittamus*.
- 85 See, e.g., his own comments in the same letter to Cardinal Bessarion, dated *die sexta Iulii anno Domini M^oCCCC^oLIII^o*, *ibid.*, p. 66: *Et per immortalem Deum, cuius oculis patent et manifesta sunt omnia, saepius ac saepius illum execratus sum ac maledixi ex Turcis qui me sagitta fixit atque in sinistra capitis parte vulneravit ante ianuam cuiusdam monasterii, non acriter tamen ut eadem hora mihi vitam eripuerit . . . sed me Deus, opinor, servare voluit, ut reliquas omnes tales ac tantas infortunatissimae illius urbis adversitates conspiciam*.
- 86 This letter was dictated by Isidore in Greek and was translated into Latin, as the *incipit* declares: *Epistola composita per ser Pasiun de Bertipalia notarium ad instantium reverendissimi domini domini Isidori cardinalis Sabiniensis*; for the quotation in this text, see *ibid.*, p. 60: *illa enim die anima dicti ultimi Constantini Romanorum imperatorum, impensato martirio coronata non dubitatur ad superos evolasse cum alia christianorum multitudine copiosa qui cum eo impie occisi fuerunt, inter quos, crede, beatissime pater,*

fuisse multos solemnes clericos, quam plures insignes et alios multos vita et moribus notabiles tam incolas et advenas.

- 87 For the complete text of this fascinating elegy, see M. Baselga y Ramírez, *El Cancionero Catalán de la Universidad de Zaragoza* (Zaragoza, 1896), pp. 247–256; it has been republished and discussed in D. S. Cirac Estopañan, *Bizancio y España: La Caída del Imperio Bizantino y los Españoles* (Barcelona, 1954), 99–111; the quotation in our text comes from stanza 10, lines 73–76 [p. 103]: *el noble Emperador; / muy animoso, con su caballería, / les resistiese, diciendo ques más valia / morir por Dios que vivir en dishonor.*
- 88 Nestor-Iskander, 77 (pp. 86, 87): пойте во врата, но не можааше пройти оть многаго трупя. И паки срѣтоша ихъ множество Турокъ, н сѣчахуся съ ними и до нощи. И тако пострада благовѣрный царь Ко[н]стянтинъ за церкви божіа и за православную вѣру, мѣсяца Маія въ 29 день.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 14.107 (p. 155); 34.21 (p. 271); 51.17 (p. 369); and 115.1 (p. 684).
- 90 *Ibid.*, 14.107 (p. 155): ὅς καὶ ἀπεκτάνθη τότε παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γενομένῃ χαλάστρᾳ, αὐτὸς τε καὶ πάντες οἱ λογάδες σχεδόν, καὶ ἐκομίσαιτο τὸν τοῦ μαρτυρίου στέφανον μὴ θελήσας προδοῦναι τοῖς ἀνόμοις τὰ βασιλεία μῆτε θελήσας τὸν κίνδυνον διαφυγεῖν δυνατοῦ ὄντος.
- 91 *Ibid.*, 34.21 (p. 271): καὶ ἐσκοτώθη ὁ ἅγιος ἡμῶν αὐθέντης καὶ ἰσαπόστολος μάρτυς κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος βασιλεὺς ὁ Παλαιολόγος.
- 92 *Ibid.*, 51.17 (p. 369): καὶ ἐσκοτώθη ὁ ἅγιος καὶ μέγας βασιλεὺς καὶ μάρτυς Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Παλαιολόγος.
- 93 *Ibid.*, 115.1 (p. 684).
- 94 *Ibid.*, 4.1017–1024 (p. 81).
- 95 *PG* 159: 941: *Imperator infelix.*
- 96 Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, l. 371: τυφλὸς τά τ’ ὄτα τὸν τε νοῦν τά τ’ ὄμμα[α].
- 97 *Minus*, 36, contains 14 paragraphs, in which he lists all the diplomatic activities that the emperor took to save his capital and reports that his pleas for help were heard by no one in western or eastern Christendom. He concludes this section by emphasizing the piety of Constantine and by agreeing with Pusculo that Constantine had been forsaken by God; see *Minus*, 36.14: τίς καὶ νηστείας καὶ δεήσεις ἐποιεῖτο καὶ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἱερέων διδοὺς αὐτοῖς χρήματα, ἢ τοῖς πτωχοῖς πλείω ἐθεράπευσεν, ἢ ἐπαγγελίας ἐποιήσατο πλείους εἰς θεὸν εἰς τὸ ἐλευθερωθῆναι τοὺς Χριστιανούς ἀπὸ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας τῶν Τουρκῶν; ἀλλ’ ὅμως πάντα ταῦτα μὲν παρεῖδε θεός, τίσι κρίμασιν, οὐκ οἶδα, τὰ δὲ ἠγνοοῦσαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἕκαστος ἔλεγε κατ’ ἐκείνου.
- 98 Kritoboulos, 1.72.1, 2: θηήσκει δὲ καὶ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος αὐτός . . . μαχόμενος, σώφρων μὲν καὶ μέτριος ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν βίῳ γενομένου, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐς ἄκρον ἐπιμεμηλημένος, συνετός τε καὶ τῶν ἄγαν πεπαιδευμένων, κὰν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δὲ πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ οὐδενὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλείων τῶν πρωτείων παραχωρῶν, ὅζυς μὲν συνιδεῖν τὸ δέον παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὅζυτερος δ’ ἐλέσθαι, δεινὸς εἰπεῖν δεινὸς δὲ νοῆσαι, δεινότερος δὲ πράγμασιν ὀμιλῆσαι, τῶν μὲν παρόντων ἀκριβῆς γνώμων, ἥπερ ἔφη τις ὑπὲρ Περικλέους, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον τοῦ εἰκότος ἀριστος εἰκαστής, ὑπὲρ τε τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν αἰρούμενος, ὅς γε καὶ τὸν ἐπικείμενον τῇ Πόλει προφανῆ κίνδυνον ὁρῶν αὐτοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ δυνάμενος αὐτὸν ἐκσῶσαι καὶ πολλοὺς ἔχων τοὺς πρὸς τοῦτο παρακαλοῦντας οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ’ εἶλετο συναποθανεῖν τῇ πατρίδι τε καὶ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προαποθανεῖν αὐτός, ὅπως μὴ ταύτην τε ἀλοῦσαν ἐπίδοι καὶ τῶν οἰκητῶρων τοὺς μὲν σφαττομένους ὡμῶς, τοὺς δὲ δορυαλώτους καὶ ἀπαγομένους αἰσχυρῶς. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶδε τοὺς πολεμίους βιαζομένους τε αὐτὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦ κατερριμένου τείχους εἰσχεομένους ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν λαμπρῶς, εἰπεῖν λέγεται μέγα βοήσας ὑστάτην ταύτην φωνήν “ἡ Πόλις ἀλίσκεται κάμοι ζῆν ἔτι περιεστίν;” καὶ οὕτως ἐς μέσους τοὺς πολεμίους ὥσαί τε ἑαυτὸν καὶ κατακοπήναι. οὕτως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ κηδεμών, δυστυχῆς μέντοι παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ, κὰν τῷ τέλει δὲ δυστυχέστατος.

- 99 See, e.g., the concluding statement of *CBB* 1: 14.107 (p. 155), quoted, *supra*, nn. 90–93.
- 100 On the debated authorship of this poem, cf. *supra*, ch. 4, n. 105. This poem is entitled *Θρήνος τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως: Διήγησις πάνυ θλιβερῆ πονετικῆ καὶ πλήρη / Βαβαὶ παπαὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς τῆς Κωνσταντίνου πόλης* in A. E. Ellissen, *Analekten der mittel- und neugriechischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 106–249; the same poem is entitled *Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, in É. Legrand, *Bibliothèque grecque vulgaire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1880; repr.: Athens, 1974), pp. 169–203; Legrand's edition (based on manuscript 2909 of the *Bibliothèque nationale* of Paris) includes a prose summary that follows the title; it is encountered only in the Paris manuscript 2909 (and is not published in Ellissen): *Θρήνος τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως. ἠγμάλωτίσθη δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων ἔτει αὐνγ', μηνὶ μαῖω κθ', ἡμέρα τρίτῃ, ὥρα πρώτη τῆς ἡμέρας. λόγος θρηνητικὸς καὶ θλιβερός καὶ πολλὰ πονετικὸς καὶ ἀναστεναγμένος περὶ τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, καὶ εἰς τὸν βασιλέα καὶ περὶ τὰ μοναστήρια καὶ τῶν ἁγίων λειψάνων, ρητόρων, ψαλτῶν, ὕμνοποιῶν, διδασκάλων καὶ ἀρχόντων, καὶ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς καὶ αἰγμάλωσις, ὅπου ἐσυνέβη τῆς ταπεινῆς τῆς πόλης, καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐθεντῶν τῆς Φραγγίας καὶ ὅλα τὰ κουμούνια ἀρχομένου ἀπὸ τὸ παρόν, Φρατζέζους, Ἀγκλέζους, Πορτογαλέζους, Σπάνια, Κατελάνους, Ταλιάνους, Αλαμάνους, Οὐγγάρους, Ρομάνους, Βενετικούς, Γενουβήζους, Σέρβους, Βλάχους, Βουλγάρους, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς, τὰ ὅποια ῥήματα γράφονται διὰ στίχου.*
- 101 Legrand edition: l. 296 (p. 179): Βενετία φουμιστή; l. 311 (p. 179): Γενουβῆσαι φρόνιοι; ll. 333, 334 (p. 180): ὃ Φράντζα τιμιώτατη καὶ πολυφουμισμένη Φρατζόρτζιδες πολεμισταί; l. 346 (p. 180): Ἐκλέξοι φρονομώτατοι; l. 354 (p. 180): Φρατζέζους καὶ Οὐγκλέζιδας, Σπανιόλους, Αλαμάνους; and ll. 465, 466 (p. 181): τὸν αὐθέντην, τὸν δοῦκαν, κύριον τῆς Μπουργούνιας, τὸν μέγαν στρατιώτην, respectively; also cf. the prose summary of this poem quoted in the previous note.
- 102 Entitled *Questo è lamento de Costantinopoli* and printed in *CC* 2: 296–315.
- 103 *CC* 2: 451 (p. 312); 463 (p. 312); 465, 466 (p. 313); 471 (p. 313); 475 (p. 313); 479 (p. 313); 483 (p. 313); 487 (p. 313); 491 (p. 313); 493 (p. 314); 501 (p. 314); 508 (p. 314); 511 (p. 314); 515 (p. 314); 518 (p. 314); and 519 (p. 314), respectively.
- 104 *El Cancionero Catalán* (ed. Estopañan): 187 (p. 106); 225 (p. 107); 229 (p. 107); 233 (p. 107); 241 (p. 107); 247 (p. 107); 249, 250 (p. 108); 253 (p. 108); 257 (p. 108); 266 (p. 108); 281 (p. 109); 289–296 (p. 108); 297–300 (p. 108); 301–304 (p. 109); and 305–312 (p. 109), respectively.
- 105 *CC* 2: 359, 360 (p. 309): *Acerba[mente] lacrimare, / Verso quel Costantino imperatore.*
- 106 *Ibid.*, p. 305: *Non so pensare qual cor de lione / Lacrimar non fazesse da bon core, / Vedendo imperatore / Costantin[o] morto in questa battaglia.*
- 107 Legrand edition: l. 185: τὸν βασιλέα τὸν πτωχόν, τὸν ἄθλιον Κωνσταντίνου.
- 108 *Ibid.*, l. 189 (p. 175): καὶ ἐγέλασθην ὁ πτωχὸς κ' ἐχάσε τὴν ζωὴν του.
- 109 *Ibid.*, ll. 46–48 (p. 171): ὃ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, κακὸν ρίζικὸν ποῦχες, / τύχην πάνυ βλαβερὴν, μοῖραν ἀτυχεστάτην, / καὶ σκοτεινὴν καὶ δολερὴν, ἀστραποκαίμενην.
- 110 On Constantine and the alleged atrocities that he (or his troops) may have committed, see *supra*, ch. 5, nn. 131–138.
- 111 Legrand edition: l. 63 (p. 171); l. 246 (p. 177); l. 676 (p. 191); and l. 908 (p. 198).
- 112 Legrand edition: l. 84 (p. 172): καὶ σὺ ἀνδρειωμένε βασιλεῦ, κακὸν ρίζικὸν ποῦχες; l. 93 (p. 172): ὃ βασιλεῦ πανφρόνιμε, κακὸν ρίζικὸν ποῦχες; l. 105 (p. 173): [ὃ] Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, πολλὸν κακὸν τὸ ποῖκες; l. 112 (p. 172); l. 276 (p. 178): ὃ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, τίς σου ἡ δόλια τύχη; l. 935 (p. 199): ὃ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, κακὴν τύχην ὀπούχες; l. 329 (p. 180); l. 456 (p. 184): ὃ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, τύχην βαρεὰν ὀπούχες; l. 523 (p. 186): ὃ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, τύχην κακὴν τὴν εἶχες; l. 585 (p. 188), l. 740 (p. 193), and l. 996 (p. 201): ὃ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, τύχην κακὴν ὀπούχες.
- 113 The basic bibliography on Sekoundinos includes the following: P. D. Mastrodemetres, *Νικόλαος Σεκουδινὸς (1402–1464) Βίος καὶ Ἔργον: Συμβολὴ εἰς τὴν Μελέτην τῶν Ἑλλήνων Λογίων τῆς Διασπορᾶς* [Βιβλιοθήκη Σοφίας Ν. Σαρπόλου 9] (Athens,

- 1970); *idem*, “Nicolaos Secundinòs a Napoli dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli,” *Ἱταλοελληνικά: Rivista di cultura greco-moderna* 2 (1989): 21–38; F. Babinger, “Nikolaos Sagountinos, ein griechisch-venedischer Humanist des 15. Jhdts,” *Χαριστήριον εἰς Ἀναστάσιον Ὀρλάνδου*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1965): 198–212; A. M. Talbot, “Sekoundinos, Nicholas,” in *ODB*, vol. 3 (New York and Oxford, 1991), p. 1865; J. Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II,” *DOP* 49 (1995) [= *Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th-15th Centuries*]: 137 ff.; Philippides, *Mehmed the Conqueror*, ch. 2; and *SFC*, pp. 40, 41, no. 10.
- 114 On July 5, 1453, Sekoundinos was ordered to accompany the Venetian nobleman Bartolamio Marcello to Istanbul and act as his interpreter; both men were to seek an audience with Mehmed II. Marcello and Sekoundinos arrived in the devastated city and stayed there for two months. They were the first official visitors from the west to tour the largely deserted city. On this visit, see Mastrodemetres, *Νικόλαος Σεκουνδινός*, pp. 53–55. In addition, see Babinger, “Nikolaos Sagountinos,” p. 203.
- 115 *NE* 3: 320 [CC 2: 136]: *Imperator ubi hostem ruinas iam occupare moenium victoriae potiri certissima vidit, ne caperetur vivus, sibi ipsi quidem proprias inicere manus et hoc pacto consciscere mortem, tametsi animus minus deerat, nefas tamen duxit et christiano principe per religionem indignum, suos, qui pauci aderant, hortari coepit, ut se occiderent; sed cum tantum facinus audere voluisset nemo, imperatoris insignibus depositis et abiectis, ne hostibus notus fieret, privatum <se> gerens stricto ense in aciem irruit fortiterque pugnando, ne inultus abiret . . . tandem est interemptus*. It was, in fact, at the request and invitation of the pope and of Alfonso of Aragon that Sekoundinos traveled to Rome and to Naples; both the pope and Alfonso, no doubt, wished to hear of the existing conditions in Constantinople that had been visited by Sekoundinos; see Barbaro, Appendix, Document 10 [= *A.S.V. Sen. Secreti, reg. XX, fol. 3'*]: *prudens vir Nicolaus Sagundino, quem ad nos misistis . . . cumque romanus pontifex eum audire voluerit, iuxta requisitionem suam ad eum se contulit, ut subinde etiam ad Serenissimum Regem Aragonum, qui eum requisivit, se transferre possit*. This speech of Sekoundinos survives in at least three separate manuscripts (see the list in Mastrodemetres, *Νικόλαος Σεκουνδινός*, p. 57, n. 1). One modern editor, V. V. Makušev, has printed the entire text in *Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalium Vicinorumque Populorum*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1874), pp. 295–306, but as he utilized the text of a single inferior manuscript and not a collation of available manuscripts, this edition contains numerous errors. A better edition (which unfortunately printed only extracts) is in *NE* 3: 316–323; more recently, selections from this speech were edited and were published (with Italian translation) in *CC* 2: 128–141. A brief discussion and evaluation of this important speech can be found in Mastrodemetres, *Νικόλαος Σεκουνδινός*, pp. 55–59. The quotation in our text can be found in *NE* 3: 320 [CC 2: 136]. For the definitive edition of this speech, with reliable text, see C. Capizzi, “L’Oratio ad Alphonsum Regem Aragonum (1454) di Nicola Sagundino, riedita secondo un ms. finora ignoto,” *OCP* 64 (1998): 329–357.
- 116 Complete letter in R. Wolkan, *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*, vol. 3 [Fontes Rerum Austriacarum 68] (Vienna, 1918), pp. 189–202. Selections (with Italian translation) are also printed in *CC* 2: 48–60). The extract in our text can be found in *CC* 2: 52–54: *nemo Latinorum satis videri doctus poterat, nisi Constantinopoli per tempus studuisset. Quodque florente Roma doctrinarum nomen habuerunt Athenae, id nostra tempestate videbatur Constantinopolis obtinere. Inde nobis Plato redditus, inde Aristotelis, Demosthenis, Xenophontis, Thuchididis, Basilii, Dionisii, Origenis et aliorum multa Latinis opera diebus nostris manifestata sunt, multa quoque in futurum manifestanda sperabamus . . . Nunc ergo et Homero et Pindaro et Menandro et omnibus illustrioribus poetis secunda mors erit. Nunc Graecorum philosophorum ultimus patebit interitus*.
- 117 *CC* 2: 46: *quid de libris dicam, qui illic erant innumerabiles, nondum Latinis cogniti? Heu, quot nunc magnorum nomina virorum peribunt? Secunda mors ista Homero est,*

secundus Platoni obitus. Ubi nunc philosophorum aut poetarum ingenia requiremus? Extinctus est fons Musarum. The fears of Aeneas Sylvius were real to a great extent. We find out elsewhere that a large number of manuscripts appropriated by the Turks during the sack were destroyed, sold for pennies, or otherwise disposed of irreverently. From a document dated *ap. s. Petr. a. 1453, viii. id. octob. pontif. anno septimo* (= Rome, October 4, 1453) [Reg. 401, fol. 47, Secret Archives of the Vatican, published in L. Pastor, *The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages Drawn from Secret Archives of the Vatican and Other Original Sources*, trans. and ed. F. I. Antrobus, vol. 2 (London, 1949), Appendix, Document 22 (pp. 524, 525)] we learn that Bishop Leonardo somehow found time during the sack, presumably after he had been ransomed, to buy books plundered from a Latin library: *Et sicut eadem petitio subjungebat venerabilis frater noster Leonardus archiepiscopus Methalinensis [= Mytilinensis], ord<inis> fratrum praedicatorum professor in Constantinopoli et Pera . . . ipseque archiepiscopus duo missalia et unum breviarium et nonnullos alios libros dict<a>e librari<a>e deputatos emere non dubitaverit.*

118 NE 3: 320 [CC 2: 136]: *princeps immortalitate dignus . . . ruinisque urbis ac regni casui regium immiscuit cadaver.*

11 *Rex quondam rexque futurus*

May 29, 1453

1 History and pseudo-history

Greeks of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were compelled to express their hopes for salvation in the form of millennial prophecies. Talk of imminent divine intervention became popular, while the loss of homeland was being increasingly attributed to the “sins” of the leadership.¹ The historical past was recast into millennial ideologies and folk histories. A number of tales were already in circulation by the end of the fifteenth century; their nucleus focused on Constantine XI and on his immediate family.

Thus Nestor-Iskander,² an eyewitness, spoke of an “empress”: “[T]he *strategoï* [= generals] and great lords who remained, took the empress, the noble maids, and the many young women, boarded the ships and galleys . . . and [went] to the island and the families of the Morea.” There was, of course, no empress. Yet rumors of her existence persisted. A sixteenth-century verse chronicle by Hierax, an official at the Patriarchate of Constantinople, relates her last moments:³

The wretched emperor Constantine, who was also known as Dragaš,/fled, with his wife and children, to the church of God’s Wisdom [= Santa Sophia]/. . ./ There, he, the children with him, and his servants/partook of the awesome sacraments of the Lord./Then, alas, he ordered the decapitation of his wife,/ of his children, and of all his servants,/as he thought that they should not remain alive.

Similar information is supplied in an early seventeenth-century anonymous chronicle:⁴ “Then, it is said, he [*sc.* the emperor] summoned his confessor and he, his queen, and his children confessed. Then he had his children and his queen beheaded in front of his eyes.”

This story must have been surrounded by an aura of authenticity because the sixteenth-century professor and author of the monumental *Turcograecia*, Martinus Crusius (or Martin Kraus), became convinced that Constantine XI did have a wife in 1453. Crusius wrote to Theodosios Zygomalas, an important official at the Patriarchate of Constantinople and an avid collector and seller of manuscripts, and asked for further information with regard to Constantine’s queen.⁵ Zygomalas did

not dismiss the tale offhand but in his reply⁶ to Crusius he supplied the details we have already encountered in Hierax:⁷

There is a tale that he [*sc.* Constantine XI] first partook of the divine sacrament together with his children, his queen, his numerous relatives, and all his servants, whose decapitation he then ordered so that they would not be captured. I do not know the name of the last empress. I have asked many people but no one could tell me true words or could show me a document.

Crusius went on to compose two epigrams in ancient Greek in honor of the last imperial couple of Constantinople; he assigned two lines to Constantine XI and four to his supposed queen:⁸

Here (where? God knows) your own homeland became your tomb,/lord of the Hellenes, most wretched Constantine.

Here (where? God knows) a nameless tomb holds you,/queen of the Hellenes; a mournful Niobe it conceals./May God erase all tears from your kind/eyes with endless joy.

Widely circulated prophecies further contaminated the legends. Such stories present us with curious amalgams of popular ideas, folk motifs, and religious speculation. Adulterated with timeless notions about divine kings and heavenly avengers, they summon motifs that have been present in Mediterranean folklore since time immemorial: death and resurrection. These tales form a notable genre of Greek popular literature in the early era after the conquest. The common denominator of these tales consists of a stubborn refusal to accept the irrevocable loss of Constantinople.

A “solution” to this thorny problem was offered early in the next century, when the curious legend of the “surrender” of Constantinople is first noted. According to this tale, the city did not fall to Mehmed II by the sword but submitted willingly.⁹ Human traitors thus assumed responsibility for the loss of this city; at the same time, the divine guardians were absolved of any charge of dereliction of duty.¹⁰ This legend is ultimately based on a fact: a number of churches were not only spared in the sack but were also left to the Christians after the sack. Thus the Church of the Holy Apostles (*Fatih Camii* after conversion) survived injury in 1453 because the sultan dispatched a special detachment of elite troops to protect it from molestation.¹¹ In addition, the Church of Theotokos Pammakaristos (a convent at the time of the siege; after conversion to Islam it became known as *Fethiye Camii*) was also spared. Saint John in Trullo (currently known as *Ahmed Pasha Mescidi*), Saint Demetrios Kanabou, Santa Maria Peribleptos (present-day *Sulu Monastir* or *Surp Kevork* of the Armenians), Saint George of the Cypresses, Saint John at Stoudios (*Imrahor Camii*), and Saint Andrew in Krisei (*Koca Mustafa Pasha Camii*) were all left in Christian hands after the sack. All churches that survived immediate conversion after the fall are located in the districts of Phanari, Psamathia, and Petrion. Recorded as late as the seventeenth century, oral tales

from these neighborhoods preserved the memory of a possible surrender. Some of these districts (such as Petron, which in 1453 was surrounded by its own wooden palisade) may have submitted, as soon as it became evident that Turks had assumed command of the Pempton sector by the western walls,¹² and may have opened the gates of their stockades, in a pathetic, last-ditch attempt to spare the local inhabitants and their possessions from harm.

Even the Muslim religious authorities of Istanbul saw advantages in this unlikely version of events, as the “surrender” of Constantinople furnished a solution to a perplexing legal situation that had surfaced by the sixteenth century: how was it that the Christians had been allowed the use of some churches after the conquest? If the city had been taken by force and had not submitted willingly, its enslaved inhabitants should not have kept possession, in theory at least, of any church. Islamic law decreed that the people of the Book (the *ahl al-kitab*, “the people of the Bible,” i.e., Jews and Christians) retained no rights whatsoever if they were conquered by the sword. In the Ottoman system the property of conquered populations automatically became state property.¹³

The patriarchs and their lawyers in their relations with the Porte effectively used this legend of the submission of Constantinople in the sixteenth century; it enabled them to argue that the conqueror himself, Mehmed II, had personally granted the Christians and their clerics a number of privileges, as a consequence of their “voluntary capitulation.” Ca. 1520, for instance, during the reign of Selim I Yavuz (the grandson of the conqueror), Patriarch Theoleptos I was able to produce three aged janissaries who swore on the Koran that they had been present during the siege and that the city had actually surrendered:¹⁴

Theoleptos responded: “If it be permitted, I will remind your Majesty of the fall of the City. Our ancestors surrendered, without a fight, half of the City to Sultan Mehmed under an agreement that (i) the churches of the Christians would not become mosques, (ii) weddings, funerals, and other Christian customs will continue unobstructed, and (iii) the holiday of Easter will be celebrated freely.” . . . The *mufti* asked the patriarch if he had the written document of this agreement. The patriarch responded that it had perished in a fire but that he could produce, however, three janissaries who were eyewitnesses to this pact. The three men, close to one hundred years old, came and testified that they were present at the fall of the City; they remembered that the noblemen of the City willingly submitted to Sultan Mehmed; that they came outside his tent, that they brought the keys of the City on a golden plate, and that they presented a number of petitions, which Sultan Mehmed granted.

Even in historical texts, in which this fiction could not be maintained, we encounter echoes of surrender, as this matter is closely related to the question of patriarchal privileges. A later text (disguised as authentic) fails to mention the legend of the surrender but attempts to supply in its place a document that lends authority to these patriarchal privileges:¹⁵

The sultan gave decrees with royal authority and undersigned by him to the patriarch, which ensured that no man would hinder or annoy him; the patriarch was absolved of taxation and tribute. The sultan further declared that all future patriarchs and their high clerics would enjoy the same privileges and would be similarly immune from taxation and tribute forever.

This source, however, is not reliable, as it does not duplicate, on this point, information found in the authentic *Minus* written by Sphrantzes himself. Thus, Pseudo-Sphrantzes may be recording an oral tradition that was in circulation at the patriarchate, ca. 1570, during the “forger’s” visit to Constantinople. By then the existence of these rights and privileges had already been defended a number of times. If such a document signed by the conqueror, presumably in the form of a *firman* or a *berat*, had ever existed, it had already vanished by 1520, when Patriarch Theoleptos I proved unable to produce it and had to rely instead on the testimony of the aged janissaries. Theoleptos I claimed that this precious deed had perished in a fire at the patriarchate.¹⁶ Plausibly the “decree” mentioned in the text penned by Pseudo-Sphrantzes is meant to be identical with Theoleptos’ lost document. It may be concluded that such a document may be entirely fictitious, as no references to the existence of this important piece of legislation in Ottoman Constantinople are found in the surviving sources.¹⁷ It seems more likely that the conqueror gave verbal pledges to this patriarch and assured him of his good will. This understanding prevailed during the lifetime of Mehmed. It was under his successors that the privileges came under fire and some document had to be invented, by hook or by crook.

The tale of the surrender of Constantinople must have sounded authentic in the sixteenth century. After all, the legal authorities of the Ottoman government took it seriously. Sultan Selim I, his *divan*, and the highest Muslim legal authority declared, after careful deliberation we are told,¹⁸ that the city, as far as it was known, had been conquered by the sword; but at the same time there was strong evidence to suggest that it had submitted. This ambiguous conclusion was thus sanctioned by legal force and was destined to become an effective weapon in the arsenal of the patriarchate every time the need arose to defend the ancient privileges that had been supposedly granted by the conqueror; since no document could be produced, the conclusion of the court had to suffice and its verdict suited both the Muslim authorities and the Orthodox patriarch. Furthermore, to the Greeks this tale suggested that human agents were responsible for betraying Constantinople to the Turks.

2 Emperor and legend

Another equally important focal point of early stories was the city’s last emperor, Constantine XI. The activities of the emperor and of his elite troops – the nucleus of the defense – can be followed up to a certain point during the night of May 28 and early morning of May 29. Before the commencement of the assault, the emperor’s soldiers and crack regiments under the command of Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani (the Genoese *condottiere* from Chios who, in the capacity of

commander in chief or *dux militiae*, had brilliantly directed the operations of the defense throughout the long siege) took their positions on the ruined fortifications, at the most vulnerable spot on the valley of Lycus, the sector of the Pempton (*Hücum Kapı* and the modern neighborhood of *Sulu Kule*), as far as the Gate of Adrianople (*Edirne Kapı*¹⁹) and prepared to defend the critical area.

If we are to believe some testimonies, the emperor, his lieutenants, and members of the court had visited the church of Santa Sophia earlier that evening and had attended the last Christian celebration, a joined Catholic mass and Orthodox liturgy. After services Constantine returned to his palace, addressed his Venetian and Genoese allies and comrades in arms, and urged them to be brave, since they all knew that the assault was about to begin. In careful and elegant prose Leonardo paints a dignified scene mixed with tones of impending doom. His composition has managed to move even critics of medieval Greece.²⁰ Leonardo is followed by Pseudo-Sphrantzes, who also rose to the solemn occasion to report in direct discourse, the speech of the emperor, concluding his scene with the following words:²¹

The unfortunate Romans listened to his words, became strong like lions, and asked and granted forgiveness from each other; they embraced with lamentation and put away all concern for their dearest. . . . But the emperor went to the most revered Church of Santa Sophia, prayed with lamentation, and partook of the divine sacraments. Many others did so also during that night. Afterwards, the emperor returned to the palace for a while and asked to be forgiven by all. Who can describe the wailing and tears that arose in the palace at that hour? No man, even if he were made of wood or stone, could have held back his tears.

Indeed, such passages reflect a monumental, tragic mood. Yet the historian may inquire as to their accuracy. Was there in fact a last celebration attended by the emperor, the Catholics, and the Orthodox in Santa Sophia? Did the emperor actually address his Constantinopolitan and Italian barons in his palace before the general assault? Was there really an opportunity for such speeches? Aside from Leonardo, who has a flair for the dramatic, other eyewitnesses fail to mention such touching scenes. There is every reason to conclude that Leonardo has provided his own free embellishment of the situation. The speech that he reports and attributes to the emperor may be the bishop's own invention and his personal effort to color and flavor, with additional pathos and dignity, his narrative that is about to reach its climactic point. Leonardo is paraphrased by Pseudo-Sphrantzes,²² who produces an even longer speech through mere rhetorical *amplificatio*.²³ The chances are that, in the hours preceding the general assault, there was no time for a celebration in Santa Sophia, at least as far as the active defenders were concerned. Such services for commanders and troops must have been held, if they took place at all, in the vicinity of the walls, where the main attack was expected, perhaps in the church of Saint Savior in Khora (present day *Kariye Camii*), which had been functioning as the imperial chapel for a number of years prior to the siege. It is inconceivable

that the emperor and all his important commanders, native, Venetian, and Genoese, left their posts, moved in a procession all the way from the western critical sector in the *Sulu Kule* area already under direct attack to Santa Sophia by the Golden Horn, then made their way to the “palace,” where Constantine delivered a leisurely speech and only then, after this long absence from the walls, did they take their assigned places on the fortifications, just moments before the commencement of hostilities. The plain fact is that Constantine had abandoned his imperial quarters at the palace, which had been turned over to the Venetian *bailo*, and his troops during most of the siege.²⁴ We do know from eyewitness sources that Constantine XI had erected a tent to house himself and to serve as his headquarters in the enclosure between the great and outer walls in the vicinity of the Gate of Saint Romanus (*Top Kapı*) and the Pempton/*Hücüm Kapı*, at this late stage in the drama.²⁵ The emperor and his commanders, who had been constantly repairing the damaged defenses with their troops and workers, would have had no opportunity to assemble for last-minute processions, speeches, and farewell scenes, no matter how moving and dignified such events would have been. In all likelihood, they were all too busy supervising the last-minute repairs that must have been going on at a feverish pace, as the general assault was expected. Moreover, all day long the Turks would have kept the defenders busy with minor engagements, bombardment, and skirmishes. If any speeches were pronounced, they would have been by necessity very short and hastily improvised at the Pempton sector. If any church services were conducted for the troops and commanders of the land sectors, they took place in the vicinity of the walls or in the imperial chapel of Khora (*Kariye Camii*), near the fortifications, and not in Santa Sophia in the tip of the Golden Horn. We can only conclude that Leonardo paints a fictional scene within the ancient cathedral and within the imperial palace in order to add nobility, atmosphere, and pathos to his narrative, as he wished to wrap the slain emperor in a shroud of tragic dignity.

Giovanni Giustiniani and Constantine XI, warlord and emperor, find themselves inseparably connected during the assault. At his arrival in the capital, Giustiniani was granted the title of *protostrator* (which Leonardo accurately renders into Latin as *dux militiae*) and was entrusted with the defense of the land walls. Throughout the siege he and his professional band deployed themselves at the most vulnerable spot of the fortifications, the Pempton sector, where the Turkish siege engines and cannon had concentrated their bombardment to raze the walls.

It is possible that Giustiniani’s purported reputation as a specialist in the defense of walled cities earned him this high post in Constantinople.²⁶ It is also possible that Constantine XI was so overjoyed at the arrival of such a large contingent from abroad (by far the most significant western contribution to the defense) that he placed its leader in complete charge of the land operations in the hope of attracting supplementary companies from Europe. This appointment, conversely, must have alienated a number of court nobles with anti-western feelings at the court, including perhaps the outspoken grand duke, Loukas Notaras.²⁷ Throughout the siege Notaras and Giustiniani displayed no affection for each other and on the eve of the general assault matters came to a head. Relations between the two individuals degenerated and a heated exchange of insults and curses ensued. Only through

the personal entreaties of the emperor did this violent quarrel find an apparent, perhaps insincere, resolution.²⁸

It is not clear what had attracted Giustiniani to Constantinople. If Barbaro,²⁹ who, most of the time, exhibits the traditional Venetian bias against the Genoese, is to be believed, the *condottiere* came to the city's aid, "because he saw the need that held Constantinople, for the benefit of Christendom, as well as for worldly honor." Kritoboulos (who wrote a long time after the siege), states, however, that Giustiniani responded to an invitation from Constantine's court: the emperor promised him the island of Lemnos in return for his services in the upcoming war.³⁰ Doukas also reports that the cession of Lemnos was confirmed by an imperial chrysobull.³¹ Such statements cannot be accepted blindly. Sphrantzes states that Constantine XI had already granted Lemnos to "the Catalan king" in return for naval aid:³² "Who knew that the Catalan king requested possession of Lemnos in order to defend against the Turks by sea and to assist the City when the need arose? And so it was done."

Separating the defenders from the enemy was a hastily erected stockade that had to be constantly reinforced and repaired. The ancient walls were especially vulnerable here, weakened by the stream of the Lycus Creek and the concentrated bombardment of the Ottoman artillery, but Giustiniani's engineers had successfully repaired the damage:³³ "As the enemy's massive stone projectiles damaged the wall with determination, with equally high spirits did he [*sc.* Giustiniani] effect repairs with bundles of logs, earth, and wine barrels, which he placed next to each other." Elsewhere Leonardo states that the constant bombardment had concentrated on three major spots.³⁴ Kritoboulos agrees and also mentions the erection of a stockade to replace the damaged fortifications:³⁵ "The cannon was demolishing the walls (already a great part of the outer, smaller wall had collapsed as well as two towers from the great wall . . .) . . . they brought long beams and formed a stockade over the collapsed wall, the outer wall, I mean." These statements are further supported by a passage in a letter of Cardinal Isidore.³⁶ The areas that sustained the greatest amount of damage can be identified easily even nowadays, as in certain spots of the middle wall the fortifications plainly do not exist. It was against these spots that the four notable Ottoman batteries had been deployed. The first was stationed at the northern sector, near the *Tekfur Saray* (the palace of Porphyrogennetus); the second, to the far south, bombarded the Pege Gate (*Silivri Kapı*); in-between these two positions, two additional batteries concentrated their fire upon the area around the Gate of Adrianople/Kharisios (*Edirne Kapı*) and upon the Pempton (*Hücum Kapısı*) and Saint Romanus (*Top Kapı*). The modern visitor can easily identify the Fifth Military Gate (*Hücum Kapı*) by a fifth-century Latin inscription on its marble lintel, bearing the name "*Pusaesus*." There is no doubt that this was the area of the general assault and the current, popular name of this gate and neighborhood preserves the memory of the event: *Hücum Kapısı*, "the Gate of the Assault."³⁷

On the eve of May 28 the defending troops passed through the gates of the Great Wall and took their assigned positions behind the stockade and the ruins of the outer wall. Behind them the gates of the Great Wall were securely locked, thus barring anyone from exiting or entering the city. This action was intended to prevent

the defenders from abandoning their posts; the upcoming struggle was evidently meant as a win-or-die situation. At the same time, no citizens from the interior could defect to the Turks, as there must have been numerous cases of desertion in the last days of May. Defectors undoubtedly had been supplying intelligence information to the Ottoman command.³⁸ The emperor had his own spies in the Ottoman camp. The sultan must have had his paid agents within the beleaguered city. As the day of the general assault drew near, potential defectors, sympathizers, and persons in the pay of the Porte must have become eager to join their master before the plunder commenced. Richer/Riccherio, who wrote a long time after the event, makes this suggestion.³⁹

If elements of a fifth column were working within Constantinople, the notorious incident involving the postern gate known as the Kerkoporta becomes understandable.⁴⁰ Apparently, this small sally port had been left open on the evening of May 28. During the last stages of the final assault a small number of Turks (probably no more than one hundred, at the most) “discovered” the Kerkoporta open, entered without opposition, climbed on the Great Wall, and erected their standards. The Venetians in charge of this sector mounted a successful counter-attack and eliminated the threat. Even though this incident was of no further military consequence, it left its mark in contemporary literature⁴¹ and was assigned immoderate weight. In fact, some contemporaries thought that it was the immediate cause of the defeat. Yet the effect of this minor incident was psychological. The Kerkoporta was situated in the neighborhood of the present-day Porphyrogenetus Palace/*Tekfur Saray*, where the Theodosian walls join the Heraclian addition, easily visible from the city itself and from the adjoining areas to the south along the land walls, as far as the Gate of Adrianople.⁴² While militarily this episode did not spell doom for Constantinople, it must have contributed to the demoralization of the population and of the defenders around the Gate of Adrianople (the highest point of the western fortifications), but not as far south as the Pempton area (the lowest point of the western fortifications). They had no way of knowing that the enemy contingent had been met and promptly dispatched. Is it possible that the Kerkoporta had been left open by a “defender” or by a group of individuals, who either wished to desert to the Turks or perhaps were eager to allow themselves an avenue of escape into the city during the assault or out of the city during the sack? It is also possible that this small gate had been left unlocked to allow entry back to the city to a scouting party, which failed to return.

Early in the morning of May 29 the first wave of Ottoman troops moved to storm the stockade before the Pempton; this wave consisted of the ill-trained and ill-equipped irregulars, whose ranks contained numerous Christian adventurers and renegades drawn to the Ottoman camp by the prospect of rich booty.⁴³ The better-armed, disciplined troops of Giustiniani and the emperor repelled them easily. Yet propelled by sheer numbers, this attack lasted two hours and achieved its primary objective of tiring the defenders. Allowing the garrison neither a respite nor a hiatus to make emergency repairs on the stockade, the sultan launched his second wave. It consisted of the regular Anatolian regiments. Better equipped than the irregulars, they displayed a greater degree of determination and launched

a disciplined attack. They, too, were repelled. All the while, the Ottoman batteries had maintained a bombardment. The third wave – the dread janissaries and best regiments of the sultan (kept in reserve so far) – finally entered the conflict. The janissary corps launched its assault upon the stockade in an orderly fashion and with deadly precision, exerting pressure on the soft spots of the perimeter simultaneously. The weary defenders struggled against this pressure and held their ground for some time and it must have looked as if they were about to carry the day when disaster struck.⁴⁴

Giustiniani, the valiant Genoese *condottiere*, was wounded at this critical moment and then demanded the key to the gate in order to withdraw into the city, and to take care of his wound; he added that he would return presently. The emperor, we are told, rushed to the scene and in vain tried to dissuade him. Giustiniani remained adamant. He was then given the key and he departed but he failed to return to his post, in spite of his promise. His conduct has been debated ever since.⁴⁵ Had he postponed his withdrawal, even for half an hour, the janissary assault might have been repelled and the city would have been saved. Undoubtedly, his retreat was the turning point in the battle. The departure of Giustiniani precipitated panic among the defenders, who began in small bands to follow the wounded warlord through the opened gate into the “safety” of the Great Wall. Their gradual withdrawal in time transformed itself into a rout, as the remaining defenders rushed their own gate and trampled each other to death. Perhaps it was at this time that the exhausted defenders, higher up around the Adrianople Gate, saw the Ottoman standards waving on the ramparts further north by the Kerkoporta, while they could also see the panic taking place south, in the sector of *Sulu Kule*, although we cannot be certain that the two events occurred at the same time. Consequently, the battle was lost in disastrous confusion and panic.

The sudden withdrawal of the commander-in-chief affords no easy explanation, especially in view of his tireless efforts throughout the course of the siege. Why this sudden change of heart? Barbaro, who was not present in this sector and could not have witnessed this incident, allows his Venetian bias to take control and states that “Giovanni Giustiniani, a Genoese from Genoa, decided to abandon his post and rushed to his ship, which was stationed by the middle of the chain.” In the margin of Barbaro’s manuscript,⁴⁶ however, a later hand has added an explanation: “because he was wounded by an arrow.” Angelo Giovanni Lomellino, the *podestà* of the Genoese colony of Pera, who was not among the defenders (but his own nephew was a volunteer with the defenders at the critical sector), may have had some information on the nature of Giustiniani’s wound, yet his text is not legible at this crucial point:⁴⁷ “Very early in the morning Giovanni Giustiniani received in . . . [i.e.: a serious wound?], retreated through the gate that he guarded, and went to the sea; from this very same gate the Turks entered, as there was no further resistance.”

Pusculo, who was one of the defenders on the walls, but not necessarily at this spot, also has his own version of the events:⁴⁸

Struck by a ball on the arm, Giovanni/departed, quietly took himself out of the conflict, and went to his ships;/either because he feared the Turks or because

he was compelled by the severity of his wound,/he deserted his post and left the wavering battle-line.

The most reasonable account of this incident is furnished in the Slavonic narrative of Nestor-Iskander, who was an eyewitness and among the defenders (but perhaps not present at the district of Saint Romanus). He states that Giustiniani was wounded twice in the course of the general assault. It was after his second wound that he decided to withdraw:⁴⁹

A stone shot, a spent ball, flew from the cannon, struck Giustiniani in the chest, and shattered his bosom . . . the strategoi and the great lords together with Giustiniani showed profound courage. Many people fell from both sides. So that God would will this to pass, there came flying a *sclopus* which struck Giustiniani on the right shoulder. He fell to the ground as if dead.

Combined with exhaustion, a second wound (which is further reported in another source⁵⁰) would render the conduct of the *condottiere* understandable.

Moreover, a story circulated in Constantinople during the sixteenth century, relating that a Greek defender had wounded the Genoese commander. We hear of this in the verse chronicle composed by Hierax, a grand logothete of the patriarchate:⁵¹

Above all, he was the bravest defender at the breach;/he fought firmly as he should throughout the conflict./Yet a spiteful individual with a firearm/took aim and struck him,/bringing about the valiant hero's death./It is said that one of the Romans from the interior/committed this wicked deed upon the Genoese man,/because he had been suffering with envy (as is usually the case with spiteful individuals everywhere)./He boarded his ships and departed to his homeland;/already the unfortunate man was breathing his last.

The same story is further preserved in the narrative of another text that was composed in the patriarchate in approximately the same period or perhaps a little earlier:⁵²

While he was at his post fighting, a shot from a harquebus hit him on the right leg; he collapsed like a corpse. His own men took him, went to the ships, made sail, and escaped as far as the island of Chios, where he died. It was rumored that he had been shot from within the fortifications but no one knows how it really came about.

Similar details are encountered in the sixteenth-century account composed by Richer/Riccherio.⁵³

Giustiniani may have been shot on purpose by one of the defenders, as rumors had it; alternatively, he may have been hit by a stray arrow, bolt, or bullet, perhaps originating among the defenders. In the confusion and semi-darkness of the early morning, while the immediate area was filled with smoke from cannon and

handgun discharge, someone from his own side may have struck Giustiniani. That his wound(s) was (were) serious cannot be disputed. He escaped on board his ship from the harbor of Constantinople, reached the island of Chios, but died within one month. He was buried in the Church of Saint Domenico. His grave displayed the following inscription:⁵⁴

Here lies Giovanni Giustiniani, a famous Genoese patrician of the *maona* of Chios; he was the warlord of the most serene Constantine, the last emperor of the eastern Christians, when Constantinople fell to the prince of the Turks, Mehmed; he died of a mortal wound, which he received in the beginning of August, on the 1458th [*sic*] year after the Virgin gave birth.

Early in August 1453, Leonardo, who had managed to flee from the sack and had also reached Chios, mentioned the death of the warlord in his letter of August 16, 1453, to Pope Nicholas V:⁵⁵ “The captain fled to Pera; next he sailed to Chios, where he died an inglorious death caused by either his wound or by sadness.” Identical sentiments are expressed in the narrative of Pseudo-Sphrantzes, who, however, was under the impression that Giustiniani died at Pera, before he set sail for Chios.⁵⁶ In the margin of one of the manuscripts of Leonardo’s account a later hand has appended an explanatory note:⁵⁷ “After he reached Chios, they gave Giovanni poison, which took away his life.”

In the morning mist of May 29 Giovanni Giustiniani (who was in shock and in pain) or one of his lieutenants demanded the key to the gate in order to withdraw to the city; the emperor argued against this course of action either with the *condottiere* himself or with his subordinate(s).⁵⁸ If this conversation actually took place – its contents aside – it could count as the last “observed” activity of Constantine XI. At least, it would have been witnessed by the troops making ready to depart, while the sector was under heavy attack. The most credible account of this incident is produced in a speech pronounced by Nikolaos Sekoundinos on January 25, 1454. Sekoundinos was not an eyewitness but visited Constantinople in the summer of 1453 as a member of an official Venetian delegation charged with the delicate mission of ransoming Venetians who had been captured in the sack. Sekoundinos and his fellow envoys were the first visitors from the west to tour the new Ottoman capital on official business:⁵⁹

When he saw that the enemy was applying greater force than usual and that the defenders were gradually tiring, as some were dead, many were wounded, and the rest were terrified and routed, Giovanni began to lose hope that the city would survive; he was wounded twice and went to the emperor . . . he promised to take the emperor on his own ship and to bring him to a safe place. When he heard the news, the emperor censured him for being afraid to die and urged him to go to the devil, adding that he expected to defend the city by himself with divine help.

Yet, in the absence of authentic evidence from the pen of an actual eyewitness, one may doubt the historicity of this incident in the form that is reported in our

accounts. It is possible that the conversation between the emperor and his warlord never took place and that Giustiniani and his surviving soldiers tacitly departed. As Giustiniani was in charge of the whole sector, he probably controlled the keys to the Pempton Gate and had no need to obtain them from the emperor. Thus, the emperor may have or may not have engaged in a heated debate with his warlord. He may have helplessly observed the retreat of his commander-in-chief. Given the general confusion in this sector, still under heavy attack,⁶⁰ I doubt that the emperor had an opportunity to rush to the side of the wounded *condottiere* and enter into a fruitless debate that degenerated into an exchange of curses. In all likelihood, the first sign of Giustiniani's withdrawal would have been the sudden absence of defenders in the sector and the rush of the remaining defenders to enter the city through the opened gate immediately after the departure of the Genoese warlord and withdrawal of his band.

Throughout the siege Constantine XI had walked a tightrope and had managed with great difficulty to maintain peace among the various groups of defenders, who shared no affection for each other: Venetians and Genoese, Greeks and Italians, Catholics and Orthodox, unionists and anti-unionists, pro-western, and pro-Turkish factions. His strong point had apparently consisted of the verbal appeals that he had successfully launched in the past two months, managing to restore temporary peace and civility among the defenders. More than once civil war seemed to be about to erupt within the city, but the emperor had managed to diffuse the tension. On this last occasion, his skill failed him and he proved unable to persuade the *condottiere* or his lieutenants to remain at the critical post a little longer. It should be remembered that the Genoese could back their demands by force of arms, as Giustiniani's regiments had consistently proven their skill in combat. Thus, the emperor could do nothing. He may have let out a stream of curses. Then in resignation he may have observed the retreat of his best troops, which followed their wounded leader into the doomed city probably in small, organized bands and in order. In time Giustiniani's band made its way to the harbor. Thus, it becomes likely that some of those soldiers in the retreating band had observed the heated conversation between warlord and emperor and subsequently escaped on board Giustiniani's ship to Chios; perhaps they had been in a position to describe this last quarrel between the emperor and his commander-in-chief. So oral versions of this incident eventually found their way into our sources and into the literature of the period. Alternatively, the entire incident involving emperor and warlord may be no more than fiction, inserted into various narratives for dramatic effect. The *condottiere* may have departed without informing his employer.

What exactly occurred at the ruined walls and the stockade after the departure of Giustiniani's band will never be known with any degree of certainty. It is precisely at this point that Constantine enters the mist and passes from history into the realm of legend and folklore. No details of the emperor's last stand were ever known. It is certain that he was involved in the last phase of the struggle near the fortifications by the sector of the Pempton – *Sule Kule*. Presumably, he perished in the ensuing struggle, but the particular details of his death are shrouded in mystery. A cardinal fact remains: no eyewitness author, whose work still survives, was anywhere near

the emperor at this critical moment. All members of his retinue present were slain and there were no survivors to provide accurate reports.

Some authors would have us believe, by the confidence expressed in their narratives, that they witnessed the emperor's death with their own eyes, even though it is clear that they were stationed elsewhere. Others, with a flair for the dramatic, let their imagination run wild. Perhaps Tetaldi supplies the most likely version of the event:⁶¹ "The cardinal of Russia died in the press; the emperor also died. Some say that his head was cut off and others that he died in the press in flight; perhaps he died in the press and the Turks beheaded him." Tetaldi is only reporting rumors. He had no way of knowing that Isidore [= "the cardinal of Russia"] had been wounded but was still alive and had fallen into the hands of the Turks. In addition to Tetaldi, Barbaro and Benvenuto admitted that they knew nothing definite about the emperor's fate and made it clear that they were reporting rumors. But others, like Leonardo or Pusculo, write with confidence and would have us believe that they had seen the death of the emperor with their own eyes. The critical passages are as follows:

BARBARO:⁶² It was impossible to discover any news of the emperor, whether he was alive or dead. Yet some said that his body was seen among the many corpses. It was also said that he had hanged himself as the Turks were making their entry through the Gate of Saint Romanus.

Added on the margin by the hand of Marco [Barbaro, *il genealogista*]: The emperor begged his attendants to kill him; in a rage, he rushed into the mêlée, sword in hand. He fell, rose again, then fell once more, and perished.

LEONARDO:⁶³ So that he would not be captured by the enemy, the emperor said: "For God's sake, let a valiant soldier pierce me with his sword so that my majesty will not succumb to wicked men." . . . The emperor fell, rose again, then fell once more; the prince of the land suffocated in the press and ended his life.

PUSCULO:⁶⁴ The emperor took off his helmet and closing his weary eyes he slept for a while within his tent. Awakened by a great deal of shouting, he jumped up and attempted to check the rout of the citizens. With drawn sword, he attacked the Turks and fought alone; he called his allies and killed three janissaries by himself. Finally, he was dealt a deadly blow by a mighty sword. Someone severed his head from the shoulders and took it away.

BENVENUTO:⁶⁵ Item: He [*sc.* Benvenuto] heard from a trumpeter that the emperor of the Greeks had been killed and that his head, mounted on a lance, was presented to the lord of the Turks.

Sphrantzes' authentic work records the death of the emperor but contains no details and no glorious last stand. Had Sphrantzes known any particulars, he would have undoubtedly included them in his narrative, which is partly intended as a eulogy and as an encomium to his dead hero, the emperor. Sphrantzes' passage is most

telling in its very brevity; the absence of fine points should be taken literally: Sphrantzes did not know how his emperor and friend had perished. Sphrantzes himself had been unable to discover any facts during his subsequent captivity:⁶⁶

On May 29, a Tuesday, during the third hour in the beginning of the day, the sultan seized the City. At that time and capture of the City my late master and emperor, Lord Constantine, was killed and perished. I was not at his side at that hour, as, by his command, I was in another part of the City. Alas, alas.

To the tradition and spirit of Sphrantzes belongs the information in a later text of the Patriarchate, which includes a reasonable account of the emperor's death:⁶⁷

As the Turks were penetrating the area of Saint Romanus, the wretched Emperor Constantine, in the company of some noblemen, was inspecting the defense. The emperor and his company encountered a number of Turks and began to fight, as they did not deign to be captured. So they cut off the emperor's head and those of his attendants, since they did not realize that he was the emperor.

Legendary tales about the emperor's death soon spread. During the day of the sack unreliable stories were already disseminating. Barbaro had heard a rumor reporting that the emperor had committed suicide.⁶⁸ Rumors and speculation multiplied and are encountered as late as the following century, when Richer/Riccherio denied a brave death to Constantine and assumed that in panic the emperor abandoned the engagement, joined in the general flight and met a common death in the press at the gate when his compatriots trampled him.⁶⁹

The Slavonic narrative of Nestor-Iskander provides a very early, probably the earliest, indication pointing to the existence of the ingredients that eventually would coalesce to form a legend. Although the nucleus of this Slavonic composition undoubtedly goes back to 1453, as its author was indeed an eyewitness,⁷⁰ his version of the death of the emperor differs. Nestor-Iskander reports oral tales that had come into existence among survivors shortly after the fall. His narrative contains rumors that attached themselves, permanently as it turns out, to the lore that surrounded the last emperor of medieval Greece and his heroic last stand:⁷¹

Having saddled a *pharis*, he [*sc.* the emperor] went to the Golden Gate. . . . He gathered about him all of the troops, up to three thousand. He found, at the Gate, many Turks guarding it; he killed them all. He went into the Gate, but was not able to pass through, against the many troops. And again a multitude of Turks encountered them. . . . And so the Orthodox emperor Constantine suffered for the Church of God and for the true faith.

Constantine's last moments are placed in the vicinity of the Golden Gate, i.e., in the southern sector of the land fortifications, and not in the middle area of the Gate of Saint Romanus. We also hear of such details in oral tales that were collected

at the end of the nineteenth century. The origins of this tradition are obscure, but they go at least as far back as the tale of Nestor-Iskander. It is possible that the legendary aura associated with the Golden Gate contributed to this tradition, as it was through this gate that victorious emperors of Constantinople had made their triumphal entries to the capital. The legends made it only natural to imagine that the resurrected Constantine XI would pass through the Golden Gate in his moment of glory, where his “sleeping chamber” was also located. During the last two centuries of Constantinople’s independent existence this gate was bricked up and in the early Ottoman period it was eventually incorporated into the curious structure that still survives and is known as the *Heptapyrgion* or *Yedi Kule* (“The Fortress of the Seven Towers”). This gate remained superstitiously bricked up in the Ottoman centuries,⁷² thus testifying to the strength of the tradition claiming that the resurrected emperor is destined to march through this gate.⁷³ The fact is that this tale of the “bricked up” gate may have been created by the conquered Greeks, who knew that the Turkish name for it was *Kapalı Kapı*, i.e., the “Closed Gate.” It had been bricked up by the Constantinopolitans before the fall and the Ottomans simply did not bother to open it again.⁷⁴

The survivors did not know the manner of Constantine’s death. It is conceivable that Constantine perished in the *mêlée* by the Pempton/*Hücum Kapı*, fighting against the invader in a vain attempt to rally his routed troops. Alternatively, the emperor may have fallen either in the ditches before the Great Wall or he may have been trampled to death by his own soldiers, while both he and his routed troops were rushing to enter into the city through the gate that had been opened for Justiniani’s withdrawal. The general information supplied by a later patriarchal text, already cited,⁷⁵ is probably as accurate as any other and is reinforced by a statement in Doukas:⁷⁶ “They [*sc.* the Turks] did not realize that he was the emperor; they killed him as if he were a common soldier and left him.”

3 The emperor’s grave

It is not all certain that a proper identification of the emperor’s remains was ever made. Once more our sources supply conflicting statements. Some eyewitness accounts do not even speak of any search. Their silence may, in the final analysis, reflect reality. When the alleged scrutiny commenced, Barbaro was on board his galley about to set sail for the Aegean Archipelago. He would not have had any knowledge of this investigation and of its results. Clearly, before his departure he only heard vague and unreliable rumors brought on board by refugees. At least in theory, Sphrantzes was present in the vicinity and in a position to hear of a search, which must have been of great concern to him, as it involved the remains of his friend and hero. The same holds true of Leonardo and Pusculo, both of whom had also been captured and were detained, either in the Ottoman camp outside the walls where the prisoners were being herded or within the city. Sphrantzes would not have passed over this matter in silence. It is his custom to cite by name the resting places of all deceased members of the imperial family.⁷⁷ Would he have made an unprecedented exception in the case of his own dear friend, Constantine?

Sphrantzes spent his period of captivity in Constantinople. He would have picked up reports of a search, of an actual identification, and of a specific grave. He would have gone out of his way to discover the resting place of his friend. Any *argumentum ex silentio* is always perilous but, in this case, we have no other way of explaining the silence of this most important eyewitness source.

Crusius, who was curious about this matter, did not know of any grave.⁷⁸ Before him Theodoro Spandugnino stated that there was no grave. Spandugnino spent time in Constantinople,⁷⁹ toured the antiquities, and investigated various matters pertaining to the siege. Later texts and secondary reports present us with accounts of detailed searches, of proper identification, of decent burial, and of supposed graves. According to Pseudo-Sphrantzes, numerous severed heads were cleaned, but the features of the emperor could not be identified beyond doubt. Eventually, a body wearing greaves and socks bearing imprints of the imperial eagles was discovered and it was concluded that this corpse must have belonged to the emperor:⁸⁰

After the city was captured, the sultan entered and immediately showed great concern about the emperor; he was extremely anxious to find out whether the emperor was still alive or dead. Some individuals came and said that he had escaped; others said that he was hiding in the city; others that he had died fighting. And as he wanted to find out exactly what had happened, he sent to the place where the bodies of the slain were lying in heaps, Christians and impious [Turks] together. They washed the heads of many corpses, in case they recognized the emperor's head. But they proved unable to recognize it; they did find the corpse of the emperor, which they recognized from the imperial greaves and shoes, which had been imprinted with golden eagles, as it was the custom with the emperors.⁸¹ When the sultan found out, he rejoiced greatly and became cheerful. By his order the Christians who were found there buried the corpse of the emperor with imperial honors.

Again, one may question the accuracy of this passage. Imperial insignia (if they really existed in the form of imprinted eagles) could have been borne by other members of the imperial family and retinue, such as Theophilus Palaeologus. Eagles, especially two-headed eagles, became an important symbol in the panoply of the patriarchate in the centuries after the fall but were not much in evidence in earlier days.

No details of this macabre search can be authenticated. That a rudimentary investigation actually took place is probably true, as the sultan would presumably desire to ascertain the fate of his adversary. The most reasonable version is encountered in a text composed at the patriarchate in the sixteenth century, which may preserve authentic details reaching back to the sack from oral accounts by survivors. This version knows of a search and of a possible identification without mention of imprinted imperial eagles, of decent burial, of imperial honors, or of a specific grave.⁸²

Later the sovereign [= sultan] feared that if he [*sc.* the emperor] were still alive and had escaped he might bring an army from the lands of the Franks against

him. After a thorough search for his remains, they found his head. Mamalis and other noblemen recognized it and he relaxed.

The anonymous chronicler has preserved a story that was circulating among the Greeks of the early sixteenth century.⁸³

Earlier is the anonymous *Lamentation of Constantinople*,⁸⁴ whose author also knows of a search but of no definite results:⁸⁵

Where is the emperor and ruler of the Romans?/O Emperor Constantine, also called Dragaš,/tell me: Where are you? Did you vanish? Were you hidden?/ Are you alive or did you die, sword in hand?/After that dog of a sultan, Lord Mehmed,/took possession of the luckless city,/he examined the severed heads/ and searched through the bodies, the slain men, I mean./He did not find what he was looking for. What need did he have to do this?/I mean, what did that dog want with your dead body/or with your precious head, my lord?

The same author addresses the duke of Burgundy and pleads for a crusade that would recover Constantinople from the Turks.⁸⁶

It would have been to the advantage of the sultan to identify the remains of his dead adversary. Then Mehmed II could assume the undisputed possession of Constantinople, as a sultan-Caesar, a title he claimed in the period following the conquest. Thus it becomes likely that, in the absence of identifiable remains, the sultan eventually selected a severed head and announced that it had been the emperor's. Few survivors could have, or would have, contradicted him. In the fifteenth century, such bloodied trophies were customarily presented to the Ottoman sultans, who took great care to display them to their subjects as proof of victory. The severed head of the slain Hungarian king, for instance, had been shown to the combatants during the battle of Varna⁸⁷ and was then carefully preserved by Sultan Murad, who dispatched it on a tour throughout his realm. Isidore, Pusculo, and our Slavic source state that Mehmed II viewed the severed head of Constantine XI.⁸⁸ Yet one remains unconvinced. Did Mehmed II actually identify and view the remains of the last Greek emperor?

Pseudo-Sphrantzes speaks of a decent burial. This is probably an invented detail by Makarios Melissenos-Melissourgos, the sixteenth-century forger-elaborator of the authentic work of Sphrantzes. It is to be expected that if the emperor's remains had been identified and had been given public burial, "with imperial honors," the Greeks of Constantinople would have never forgotten the site of their last emperor's grave. In the centuries after the sack the emperor's grave was sought time after time and a number of possible sites eventually emerged; of course, none bore the stamp of authenticity. Indeed, all alleged graves belong to the realms of fiction, deliberate forgery, fabrication, or even wishful thinking.

One of the most popular alleged resting place of Constantine XI, to which countless Greek pilgrims flocked in the nineteenth century, was located in the courtyard of an inn at Istanbul's Vefa Meidan.⁸⁹ The first time this site found its way into scholarly literature was in 1858, when Mordtmann published his popular account

on the siege and fall of Constantinople.⁹⁰ The learned Mordtmann concluded his account of the memorable events of the morning of May 29, 1453, with his description of the site.⁹¹ Echoes from his description reverberated throughout the next half-century, as Mordtmann's passage was reproduced in local guide pamphlets and countless visitors and pilgrims devoutly flocked to the site.⁹² Elaborations of this passage began to appear in popular literature; typical among them was the following description of the site:⁹³

In the old inn, in whose neighborhood was the grave, live impoverished beggars nowadays. There is no tombstone. At the corners, there are only four small, rather dark marble slabs and in the middle there is a bed of dirt . . . gone are the willow, vine, and rose bush; only a bent, low tree is left. Very close to the inn there is a large grave, surrounded by an iron fence, which is joined at the top. This is the grave of the man who killed Constantine.

Thus, not only Constantine's tomb had been located but that of his executioner also. Mordtmann had said nothing about this last grave. Paspates was the first scholar to point out that ulterior motives may have been responsible for the entire tale:⁹⁴

A few years ago the Greek owner of a general store in the square called Vefa, beyond the Un Kabani Gate, erected a small grave in some corner of the wall. On this grave of Emperor Palaeologus, he placed an ever-burning lamp. After some time had passed this grave became part of his lucrative business. The authorities put a stop to this fraud some time ago.

Thus, in Paspates' view Mordtmann and countless other pilgrims had been victims of a scam. This is not the end of the story. In 1892 Mijatovich repeated, in lyric prose, Mordtmann's information and added a few other touches in the conclusion of his book:⁹⁵

In the neighborhood of the Weffa-Mosque, in a yard surrounded by the dwellings and huts of poor artisans, there stands an old willow, whose branches are wreathed round by a profusion of climbing roses and wild vines.

In the shadow of this tree a slab of white marble without any inscription covers a grave, at whose head an oil lamp is lit every evening. . . . The slab covers the remains of the last Greek emperor.

Pears was the first scholar to pay heed to Paspates' warning and pointed out the obvious problems and contradictions in the circulating stories. He reasonably inferred from the surrounding iron fence that he was probably facing the monument of a dervish.⁹⁶

The last scholar to carry out a serious examination of this alleged grave was Siderides and he did so on three occasions: 1890, 1904, and 1908. He summarized his inspection:⁹⁷ "In the year 1904 the so-called tomb of Constantine had vanished.

The corner of the establishment's wall had collapsed and stones and ruins had covered it. . . . This year I also saw the grave and it was still covered by ruins." Even so, the identification of this site with the grave of the last emperor persisted and circulated widely. It proved so popular that a tale grew around it and was collected by a folklorist in the beginning of the twentieth century.⁹⁸

Invention and fabrication aside, the true grave of Constantine XI, it may be concluded, was never known for one simple reason: there had never been a tomb. After the sack, his unidentified remains, together with those of the dead defenders, were disposed of in a most efficient way. A sixteenth-century text, composed in the patriarchate, reports that the bodies of the dead were collected and burned, *sine caeremonia*, at a dry section of the moat, i.e., in the vicinity of the last stand:⁹⁹ "All the bodies that were in the Gates, inside and outside, they collected in the middle of the moat and burned them."

The improvised cremation must have included the emperor's remains. Even if his corpse had been actually identified, it would have been cremated along with the anonymous dead, as the Osmanli administration could not allow a burial site for the last Greek emperor. It was bound to become a gathering spot for Greeks and a potential source of unrest and agitation. The last emperor of Constantinople could not be granted a public tomb in Turkish Istanbul if the conquerors wished to avoid the creation of a popular cult among their newly acquired Christian subjects. In the years to come, Constantine XI was elevated to the status of a martyr or saint in the eyes of the Greeks, who were eager to flock to any site purported to be their last emperor's tomb. In the ensuing centuries, Constantine's fame throughout the Greek-speaking world was destined to rival the popularity that had been enjoyed by another medieval hero in the west, King Arthur.¹⁰⁰

The parallelism is striking. Arthur was also a historical figure, a warlord in late fifth-/early sixth-century Britain, who became a symbol of Celtic resistance against the invading Saxons. As far as records go, we have a testimony to Arthur's death in the *Easter Annals from Wales*, the *Annales Cambriae*. For the year 93 [= A.D. 539], the following entry survives:¹⁰¹ "The battle of Camlann in which Arthur and Medraut [= Mordred?] fell." In the centuries following this battle a host of stories appeared, countless graves were pointed out, and, in legend, the death of Arthur was altogether denied, as he was thought to have been transported on board a barge to Avalon, the island of the apples, a Celtic paradisiac state of immortality and eternal youth, ruled by the Lady of the Lake; there Arthur awaits the day when he will be summoned to save his homeland once more. This legend was formed while the Celts were increasingly falling under the domination of the Anglo-Saxon conquerors. The figure of Arthur attracted Celtic aspirations and pride: in contrast to the depressing reality, he and his famed resistance against the invaders stood for the Golden Age of the past and the millennial paradise of the future. Arthur became a Messianic figure in medieval Celtic folklore, a reminder of a lost Golden Age, and an optimistic omen for a glorious future.¹⁰²

Similar were the circumstances that created the legend of Constantine XI, the heroic emperor of Greece, who, like Arthur after Camlann, also disappeared after his last battle. In the popular mind Constantine XI became a symbol of an idealized

past, whose actual problems, divisions, polarization, or internal strife were erased from memory. At the same time, the vanished emperor became a symbol of resurrection, of renewal, and of a future reconstitution of the dismembered empire. His tale continued to receive embellishment and reached its climactic elaboration in the nineteenth-century formulation of the Grand Idea or Vision, as it was called, which predicted the utter annihilation of the Ottoman Empire and the resurgence of a modern Commonwealth of Balkan Christians under the leadership of the Greeks, the true heirs of Constantine XI.¹⁰³

The tale of the last emperor of Greece was not a conscious literary creation by known authors, just like the tale of Arthur. Long before the appearance of the *Historia Britonnum* attributed to Nennius and Geoffrey of Monmouth's celebrated *Historia Regum Britanniae*, the story of Arthur existed as an oral legend. Constantine's tale also proved to be a most influential legend in the post-medieval era of Greece. Its appeal is comparable to that of another pan-Hellenic, timeless hero, Herakles, who also refused to die. Ambivalence about death forms the basis of ancient Greek hero cult; we come across it in the case of Herakles as early as the date of an interpolated passage of the Homeric *Odyssey*: Odysseus only sees, in Hades, the image of Herakles, because the true essence of the hero is on Mount Olympus with the gods.¹⁰⁴ Historical figures such as Arthur or Constantine XI transcend the boundaries of history precisely because of the monumental nature of the events in which they were involved. They depart from ordinary experience and become symbols, embodying a paradisiac Golden Age of a long lost past and, at the same time, holding the promise of a millennial future.

The origins of the tale go back to the early days after the sack, as it is suggested by the anonymous author of the *Lamentation of Constantinople*, who was clearly aware of the motif and has preserved an early form of it:¹⁰⁵

O Emperor Constantine, what became of you?/They say that you died, sword in hand./But again, I have heard it said that you were concealed/by the all-mighty right hand of the Lord.

This early nucleus was elaborated over the centuries and produced the popular version that was collected in the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁶ Here we encounter the final formulation of the motif of the emperor who has been turned into stone:

When the time came for the City to become Turkish and the Turks were entering, our emperor rushed on his horse to stop them. Countless multitudes were the Turks. Thousands surrounded him; he struck and dealt blows with his sword endlessly. Then his horse was killed and he fell. As a Moor was lifting his sword to strike the emperor, the Lord's angel came, snatched him, and conducted him to a cave, deep into the earth in the vicinity of the Golden Gate. There the emperor was turned into stone and is awaiting the arrival of the same angel, who will raise him. The Turks are aware of what is destined to pass but they have been unable to find the emperor's cave. For this reason, they have

bricked up the [Golden] Gate, as they know that through it the emperor will enter to reclaim his City. When God wills it, the angel will descend into the cave, will release the emperor from the stone, and will hand him the sword that he had used in the last battle. The emperor will rise, will enter the City through the Golden Gate, and, together with his troops, will pursue the Turks as far as the Red Apple Tree. And such slaughter will ensue that a calf will swim in blood.

The roots of this story are much older than the sack of Constantinople in 1453. Certain themes reach all the way back to late antiquity. Most versions make reference to the Red Apple Tree, which was believed to be the original homeland of the Turks. We further encounter curious amalgams of images and ancient lore that seem to lead to the golden apples of the Hesperides. The central core is provided by the timeless symbolism of the apple. Numerous layers of Constantinopolitan folklore from various ages can be detected.

The most ancient stratum takes us all the way back to the Justinianic era,¹⁰⁷ itself an age that proved fertile ground for the sowing of miracle stories and legends. Procopius, the historian and contemporary of Justinian I, was already aware of such tales growing around the bronze equestrian statue of this emperor in the seventh century.¹⁰⁸ This colossal statue of Justinian I was erected at the Forum of Augustus; it portrayed Justinian in the imperial stance: his left hand held the *orbis/globus crucifix*, while his right arm pointed to the east. Procopius preserved the early interpretation of the symbolism:¹⁰⁹ the orb stood for the world and the cross represented the power over the world granted to the Greek emperor by God.¹¹⁰ The gesture of the right arm was taken as a sign that the emperor would put a stop the advance of the eastern barbarians.

In the following centuries, this original explanation was modified to suit new circumstances. After the Persian threat had been obliterated, the raised arm of Justinian I was supposed to indicate that the Arabs would advance no farther and later, when the Turks emerged as the major threat to the Greek state, a new version of the same gesture appeared.¹¹¹ By the second quarter of the fifteenth century the *orbis* had fallen to the ground. At this time, the orb was commonly referred to as “the apple,” whose fall was seen as an omen predicting the loss of Greek territory and the growing might of the Turks.

Understandably, elements in this interpretation also found appeal among the Turks, who modified the tale of the apple even further, turning it into their own legend of the red apple, the *kızıl elma*.¹¹² For them the apple symbolized political and military supremacy over Christians. Among the Greeks, however, the “red apple” was understood as a reference to the place of origin of the Ottoman Turks, thought to be located in the interior of Asia. Thus, the mythical cradle of the Turks came to be known among the Greeks as “the lone apple tree.” And of this place the anonymous author of the early *Lamentation* was aware:¹¹³

Let Christ, the king of glory, be glorified./Let the impious [= the Turks] be slaughtered and experience great pain;/let them be totally uprooted from

Romania [= the Greek empire]/. . . /Let them go back to their place of origin, as far away as the lone tree.

These tales had no basis in historical reality. Yet they became a vital part of the Greek view of the universe and of historical reality during the centuries following the sack of Constantinople.

4 Resurrection and triumph

Millennial tales suggested that, as he was about to be killed, Constantine XI was spirited away by an angel of the Lord, who took his sword away from him and conducted him to sleep in a subterranean structure in the vicinity of the Golden Gate at the fortress of the Seven Towers (*Yedi Kule*).¹¹⁴ There the emperor occasionally stirs; he catches a glimpse of his empty scabbard and realizes that the time has not come for him to rise;¹¹⁵ his awakening will come only when the angel restores his sword to him. His emergence from his rocky chamber was assured by popular prophetic texts attributed to Methodius of Patara, Daniel, and Leo the Wise.¹¹⁶

Illustrations of the sleeping emperor were in circulation, evident in numerous manuscripts,¹¹⁷ by the middle of the sixteenth century. One master painter produced a series of high-quality miniatures, the Veneto-Cretan painter George Klontzas (ca. 1540–1608).¹¹⁸ Klontzas illustrated one *codex* of prophecies for a Venetian polymath in Crete, Franciscus Barocius (Francesco Barozzi), a scholar interested in mathematics, ancient literature, astronomy, and the occult, who attracted the attention of the Holy Inquisition and was tried on a charge of witchcraft in 1587, ten years after Klontzas completed this *codex*,¹¹⁹ currently in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. This *codex* of Barozzi with the illustrations of Klontzas was not signed by the artist; yet there can be no doubt that the miniatures were executed by Klontzas' hand,¹²⁰ as he reproduced them again, with some variation, for his own *codex* illustrated at the end of his career; it is housed in Venice's *Marciana* Library.¹²¹ Both *codices* represent Klontzas' own conception of the past, the present, and the future, as it was predicted in apocalyptic literature. Scenes from the Old and New Testaments and from ancient Greek, medieval Greek, Venetian, and Cretan history abound in both *codices*. Above all, Klontzas penned a series of miniatures portraying Constantine XI's eventual resurrection and the main events, which, prophecies declared, would occur in the future triumphant reign of this re-animated emperor.¹²² It perhaps should be added that in the Barozzi *Codex* the text remains separate from the miniatures, while in the Venetian *codex*, Klontzas integrated the text with his illustrations.

The first miniature in the Venice *codex* depicts the sleeping emperor, whom Klontzas labels "the peaceful emperor." Constantine is portrayed as resting (dead or asleep) in a stone sarcophagus borne by two foxes (or imperial lions) in the outskirts of the western walls of Constantinople.¹²³ There exist numerous counterparts in earlier manuscripts, which have inspired Klontzas.¹²⁴ The Cretan artist, however, went beyond his predecessors, as he illustrates the emperor about to be awakened. Angels carrying a scepter and Constantine's sword flank the sarcophagus. Thus,

Klontzas indicates that the long sleep of “the peaceful emperor” is over. In addition, a woman (the personification of Constantinople?) seems to be extending a crown to the emperor in the sarcophagus. The city in the background is further illuminated by a ray marked by the following inscription:¹²⁵ “And an invisible column will cry out loudly: ‘Go to the west of the [city of the] Seven Hills [= Constantinople]’.”

Klontzas’ next miniature¹²⁶ shows the awakened emperor sitting on the edge of his sarcophagus. He is still flanked by the angels bearing his regalia. A cross and a host of angels descend from heaven, while throngs of Constantine XI’s subjects reverently kneel before him; Klontzas adds a few lines of commentary, which begin with the following words: “Come out to me, guest of the Seven Hills, inhabitant of the stone.” The third miniature depicts the enthronement of “the peaceful emperor” in Santa Sophia, attended by his subjects, the clergy, and angels.¹²⁷ The next miniature is divided into three parts: the emperor’s march to his palace, his first dinner, and his enthronement. Constantine holds cross and drawn sword.¹²⁸ With this miniature Klontzas concludes the early career of the resurrected Constantine and his recovery of Constantinople.

The next group of drawings illustrates Constantine’s future wars. The resurrected emperor fights six battles to defeat his old enemies, the Turks. These miniatures conclude with Constantine praying before the relics of saints of Cappadocia’s Caesaria.¹²⁹ The third section of the future history of Constantine describes his recovery of the Holy Land, his subjugation of Arabia, his triumphal entrance into Jerusalem, and his final moments on the earth.¹³⁰ At the end of his second life the emperor surrenders his crown and his cross inside the Church of the Resurrection: this is clearly the climactic event of his second reign, and its illustration takes up an entire folio.¹³¹ Next Constantine is shown on his throne within his palace in Jerusalem.¹³² This miniature bears the following caption: “The palace in Jerusalem, where the peaceful emperor stayed so that the appointed six years would be completed.” In the next miniature Constantine surrenders his soul which is then borne upwards by angels to God;¹³³ Klontzas adds the following comment: “When the six years were completed, the emperor came to the place called Golgotha. There he prayed, surrendered his saintly soul to the hands of saintly angels, and his life came to an end.” Klontzas’ last miniature of Constantine portrays the Church of the Resurrection, in which priests are about to place the corpse of the emperor into a sarcophagus, whose massive lid takes up most of the foreground.¹³⁴ The following caption accompanies this last depiction of the peaceful emperor: “This is the portrayal of the funeral of the saintly corpse of the peaceful emperor.”

This was not the end of the tale, however, nor the end of Klontzas’ miniatures. The popular prophecies spoke of conquests that would be carried out by the four sons of Constantine XI, who, it was predicted, would eventually become involved in a series of civil wars. “The new emperor” would finally defeat them. In turn, his son, Konon, would initiate another series of wars, against the wishes of his father. And so begins the slow but inevitable dissolution of the world, Klontzas’ next subject. In an almost Hesiodic style the artist depicts the departure of Peace from the earth, which is then followed by the enthronement of Emperor Argyros

destined to annihilate all non-Christians. Klontzas then depicts the future, with the true union of the Greek and Catholic Churches.

Thus, Klontzas is moving closer and closer to his favorite subject in painting: the Second Coming of Christ and the Last Judgment. First, he illustrates the destruction of Constantinople: she sinks to the bottom of the sea, her sacred relics are taken up to the Heaven, and a column marks the spot where the city had stood, as a reminder of her former majesty. The overall climax to the entire series, Klontzas' *Ragnarok*, consists of a detailed depiction of the Second Coming of Christ and of the Last Judgment.

Thus, in such apocalyptic tales and images the Greeks sought comfort and hope. It is a glorious tale and Klontzas does justice to it with his magnificent illustrations. But it is also meaningful that Constantine XI had become, by the late sixteenth century, an essential part of these tales. Constantine's awakening heralds the beginning of the end of secular history. As long as the last Greek emperor remains asleep, time stands still. The awakened emperor becomes the agent of ultimate destruction, as his re-animation sets the millennial wheels in motion. In the short term, the Greeks assume their rightful position in the world but their universe is growing old and, after their ultimate victory, it moves on to its doom. After the triumph of the Greeks there will be no other future and the purpose of the universe will have been realized.

Constantine XI, the last Greek emperor, had brought their old world to an end. As he fell asleep in 1453, the Greeks also entered a period akin to hibernation and time stood still. The sleeping emperor was thus identified with a hypnotic state of his empire. But all was not lost in 1453 because Constantine also held the promise of renewal, as his awakening was expected to usher in a new era of resurrection for a defeated and humiliated people. He was the end and the beginning, death and awakening. He is the prelude to the Second Coming.

Constantine XI's reign had been tragic; his life had been full of disappointments. The tale and vision of his glorious comeback declare that the resurrected emperor will achieve precisely what he failed to accomplish while he was alive. Mythology gives him a second chance. He will rise from the grave that in reality he never possessed. He will be crowned emperor in Santa Sophia, the most famous church in eastern Christianity, and thus enjoy an honor denied to him while he was alive. He will be victorious, while in his life he met with defeat; he will rid the world of his old enemies, who in historical time had vanquished him and deprived him of his city and of his life; he will even recover Jerusalem, a goal that had eluded generations of crusaders; and he will finally find a grave in the holy city, which in life he never had. The sons that he never had in his life will succeed him and will conquer the earth, eliminating Islam once and for all. His descendants will see a united Christendom, a goal that neither Constantine XI nor his predecessors could have ever brought about, even though they had done their best to achieve the impossible. There is nothing to accomplish beyond this glorious conquest. The universe will grind to a halt.

It is a grand fantasy put together by a people who could see no immediate secular salvation and who had to rely on prophecies. The depressing circumstances of

the present were disregarded and national aspirations found expression in apocalyptic visions and tales. Millennial stories made it possible for them to look forward to a glorious future. Few individuals are given second chances to correct their mistakes and recreate the glories of the past. Constantine XI was not allowed to die in obscurity, no matter what History taught. His former subjects under the Ottoman Turks would have none of this. They were convinced that Constantine XI would return in glory and that he would be the invincible conqueror that he had never been. No longer an impotent emperor, he would assume firm control of his own destiny and of his resurrected empire. Myth transformed him into a Messiah and myths, as we know, seldom lie.

Notes

- 1 See Zoras, *Περὶ τὴν Ἄλωσιν*, *passim*.
- 2 Nestor-Iskander, 79 (pp. 88, 89): оставший же стратиги и бояре вземъ царицу и благородныхъ дѣвиць и иладыхъ женъ миогыхъ, отпустиша въ карабли и катаргн во острова Амарію къ племянамъ.
- 3 C. N. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, vol. 1 (Venice, 1872; repr.: Athens, 1972), pp. 266, 267 (ll. 669–677) [also published by Déthier, *Monumenta Hungariae Historica* 21, part 1: 357–390]: ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος κράτωρ δέ, ὁ Δράγασις τοῦπικλιν, / ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ τῷ ναφ̄ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ Σοφίας, / . . . / καταφυγὼν ὁ δυστυχῆς σὺν γυναιξί καὶ τέκνοις, / μεταλαμβάνει τῶν φρικτῶν κυρίου μυστηρίων / αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ παῖδες ὁμοῦ καὶ δοῦλοι / τὴν ὁμνεύετιν φεῦ! δ' αὐτοῦ κατατομεῖ τὸ πρῶτον, / καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους πάντας, / μὴ ζῆν προκρίνας.
- 4 *BCIII*, 7.30: τότε λέγουσι πῶς ἔκραξε [*sc.* ὁ βασιλεὺς] τὸν πνευματικὸν καὶ ἐξεμολογήθη αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ βασιλισσά του καὶ τὰ παῖδιά του. καὶ ἀπὸ κεῖ ἔβαλε καὶ ἐκόψαν τὰ κεφάλια τῶν παιδίων του καὶ τῆς βασιλισσας ὁμπρὸς του. Discussion of this particular point in Zoras, *Περὶ τὴν Ἄλωσιν*, pp. 130 ff.
- 5 M. Crusius, *Turcograecia libri octo* (Basel, *sine anno* [1584]), p. 97. On Crusius and his Greek correspondents, cf. O. Kresten, *Das Patriarchat von Konstantinopel im ausgehenden 16. Jahrhundert, Der Bericht des Leontios Eustratios im Cod. Tyb. MB 10: Einleitung, Text, Uebersetzung, Kommentar* (Vienna, 1970), esp. pp. 17–24; G. E. Zachariades, *Tübingen und Konstantinopel. Martin Crusius und seine Verhandlungen mit der griechisch-orthodoxen Kirche* (Göttingen 1941), p. 82; and Z. N. Tsirpanles, *Οἱ Μακεδόνες Σπουδαστὲς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Κολλεγίου Ρώμης καὶ ἡ Δράση τους στὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ στὴν Ἰταλία (16ος Αἰ.–1650)* [Μακεδονικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη 35] (Thessalonica, 1971), ch. 1. On Crusius, see S. Karouzou, *Μαρτῖνος Κρούσιος: Ὁ Πρῶτος Φιλέλληνας* (Athens, 1973); Crusius was born in Bamberg on September 26, 1526, and the inscription on his tomb in Stiftskirche reads as follows, in Greek, ἐνθάδε παιδευτῆς Μαρτῖνος Κρούσιος εὐδῶ / Ἑλλάδος ἐν Τυβίγγη μούνη σοί, Χριστέ, πεποιθώς, and in a Latin paraphrase: *Crusius hic recubo, decui qui graeca atque latina / diu, Christo spe nixus in uno*.
- 6 The correspondence between the two scholars is discussed in Zoras, *Περὶ τὴν Ἄλωσιν*, p. 121, and in S. P. Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σὺζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις,” *NH* 4 (1907): 450. Crusius states that he could find no information on the last queen either in Constantinople or in Venice; he expresses surprise that such an illustrious woman could have been forgotten, *Turcograecia*, p. 57: *Nomen eius nondum ex libris invenire: sed nec e Constantinopoli, nec Venetijs, cognoscere potui. Mirum, personae tam illustris, tantam in Historiis obliuionem esse*. On the family of Zygomas, see the collection of studies in *Ἰωάννης καὶ Θεοδόσιος Ζυγομαλάς: Πατριαρχεῖο – Θεσμοί – Χειρόγραφα*, ed. S. Perentides and G. Steires (Athens, 2009).

- 7 *Turcograecia*, p. 96: φέρεται δὲ λόγος ὅτι ὁ πρότερον μεταδοῦς [*sc.* αὐτοκράτωρ Κωνσταντῖνος] τῶν θείων μυστηρίων τοῖς παισὶν αὐτοῦ, τῇ βασιλίσει καὶ πολλοῖς συγγενέσι καὶ οἰκείοις ἅπαντας ἀποκεφαλίσθηναι προσέταξε τοῦ μὴ αἰχμαλωσίας τυχεῖν. βασιλίσεως ὄνομα ὑστάτης οὐκ οἶδα. ἠρώτησα γὰρ πολλοῖς, καὶ οὐδεὶς μοι εἶχε ἀληθείας ῥήματα ἢ γραφῆν δεῖξαι.
- 8 *Turcograecia*, p. 57: ἐνθάδε (ποῦ; Θεὸς οἶδε) κάρη σέο πατρὶς ἔχωσεν / Ἑλλήνων ἀγέ, λῶισθε, ταλάντατε Κωνσταντίνε and a longer one for his supposed queen: ἐνθάδε (ποῦ; Θεὸς οἶδε) τάφος σὸς ἀνώνυμος ἔστιν / Ἑλλήνων βασιλὶς, Νιόβην κρύπτουσα γοῶδη / ὄψεσιν ἀλλὰ φιλανθρώποις Θεὸς ὑμετέρρησι / χάρμασι ἀλλήκτοις ἀπὸ δάκρυα πάντα καθαίροι. Crusius' own Latin translation of his Greek epigrams into Latin is worth quoting, 57: *Hic vñim? Nouit Deus est tua tumba: fidelis Rex Graium postreme, miserime Constantine. And: Hic tua (vbi? Nouit Deus) est sine nomine tumba: quae luctu Nioben superas, Augusta fidelis. Sed deus a vestris oculis mitissimus omnes abstergat lacrymas, aeternaque gaudia donet.* It is interesting to note, in passing, that the Latin version is not an exact translation of the Greek text of the elegy on the “empress,” as in the Greek version Crusius modifies “eyes” by “very kind”; in his Latin rendition *mitissimus* modifies *deus*. The epigrams are discussed in Zoras, *Περὶ τὴν Ἄλωσιν*, p. 131, and in Lampros, “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος,” pp. 450, 451.
- 9 On this curious legend, cf. J. H. Mordtmann, “Die Kapitulation von Konstantinopel im Jahre 1453,” *BZ* 21 (1901): 129–144; *FC*, pp. 199–204; M. Philippides, “An ‘Unknown’ Source for Book III of the *Chronicon Maius* by Pseudo-Sphrantzes,” *BSEB* 10 (1983): 174–183; and *idem*, “Patriarchal Chronicles of the Sixteenth Century,” *GRBS* 25 (1984): 87. For the occasions that patriarchs had to rely on this story in order to retain their privileges under the sultanate, see A. K. Hypsilantes, *Ἀθανασίου Κομνηνοῦ Ὑψηλάντου Ἐκκλησιαστικῶν καὶ Πολιτικῶν τῶν εἰς Δώδεκα, Βιβλίον Η΄ Θ΄ καὶ Ι΄ ἦτοι τὰ Μετὰ τὴν Ἄλωσιν (1453–1789) (ἐκ Χειρογράφου Ἀνεκδότου τῆς Μονῆς τοῦ Σινᾶ)*, ed. A. Germanos (Constantinople, 1870), *passim*.
- 10 Two entries in chronicles speak of a betrayal from within; see Lampros, “Μονοῦδια καὶ Ὁρῆνοι,” pp. 262, 263 (with the original erroneous spelling): Φεῦ, φεῦ, καὶ ἀπόλετο [*sc.* ὁ βασιλεὺς] σὺν ἅμα τῇ πατρίδι καὶ κατεδαφίσται ἐκ βάθρων εἰς τάχος καὶ οἰκίτορες ταύτης διεσκορπίσθησαν ἐν διαφόροις πόλεις καὶ χώρας γέγονε δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὀλέθριον κακὸν διὰ συνδρομῆς τινῶν οἰκητόρων τῆσδε πόλεως [*my emphasis*]. Another notice provides a variant: γέγονε δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὀλέθριον κακὸν, διὰ τινων οἰκητόρων τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως. In an Ottoman text of 1604 the same story about the surrender of Constantinople is told but this time the surrender is assigned to the Jewish population of Constantinople and is employed to justify the seventeenth-century privileges enjoyed by the Jews of Constantinople. Specifically, this text claims that the Jews and Mehmed II had drawn up their own accord, whose terms determined that the Jews of Constantinople would provide no aid or help to the Greek emperor; in return, Mehmed pledged to keep unharmed and unchanged the existing synagogues. On this topic, see M. Euthymiou, “Οἱ Ἑβραῖοι τοῦ Βυζαντίου καὶ ἡ Πτώση τῆς Βασιλεύουσας,” in E. Chrysos, ed., *Ἡ Ἄλωση τῆς Πόλης* (Athens, 1994), pp. 143–153, esp. p. 150.
- 11 The forced conversion of churches continued at an accelerated rate throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries after the reign of Mehmed II; cf. Paspates, *Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται*, pp. 277–405 (with some woodcuts from the nineteenth century), and *idem*, *Πολιορκία καὶ Ἄλωσις*, pp. 223–242. For the history of some of these structures, see J. Freely and A. S. Çakmak, *Byzantine Monuments of Istanbul* (Cambridge, 2004).
- 12 *FC*, pp. 199–204.
- 13 M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955); F. Lokkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period* (Copenhagen, 1950), pp. 38–92; and Inalcik, “The Policy of Mehmed II,” p. 232. On the tax relations between Porte and the Patriarchate in the early period after the conquest, cf. T. Papademetriou, *Render unto the Sultan: Power, Authority, and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Early Ottoman Centuries* (Oxford, 2015).

- 14 Hypsilantes, *Tà Metà tήn Άλωσιν*, p. 52. In Book II of the *Turcograecia*, Crusius mentions this incident embedded in the *Historia Patriarchica*, pp. 156–163; its text preserves the name of the Greek lawyer who devised this strategy that ensured the continuation of the patriarchal privileges; he apparently saved a number of churches from conversion: Xenakis. This text, however, places the event in a later period, during the reigns of Patriarch Hieremias and Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent; aside from this chronological impossibility, it seems that the report preserved in Crusius contains authentic details and echoes of the events that must have taken place earlier in the reigns of Patriarch Theoleptos I and Sultan Selim I Yavuz; it is simply the same incident placed in a later reign: ὁ Θεόληπτος ἀπεκρίθη, ὅτι “ἂν ἦναι ἄδεια, θὰ ὑπενθυμίσω τὴν Βασιλείαν Σου τῶν ἄλωσιν τῆς Πόλεως οἱ πρόγονοί μας ἔδωσαν ἀναιματί τὸ ἥμισυ μέρος τῆς Πόλεως τῆν σουλτάν Μεχμέτ με τοιαύτας συμφωνίας α’, ὅτι αἱ ἐκκλησίαι τῶν Χριστιανῶν νὰ μὴ γενοῦν τζαμία, β’, ὅτι οἱ γάμοι, αἱ ταφαί, καὶ ἄλλα ἔθιμα τοῦ χριστιανισμοῦ νὰ γίνονται ἀνεμποδίστως, γ’ ἡ ἑορτὴ τοῦ Πάσχα μὲ ἐλευθερίαν νὰ πανηγυρίζεται . . .” τότε ὁ μουφτής ἠρώτησε τὸν πατριάρχην ἂν ἔχη τὸ ἔγγραφον ταύτης συμφωνίας ἀπεκρίθη ὁ πατριάρχης ὅτι νὰ κατεκάη ἀπὸ πυρκαϊᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μπορεῖ νὰ φέρῃ μάρτυρας τρεῖς γιαννιτζάρους αὐτόπτας τῆς τοιαύτης συμφωνίας. ἦλθον οὗτοι καὶ οἱ τρεῖς, ἄγοντες ἔτος τῆς ἡλικίας πλησίον τῶν ἑκατῶν, καὶ ἔμαρτυρήσαντο ὅτι ἦσαν παρόντες εἰς τὴν ἄλωσιν τῆς Πόλεως καὶ ἐνθυμοῦνται ὅτι οἱ εὐγενεῖς αὐτῆς ὑπετάγησαν ἔκουσιως τῷ σουλτάν Μεχμέτ, ἐλθόντες καὶ εὐρόντες αὐτὸν ἔξω εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν του, καὶ ἀγαγόντες καὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῆς Πόλεως ἐπὶ χρυσοῦ πινακίου, καὶ ζητήσαντες παρ’ αὐτοῦ τινα ἄρθρα ἄτινα ἐδέχθη ὁ σουλτάν Μεχμέτης.
- 15 *Maius*, 3.13.9: ἔδωκε δὲ καὶ προστάγματα ἐγγράφως τῷ πατριάρχει μετὰ ἐξουσίας βασιλικῆς ὑπογεγραμμένα κάτωθεν, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτὸν ἐνοχλήσῃ ἢ ἀντιτείνῃ, ἀλλὰ εἶναι ἀναίτιον καὶ ἀφορολόγητον καὶ ἀδιάσειστον τε ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐναντίου, καὶ τέλους καὶ δώσεως ἐλεύθερος ἔσῃται αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτὸν πατριάρχαι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ὁμοίως καὶ πάντες οἱ ὑποτεταγμένοι αὐτῷ ἄρχιερεῖς.
- 16 T. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination* (Brussels, 1952; repr.: London, 1990), Part I, does not deny the existence of an original document. Inalcik, “The Policy of Mehmed II,” p. 233, n. 11, points out that the Turkish *mufti*, the head of the *ulema*, and the patriarch were all too willing to embrace this story of the supposed capitulation and give it official sanction in order to preserve the *status quo* and avoid possible friction within the city.
- 17 Hypsilantes, *Tà Metà tήn Άλωσιν*, pp. 52, 53.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 On the topography of the area, the various civil and military gates, and the state of the fortifications in 1453, see *SFC*, ch. 5.
- 20 The events preceding the general assault are discussed in Zoras, *Περὶ τήν Άλωσιν*, pp. 73–89, who expresses doubts about the authenticity of the emperor’s speech. Gibbon, who only had contempt for medieval Greece and its theocratic culture, believed that only in those final hours did the Greeks of Constantinople rise to the occasion to provide a decent funeral to their state, worthy of their ancestors, the ancient Greeks; see Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. 7, pp. 188 ff.
- 21 *Maius*, 3.9.1: ἀκούσαντες οἱ δυστυχεῖς Ῥωμαῖοι καρδίαν ὡς λέοντες ἐποίησαν καὶ ἀλλήλους συγχωρηθέντες ἦττον εἰς τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλλαγήναι καὶ μετὰ κλαυθμοῦ ἐνηγκαλίζοντο, μῆτε φιλάτων μνημονεύοντες . . . ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐν τῷ πανσέπτῳ ναῷ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σοφίας ἐλθὼν καὶ προσευξάμενος μετὰ κλαυθμοῦ τὰ ἄχραντα καὶ θεῖα μυστήρια μετέλαβεν. ὁμοίως καὶ ἕτεροι πολλοὶ τῇ αὐτῇ νυκτὶ ἐποίησαν. εἶτα ἐλθὼν εἰς τὰ ἀνάκτορα, ὀλίγον σταθεὶς καὶ ἐκ πάντων συγχώρησιν αἰτήσας, ἐν τῇδε τῇ ὥρᾳ, τίς διηγήσεται τοὺς τότε κλαυθμοὺς καὶ θρήνους τοὺς ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ; ἐὰν ἀπὸ ξύλου ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐκ πέτρας ἦν, οὐκ ἐδύνατο μὴ θρηνησῆαι.
- 22 The dependence of Pseudo-Sphrantzes on Leonardo is discussed in Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople: Bishop Leonard and the Greek Accounts”; in *idem*, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonardo and His Italian Followers,” pp. 189–227;

- and, exhaustively, in *SFC*, ch. 3. Pseudo-Sphrantzes has simply expanded and paraphrased into Greek the speech of the emperor reported in the Latin text of Leonardo. The entire speech can be found in Pseudo-Sphrantzes, *Maius*, pp. 414–422 [translation: pp. 120–124]. Also see Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 67, and n. 26.
- 23 *FC*, pp. 130–132, and Stacton, *The World on the Last Day*, pp. 229, 230, have accepted as historical the details provided by Pseudo-Sphrantzes and Leonardo's report of the emperor's speech, even though *FC*, p. 193, is aware of the unreliability of Pseudo-Sphrantzes. In an earlier age Gibbon proved more cautious and expressed doubts on the authenticity of this speech; see Gibbon, vol. 7, p. 188, n. 76: "I am afraid that this discourse [*sc.* the emperor's last speech] was composed by Phranza [= Pseudo-Sphrantzes] himself; and it smells so grossly of the sermon and the convent that I almost doubt whether it was pronounced by Constantine." *FC* is followed by Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 67, who seems to accept, with some reservations, the historicity of Constantine's speech.
- 24 During the siege, the Venetians defended the area around the imperial palace of Blakhernai, which was turned over to them by Constantine himself. Since the banner of Saint Mark was flying above the official residence of the Greek emperor, one might think of an intriguing and diplomatically thorny situation that would have resulted, had Constantinople been saved in 1453. Among other scholars, I still support the view that the imperial residence in 1453 was at Blakhernai and had not been transferred to the Porphyrogenetus Palace [*Tekfur Saray*], as has been occasionally (although inadequately, in my opinion) suggested: on the supposed transfer to the *Tekfur Saray*, see N. Asutay-Effenberger, *Die Landmauer von Konstantinopel-Istanbul. Historisch-topographische und baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (Berlin and New York, 2007), pp. 134–142.
- 25 That the emperor had actually established his headquarters at the breach is stated explicitly in Puscuro's hexameters (4.1007–1013 [p. 81], not in *CC* 1); Puscuro relates that the emperor attempted to catch some sleep in this tent before Giustiniani was wounded in the final assault; the emperor sought rest in his headquarters at this sector within his tent, *intra tentoria* (4.1008 [p. 81]). There is no reason to doubt the evidence supplied by this reliable eyewitness.
- 26 Two years earlier Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani had served as the *podestà* of the Genoese colony Caffa on the shores of the Black Sea. In contemporary texts he is described as a soldier of fortune and as a corsair; see *CC* 1: 349, n. 32. Similar is Barbaro's opinion, who, as a Venetian, displays no liking for the Genoese warlord, 13 [= *CC* 1: 12]: *vene in Costantinopoli Zuan Zustignan Zenovexe e de corser de una nave*. For a general account of the late medieval Italian *condottiere*, see H. W. Koch, *Medieval Warfare* (London, 1978), ch. 13. That Giustiniani was a specialist in defending walled cities, with a well-known reputation, is more often stated than demonstrated. I have been unable to uncover anything definite about his earlier career or his supposed reputation in contemporary documents and literature; nothing exists to suggest that he was a famous soldier prior to his arrival in Constantinople, apart from the fantasies and the speculations encountered in D. Rhodokanakes, *Ἰουστινιάναι – Χίος* (Syra, 1900); extracts from some documents that may (or may not) refer to him can be found in *NE* 3: 88, 272, n. 1, 301, n. 1, and 319, 320. I examine the available evidence in "Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani." On Giustiniani, cf. *PLP* 4: no. 8227 (pp. 122, 123).
- 27 In the nineteenth century, the erudite Mordtmann the elder discovered an inscription marking the site of the grand duke's home, who, the text of the inscription stated, was also the "interpreter," *διερμηνευτής*/dragoman, of the emperor. The inscription was found "an der Stadtmauer auf die Seite des Marmara – Meers in der unmittelbaren Nähe des Bukoleon, den heutigen Thuren, Tschatlady Kapu und Achys Kapussi unmittelbar unterhalb eines türkischen Holzhauses, welches oben auf der Maurer steht." See A. D. Mordtmann, *Belagerung und Eroberung Constantinopels durch die Türken im Jahre 1453 nach dem originalquellen bearbeitet* (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1858), pp. 142, 143, n. 27. Cf. *SFC*, pp. 258–260. The same title of "interpreter" is repeated in a Latin

- translation of an imperial document from 1450, in which the emperor further states that Notaras was the grand duke and a relative of his by marriage; see *NE* 3: 258: *peciit [= petiit] nos dilectus gener imperii mei, magnus dux dominus Luchas Dierminestis [= Diermineftis]*.
- 28 *PG* 159: 936 [= *CC* 1: 152]: *Interea capitaneus generalis Johannes Justinianus . . . petivique sibi a Chirluca [= Kyr Luca, i.e.: Κύρ<ιος> Λουκάς <Νοταρῦς>], magno duce consulari, communis urbis bombardas . . . Quas cum superbe denegasset: "Quis me, capitaneus inquit, o proditor; tenet ut gladio non occumbas meo?"* The same story is repeated in Languschi-Dolfin, p. 21: *Infra questo tempo Joanne Zustignan capitano general . . . domando a Chir Luca Notara gran consigliero alcune bombarde . . . et quelli cum superbia denego voler dar. Al qual irato Joanne Zustignan disse o traditor; et che me tien che adesso non te scanna cum questo pugnall.* The same text (paraphrased into Greek) reappears in the *BC111*, 7.18, and in the *Maius*, 3.7.2 (p. 406).
- 29 Barbaro, 13 [= *CC* 1: 12]: *perchè l'intendeva la nezesitate che havea Costantinopoli, e per beneficio de la christianitate, e per honor del mundo.* Nikolaos Sekoundinos, the Greek humanist from Negroponte in the service of Venice and the talented simultaneous translator of Greek/Latin during the Council of Florence, states, in vague terms, that Justinianians were attracted to Constantinople by an imperial award: *stipendio imperatoris conductus* (*CC* 2: 134). See *PLP* 10: no. 25106 (pp. 209, 210), and P. D. Mastrodemetres, Νικόλαος Σεκουνδινός (1402–1464) Βίος και Έργον: Συμβολή εις την Μελέτην των Ἑλλήνων Λογίων της Διασποράς [Βιβλιοθήκη Σοφίας Ν. Σαρπόλου 9] (Athens, 1970).
- 30 Kritoboulos, 1.25.1: *καί τις ἀνήρ Ἰταλὸς Ἰουστίνος . . . διέτριβε περί τε Χίον καὶ Ῥόδον . . . ἦκεν αὐτόκλητος . . . βοηθήσων Ῥωμαίοις καὶ βασιλεῖ Κωνσταντίνῳ. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ μετὰ κλητὸν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι φασι παρ' αὐτοῦ ὑπεσχημένον μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον μισθὸν τῆς βοηθείας τὴν Λήμνον αὐτῷ.*
- 31 Doukas, 38.2: *ὁμοίως καὶ ἐκ τῆς Γενούας ἐλθὼν εἰς ὀνόματι Ἰωάννης Λόγγος ἐκ τῶν Ἰουστινιάνων σὺν δυσὶ νῆας ὑπερμεγέθους, ἔχων καὶ πολεμικὰς παρασκευὰς πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς σὺν ἐνόπλοις νέοις Γενουίταις . . . εὐεργέτης [sc. ὁ βασιλεὺς] δὲ τούτῳ καὶ διὰ χρυσοβούλλου γράμματος τὴν νῆσον Λῆμνον, εἰ ἀποκρουσθήσεται ὁ Μεχεμετ καὶ ὑποστραφήσεται ἀπρακτος, ἐξ ὧν θαρρεῖ κερδᾶναι τῆς Πόλεως.*
- 32 *Minus*, 36.12: *τίς ἠπίστατο τὴν τοῦ ῤηγὸς ζήτησιν τῶν Καταλωνῶν, ὅτι νὰ δοθῆ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἡ Λῆμνος καὶ νὰ ἔνι κατὰ τῶν Τούρκων ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ αἰεὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς Πόλεως ἐν ἀνάγκῃ βοηθός; καὶ ἐπράττετο.* For the history of Lemnos in this period, cf. P. Topping, "Latins on Lemnos before and after 1453," in A. Bryer and H. Lowry, eds., *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society* [= *Papers Given at a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*] (Birmingham and Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 217–324; Reinsch's edition of Kritoboulos, pp. 78, 79, and n. 39 of the introduction; and H. W. Lowry, *Fifteenth Century Ottoman Realities: Christian Peasant Life on the Aegean Island of Lemnos* (Istanbul, 2002).
- 33 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 928 [= *CC* 1: 132]: *Nam quanto hostis mole ingentis lapidis muros conterebat, tanto hic animosius armentis, humo vasisque vinariis intercompositis reparabat.* It is possible that, at this lowest point in the fortifications, the moat did not exist in 1453; it certainly was missing on the uphill stretch from the Pempton to the Adrianople/Edirne Gate (the highest point of the fortifications). See *SFC*, pp. 309, 310.
- 34 Leonardo, *PG* 159: 930 [= *CC* 1: 136–138]: *Theucus tribus iam in locis concussos lapidibus muros machinis dissiparet.* Kritoboulos, 1.48.7, repeats the same information: the wall had been damaged severely in three spots.
- 35 Kritoboulos, 1.34: *ἡ μηχανὴ καὶ τὸ τεῖχος κατήρριπτεν (ἤδη γὰρ πολὺ τι κατέπεσε τοῦ ἔξω μικροῦ τεῖχους ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου δύο πύργοι . . .) . . . κεραιὰς μεγάλας ἐπαγαγόντες ἀπεσταύρουν κατὰ τὰ παρερηγμένα τοῦ τεῖχους, λέγω δὴ τοῦ ἐκτός.*
- 36 Letter of July 6, 1453, to Cardinal Bessarion, *CC* 1: 74: *ad eam partem maxime semi-ruptam circa Sanctum Romanum.*
- 37 On the general sector and the location of Saint Romanus Gate, cf. Paspates (who misplaces the Gate of Saint Romanus), *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται*, p. 72. Paspates did record the

- Latin inscription on the lintel of *Hücum Kapı*: *Portarum valido firmavit omine muros / Pusaesus magno non minor Anthemio*; E. Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks* (New York, 1968; repr.: of 1903), pp. 429–435; and *PaL* 2: 115, n. 28. For an extensive survey of this sector and for the controversial problems surrounding this area and the events of 1453, see *SFC*, ch. 5.
- 38 Kritoboulos, 1.49.1. See Philippides, “Rumors of Treason.”
- 39 Contrary to what had been assumed by scholars in the past, “Christoforo Riccherio” is not an eyewitness; he wrote an account of the Ottoman Turks that appeared in print by 1543; thus it is no surprise that an original manuscript does not exist. On the work of Richer/Riccherio and the reasons why this later text has been mistakenly taken to be that of an eyewitness, cf. M. Philippides, “The Value of Christoforo Riccherio’s ‘Eyewitness’ Narrative of the Fall of Constantinople in 1453,” in *Sixteenth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference Abstracts of Papers* (Baltimore, 1990), pp. 36, 37; and *idem*, “*Urbs Capta*: Early ‘Sources’ on the Fall of Constantinople 1453,” in T. S. Miller, J. Nesbitt, eds., *Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, S.J.* (Baltimore, 1995), pp. 209–224, where it is demonstrated that “Riccherio” is really Richer, a *cubicularius* at the French court; his work is highly derivative and was published for the first time in 1543. On this specific point, see the text of Riccherio (English translation in Melville-Jones, *The Siege of Constantinople 1453*, p. 122; its sources on this point include an obscure *opusculum* of Pius II, entitled *Tractaculus*): *Obseratae tum erant fores, quibus pomoerio egressuris via patebat: quod ea praesertim ratione cautum fuerat, ut praerepta certantibus abeundi facultate, id unum sibi proponerent, aut viriliter moriendum: eaque de causa audacius alacriusque decertarent*. For a new edition, with the first English translation and commentary of Pius’ work, see Philippides, *Mehmed II the Conqueror*, ch. 3. On Richer, see *SFC*, pp. 93–104.
- 40 See Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 197. More cautious was Paspates, *Πολιορκία και Άλωσις*, p. 179, who treated the Kerkoporta as minor incident, with little bearing on the actual fighting, except that it may have assisted in lowering the morale of the defenders: ἐκ τῆς διηγῆσεως τοῦ ἡμετέρου Δούκα, γινώσκουμεν ὅτι ἡ εἰσοδος διὰ τῆς Κερκοπόρτας οὐδόλως ἀπενέκρωσεν τὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῦ Ἁγίου Ῥωμανοῦ αἱματηρὸν ἀγῶνα. Discussion of this minor and inconsequential incident in *SFC*, Appendix 3.
- 41 E.g., Doukas, 29.9.
- 42 Cf. Paspates, *Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται*, pp. 63–67; Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, pp. 341–344; and *PaL* 2: 127, n. 61.
- 43 On the Christian allies of the sultan, including sappers from Serbia, see Stacton, *The World on the Last Day*, p. 232. For the Ottoman army in this period, see H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* [Late Byzantine and Ottoman Studies 1] (New Rochelle, 1989; repr. of the 1973 ed.).
- 44 For the different waves of troops launched in this assault, cf. the general account in *FC*, pp. 137–139; Stacton, *The World on the Last Day*, pp. 232, 233; Paspates, *Πολιορκία και Άλωσις*, ch. 6; *MCT*, pp. 91, 92; *PaL* 2: 126–129; and *SFC*, ch. 9, section 3.
- 45 His retreat has been the subject of a controversy that reaches all the way back to the authors of our sources in the fifteenth century. One modern authority (*PaL* 2: 128) absolves the Genoese warlord of all charges of cowardice. Kritoboulos, 1.58.3, states that after Giustiniani was wounded, his men took matters into their own hands and focused their attention solely on finding an avenue to carry their leader away: ἐκλύονται δὲ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἀπειρηκότες τῷ πάθει καὶ καταλείψαντες τὸ σταύρωμα καὶ τὸ τεῖχος, ἵνα ἐμάχοντο, πρὸς ἓνα μόνον ἑώρων, ἀποκομίσαι τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς ὀλκάσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀποκομισθῆναι σῶς, καίτοι τοῦ βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου πολλὰ παρακαλοῦντος αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπεσχημένου μικρὸν παραμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος λωφήσῃ· οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ’ ἀναλαβόντες τὸν ἡγεμόνα σφῶν ὀπλισμένοι ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὰς ὀλκάδας σπουδῇ καὶ δρόμῳ. For some early testimonies on the conduct of Giovanni Giustiniani, see A. Pertusi, “La Lettera di Filippo da Rimini, cancelliere di Corfù, a Francesco

- Barbaro e i primi documenti occidentali sulla caduta di Costantinopoli (1453),” in *Μνημόσυνον Σοφίας Ἀντωνιάδη* [Βιβλιοθήκη τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βενετίας Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν 6] (Venice, 1974), pp. 120–157, esp. p. 145, n. 84.
- 46 Barbaro, 55 [= CC 1: 33]: *Zuan Zustignan, zenovexe da Zenova, se delibera de abandonar la sua posta e corse a la sua nave, che iera stà messa a la cadena*. With typical Venetian bias, Barbaro adds that Giustiniani’s regiment divulged the false news that the Turks had already entered the city: *e questo Zuan Zustignan, l’imperator si l’avea fato capetanio da tera; e scampando questo che iera capetanio, vignando el dito per la tera criando: ‘Turchi son intradi dentro la tera;’ e menteva per la gola, che ancora i non iera intradi dentro*. Added *marginalium*: *per esser ferito de frezza*.
- 47 CC 1: 42: *in summo mane Iohannes Iustinianus cepit in . . . mentum <id est: cepit vuln[us] . . .] tremendum?>, et portam suam dimisit et se tiravit ad mar<e>, et per ipsam portam Teucri intraverunt, nulla habita resistantia*. Lomellino adds that the Turks entered through the same gate precisely because there the resistance had diminished: *et per ipsam portam Teucri intraverunt, nulla habita resistantia*. Similar is the statement of Tetaldi (Latin version), *caput 28.1: Absente igitur praefato domino Ioanne Iustiniensi qui curationis necessitate diverterat ab exercito suo, hi qui subtractionis eius causam ignorabant putantes eum fugae metusve occasione declina<vi>sse ac praesentiam suam subtraxisse fugae praesidium et ipsi quaesierunt, non praeavisati se defendere contra insultus adversariorum, absente capitaneo suo*.
- 48 Pusculo, 4.975–979 [CC 1: 212] *Ioannes abiit percussus glande lacertum / ac se subripuit pugnae navesque petivit, / sive metu Teucrum, seu vulnere abactus acerbo, / deseruit locum, trepidantiaque agmina liquit*.
- 49 Nestor-Iskander, 60 (pp. 74, 75) ударивъ Зустунѣа по персѣмъ, и разрази ему перси. И паде на землю; and 64 (p. 76, 77): Стратиги же и вельможи вкупѣ съ Зустунѣемъ мужествоваху крѣпко, и падоша множество людей отъ обонихъ странѣ. Но еже богъ изволи тому не прейти: прилетѣвшу убо склопу, и удари Зустунѣа и срази ему десное плечо, и паде на землю аки мертвъ.
- 50 That Giustiniani was wounded twice before he abandoned his post is also ascertained by Sekoundinos; see CC 2: 134: *duobus acceptis vulneribus*.
- 51 Hierax, p. 265 (ll. 636–646): Πρὸ πάντων δὲ ἦν πρόμαχος αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς χαλάστραις, / ὡς ἔδει τε ἐμάχετο στερρῶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ / ἀλλὰ γε βάσκανος ἀνὴρ τις διὰ τουφεκίου / βάλλει ἐπὶ τῷ ἥρωϊ καὶ πλήττει τὸν γενναῖον, / καὶ φόνον ἐπροξένησε εἰς ἄνδρα τηλικούτον. / Λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐντὸς Ρωμαίων ἦν ὁ δράσας / τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιβούλευμα κατὰ τοῦ Γενουβίσου, / φθόνῳ τρωθεῖς, ὡς εἶθισται, πάντοτε τοῖς βασκάνοις. / Εἰς δὲ τὰς νῆας εἰσελθὼν ἀπήλθεν εἰς πατρίδα, / πνέων ἔτι ὁ δυστυχῆς τὰ λοιπὰ θανάτου. Rumors of betrayal were also circulating soon after the sack. Scholarius, who was present in Constantinople but took no active part in the defense, was told by his nephew, who had fought bravely at the sea walls and had been wounded in the last battle, that a section of the land walls had been deserted and left unguarded by those charged with its protection; this may be an allusion to the retreat and subsequent withdrawal of Giustiniani’s band; see Scholarius, *Oeuvres complètes* 1: 279: ὁ πόλεμος ἐπεστήκει, καὶ μόνος ἦ κομιδῆ σὺν ὀλίγοις ὑπολειφθεῖς, οὐπὲρ ἐτάξατο, πολλοῖς δὲ τραύμασιν, ἃ ταῖς χερσὶν ἐδέξω καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ, αὐταῖς ταῖς κλίμαξι τοὺς δ’ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀνελθεῖν, πεπειρωμένους συγκατεσπάσατε, ἕως ἡμεῖς ἀνελθεῖν μὲν ὑπὸ θαλάττης οὐδὲν παρήκατε πράττειν ὧν ἐπεθύμουν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ γῆς, δι’ ἐρήμου κατεληλυθότες τοῦ τεύχους, πάντα ἐσκύλευον, φυγῇ προδεδοκότων τῶν φυλάξειν ὑποσχομένων.
- 52 *EX*, 30: ἰσταμένου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντιμαχοῦντος, ἐλθοῦσα βολὴς ἐκ σκλόπου δέδωκεν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν δεξιὸν πόδα, καὶ πεσὼν χαμαὶ ὡσπερ τεθηκῶς, ἄραντες αὐτὸν οἱ ἴδιοι ἄνθρωποι ἀπήλθον ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ ποιήσαντες ἰστία ἀπέδρασαν ἐκ τῆς Χίου νήσου, κάκει ἐτελεῦτήσεν. ἐφημίσθη οὖν ὅτι ἔνδοθεν τοῦ κάστρου δέδωκαν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ οἶδε τις ὅπως γέγονεν.

- 53 Riccherio, p. 95, whose source seems to have put the blame on bad luck and not on an act of treason: *Accidit ut inter pugnandum cum irrumpenti hosti fronte, adversa obsisteret, telo suorum infoeliciter in hoste misso, graviter incautus vulneratur. Cruoris extemplo e dorsi vulnere manentis abundantiam intuitus, nolens ut, demum praedicabat, commilitonibus perturbationi interpellationique esse, si quempiam eorum accersitur medicum dimitteret, clanculum se praelio subduxit.*
- 54 Hieronimo Giustiniani's work (1586), *Istoria di Scio scritta nell'anno 1586* [= *Hieronimo Giustiniani's History of Chios*, ed. P. P. Argenti (Cambridge, 1943), p. 418]: *Hic iacet Ioannes Iustinianus, inclitus vir ac Genuensis patricius Chiique maunensis, qui in Constantinopolis expugnatione a principe Turchorum Mehemet, serenissimi Constantini Orientalium ultimi Christianorum imperatoris magnanimus dux, lethali vulnere icto interiiit, anno a partu Virginis M.III. L, VIII Kal. Augusti.* The text of the same inscription is given in Hasluck, "The Latin Monuments of Chios," no. 18 (p. 155), who reproduces the inscription from Hieronimo Giustiniani's work: *Hic jacet Joannes Iustinianus, inclitus vir, ac Patricius Genuensis, Sciique Maonensis, qui in Constantinopolis expugnatione a Principe Turcarum Mehemet Serenissimi Constantini Orientalium ultimi Christianorum Imperatoris magnanimus Dux electus, vulnere accepto interiiit anno à partu Virginis M.III.V.VIII. Kalend. August.* On the erroneous date, see CC 1: 404, 405, n. 57. In addition, cf. P. P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, pp. 368, 599, and PaL 2: 129, n. 69. Paspates, *Πολιορκία καὶ Ἄλωσις*, p. 182, n. 2, states that it was Déthier who actually found the tombstone with the inscription and cites the Latin text (presumably from Déthier's records), without further attribution: *Hic jacet Ioannes Iustinianus inclitus vir ac Genuensis Patricius Chius Maonensis, qui in Constantinopolis expeditione Principae Turcarum Meemete Serenissimi Constantini Orientalium Christianorum Imperatoris, magnanimus dux, lethali vulnere ictus interiiit.* Perhaps no punctuation was on the original tombstone, as it is cited differently in our versions. The warlord's tomb was located in the church of Santo Domenico (later known as Santa Maria del Castelo). The tomb has disappeared without trace. Paspates, p. 185, states that the inscription was lost in the earthquake of 1881.
- 55 Leonardo, PG 159: 940 [CC 1: 162]: *Refugit capitaneus in Peram; qui post Chium navigans ex vulnere vel tristitia inglorium transitum fecit.* A vernacular translation of this passage can be found in Languschi-Dolfin, 29: *et fugisse in Pera lo qual dapo in nauigando a Chio da la ferita o piutosto da tristitia morite senza gloria.* This withdrawal and departure of Giustiniani made a deep impression in the literature of the period and had not been forgotten one century later. See, e.g., an Italian report found in a seventeenth-century manuscript of Naples and published by S. P. Lampros, "Μονωδία καὶ Θρηνοί," pp. 259, 260: *La qual presa fu che hauendo Constantino messa la miglior gente di fuori a diffendere i barbareni sopra il quali era un caualliere genovese chiamato Giustiniano nel cui valore tutti greci di dentro s'appogiauano, ma essendo ferito abbandonò il loco per andar à curarsi, il che veduto da suoi cominciorno a indebolirsi, et appertagli una porta perche dentro entrasse i suoi si persero d'animo, il che sentito il Turco rinforzò con maggior empito l'assalto, et gli Christiani per saluarsi si misero in fuga per la porta doue er entrato il genouese, et hauendo i Turchi preso il muro si mescolarono con loro, et entrorno nella Città, doue fecero grande uccisione de Christiani, et l'Imperatore fu ucciso hauendosi l'habito mutato per non essere consciuto, et il suo corpo fu preso, et troncatogli la testa, et postala sopra una lancia fu portata per il campo, et il genouese ueduta la Città presa scampò per mare et morì in una picciola isoletta.*
- 56 *Maius*, 3.9.7 [p. 127 in translation]; his immediate source is, as usual, Leonardo, whom Pseudo-Sphrantzes seems to have misunderstood on this point; while he retains Leonardo's phraseology describing Giustiniani's cause of death, Pseudo-Sphrantzes seems to think that Giustiniani died in Pera and fails to mention the escape of the wounded warlord on board his ship: *πολλὰ δὲ εἰπόντος τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῷ [sc. Giustiniani], οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ Γαλατῶ [= Pera] περάσας . . . αἰσχυρῶς δὲ ἐκεῖ τελευτῆ ἐκ τῆς πικρίας καὶ περιφρονήσεως.*

- 57 *CC* 1: 404, n. 57: *Cum Chium applicavisset ab illis venenum Ioanni datum est quo vita functus est.* This is a fascinating note but its subject matter is quite obscure. Who were these people and why did they poison Giustiniani? Was it perhaps a case of mercy killing, as the warlord must have been in terrible pain? Pertusi, *CC* 1: 404, n. 57, believes that this note originated in a malicious rumor of Venetian origin.
- 58 Leonardo, Isidore, and Puscilo make no mention of the emperor's attempt to dissuade Giustiniani from retreating behind the walls. Doukas reports that the warlord informed the emperor of his intention to return as soon as possible and that he asked him to hold out by himself for a while. Doukas states that the emperor lost heart after the departure of his warlord, 39.10: ἐπλήγη γὰρ διὰ μολυβδοβόλου ἐν τῇ χειρὶ ὄπισθεν τοῦ βραχίονος, ἔτι σκοτίας οὔσης καὶ διατρήσας τὴν σιδηρᾶν χλαμύδα, καὶ ἴτις ὑπῆρχε κατασκευασμένη ὡς τὰ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ὄπλα, οὐκ ἠδύνατο ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς ἡρεμεῖν. καὶ λέγει τῷ βασιλεῖ “στήθι θαρσαλέως, ἐγὼ δὲ μέχρι τῆς νηὸς ἐλεύσομαι κάκει ἰατρευθεὶς τάχος ἐπιστρέψω.” . . . ὁ βασιλεὺς δὲ ἰδὼν τὸν Ἰουστινιανὴν ἀναχωρήσαντα ἐδειλίασεν καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτόν. Kritoboulos, 1.58.3, states that the emperor in vain implored Giustiniani's company to stay: καίτοι τοῦ βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου πολλὰ παρακαλοῦντος αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπεσχημένου μικρὸν παραμεῖναι ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος λωφῆσῃ οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδέξαντο. The most elaborate account of this alleged conversation is in the narrative of Pseudo-Sphrantzes, whose immediate source (if indeed the forger did not invent the details) on this crucial event remains unidentified and unknown. Modern historians have followed, on the whole, Pseudo-Sphrantzes' tale. Thus *FC*, p. 138, Stacton, *The World on the Last Day*, p. 233, *MCT*, p. 92, and Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, p. 69, all accept this conversation as a historical fact.
- 59 *CC* 2: 134: *Ioannes, ubi vidit hostem acrius solito urgere et inolescere, propugnatores vero contra sensim deficere, quippe quorum alii interempti, nonnulli saucii, reliqui perterriti et fugati, salutem urbis desperare coepit, duobusque acceptis vulneribus, imperatorem adiit . . . polliceri se proinde imperatorem ipsum navi sua incolumem ad locum devecturum salutis. Quo nuntio habito, imperator illum quidem sibi timentem reprehendit et in malam rem abire iussit, sperare, inquires, ope auxilioque divino urbem illam se defensurum.* The complete text of this speech has been published (with numerous errors) in V. V. Makušev, *Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalium Vicinorumque Populorum*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1874), pp. 295–306. Selections from the same text, but deriving from a different manuscript, have been edited in *NE* 3: 316–323. Further extracts can be found in *CC* 2: 128–141 (with Italian translation). For a new edition of this speech, see C. Capizzi, “L'Oratio ad Alphonsum Regem Aragonum (1454) di Nicola Sagundino, riedita secondo un ms. finora ignoto,” *OCP* 64 (1998): 329–357. On Sekoundinos' work, manuscripts, and modern editions, see *SFC*, pp. 40–42.
- 60 Kritoboulos seems to have realized that such confusion prevailed in this sector under heavy attack, 1.58.1: ἦν οὖν παρ' ἀμφοτέρων κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ βοή συμμιγῆς βλασφημούντων, ἀπειλούντων, ὠθούντων, ὠθουμένων, βαλλόντων, βαλλομένων, κτεινόντων, κτεινομένων, πάντα δεινὰ ποιούντων μετὰ θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆς καὶ ἦν ἰδεῖν ἐνταῦθα μάχην κρατερᾶν συνισταμένην τε καὶ συσταδὸν γενομένην μετὰ φρονήματος μεγίστου καὶ ὑπὲρ μεγίστων ἄθλων μαχομένων καὶ γενναίων ἀνδρῶν.
- 61 Tetaldi, col. 1823 [Philippides edition: ch. xxvii, p. 344; *CC* 1: 184, 185, for Italian translation]: *Le cardinal de Russie mourut en la presse, aussi mourut lempereur: Aucuns dient qu'il est la teste tailée, ou qu'il mourut en la presse, s'en voulant s'yssir lun & l'autre, peutêtre qu'il fut mort en la presse, & que puis les Turcs luy eussent tailée la teste.* The equivalent Latin text of Tetaldi, *caput* 20.1, reads as follows (English translation in Philippides, p. 199): *Interea rex Constantinopolitanus ad extrema devolutus mortem invenit (narrantibus de illo quibusdam), quod capitis detruncatione vitam fini<v>erit, aliis vero dicentibus quod in transitu portae dum fugere tentaret, hostibus occurrentibus, morte praeoccupatus defecerit. Et revera utrumque rationabiliter credi potest, ut in porta primo sit interceptus et postea decollatus.*

- 62 Barbaro, 57 [CC 1: 35]: *De l'imperador mai non se potè saver novella di fatti soi, ni vivo, ni morto, ma alcuni dixè che el fo visto in nel numero di corpi morti, el qual fo dito, che el se sofgè al intra'che fexe i Turchi a la porta de san Romano. In mrg. add. fu de ser Marco: L'imperator pregava che li suoi l'amazasse et si messe nella furia con la spada, et cascò e rilevò, poi recascò, et così morì.*
- 63 Leonardo, PG 159: 941 [CC 1: 164]: *Imperator insuper, ne ab hostibus capiatur: "O quispiam," inquit, "valens tyro propter Deum, ne maiestas vaftris viris succumbat mea, gladio me transfigat." . . . imperator cadens atque resurgens relabitur et compressione princeps patriae e vita demigrat.* Leonardo is followed in the vernacular by Languschi-Dolfin, pp. 29, 30. The *BC111*, 7.30, which also depends on Leonardo, provides a slightly different account. Scholars have failed to note that Leonardo's picture of the emperor asking for death derives from the Old Testament, Kings 1.31, in which Saul begs his armor-bearer to slay him in order to avoid capture; this Biblical allusion is also echoed in Doukas, 39.13 [CC 2: 176, with Italian translation]: ὁ βασιλεὺς οὖν ἀπαγορεύσας ἑαυτόν, ιστάμενος βαστάζων σπάθην καὶ ἀσπίδα, εἶπε λόγον λύτης ἄξιον "οὐκ ἔστι τις τῶν Χριστιανῶν τοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν μου ἀπ' ἐμοῦ;" ἦν γὰρ μονώτατος ἀπολειφθεῖς.
- 64 Pusculo, 4.1007–1014 (p. 81) [not in CC 1]: *Rex ut forte caput galea nudatus inani / inclinans oculos intra tentoria fessos / carpebat somnum, magno clamore citatus / exilit, eque fuga cives revocare laborans / ense petit nudo Teucros, solusque repugnans / increpitat socios, tres ipsoque aggere truncate / Ianizaros. Tandem media inter tempora grandi / vibrato cecidit gladio. Caput abstulit unus / ex humeris.*
- 65 *TlePN*, p. 7: *Item: quod audivit [sc. Benvenutus] ab uno trumpeta quod inperator Gregorum fuit interfectus et eius caput super lancea Turcorum domino presentatum.* Of additional interest is the information supplied by Sekoundinos, CC 2: 136: *Imperator ubi hostem ruinas iam occupare moenium victoriaque potiri certissima vidit, ne caperetur vivus, sibi ipsi quidem proprias iniicere manus et hoc pacto consciscere mortem, tametsi animus minus deerat, nefas tamen duxit et christiano principe per religionem indignum, suos, qui pauci aderant, hortari coepit, ut se occiderent; sed cum tantum facinus audere voluisset nemo, imperatoris insignibus depositis et abiectis, ne hostibus notus fieret, privatam <se> gerens stricto ense in aciem irruit fortiterque pugnando, ne inultus abiret, princeps et immortalitate dignus hostili manu tandem est interemptus ruinisque urbis ac regni casui regium inmiscuit cadaver.*
- 66 *Minus*, 35.9: καὶ τῇ κ^θ Μαΐου, ἡμέρα γ^η, ὥρα τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρχῆ ἀπῆρε τὴν Πόλιν ὁ ἀμυρᾶς, ἐν ἧ ὥρα καὶ ἀλώσει τῆς Πόλεως καὶ ὁ μακαρίτης αὐθέντης μου καὶ βασιλεὺς κύρ Κωνσταντῖνος σκοτωθεὶς ἀπέθανεν, ἐμοῦ πλησίον αὐτοῦ οὐχ εὐρεθέντος τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐκείνῃ, ἀλλὰ προστάξει ἐκείνου εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν δῆθεν ἄλλου μέρους τῆς πόλεως, ἰού, ἰού.
- 67 *EX*, 35: ὁ ταλαίπωρος δὲ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος ἅμα τοῦ εἰσελθεῖν τοὺς Τούρκους ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ Ἁγίου Ῥωμανοῦ περιπατῶν μετὰ καὶ ἐτέρων ἀρχόντων θεωροῦντες τὰ τεῖχη ὑπήντησαν αὐτῶ μερικοὶ Τούρκοι καὶ πολεμήσαντες οὐ κατεδέξαντο δουλωθῆναι αὐτοῖς. ὅθεν ἀπέταμον τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καὶ τῶν εὐρεθέντων μετ' αὐτοῦ, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι ἔστι βασιλεὺς. Also, see Kritoboulos, 1.60.3: καὶ γίνεται ὠθισμὸς ἐνταῦθα καὶ φόνος τῶν προστυχόντων πολλὸς παρὰ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἅτε συνδεδραμηκότων καὶ ἐτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγων ἀτάκτως πρὸς τὴν βοήν πολλαχόθεν οὗ δὴ καὶ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος πίπτει μαχόμενος μετὰ τῶν σὺν αὐτῶ γενναίως.
- 68 *Supra*, text with n. 62.
- 69 Riccherio, p. 96: *Sed Imperator Constantinus ut suos fugere intuetur, sui officii ac dignitatis oblitus, nec eius quod tantum principem decebat satis memor, esse scilicet imperatorium suis fuis pulchram mortem opetere: terga quoque ipse dat, et praeceps recta in portam post suos fertur: Ob cuius angustiam offensus, atque indiscriminatum abeuntium impetu succussus humi procubisset, miserrime proculcatus interiiit.*
- 70 Philippides, "Some Prosopographical Considerations."
- 71 Nestor-Iskander, 77 (pp. 86, 87): И всѣдъ на фарисъ, пойдѣ къ Златымъ Вратамъ . . . Всѣхъ воинъ собрашесе съ нимъ до трѣю тысящъ, и обѣрте во врагѣхъ множество

- Турокъ стрегуши его, и побивше ихъ всѣхъ, пойде во врата, но не можааше пройти отъ многого трупіа. И пакн срѣтоша ихъ множество Турокъ . . . И тако пострада благовѣрный Ко[н]стянтинъ за церкви божіа и за православную вѣру.
- 72 *MP*, p. 546 (with an accompanying photograph as fig. 4).
- 73 For the influential tale, see N. G. Polites, *Μελέται περί τοῦ Βίου καί τῆς Γλώσσης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ, Παραδόσεις*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1904), p. 22: Ἐκεῖ μένει μαρμαρωμένος ὁ Βασιλεὺς, καὶ καρτερεῖ τὴν ὥρα νάρθη πάλι ὁ ἄγγελος νὰ τὸν σηκώσει. Οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὸ ξεῦρουν αὐτό, μὰ δὲ μποροῦν νὰ βροῦν τὴ σπηλιὰ ποῦ εἶναι ὁ βασιλεὺς γι' αὐτὸ ἔχτισαν τὴν πόρτα ποῦ ξεῦρουν πῶς ἀπ' αὐτὴ θὰ ἔμπῃ ὁ βασιλεὺς γιὰ νὰ τοὺς πάρῃ πίσω τὴν Πόλη . . . καὶ θὰ σηκωθῆ ὁ βασιλεὺς, θὰ μπῆ ἔς τὴν Πόλη ἀπὸ τὴ Χρυσόπορτα, καί, κυνηγώντας μετὰ τὰ φουσσᾶτα του τοὺς Τοῦρκους, θὰ τοὺς διώξῃ ὡς τὴν Κόκκινη Μηλιά. Cf. Emellos, *Θρυλούμενος*, esp. pp. 7–28; Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 103–105; and *SFC*, ch. 4, for more details.
- 74 S. Guberti Basset, “John V Palaiologos and the Golden Gate in Constantinople,” in J. S. Langdon, S. W. Reinert, J. Stanoievich Allen, C. P. Ioannides, eds., *Τὸ Ἑλληνικόν: Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr., vol. 1: Hellenic Antiquity and Byzantium* (New Rochelle, 1993), pp. 117–135; J. Freely and A. S. Çakmak, *Byzantine Monuments of Istanbul* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 44–47; and *SFC*, pp. 315–320.
- 75 *Supra*, n. 67.
- 76 Doukas, 39.13: οὐ γὰρ ἤδεσαν [*sc.* οἱ Τοῦρκοι] ὅτι ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς κοινὸν στρατιώτην τοῦτον θανατώσαντες ἀφήκαν.
- 77 See, e.g., *Minus*: 5.2: “Lady Anna of Russia . . . was buried in the Monastery of Lips;” 14.1: “our emperor Lord Manuel . . . was entombed in the . . . Monastery of the Pantokrator;” 24.3: “Lady Zoe, Lord Demetrios’ wife . . . was buried in the Convent of Lady Martha;” 28.2: “Lord Theodoros . . . was buried in the Monastery of the Pantokrator;” 28.7: “our emperor Lord John . . . was buried in the Monastery of the Pantokrator.”
- 78 Theodosios Zygomalas (the correspondent of Crusius) did not know of any grave associated with Constantine XI and when he was asked about it, he proved unable to show any tomb to the distinguished visitor Stefan Gerlach (a friend of Crusius), to whom, however, he pointed the spot near the walls, where, it was commonly held, the emperor had perished; see X. A. Siderides, “Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Θάνατος, Τάφος, καὶ Σπάθη,” *Ἡ Μελέτη* 2 (1908): 130.
- 79 T. Spandugino, *De la origine deli Imperatori Ottomani, ordini de la corte, forma del guerreggiare loro, religione rito, et costumi de la nationes*, ed. C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεῖα Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας*, vol. 9 (Paris, 1890; repr.: Athens, 1972). Spandugino, p. 154, reports that his contemporary Christians in Constantinople knew of no grave: *Scriveno li hystoriographi di Turchi, questo Mehemeth haver fatto cercare il corpo del sacro imperatore, et trovato che 'l hebbono, dicono che pianse sopra quello, et honorolo et accompagnolo alla sepoltura sua. Ma li christiani negano esser sta trovato nè conosciuto, perche in vero in Costantinopoli non si trova in alcun luogo la sepultura sua.* Spandugino was related both to the Notaras family and to Mara, the Serbian widow of Murad II, and stepmother of Mehmed II, who consistently displayed respect and affection for her. For an English translation, see D. M. Nicol, *Theodore Spandounes: On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors* (Cambridge, 1997). Also see *SFC*, ch. 1, sec. 5.
- 80 *Mainus*, 3.11.1: ὡς οὖν ἡ πόλις, ἕάλω, ὁ ἀμηνᾶς ἔνδον εἰσελθὼν εὐθὺς πάσῃ σπουδῇ ζήτησιν ἐποίει περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως, κατὰ νοῦν λογιζόμενος ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ μόνον μαθεῖν ἢ ζῆν ἢ τεθνηκεν ὁ βασιλεὺς. καὶ τινες μὲν ἐλθόντες ἔλεγον ὅτι ἐφυγεν, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔλεγον εἶναι κεκρυμμένον, ἄλλοι δὲ τεθνάναι μαχόμενον. καὶ θέλων πιστοθῆναι ἀληθῶς ἔστειλεν, ἔνθα τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀναιρεθέντων ἔκειτο σωροειδῶς Χριστιανῶν τε καὶ ἀσεβῶν καὶ πλείστας κεφαλὰς τῶν ἀναιρεθέντων ἐπλυναν, εἰ τύχη καὶ τὴν βασιλικὴν γνωρίσωσι. καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνήθησαν γνωρίσαι αὐτήν, εἰ μὴ τὸ θενοῦς πτώμα τοῦ βασιλέως εὐρόντες, ἐγνώρισαν αὐτὸ ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν περικημιδῶν ἢ καὶ πεδῶν, ἔνθα χρυσοῖ ἀετοὶ ἦσαν γεγραμμένοι, ὡς ἔθος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς βασιλεῦσι. καὶ μαθὼν ὁ ἀμηνᾶς περιχαρῆς

- καὶ εὐφραϊνόμενος ὑπῆρξε καὶ προστάζει αὐτοῦ οἱ εὐρεθέντες Χριστιανοὶ ἔθασαν τὸ βασιλικὸν πτῶμα μετὰ βασιλικῆς τιμῆς.
- 81 Eagles may have been worn as rare insignia by emperors as early as the twelfth century; cf. S. P. Lampros, “Ἐκφρασις τῶν Ξυλοκονταριῶν τοῦ Κραταιοῦ καὶ Ἁγίου ἡμῶν Αὐθέντου καὶ Βασιλέως,” *NH* 5 (1908): 18: τὸ πῆδιλον ἐρυθρὸν καὶ ὄντως βασιλικόν. ἄετοι λευκοὶ τοῖς πῆδιλοις ἀπὸ μαργάρου γεγράφαντο; *idem*, “Ὁ Δικέφαλος Αετὸς τοῦ Βυζαντίου,” *NH* 6 (1909): 431–473; and C. Chotzakoglou, “Die Palaiologen und das früheste Auftreten des byzantinischen Doppeladlers,” *BS* 57 (1996): 60–69; the official coat of arms of the Palaeologi does not include eagles.
- 82 *EX*, 35: ὕστερον δὲ πολλῆς ζητήσεως γεναμένης περὶ αὐτοῦ, φοβούμενος ὁ αὐθέντης μήπως ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἐστὶ καὶ πορευθεὶς φέρη ἐκ τῆς Φραγγίας λαὸν κατ’ αὐτοῦ, εὗρον γὰρ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεγνώρισαν αὐτὴν ὁ τε Μάμαλις καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὕτως ἠσύχασεν.
- 83 The same name is also encountered in the narrative of Syropoulos, 11.12: Λάσκαρις Μάμαλις. “Mamalis” may have Turkish origins and was taken to be Turkish by the author of a note in a manuscript published by Lampros, “Μονωδία καὶ Θρηνοί,” p. 250; the author of the entry changed the name into a title, “Imam Ali:” ὕστερον δὲ ὡσάν ἐπάρθη ἡ πόλις ἐγίνθη ζητήσις διὰ τὸν βασιλέα ὑπὸ τοῦ σουλτάνου, διότι ἐφοβεῖτο νὰ μὴ φύγη καὶ πάγει εἰς τὴν φραγγίαν καὶ λάβῃ βοήθειαν καὶ ἔλθῃ καὶ τὸν πολεμήσῃ καὶ ἦραν τὴν κεφαλὴν τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τὴν ἤφεραν τὸν σουλτάνου καὶ ἐγνώρισε αὐτὴν ὁ ἄρχων ὁ ἡμᾶ ἀλλῆς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ πληροφορηθεὶς ὁ σουλτάνος ἐχάρη μεγάλως. This note and the information supplied by *EX* 35 (*supra*, n. 82) derive from the same source. On a Mamalis, cf. *PLP* 7: no. 16554 (p. 61), who may, perhaps be identified with a Laskaris Mamalis, *PLP* 7: no. 16558 (pp. 61, 62).
- 84 Greek text (with German translation) in *Analekten der mittel- und neugriechischen Literatur*, ed. A. Ellissen, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 106–249; and in É. Legrand, *Bibliothèque grecque vulgaire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1880): 169 ff. The testimony of this author has been overlooked by modern historians. The identity of the author still remains a mystery, although in the past an attempt was made to identify him with the Rhodian poet Emmanuel Georgillas; cf. A. Gidel, *Études sur la littérature grecque moderne* (Paris, 1866), p. 66; E. Egger, *L’Hellenisme en France* (Paris, 1869), p. 439, n. 1; Ellissen and Lampros, “Μονωδία καὶ Θρηνοί,” p. 194, have rejected the attribution to Georgillas. Also cf. B. Knös, *L’Histoire de la Littérature néo-grecque. La période jusqu’en 1821* (Stockholm, Göteborg, and Uppsala, 1962), pp. 165, 166. *CC* 2: 511, agrees with a date of composition ca. 1455/56: “*composto vero il 1456 . . . al momento in cui Callisto III proclamò la crociata contro i turchi, ma forse da datare, più esattamente al 1455.*” Also on this matter, cf. the opinion of Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησιμολογίου,” pp. 244^{ff}. In a recent study, G. H. Henrich, “Ποῖος Ἐγραψε τὸ Ποίημα Ἀλωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, (BB1, 177–197),” in È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds., *Constantinople: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη 550 Χρόνια ἀπὸ τὴν Ἄλωση*, vol. 2 (Granada, 2006), pp. 405–414, through internal evidence of hints, riddles, and deliberate allusions, supports the view that the poet was Manolis Limenites who is further been identified with Emmanuel Georgillas, thus attempting to restore the original attribution.
- 85 Ellissen, ll. 387 ff. (p. 158): καὶ ποῦ ὁ αὐτοκράτορας βασιλεὺς τῶν Ρωμαίων; / Ὡ Κωνσταντίνε βασιλεῦ, Δράγαζι τὸ ἴνιδι, / εἰπέ μου ποῦ εὗρίσκεσαι, ἐχάθης, ἐκρυβήθη; / Ζῆσαι ἦ καὶ ἀπέθανες ἐπάνω ᾗς τὸ σπαθὶ σου; / Ὅτι ὁ σκύλος, ὁ ἀμυρᾶς ὁ Μαχουμέτ ὁ κράτωρ, / ὅπου αὐθέντευσε λοιπὸν τὴν ἄτυχον τὴν Πόλιν, / πολλὰ γὰρ ἐνηλάφησε τὰ κομμένα κεφάλια, / καὶ τὰ κορμῖα ἐδιέγερνε λέγω τὰ κεκομμένα, / τὸ ἴγυρευεν οὐδὲν ἦρε, οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἡ χρεία, / νεκρὸν σῶμα λέγω τὸ σὸν τί τῶθελεν ὁ σκύλος, / ἦ τὴν τιμίαν κεφαλὴν, ᾗ φθέντα, τὴν ἰδικὴν σου.
- 86 The anonymous author devotes special attention to the connections between Constantinople and Burgundy in ll. 365–398 (pp. 156–160). For the interest of the court of Burgundy in the fall of Constantinople and in the Ottoman Turks, in general, see *SOC*, ch. 1.

- 87 In 1444, during the battle of Varna, King Ladislas lost his mount; he was decapitated and his severed head was then displayed; see *MCT*, p. 39. Testimonies on the battle and aftermath are collected in translation in C. Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–1445* [Crusade Texts in Translation] (Aldershot, 2006).
- 88 Pusculo, 4.1015–1017 [not in *CC* 1]. The Serbian Janissary, Konstantin Mihailović from Ostrovica, repeats the same information; see B. A. Stolz, *Konstantin Mihailović, Memoirs of a Janissary* (Ann Arbor, 1975) [partial Italian translation in *CC* 1: 256–260]. Also see Nestor-Iskander, 82 (pp. 92, 93), who reports that the head was found by a Serb and was then identified by the patriarch, who deposited it in a case and placed it under the altar of Santa Sophia: И ту срѣте его њъкий Сербинъ, принесе ему цесареу главу. Онъ же возрадовася зѣло . . . Патриархъ же вземъ положи ю въ ковчежець сребранъ и позлащенъ и скры ю въ великую церкви подъ престоломъ.
- 89 For a survey of the remains in modern Istanbul's Vefa Meidan and further discussion, see *SFC*, pp. 231–265, which evaluates, pp. 266–288, the tradition that Constantine XI's grave is located within the Church of Santa Theodosia (*Gül Camii*).
- 90 A summary of all suggested sites (without discussion) can be found in Magoulias' translation of Doukas, pp. 231, 232, n. 289. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 93, 94: "It is idle to speculate further."
- 91 Mordtmann, *Belagerung und Eroberung*, p. 100: "In der Nähe des Wefa Meidani unter der Wefa-Moschee, im Winkel eines von Schumachern, Suttlern und anderen Handwerken bewohnten Haus ruht der Leichman, von einem Steine ohne Aufschrift bedeckt, unter dem Schatten eines von wilden Weinreben und Rosen umruncklen Weidenbaums. Eine einfache Lampe, von der Regierung mit Oel versehen, wird noch jetzt jeden Abend über dem Grabe angezündet." It is clear that Mordtmann was reporting tales that were already in existence. Eleven years before Mordtmann's book appeared, the Vefa site had already been reported, with the essentials of the story in existence; see Ch. Parmenides, *Νέα Ποιήματα* (Athens, 1847), p. 151: Ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει, κάτω τοῦ σεραγίου, ὑπάρχουσι παλαιά τινα χάνια, χρησιμεύοντα εἰς διαφόρους βαναύσους ἐργασίας, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὡς στάβλοι ἵππων. Ἐντὸς λοιπὸν τοιοῦτου καταγωγίου, εἰς ὑπαίθρων γωνίαν, λυχνία τις ἀναπτομένη αὐθημερὸν ἐπὶ Τοῦρκων διασκορπίζει ἀμυδρὸν φῶς εἰς μνημεῖον τι. Παράδοσις παλαιοτάτη . . . ἀναφέρει ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἔρημον τοῦτο μνημα κεῖνται τὰ ὀστᾶ τοῦ τελευταίου χριστιανοῦ τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως βασιλέως.
- 92 The site no longer exists and the alleged grave has vanished without trace. A modern Greek translation of Mordtmann's passage by N. Dragoumes can be found in *Πανδώρα* 10 (1860): 209. In 1862, N. Dragoumes visited the site and provided the following description in *Πανδώρα* 13 (1862): 201; his conclusion is important, as he shows that there never was a lamp over the grave: Ἐν τινι χανίῳ κατὰ τὸ Βεφᾶ Μεϊδάνι κειμένῳ, σώζεται μνημεῖον, τὸ ὁποῖον ἡ παράδοσις λέγει τάφον Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ τελευταίου. Τὸν τάφον τοῦτον ἐπισκέπτεται ὅστις θέλει καὶ ἐνίοτε ἱερεὺς Ἕλλην ἔρχεται φέρων λιβανωτὸν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων τὸ τρισάγιον, καθαγιάζει τὴν μνήμην τοῦ ἱερομάρτυρος αὐτοκράτορος. Τὸν τάφον τοῦτον ἐπισκεφθεὶς μετὰ πολλῆς κατανόξεως, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐπιστάσις, δὲν εὔρον κατὰ πάντα ὅποιον περιγρᾶφει ὁ Μόρντμαν . . . Περί δὲ τὸν τάφον δὲν φαίνονται οὔτε ροῦδαί οὔτε ἀγρία ἄμπελος οὔτε ἰτέα, ἀλλὰ ταπεινὸν . . . δένδρον πρὸ ἐνὸς ἔτους φυτευθὲν ἀντικατέστησεν τὴν ἄλλοτε ὑπάρχουσαν . . . ἰτέαν. Πρὸς τοῦτοις ὁ φύλαξ μὲ ἐβεβαίωσεν, ὅτι ποτὲ λυχνος δὲν ἀνήπτετο ἐπὶ τοῦ τάφου.
- 93 This description is cited without further attribution in Siderides, "Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Θάνατος, Τάφος, καὶ Σπάθη," p. 137: Εἰς τὸ παλαιὸν χάνιον, πλησίον τοῦ ὁποίου εὐρίσκετο ὁ τάφος, κατοικοῦσι σήμερον ἐπαῖται ρυπαροὶ ὁ μονόλιθος δὲν ὑπάρχει τέσσαρα μικρὰ ὑπομέλαινα μάρμαρα ὑπάρχουσιν εἰς τὰς γωνίας, καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ στρῶμα χώματος . . . ἐξέλιπε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἰτέα, καὶ ἡ κληματὶς, καὶ ἡ ροδὴ μόνον δὲ κυρτόν τι καὶ χαμηλὸν δένδρον ἀπέμεινε. Πλησιέστατα τοῦ χανίου εὐρίσκεται μέγας τις τάφος, ἔχων σιδηροῦν κιγκλίδωμα ἐνούμενον καθ' ὕψους εἰς τοῦτον ἐτάφη ὁ φονεὺς

- τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου. It seems that a Greek in Constantinople attempted to secure official permission to clean and restore the “tomb” of Constantine, together with the tomb of his supposed killer; work began and the tomb of Constantine’s killer was first restored but no further work was allowed to be carried out. The Greek who undertook this project was then arrested and vanished without a trace. Cf. Dragoumes in *Πανδώρα* 13, pp. 201–203; and P. I. Spyropoulos, *Ἡ Ἀλωση τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως: 29 Μαΐου 1453* (Athens, 1991), pp. 202–215.
- 94 Paspates, *Πολιορκία καὶ Ἀλωσις*, p. 187: Πρὸ τινων ἐτῶν, παντοπόλης Ἑλλῆν ἐν τῇ πλατεῖα καλουμένη Βεφᾶ, ἄνω τῆς πύλης Οὐν καμπάνι, ἤγειρε μικρὸν τάφον ἐν τινι γωνίᾳ τοῦ τείχους. Ἐπὶ τοῦ τάφου τούτου τοῦ βασιλέως Παλαιολόγου, ἔκαιε λυχνία ἀκοίμητος. Ὁ τάφος οὗτος μετὰ καιρὸν, ἐγένετο ἐμπόρευμα ἐπικερδέστερον τοῦ παντοπωλείου του. Ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸ τινος καιροῦ ἀπηγόρευσε τὴν καπηλειὰν ταύτην.
- 95 Mijatovich, *Constantine Palaeologus*, p. 230.
- 96 Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, p. 355, n. 2.
- 97 Siderides, “Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Θάνατος, Τάφος, καὶ Σπάθη,” pp. 139, 140: ἐν ἔτει 1904 τὸ λεγόμενον μνημα τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου ἦτο ἀφανές, κατέρρευσε ἢ αὐτόθι γωνία τοῦ τοίχου τοῦ κτήματος καὶ λίθοι καὶ χρώματα κατεπλάκωσαν αὐτό . . . Καὶ ἐφέτος εἶδον τὸν τάφον ἐσκεπασμένον ἐτι ὑπὸ τῶν χωμάτων. Siderides develops a complicated hypothesis, which he bases on the late testimony of the Turkish traveller Evliya Çelebi; on Evliya, cf. A. A. Pallis, “A Seventeenth Century Turkish Baedeker: The Travel-Book of Evliya Cheleby,” in *Greek Miscellany: A Collection of Essays on Medieval and Modern Greece* (Athens, 1964), pp. 84–101; and *idem*, *Σελίδες ἀπὸ τὴν Ζωὴ τῆς Παλιᾶς Γενιτσαρικῆς Τουρκίας κατὰ τὴν Περιγραφήν τοῦ Τούρκου Περιηγητῆ τοῦ 17. Αἰ. Ἐβλιᾶ Τσελεμπῆ* (Athens, 1941; repr.: 1990); for the relevant passages of Evliya, see the selections in French translation by H. Turková, “Le Siège de Constantinople d’après le Seya – hatname d’Evliya – Çelebi,” *BS* 14 (1953): 1–13. Also see the translation by J. von Hammer, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in the Seventeenth Century, by Evliyâ Efendî* (London, 1834). Siderides suggested that the body of Constantine XI was buried in the Church of the Holy Apostles (which was designated by the Conqueror as the first seat of the patriarchate after the fall). This church was annexed and became the mosque of the Conqueror (*Fatih Camii*), after extensive renovations under the supervision of Sinan/Christodoulos, the sultan’s Greek architect (who became a renegade and converted to Islam; see *MCT*, pp. 292, 293); at the time of the conversion of the Holy Apostles, Siderides believes, the remains of the emperor were transferred to the Church of Santa Theodosia (*Gül Camii*) by Sinan/Christodoulos himself; Siderides claimed to have detected traces of the grave of the emperor in *Gül Camii*; echoes of Siderides’ speculation are still encountered; see, e.g., J. Freely, *Blue Guide: Istanbul* (London and New York, 1988), p. 233, and Freely and Çakmak, *Byzantine Monuments*, p. 225, who classify Siderides’ view as “an apocryphal Greek legend.” Detailed discussion of this supposed tomb and Santa Theodosia in *SFC*, pp. 265–288. Equally absurd are numerous other suggestions placing the grave at the Monastery of Peribleptos (*Sulu Monastir*) in Hypsomatheia, under the altar of Santa Sophia (Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, p. 354, n. 2, adds that such a story was in circulation among the Turks of Istanbul in his day; but the origins of this story go back to Nestor-Iskander), in a district of Pera, or in the imperial palace itself. For analysis of the monuments involved, see *SFC*, pp. 231–288.
- 98 Greek Text in N. G. Polites, *Μελέται*, no. 34 (pp. 22, 23): Κοντὰ ᾿ς τὸ Βεφᾶ Μεϊδάνι, ᾿ς ἓνα χάνι μέσα, ᾿ς τὴν ἀυλὴν, εἶναι θαμμένος ὁ βασιλιάς. Ἄλλοτε εἶχαν ἀναμμένη καὶ μιὰ καντήλα ἀπάνω ᾿ς τὸ μνημα του, τώρα εἶναι πολλὸς καιρὸς ποῦ δὲν τὴν ἀνάβουν. Καὶ ᾿ς ἄλλη μεριά ᾿ς τὸ ἴδιο χάνι ἔχουν τὸν Ἀράπη ποῦ τὸν ἐσκότωσε, σκεπασμένο ὄλο λαχούρια καὶ χαλιά.
- 99 *EX*, 3: τὰ δὲ σώματα πάντα ὅσα ἦν ἐν ταῖς πύλαις ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνάψαντες πυρκαϊὰν ἐν μέσῳ τῆς σοῦδας κατέφλεξαν ἅπαντα.

- 100 On Arthur of Britain, cf., among countless others, J. Morris, *The Age of Arthur: A History of the British Isles from 350 to 650* (New York, 1973), esp. pp. 117–126; G. Ashe, *The Discovery of King Arthur* (Garden City, 1985); K. H. Jackson, “The Arthur of History,” in S. R. Loomis, ed., *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages: A Collaborative History* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 1–12; R. S. Loomis, “The Legend of Arthur’s Survival,” in *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages: A Collaborative History* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 64–72; and J. J. Parry and R. A. Caldwell, “Geoffrey of Monmouth,” in *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages: A Collaborative History* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 72–94. Of course, this “vanishing emperor” motif is widespread. Frederick II, too, attracted his share of stories, in which the theme of the king entombed in a mountain is encountered; see A. H. Krappe, *The Science of Folklore* (New York, 1964), pp. 108–110. In addition, see Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησμολογίου,” esp. pp. 244 ff.
- 101 L. Alcock, *Arthur’s Britain* (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 45: *Gueith camlann in qua arthur & medraut corruerunt*.
- 102 Cf. Krappe, *The Science of Folklore*, ch. 5; and Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησμολογίου.”
- 103 On the “Grand Vision/Idea” and its political implications and aspirations in the modern period, see T. G. Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism* (Boulder and New York, 1984). Also see D. D. Dakin, *The Unification of Greece 1770–1923* (New York, 1972), pp. 71–74. The climax of the Grand Idea was reached in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, when Greece conquered enormous territorial extensions. In the culture of the period, numerous popular lithographs were produced, immortalizing the victories of the Greek armed forces; their subjects remind us of the importance of the legend of the “resurrected emperor.” See, e.g., a lithograph by the academic painter Phrixos Aristeus (1871–1951), who portrayed the Greek army advancing to Istanbul, with the Golden Horn and Santa Sophia in the background. The Greek commander-in-chief in the Balkan Wars, Crown Prince Constantine XII, is leading, on his mount, a phalanx of regulars but the way is pointed out to him by another rider, the resurrected Constantine XI, with crown and purple cloak fluttering behind him. The lithograph bears the following inscription: “Ἡ Ἀνάστασις τοῦ Μαρμαρωμένου Βασιλιᾶ, Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος 1453 – Διάδοχος Κωνσταντῖνος 1912”. For a color reproduction of this lithograph (and a collection of numerous other fascinating lithographs of this nature, depicting the battles of 1912–1913), see E. Papaspyrou-Karademetriou, *Βαλκανικοί Πόλεμοι 1912–1913: Ἑλληνικὴ Λαϊκὴ Εἰκονογραφία* (Athens, 1999), esp. illustration 5 (p. 59) for the approach to Istanbul.
- 104 *Odyssey* 11.601–603: τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακλεΐην, / εἶδωλον αὐτὸς δὲ μετ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι / τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς. Furthermore, like Arthur’s Excalibur, the motif of Constantine’s sword forms another important part of the legend. For a recent analysis, cf. Emellos, *Θρολούμενα*, pp. 50, 59.
- 105 Ll. 1013–1017: ὦ Κωνσταντῖνε βασιλεῦ, τί νάνεν ἀπὸ ἴσεννα; / Λέγουν ὅτι ἀπέθανες ἐπάνω στὸ σπαθὶ σου, / ἦκουσα πάλι νὰ λέγουσι καὶ εἶσαι κεκρυμμένος / ὑπὸ χειρὸς τε πανσθενοῦς δεξιᾶς τε τοῦ Κυρίου.
- 106 Polites, *Μελέται*, no. 33 (p. 22): ὅταν ἦρθε ἡ ὥρα νὰ τουρκένη ἡ Πόλη, καὶ μῆταν μέσα οἱ Τοῦρκοι, ἔτρεξε ὁ βασιλιάς μας καβάλλα ἔς τᾶλογο τοῦ νὰ τοὺς ἐμποδίσῃ. Ἦταν πλῆθος ἀρίφνητο ἡ Τουρκιά, χιλιάδες τὸν ἔβαλαν στὴ μέση, κ’ ἐκεῖνος χτυποῦσε κ’ ἔκοβε ἀδιάκοπα μετ’ τὸ σπαθὶ του. Τότε σκοτώθη τᾶλογο τοῦ, κ’ ἔπεσε κι αὐτός. Κ’ ἐκεῖ πὺ ἕνας Ἀράνης σήκωσε τὸ σπαθὶ του νὰ χτυπήσῃ τὸν βασιλιά, ἦρθε ἄγγελος Κυρίου καὶ τὸν ἄρπαξε, καὶ τὸν πῆγε σὲ μιὰ σηλιά βαθιά κάτω, κοντὰ ἔς τὴ Χρυσόπορτα. Ἐκεῖ μένει μαρμαρωμένος ὁ Βασιλιάς, καὶ καρτερεῖ τὴν ὥρα νᾶρθῃ πάλι ὁ ἄγγελος νὰ τὸν σηκώσῃ. Οἱ Τοῦρκοι τὸ ξεύρουν αὐτό, μὰ δὲν μποροῦν νὰ βροῦν τὴ σηλιά ποῦ εἶναι ὁ βασιλιάς γι’ αὐτὸ ἔχτισαν τὴν πόρτα ποῦ ξεύρουν πῶς ἀπ’ αὐτὴ θὰ ἔμῃ ὁ βασιλιάς γιὰ νὰ τοὺς πάρῃ πίσω τὴν Πόλη. Μὰ ὅταν εἶναι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ,

- θὰ κατεβῆ ὁ ἄγγελος ἔς τὴν σπηλιὰ θὰ τὸν ξεμαρμαρώση, καὶ θὰ τοῦ δώσει ἔς τὸ χέρι πάλι τὸ σπαθί, ποῦ εἶχε στὴ μάχη. Καὶ θὰ σηκωθῆ ὁ βασιλιᾶς, καὶ θὰ μπῆ ἔς τὴν Πόλη ἀπὸ τῆ Χρυσόπορτα, καὶ κληγγώντας μὲ τὰ φουσσάτα τοῦ τοῦς Τούρκους, θὰ τοῦς διώξῃ ὡς τὴν Κόκκινη Μηλιά. Καὶ θὰ γίνῃ μεγάλος σκοτωμός, ποῦ θὰ κολυμπήσῃ τὸ μουσκάρι ἔς τὸ αἶμα.
- 107 See J. W. Barker, *Justinian and the Later Roman Empire* (Madison, 1966); and A. Cameron, *Procopius and Sixth Century* [The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 10] (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985).
- 108 A massive statue was erected by Justinian I after the completion of Santa Sophia; an old statue of Theodosius the Great or of Theodosius II was utilized, on which a new head and elaborate headdress were placed. Even in the Middle Ages there was uncertainty as to the person that this statue was supposed to portray; it was variously identified with Justinian I, Heraclius, Theodosius, and even Constantine the Great. Cf. Barker, *Justinian and the Later Roman Empire*, p. 265, and pp. 290–292; R. Guiland, “Études sur la Topographie de Constantinople byzantin,” *Ἑλληνικά* 17 (1962): 95–99; C. Mango, *The Brazen House: A Study of the Vestibule of the Imperial Palace of Constantinople* (Copenhagen, 1959), pp. 36–72; G. Downey, “Justinian as Achilles,” *TAPA* 71 (1940): 70–73; C. Mango, *The Art of the Byzantine Empire*, 312–1453 (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), p. 57; G. Downey, “Notes on the Topography of Constantinople,” *Art Bulletin* 34 (1952): 235, 236; P. W. Lehman, “Theodosius or Justinian? A Renaissance Drawing of a Byzantine Rider,” *Art Bulletin* 41 (1959): 39–57; and C. Mango, “Letters to the Editor,” *Art Bulletin* 41 (1959): 351–356. A collection of the late Russian accounts in Majeska, *Russian Travelers*, pp. 237–240 (with sound commentary on this point). Western and eastern accounts are included in Van der Vin, *Travellers to Greece and Constantinople*, vol. 1: 271–278.
- 109 Procopius, 7.1.2.5–12. Text and translation in Lehman, “Theodosius or Justinian?,” pp. 41–44 and n. 10. For a Renaissance drawing of the statue, associated with Cyriacus of Ancona, see Barker, *Justinian and the Later Roman Empire*, fig. 10.
- 110 It is usually identified as “the golden apple with the cross” in Russian accounts. The Germans called it *Reichsapfel*, as it is evident in Schiltberger (see *Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger aus München*, ed. K. F. Neumann [Munich, 1859], p. 137), who further informs us that it was no longer *in situ* in 1427, when he visited Constantinople. As the orb was still in place when it was seen by the Russian traveler Zosima in 1421/22 (Majeska, *Russian Travelers*, p. 240, n. 17), it follows that it fell sometime between 1421/22 and 1427. This was not the first time that the “apple” had fallen from the hand of the rider; it had also fallen in 1316 and had been restored to the statue’s hand by 1325 (see Van der Vin, *Travellers to Greece and Constantinople*, vol. 1, p. 275). It appears that an unsuccessful attempt to raise the orb was made in 1435 (Van der Vin, p. 275). Thus, the fall of the orb in this later period further fueled the prophecies of doom that were circulating.
- 111 There were other interpretations; see Majeska, *Russian Travelers*, p. 240.
- 112 Constantinople was often compared by the Turks to a red apple. This “red apple” may refer to the “apple” in the statue’s hand; see Van der Vin, *Travellers to Greece and Constantinople*, vol. 1, p. 275. On the Turkish folklore, cf. Vacalopoulos, *Origins*, p. 347, n. 115; F. Babinger, “Quizil Elma,” *Der Islam* 12 (1922): 109–111; F. Hasluck, “The Prophecy of the Red Apple,” in *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1920), pp. 736–740; and E. Rossi, “La legenda turco-bizantina del Pomo Rosso,” *SBN* 5 (1939): 542–553. For apples in general, cf. A. R. Littlewood, “The Symbolism of the Apple in Greek and Roman Literature,” *HSCP* 72 (1967): 147–181; *idem*, “The Symbolism of the Apple in Byzantine Literature,” *JöB* 23 (1974): 35–59; and G. Martin, “Golden Apples and Golden Boughs,” in *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson*, vol. 2 (Saint Louis, 1953), pp. 1191 ff. For a brief, incomplete summary of this motif in the Greek literature of the nineteenth century, see Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*, pp. 107, 108. For the meaning of the Red Apple Tree/Κόκκινη Μηλιά in

- Greek folklore, see K. Romaios, “Ἡ Κόκκινη Μηλιά τῶν Ἐθνικῶν μας Θυρῶλων,” *ΕΕΒΣ* 23 (1953) [*Κανίσκιον Ι. Φαίδωνι Κουκουλίε*]: 676–688.
- 113 Ll. 862–867: Καὶ νὰ δοξάζεται Χριστὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς δόξης, / κι οἱ ἄσεβεις νὰ σφάζονται καὶ νᾶχουν πόνον μέγαν, / παντάπα νὰ ᾽ξεριζωθοῦν ἀπὸ τὴν Ρωμανίαν, / . . . / Νὰ ᾽πᾶσιν ἀπεκεῖ πὺδ ἦλθαν ἕως Μονοδενδρίου.
- 114 The tradition of placing the emperor in the vicinity of the Golden Gate was old, as it is encountered in Nestor-Iskander’s text; cf. *supra*, n. 71. Eventually the tale is taken up by literary authors and poets. It is encountered in the famous poem of George Bizyenos (Vizyenos) (1848–1894), *Ὁ Τελευταῖος Παλαιολόγος* (from his collection *Ἀτιθίδες Ἀῤῥαι* [Athens, 1884], lines 7–12): Στὴν Πόλη, στὴν Χρυσόπορτα, στὸν πύργο ἀπὸ κάτω, / εἶν’ ἕνα σπήλαιο πλατὺ, στρωμένο σὰ παλάτι, / σὺν ἅγιο παρακκλησί. / Κανένας Τοῦρκος δὲν μπορεῖ νὰ κρατηθῆ κοντὰ του / κανεὶς τῆς σιδερόπορτας ναυρῆ τὸ μονοπάτι / νὰ πᾶ νὰ τὸ μὴνύση. On Bizyenos, see, A. Zimbone, “Ὁ Γεώργιος Βιζυηνὸς καὶ ἡ Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως,” *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινουπόλη: 550 Χρόνια ἀπὸ τὴν Ἄλωση* 2: 435–455. In addition, see Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησιμολογίου,” esp. p. 244.
- 115 Such interruptions are mentioned in Bizyenos’ poem, ll. 85–90: – Καὶ τώρα πᾶ δὲν εἰμπορεῖ, γιγατάκα, νὰ ᾽ξυπνήση; / – ὦ βέβαια! Καιροῦς, καιροῦς, σηκώνει τὸ κεφάλι, / στὸν ὕπνο τὸ βαθύ του, / καὶ βλέπ’ ἂν ἦρθεν ἡ στιγμὴ, πῶχ ὁ Θεὸς ὀρίσει, / καὶ βλέπ’ ἂν ἦρθ’ ὁ ἄγγελος γιὰ νὰ τοῦ φέρῃ πάλι / τὸ κοφτερὸ σπαθὶ του.
- 116 The oracular texts attributed to Leo the Wise and Methodius of Patara were very popular in the fifteenth century and were known to Nestor-Iskander, who was eyewitness of the siege, 85–87 (pp. 94, 95): Но убо разумѣши, окаянне, аще вся прежереченная Мѣθοдіемъ Патаромскимъ и Львомъ Премудрымъ и знаменія о градѣ семь съвершишася, то и послѣдняя не прейдуть, но также съвершишася, имуть. Пишетъ бо: “Русии же родъ съ прежде создательными всего Измаилта побѣдять и сед[ь]мохолмага приимуть . . .” . . . И паки въ послѣднемъ видѣнїи Даниловѣ.
- 117 See the investigation of Bees, “Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησιμολογίου.” On the *corpus* of the prophecies of Leo the Wise, see A. Rigo, *Oracula Leonis. Tre manoscritti all’imperatore Greco-veneziano degli oratori attribuiti all’imperatore bizantino Leone il Saggio* (Bodl. Baroc. 170, Marv. gr. VII. 22, Marc. Gr. 3) (Venice, 1988); a version (translated from Klontzas’ *codex*) of the prophecies into Slavic also exists: J. Vereecken, “Les Oracles de Léon le Sage en slavon serbe. Fragment d’un manuscrit du XVème siècle de la Bibliothèque Lénin à Moscou,” *Slavica Gandensia* 14 (1987): 105–127. Also see K. Kyriakou, *Οἱ Ἱστορημένοι Χρησμοὶ τοῦ Λέοντα τοῦ Σοφοῦ, Ἱστορικὴ Τοποθέτηση καὶ Εἰκονογραφικὴ Εἰζέταση. 15ος-17ος Αἰ.* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Thessalonica, 1988).
- 118 On Klontzas, in general, see A. Paliouras, “Ἡ Ζωγραφικὴ εἰς τὸν Χάνδακα ἀπὸ 1500–1600,” *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 10 (1973), 101–123; *idem*, “Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας στὸ Σινά,” *Πεπραγμένα Ζ’ Διεθνοῦς Κρητολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου* 2.2 (Rethymnon, 1995): 599–609; and P. L. Votokopoulos, *Τὸ Θεῖον Πάθος σὲ Πίνακα τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα* (Athens, 2005). Professor Paliouras’ numerous studies relating to Veneto-Cretan schools and to Klontzas are collected in A. Paliouras, *Μεταβυζαντινὴ Ζωγραφικὴ: Συλλογὴ Ἀρθρῶν* (Ioannina, 2000). Extremely informative on Klontzas as a painter, as opposed to miniaturist, is P. A. Votokopoulos, *Τὸ Θεῖον Πάθος*.
- 119 On this fascinating personality, Francesco Barozzi, see B. Boncompagni, “Intorno all Vita ed ai lavori di Francesco Barozzi,” *Bolletino di Bibliografia e di Storia delle Scienze Matematiche e Fisiche* 17 (1884): 795–848; and D. Gialamas, “Νέες Εἰδήσεις γιὰ τὸ Βενετο–Κρητικὸ Λόγιο Φραγκίσκο Βαροτζί (1537–1604),” *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 20 (1990): 300–403. This *codex* is preserved in the Bodleian Library of Oxford: *Codex Barocianus Graecus* 170 (with twenty-five color miniatures); its text is bilingual, Greek and Latin, with the title (fols. 1–4): *Λέοντος τοῦ Σοφοτάτου Βασιλέως*

Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Χρησμοί. Leonis Sapientissimi Constantinopolitanae Urbis Imperatoris Vaticinia . . . a Francisco Barocio mendis infinitis expurgate ac primo iam Latino sermone donata... illustrissimo Iacobo Foscareno Equiti Cetae Imperatoria Auctoritate Consuli Heroi Amplissimo Franciscus Barocius. S.P.D. At the end of fol. 4 a date is cited in Latin: *Creta VI Idus Aprilis M.D.LXXVII*. The definitive modern edition of this *codex* is provided in the meticulous study (illustrated with color plates) by J. Vereecken and L. Hadermann-Misguich, *Les Oracles de Léon le Sage illustrés par George Klontzas: La version Barozzi dans le Codex Bute* [Ελληνολατινική Ανατολή 7] (Venice, 2000).

- 120 See the comparative study of A. D. Paliouras, “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi,” in *Πεπραγμένα Δ΄ Διεθνoῦς Κρητολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου*, vol. 2 (Herakleion, 1981), pp. 318–328 [= Paliouras, *Μεταβυζαντινὴ Ζωγραφικὴ*: 79–89, with pls. 96–114], and pertinent bibliography.
- 121 The Venice *codex* of Klontzas (*codex Ven.* 1466) first attracted scholarly attention in the eighteenth century; see G. L. Mingarelli, *Graeci codices manu scripti apud Naniōs patricios Venetos asservati* (Bologna, 1784). It was re-catalogued by E. Mioni, *Codices Graeci manuscripti* [*Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum. Indici e Cataloghi*, New Series 6], vol. 2 (Rome, 1960). The miniatures of the Klontzas *codex* (but not all of the accompanying text) were finally published (in black-and-white and not in the original color pen ink) and analyzed in A. D. Paliouras, *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας (1540 ci. – 1608) καὶ αἱ Μικρογραφίαι τοῦ Κώδικος Αὐτοῦ* (Athens, 1977). There is a considerable amount of text that accompanies Klontzas’ miniatures in the *codex*; this text has never been edited and printed in its entirety. A third oracular (but of no concern to us, as it does not illustrate the afterlife of Constantine XI) *codex* of Klontzas has also (re)appeared in private ownership in Paris and is discussed by M. Khatzidakas, “Παρατηρήσεις σὲ Ἄγνωστο Χρησμολόγιο τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα,” in *Θυμίαμα στὴ Μνήμη τῆς Δασκαρίνας Μπούρα*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1994), pp. 51–61 (Plates in vol. 2: 6, 7 [pp. 30–32]).
- 122 Paliouras, *codex Ven.* 1466, plates 314–330, corresponding to fols. 155^r–163^v of the *codex*: ὁ εἰρηνικός βασιλεὺς. This is a duplication/variation of the miniature in fol. 14 of the Oxford *codex*.
- 123 *Ibid.*, plate 314 (fol. 155^r).
- 124 Such a depiction is encountered in the *Marc. Gr. Cod. Cl.* VIII 3, fol. 6^r and is further echoed in the same work in fol. 35^r; the prototype of Klontzas may be his own miniature in the *Barozzi Codex* 170, reproduced in Paliouras, pp. 246, 247, plate ια΄. On the *Barozzi Codex*, cf. A. Paliouras, “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi,” in *Πεπραγμένα Δ΄ Διεθνoῦς Κρητολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου*, vol. 2 (Herakleion, 1981), pp. 318–328. Further illustrations and discussion are found in Vereecken and Hadermann-Misguich, *Les Oracles, passim*. The traditional portrayal of “the sleeping emperor” continued to find artistic expression all the way to the end of the nineteenth century; see, e.g., L. Stephanitz, *Σύλλογος Διαφόρων Προρρήσεων* (Athens, 1838), who included a picture of the sleeping Constantine XI in his sarcophagus with an angel watching and holding over him an imperial crown (reproduced as plate 11 in Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor*). For the text that may have been the inspiration of Klontzas, see Paliouras, “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi,” pp. 325, 326: it may have been another *codex* of Barozzi, *Barocianus Graecus*, p. 145, which includes the Greek text of the prophecies of Leo the Wise but lacks illustrations.
- 125 Paliouras, plate 314 (fol. 155^r): Καὶ στύλος ἀφανῆς ἀναβοῆσει μέγα ἄγετε πρὸς δυσμάς ἐπταλόφου [= Barozzi 170, fol. 14: Paliouras, “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi,” pl. 104a, without the inscription].
- 126 Paliouras, plate 315 (fol. 155^v); explanatory inscription: τὴν πέτραν οἰκῶν ἄγε δεῦρο με ξένη ἐπταλόφου [= Barozzi 170, fol. 15: Paliouras, “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi,” pl. 105a, without the inscription].

- 127 *Ibid.*, plate 316 (fol. 156^v) [= Barozzi 170, fol. 16: Paliouras, “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi,” pl. 106a].
- 128 *Ibid.*, plate 317, 318 (fol. 155^v).
- 129 *Ibid.*, plates 319, 320, 321, and 322 (fols. 156^v, 158^r, 158^v, and 159^r, respectively).
- 130 *Ibid.*, plates 323, 324, 325, and 326 (fols. 19^v, 160^r, 160^v, and 161^r, respectively).
- 131 *Ibid.*, plate 327 (fol. 161^v).
- 132 *Ibid.*, plate 328 (fol. 162^r); caption: τὸ παλάτιον ὅπου ἐστάθη ὁ εἰρηνικὸς βασιλεὺς εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα διὰ νὰ πληρώσουσι οἱ εἰρημένοι χρόνοι ἕξ.
- 133 *Ibid.*, plate 329 (fol. 162^v); caption: καὶ κομπλήροντας οἱ εἰρημένοι ἕξ χρόνοι ἔρχεται ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰς τόπον λεγόμενον Γολγοθᾶ. κάκει κάμνοντας προσευχὴν καὶ παραδίδοντας τὴν ἁγίαν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἁγίων ἀγγέλων καὶ λαμβάνει τέλος.
- 134 *Ibid.*, plate 330 (fol. 163^v); caption: ἐδῶ κηδεύεται τὸ ἅγιον σῶμα τοῦ εἰρηνικοῦ βασιλέως.

Bibliography

I. Collections of sources

- Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana.* F. Miklosich and J. Müller, eds. Vol. 2. Vienna, 1860; Vol. 3, Vienna, 1865; and Vol. 5, Vienna, 1877.
- Analekten der mittel-und neugriechischen Literatur.* A. Ellissen, ed. 5 vols. Leipzig, 1855–1892. Vol. 3. Vienna, 1887.
- Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria.* B. L. Belgrano, ed. Vol. 10. Geneva, 1874; and Vol. 13.2. Geneva, 1877.
- Bibliothèque grecque vulgaire.* É. Legrand, ed. Vol. 1. Paris, 1880; repr. Athens, 1974.
- Византийского-Славянские Сказания о Создании Храма Св. Софии.* S. G. Vilinskii, ed. Odessa, 1900.
- La Caduta di Costantinopoli.* Vol. 1: *Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei.* Vol. 2: *L'Eco nel Mondo.* A. Pertusi, ed. Verona, 1976.
- Chroniques gréco-romanes Inédites ou peu connues publiées avec notes et tables généalogiques.* C. Hopf, ed. Paris, 1873; repr. Brussels, 1966.
- Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini.* R. Wolkan, ed. *Fontes Rerum Austriacorum* 68. Vol. 3. Vienna, 1918.
- Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken. Chronica Byzantina Breviora.* P. Schreiner, ed. *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 12.1, 2, and 3. 3 vols. Vienna, 1975–1979.
- Die griechisch-christlichen Inschriften des Peloponnes.* N. A. Bees, ed. Athens, 1941.
- Epistolae Pontificiae ad Concilium Florentinum Spectantes.* G. Hofmann, ed. Part 3: *Concilium Florentinum ad Documenta et Scriptores*, Series A.1. Rome, 1946.
- “Ενθυμήσεων ἤτοι Χρονικῶν Σημειωμάτων Συλλογὴ Πρώτη.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἑλληνομνημῶν* 7 (1910). Pp. 113–313.
- Mehmed the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Views and Testimonies.* Ed. trans. and annotated by M. Philippides. *Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies.* Vol. 302. Tempe, 2007.
- Μελέται περὶ τοῦ Βίου καὶ τῆς Γλώσσης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ. Παραδόσεις.* N. G. Polites, ed. Vol. 1. Athens, 1904.
- Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη ἢ Συλλογὴ Ἀνεκδότων Μνημείων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας. Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi.* C. N. Sathas, ed. 7 vols. Venice, 1872–1894; repr. Athens, 1972.
- Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalium vicinorumque Populorum.* V. V. Makušev, ed. Vol. 1. Warsaw, 1874.
- Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Ser. Scriptores.* Vol. 21, parts 1–2; Vol. 22, parts 1–2. P. A. Déthier and K. C. Hopf, eds. *Sine loco* (Galata/Pera? or Budapest?), *sine anno* (1872?/1875?).

- “Μονοδίαι καὶ Θρηνοὶ ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀλώσει τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 190–269.
- Μνημεῖα Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας, Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge.* C. N. Sathas, ed. Vol. 9. Paris, 1890; repr. Athens, 1972.
- Notes et Extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e Siècle.* N. Iorga (Jorga), ed. 8 vols. Paris and Bucharest, 1899–1902, 1916.
- Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios.* L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, eds. 4 vols. Paris, 1928–1935.
- Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά.* S. P. Lampros, ed. 4 vols. Athens, 1912–1930; repr. Athens, 1972.
- Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series Graeco-Latina.* J. P. Migne, ed. 161 vols. in 166. Paris, 1857–1866.
- Quae supersunt actorum graecorum Concilii Florentini.* J. Gill, ed. Rome, 1953.
- Regesten der Kaiserkunden des oströmischen Reiches.* F. Dölger, ed. 5 vols. Munich and Berlin, 1965.
- Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie.* F. Thiriet, ed. 3 vols. Paris and The Hague, 1958–1961.
- Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries.* G. P. Majeska, ed. and trans. *Dumbarton Oaks Studies* 19. Washington, DC, 1984.
- “Σημειώματα περὶ Ἀρχαίων Ἑλληνικῶν Ἐπιγραφῶν ἐν Μεσαιωνικοῖς Κώδιξι καὶ Χειρογράφοις Συλλογαῖς Ἑσπερίων Λογίων.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 1 (1904). Pp. 385–411.
- The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts.* J. R. Melville-Jones, trans. Amsterdam, 1972.
- Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli.* *Il Mondo Medievale. Studi di Storia e Storiografia: Sezione di Storia Bizantina e Slava* 4. A. Pertusi, ed. *edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile.* Bologna, 1983.
- Thesaurus novus anecdotorum.* E. Martène and U. Durand, eds. Vol. 1. Paris, 1717.
- Travellers to Greece and Constantinople: Ancient Monuments and Old Traditions in Medieval Travellers' Tales.* J. P. A. Van der Vin, trans. 2 vols. Leiden, 1980.
- Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Greek Accounts.* J. R. Melville-Jones, ed. and trans. *Archivio del Litorale Adriatico VIII* (Padua, 2002 [*sic*; in fact: 2006]).
- Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Venetian Documents.* J. R. Melville-Jones, ed. and trans. *Archivio del Litoral Adriatico VII.* Padua, 2002.

II. Individual western sources

- Alexius (Bishop of Clusium). *Andreis, id est hystoria de receptione capitis Sancti Andreae.* “Ἀλεξίου Ἐπισκόπου Ἀνδρεῖς.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 10 (1913). Pp. 80–112.
- Anonymous. *Lamento de Costantinopoli.* A. Medin and L. Frati, eds. *Lamenti Storici dei Secoli XIV, XV e XVI.* Scelta di Curiosità Letterarie Inedite o Rare 226. Vol. 2. Bologna, 1888. Pp. 127–146.
- . *Elegia Catalana. El Cancionero Catalán de la Universidad de Zaragoza.* M. Baselga y Ramírez, ed. Zaragoza, 1896. Pp. 247–256.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli.* A. Pertusi, ed. Vol. 2: *L'eco nel mondo.* Verona, 1976. Pp. 296–315.
- Barbaro, Nicolò. *Giornale dell'assedio di Costantinopoli 1453 di Nicolò Barbaro P.V. corredato di note e documenti.* E. Cornet, ed. Vienna, 1856.

- . English translation: J. R. Melville-Jones. *Nicolò Barbaro: Diary of the Siege of Constantinople*. Jericho, New York, 1969.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli, Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. A. Pertusi, ed. Verona, 1976. Pp. 8–38 (selections with improved text).
- . Modern Greek translation: V. A. Lappa. *Η Πόλις Εάλω: Το Χρονικό της Πολιορκίας και της Άλωσης της Κωνσταντινούπολης*. Athens, 1993. Pp. 93–213.
- Benvenuto. *Relazione*. “The Anconitan Colony in Constantinople and the Report of Its Consul, Benvenuto, on the Fall of the City.” In A. Pertusi, ed. *Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis*. A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis, ed. New Brunswick, 1980. Pp. 199–218.
- . *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava* 4. A. Pertusi, ed. (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile). Bologna, 1983, pp. 4, 5 (with Italian translation).
- . English translation: M. Philippides. *Byzantium, Europe, and the Early Ottoman Sultans 1373–1513: An Anonymous Greek Chronicle of the Seventeenth Century (Codex Barberinus Graecus 111)*. *Late Byzantine and Ottoman Studies* 4. M. Philippides, trans. New Rochelle, 1991. Pp. 197–199.
- Birago Lampo [Lampugnino]. *Strategicon adversus Turcos*. “Le Notizie sulla organizzazione amministrativa e militare dei Turchi nello Strategicon adversus Turcos di Lampo Birago (c. 1453–1455).” A. Pertusi, ed. *Studi sul medioevo cristiano offerti a R. Morghen per il 90 anniversario dell’Istituto Storico italiano (1883–1973)*. Vol. 2. Rome, 1974. Pp. 669, 700.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli, Vol. 2: L’eco nel mondo*. A. Pertusi, ed. Verona, 1976. Pp. 114–125.
- Clavijo de, Ruy González. English translation: G. Le Strange. *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403–1406*. London, 1928.
- . *Embajada a Tamorlan*. F. Lopez Estrada, ed. Madrid, 1943.
- Crusius, M. [Kraus, Martin]. *Turcograecia libri Octo à Martino Crusio, in Academia Tybigeni Graeco & Latino Professore, vtraque lingua edita. Quibus Graecorum status sub imperio Turcico, in Politia & Ecclesia, Oeconomia, & Scholis, iam inde ab amissa Constantinopoli, ad haec usque tempora, luculenter describitur*. Basel, sine anno (1584).
- Cyriacus of Ancona [Ciriaco de Pizzicoli]. *Inscriptiones seu Epigrammata Graeca et Latina reperta per Illyricum a Cyriaco Anconitano apud Liburniam, designatis locis, ubi quaeque inventae sunt cum descriptione itineris*. Rome, 1747.
- . *Μηνῶν τοῦ Ἐνιαυτοῦ Τάξις Ἀφιερωμένη εἰς τὸν Κωνσταντῖνον Παλαιολόγον*. G. Castellani, ed. “Un traité inédit en grec de Cyriaque d’Ancone.” *Études grecques* 9 (1896). Pp. 225–230.
- . *Alma Città*. S. P. Lampros, ed. “Ἐπίγραμμα τοῦ Κυριακοῦ τοῦ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος περὶ τοῦ Μεσαιωνικοῦ Μυστρά.” *Ἐπετηρὶς τοῦ Φιλολογικοῦ Συλλόγου Παρνασσῶ* 7 (1903). P. 41. Reprinted in S. P. Lampros, *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. P. 96.
- . “Ciriaco d’Ancona e la sua descrizione autografa del Peloponneso trasmessa da Leonardo Botta.” In S. Sabbadini, ed. *Miscellanea Ceriani. Raccolta di scritti originali per onorare la memoria di A. M. Ceriani*. Milan, 1910. Pp. 180–247. Reprinted in R. Sabbadini, *Classici e Umanisti da Codici Ambrosiani*. *Fontes Ambrosiani* 2. Florence, 1933. Pp. 1–52.
- . “Ciriaco d’Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi.” F. Pall, ed. *Bulletin historique de l’Académie roumaine* 20 (1938). Pp. 60, 61.

- . *Μηνῶν τοῦ Ἐνιαυτοῦ Τάξις Ἀφιερωμένη εἰς τὸν Κωνσταντῖνον Παλαιολόγον*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογεία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 96–98.
- Da Rimini, Filippo. *Epistola ad Franciscum Barbarum, virum inclitum, procuratorem Sancti Marci dignissimum* [= *Excidium Constantinopolitanae urbis*]. A. Pertusi, ed. “La lettera di Filippo da Rimini, cancelliere di Corfù, a Francesco Barbaro e i primi documenti occidentali sulla caduta di Costantinopoli (1453).” *Μνημόσωνον Σοφίας Ἀντωνιάδη*. Βιβλιοθήκη τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βενετίας Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν 6. Venice, 1974. Pp. 120–157.
- . Selections with Italian translation. *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile)*. Bologna, 1983. Pp. 127–141.
- De’ Pigli, Giovanni. *Relazione di Giovanni de’Pigli da Peretola intorno a un viaggio dell’imperatore di Costantinopoli fatto nell’1439*. Giovanni. P. Ferrato, ed. Bologna, 1867.
- . “Μία Ἡμέρα Ἰωάννου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου ἐν Περετόλῃ τῆς Τοσκάνης.” S. P. Lampros, ed. and trans. into Modern Greek. *Δελτίον τῆς Ἱστορικῆς καὶ Ἐθνολογικῆς Ἐταιρείας τῆς Ἑλλάδος* 6 (1901). Pp. 351–357.
- . “Emperor John Slept Here.” K. M. Setton, ed. and trans. into English. *Speculum* 33 (1958). Pp. 222–228.
- . “Ἰωάννου de’ Pigli Ἔκθεσις περὶ Ἐκδρομῆς Ἰωάννου Η΄ Παλαιολόγου εἰς Περέτολαν τῆς Τοσκάνης τῷ 1438.” In S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογεία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 327–329.
- . English translation: K. M. Setton. *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571), Vol. 2: The Fifteenth Century*. Philadelphia, 1978. Pp. 63, 64.
- D’Escouchy, Matthew. *Chronique*. G. Du Fresne de Beaucourt, ed. 3 vols. Paris, 1863–1864.
- De Soemmern, Henry. *Qualiter urbs Constantinopolis anno LIII^o a Turcis depraedata fuit et subiugata*. N. I. Iorga, ed. *Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XV^e siècle*. Vol. 3. Paris, 1902. Pp. 307–315.
- . Selections. *La Caduta di Costantinopoli, Vol. 2: L’eco nel mondo*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. Verona, 1976. Pp. 82–97.
- . *Mehmed the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Views and Testimonies*. M. Philippides, ed. and trans. into English. *Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies* 302. Tempe, 2007. Pp. 121–132.
- Diedo, Alvise [Ludovico]. *Relazione “de clade Constantinopolitana” al Senato Veneziano: Testimonianze (a Venezia, 4 luglio 1453)*. *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile)*. A. Pertusi, ed. (with Italian translation). Bologna, 1983. Pp. 6–9.
- Di Montaldo, Adamo. *De Constantinopolitano Excidio ad nobilissimum uenem Melladucam Cicadam*. P. A. Déthier, C. Desimoni, and C. Hopf, eds. In *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 10 (1874). Pp. 289–350.
- , P. A. Déthier, C. Desimoni, and C. Hopf, eds. *Monumenta Hungariae Historica Vol. 22.2. Sine loco (Galata/Pera? or Budapest?), sine anno, 1872?/75?*. Pp. 35–70.
- . *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (edizione*

- postuma a cura di A. Carile*). Bologna, 1983. Pp. 188–209 (selections with Italian translation).
- Dolfin, Zorzi. *Cronaca delle famiglie nobili di Venezia*. G. M. Thomas, ed. “Die Eroberung Constantinopels im Jahre 1453 auf einer venetianischen Chronik.” *Sitzungsberichte der königl. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Klasse*, Band 2. Munich, 1866. Pp. 1–38.
- . English Partial translation. J. R. Melville-Jones. *The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts*. Amsterdam, 1972. Pp. 125–130.
- . *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia*, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (*edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile*). Bologna, 1983. Pp. 169–180 (selections).
- Dotti, Paolo. *Notes et Extraits pour servir à l’histoire des Croisades au XVI^e Siècle*. N. Iorga (Jorga), ed. Vol. 2. Paris and Bucharest, 1899. Pp. 513, 514 (extracts only).
- . *Missiva domini Pauli de Dotis, juris utriusque interpretis, olim ordinarii Paduae, relegati in Candiam, narrans de expugnatione civitatis illustris Constantinopolitanae*. In “Μονοῳδοὶ καὶ Ὁρῆνοι ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀλώσει τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 263–265.
- . With Italian translation. *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol 2: L’Eco nel Mondo*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 12–17.
- Froisart. *Livre du bon messire Jean le Maingre, dit Boucicaut, Marechal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*. C. A. Buchon, ed. Vol. 3. Paris 1835. Pp. 563–595.
- Giustiniani, Hieronimo. *Istoria di Scio scritta nell’anno 1586*. Paris, 1585.
- . *Hieronimo Giustiniani’s History of Chios*. P. P. Argenti, ed. Cambridge, 1943.
- Giustiniani, Leonardo. *Epistula*. In *D. Philippi Loniceri Chronica Turcica*. D. P. Lonicer, ed. Vol. 2. *Francofurti ad Moenum*. Frankfurt am Main, 1578. Pp. 84–102.
- . *De Urbis Constantinopoleos Jactura Captivitateque*. I. I. Sreznevskii, ed. *Повѣсть о Царьградѣ*. Saint Petersburg, 1855. Pp. 50–68.
- . *Epistula*. J.-P. Migne, ed. *Patrologia graeca*. Vol. 159. Paris, 1866. Cols. 923–953.
- . *Epistula*. P. A. Déthier and K. C. Hopf, eds. *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Ser. Scriptores* 21/1–2; 22/1–2. *Sine loco* (Galata/Pera? or Budapest), *sine anno*, 1872?/75?. Pp. 333–616.
- . *Epistola reverendissimi in Christo patris et domini domini Leonardi Ordinis Praedicatorum, archiepiscopi Mitileni, sacrarum litterarum professoris, ad beatissimum dominum nostrum Nicolaum papam quintum [De urbis Constantinopolis captivitate]*. L. T. Belgrano, ed. In “Prima Serie di Documenti Riguardanti la Colonia di Pera.” *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 13 (1877), no. 150. Pp. 233–257.
- . English translation: J. R. Melville-Jones. *The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts*. Amsterdam, 1972. Pp. 11–42.
- . Selections (with improved text and Italian translation): *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 124–171.
- Ivani [da Sarzana], Antonio. *Expugnation Constantino-politana ad illustrem dominum Federicum Montisferetri Urbini ac Durantis comitem*. Published as *Anonymi historiola quae inscribitur Constantinopolitanae civitatis expugnatione conscripta a 1459 p. Chr.e cod. Chart. Bibl. Templi Cathedr. Strengnes*. In *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*. P. A. Déthier and K. C. Hopf, eds. Vol. 22.1, *sine loco* [Galata/Pera or Budapest?], *sine anno*, 1872?/75?. Pp. 71–94.
- . *Expugnation Constantinopolitana edita per Antonium Ivanum ad illustrem dominum Federicum Montisferetri Urbini ac Durantis comitem*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Testi Inediti e*

- Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile). Bologna, Bologna, 1983. Pp. 146–165.
- Languschi de', Giacomo [Langusco de, Giacomo (= Dolfin, Zorzi)]. *Excidio e presa di Costantinopoli nell'anno 1453*. In “Die Eroberung Constantinopels im Jahre 1453 auf einer venetianischen Chronik.” G. M. Thomas, eds. *Sitzungsberichte der königl. bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos. – hist. Klasse 2*. Munich, 1866. Pp. 1–38.
- . *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed.. Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile). Bologna, 1983. Pp. 169–180 (selections).
- Leonardo of Chios. Cf. Giustiniani, Leonardo.
- Lomellino, Angello Giovanni. *Epistula*. S. De Sacy, ed. “Pièces diplomatiques tirée des Archives République de Gênes.” *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi* 11 (1827). Pp. 74–79.
- . “Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera.” L. T. Belgrano, ed. *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 13 (1877), no. 149. Pp. 229–233.
- . “Notes et Extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e Siècle.” N. Iorga (Jorga), ed. *Revue de l'Orient latin* 8 (1900/01). Pp. 105–108.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 42–51 (improved text with Italian translation).
- English translation: J. R. Melville-Jones. *The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts*. Amsterdam, 1972. Pp. 131–135.
- Mandeville, John. *Mandeville's Travels: Texts and Translations*. M. Letts, ed. Vol. 1. London, 1953.
- Nicholas V, Pope. *Επιστολή Νικολάου Πέμπτου Ρώμης Αρχιερέως Μεγίστου πρὸς Κωνσταντῖνον Βασιλέα Ρωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Λατίνης Μεθερμηνευθεῖσα Φωνῆς ὑπὸ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Γαζῆ*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 49–63.
- . English translation: W. K. Hanak. “Pope Nicholas V and the Aborted Crusade of 1452–1453 to Rescue Constantinople from the Turks.” *Byzantinoslavica* 65 (2007). Pp. 337–359.
- Pius II, Pope [Piccolomini, Aeneas, Sylvius]. *Aeneae Sylvii Piccolomini Senensis, qui post adeptum pontificatum Pius eius nominis Secundus appellatus est, opera quae extant omnia, nunc demum post corruptissimas aeditiones summa diligentia castigata & in unum corpus redacta, quorum elenchum uersa pagella indicabit*. Basel, sine anno, 1551?.
- . *De Captione Urbis Constantinopolis Tractaculus*. In *Aeneae Sylvii Piccolomini Senensi, qui post adeptum pontificatum Pius eius nominis secundus appellatus est, opera quae extant Omnia, nunc demum post corruptissimas aeditiones summa diligentia castigata & in unum corpus redacta. Quorum elenchum uersa pagella indicabit*. Basel, sine anno [= 1571], ex officina Henrici Petrina; repr. Frankfurt, 1967. Pp. 400–403.
- . *Epistulae*. A. Pertusi, ed. *La Caduta di Costantinopoli, Vol. 2: L'eco nel mondo*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 44–67 (selections with Italian translation).
- . *Commentarii. Pius II Commentaries*. M. Meserve and M. Simonetta, eds. and trans. The I Tatti Renaissance Library 12. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA and London, 2003.
- . *Tractaculus. Mehmed the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Views and Testimonies*. M. Philippides, ed., trans. and annotated. Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies. Vol. 302. Tempe, 2007. Pp. 93–119.

- Polo, Marco. *The Travels of Marco Polo*. R. Latham, trans. Harmondsworth, 1978.
- Pusculo, Ubertino. *Constantinopolis libri IV*. G. Bregantini, ed. Vol. 1. Venice, 1740.
- . *Analekten der mittel-und neugriechischen Literatur*. A. S. Ellissen, ed. Vol. 3. Leipzig, 1857, Appendix. Pp. 12–83.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 200–213. Selections (with improved text) and Italian translation).
- Riccherio [Richerus/Richer], Christoforus. *De rebus Turcarum libri octo*. Paris, 1540.
- . English Partial translation: J. R. Melville-Jones. *The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts*. Amsterdam, 1972, Pp. 117–124.
- Sagundino, Nicola. Cf. Sekoundinos, Nikolaos.
- Sansovino, Francesco. *Historia universal dell' origine et imperio de Turchi: nella quale si contengono la origine, le lege, l'usanze, i costumi, cose religiosi come mondani de' Turchi: oltre cio vi sono tutte le questa gente fino al modern Selim con le vite di tutti i principi di casa Ottomana*. 3 vols. Venice, 1564, 1568, 1571, etc.
- . *Gl' annali Turcheschi ovvero vite de principi della casa Ottomana. Ne quali si descrivono di tempo in tempo tutte le guerre fatte dalla natione de Turchi in diverse Prouincie del Mondo con moltiparticolari della Morea et delle case nobili dell Albania, & dell' Imperio & stato de Greci*. Venice, 1573.
- Scalamonti, Francesco. *Vita Viri Clarissimi et Famosissimi Kyriaki Anconitani by Francesco Scalamonti*. C. Mitchell and E. W. Bodnar, eds. and trans. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge. vol. 86, pt. 4. Philadelphia, 1996.
- Schiltberger, Johann. *Reisebuch*. V. Langmantel, ed. Tübingen, 1855.
- . *Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger aus München*. K. F. Neumann, ed. Munich, 1859.
- Sekoundinos, Nikolaos. *Ad serenissimum principem et invictissimum regem Alfonso Nicolai Sagundini oratio*. V. V. Makušev, ed. *Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalium vicinorumque Populorum*. Vol. 1. Warsaw, 1874. Pp. 295–306.
- . *Oratio Nicolai Sagundini, dita in urbe Neapoli, ultima Januarii, anno domini 1453 ad Serenissimum principem et novissimum regem*. N. Iorga (Jorga), ed. *Notes et Extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e Siècle*. Vol. 3. Paris and Bucharest, 1902. Pp. 316–323.
- . *Ad serenissimum principem et invictissimum regem Alfonso Nicolai Sagundini oratio. La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. *La Caduta di Costantinopoli, Vol. 2: L'eco nel mondo*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 128–141 (selections).
- . “L'Oratio ad Alphonsum Regem Aragonum (1454) di Nicola Sagundino, riedita secondo un ms. finora ignoto.” C. Capizzi, ed. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 64 (1998). Pp. 329–357.
- Spandugnino [Spandounis/Spandounes], Theodorus. *De la origine degli imperatori Ottomani ordini de la corte, forma del guerreggiare loro religione rito, et costumi de la nationes*. C. N. Sathas, ed. *Μνημεία Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge*. Vol. 9. Paris, 1890; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 135–261.
- . English translation: D. M. Nicol. *Theodore Spandounes: On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors*. Cambridge, 1990.
- Tafur, Pero. *Andanças é viajes de Pero Tafur por diversas partes del mundo avidos (1435–1439)*. M. Jimenez de la Espada, ed. *Collecion de libros Españoles raros ó curiosos* 8. 2 vols. Madrid, 1874.
- . English translation: M. Letts. *Pero Tafur: Travels and Adventures*. New York and London, 1926.

- Tetaldi [Tedaldi, Tetardi], Jacopo [Giacomo]. *Informations envoyées, tant par Francisco de Franc, à très reverend pere en Dieu Monseigneur le cardinal d'Avignon, que par Jehan Blanchin & Jacques Edaldy marchand Florentin, de la prise de Constantinople par l'empereur Turc le xxix. Jour de May MCCCCLIII, à laquelle ledit Jacques estoit personnellement*. E. Martène and E. Durand, eds. In *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, Vol. 1: Tomus primus complectens regum ac principum aliorumque virorum illustrium epistolas et diplomata benè multa*. Paris, 1717. Cols. 1819–1826. (French version).
- . *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum. Dogmaticorum, moralium amplissima collectio*. E. Martène and E. Durand, eds. Vol. 5. Paris, 1729. Pp. 785–800 (Latin version).
- . English translation of the French version: J. R. Melville-Jones. *The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts*. Amsterdam, 1972. Pp. 1–10.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 175–189 (selections in Italian translation).
- . *Mehmed the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Views and Testimonies*. M. Philippides, ed., trans. and annotated. *Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies*. Vol. 302. Tempe, 2007. Latin text and English translation: Pp. 133–217; French version: Appendix I, Pp. 341–346.

III. Individual Greek, Slavic, and eastern sources

- Abraham Ankiwraç i [= of Ankara]. *Haykakan albyowrner Byozandiaji ankman masin – Армянские Историчинки о Падении Византии*. H. A. Anasjan, ed. Erevan, 1957. Pp. 35–55.
- . “Two Contemporary Elegies on the Fall of Constantinople 1453.” A. K. Sanjian, trans. *Viator, Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 1 (1970). Pp. 223–261.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, trans. into Italian. *Vol. 2: L'eco nel mondo*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 412–419.
- . *Die Eroberung Konstantinopels im Jahre 1453 aus Armenischer Sicht. Byzantinische Geschichtschreiber 13*. M. B. Krikorian and W. Seibt, trans. into German. Graz, Vienna, and Cologne, 1981.
- Agallianos, Theodoros. “Ἐκ τοῦ Κώδικος τοῦ Νικολάου Καρτζᾶ.” S. Eustratiades, ed. *Ἐκκλησιαστικὸς Φῶρος* 6 (1910). Pp. 200–206.
- . *Ὁ Θεόδωρος Ἀγαλλιανὸς Ταυτιζόμενος πρὸς τὸν Θεοφάνη Μηδείας καὶ οἱ Ἀνέκδοτοι Λόγοι του. Μία Νέα Ἱστορική Πηγή τοῦ Πατριαρχείου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως κατὰ τοὺς Πρώτους μετὰ τὴν Ἄλωσιν Χρόνους*. C. G. Patrinelis, ed. Athens, 1966.
- Anonymous. *Ἐκθεσις Χρονική. Ecthesis Chronica et Chronicon Athenarum*. S. P. Lampros, ed. London, 1902.
- Text with English translation: M. Philippides. *Emperors, Patriarchs, and Sultans of Constantinople, 1373–1513: An Anonymous Greek Chronicle of the Sixteenth Century*. Brookline, 1990.
- . “Ἀνώνυμος Περιγραφή Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἐλληνομνήμων* 3 (1906). Pp. 249–251.
- . “Ἀνέκδοτος Σύνομις Ἱστοριῶν.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς Ἐθνικὸν Πανεπιστήμιον* 3 (1906/07) [Athens, 1909]. Pp. 150–227.
- . “Ἐκφρασις τῶν Ξυλοκονταριῶν τοῦ Κραταιοῦ καὶ Ἁγίου Ἡμῶν Αὐθέντου καὶ Βασιλέως.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἐλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 3–18.
- . *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὸν Αὐτοκράτορα [Γωάννην τὸν Παλαιολόγον]*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 292–308.

- . *Ἐπιστολή [τῷ Εὐσεβεστάτῳ Δεσπότη καὶ Αὐταδέλφῳ τοῦ Κραταιοῦ καὶ Αγίου Ἡμῶν Αὐθέντου καὶ Βασιλέως Κῆρ Κωνσταντίνῳ ἐν Ἀχαΐα διὰ Μέτρων Ἡρωϊκῶν]*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 88, 89.
- . “Chronicon breve de Graecorum imperatoribus, ab anno 1342 ad annum 1453 e codice Vaticano graeco 162.” R.-J. Loenertz, ed. *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 28 (1952). Pp. 204, 205.
- . *Ἡ Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ ἡ Βασιλεία Μωάμεθ Β΄ τοῦ Κατακτητοῦ (κατὰ τὸν Ἀνέκδοτον Ἑλληνικὸν Βαρβερινὸν Κώδικα 111 τῆς Βατικανῆς Βιβλιοθήκης)*. G. T. Zoras, ed. Athens, 1952.
- . “A Note on the Capture of Constantinople in 1453.” R. Browning, ed. *Byzantion* 22 (1953). Pp. 379–383.
- . *Τὸ Ἀνακάλημα τῆς Κωνσταντινούπολης. Κρητικὴ Ἐκδοσις μὲ Εἰσαγωγή, Σχόλια καὶ Γλωσσάριο*. E. Kriaras, ed. Thessalonica, 1956 (2nd ed.: Thessalonica, 1965).
- . *Χρονικὸν περὶ τῶν Τούρκων Σουλτάνων (κατὰ τὸν Βαρβ. Ἑλληνικὸν Κώδικα 111)*. G. T. Zoras, ed. Athens, 1958.
- English translation: M. Philippides. *Byzantium, Europe, and the Early Ottoman Sultans 1373–1513: An Anonymous Greek Chronicle of the Seventeenth Century (Codex Barberinus Graecus 111)*. Late Byzantine and Ottoman Studies 4. New Rochelle, 1991.
- . *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo. Prolegomeni, testo critico e traduzione*. G. Schirò, ed. and trans. *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 10. Rome, 1975.
- . *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken. Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae*. P. Schreiner, ed. Vol. 1: *Chronica Byzantina Breviora, Teil 1: Einleitung und Text*. Vienna, 1975. Pp. 635, 636.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. Vol. 2: *L'Eco nel Mondo*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 152–159 (selections).
- . *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava* 4 (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile). Bologna, 1983. Pp. 214, 215.
- Argyropoulos, Ioannes. *Ἀργυροπούλεια: Ἰωάννου Ἀργυροπούλου Λόγοι, Πραγματεῖαι, Ἐπιστολαί, Προσφωνήματα, Ἀπαντήσεις καὶ Ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς Αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν Ἰσαάκιον. Ἐπιστολαὶ καὶ Ἀποφάσεις περὶ Αὐτῶν. Προτάσσεται Εἰσαγωγή περὶ Ἰωάννου Ἀργυροπούλου, τῆς Οἰκογενείας Αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἀργυροπούλων καθ' Ὅλον*. S. P. Lampros, ed. Athens, 1910.
- . *Προσφώνημα εἰς Κωνσταντίνον Παλαιολόγον ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀναρρίσει*. (Erroneously attributed to Michael Apostolis). S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 67–82.
- Bessarion, John. *Στίχοι Ἰαμβικοὶ Ἐπιτύμβιοι ἐπὶ τῇ Μακαρίτιδι καὶ Αἰοδίμῳ Κυρία Ἡμῶν Βασιλίδι Κυρία Θεοδώρα τῇ Παλαιολογίνῃ Ποιηθέντες παρὰ Βησσαρίωνος Ἱερομονάχου*. S. P. Lampros, ed. “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομῆμων* 4 (1905). Pp. 425, 426.
- . “Υπόμνημα τοῦ Καρδινάλιου Βησσαρίωνος εἰς Κωνσταντίνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Νέος Ἑλληνομῆμων* 3 (1906). Pp. 15–27 [= *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 32–45].
- . *Μονωδία ἐπὶ τῇ Θειοτάτῃ καὶ Εὐσεβεῖ Κυρία Ἡμῶν τῇ Αἰοδίμῳ καὶ Μακαρίτιδι Βασιλίσσῃ Κυρᾷ Κλεόπῃ Παλαιολογίνῃ Συγγραφεῖσα παρὰ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς Ἱερομονάχοις Βησσαρίωνος*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 154–160.
- Cananus. Cf. Kananos, Ioannes (John).

- Chalcocondylas. Cf. Khalkokondyles, Laonikos (Nikolaos).
- Chalcondyles. Cf. Khalkokondyles, Laonikos (Nikolaos).
- Chrysoloras, Demetrios. *Σύγκρισις Παλαιῶν Αρχόντων καὶ Νέου, τοῦ Νῦν Αὐτοκράτορος Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγου*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 222–245.
- . *Manuel Chrysoloras and His Discourse Addressed to the Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus Μανουὴλ Χρυσολοῤῥᾶ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Αὐτοκράτορα Μανουὴλ Β΄ Παλαιολόγου*. C. G. Patrinelis and D. Z. Sofianos, eds. Athens, 2001.
- Critobulus. Cf. Kritoboulos, Michael [Hermodoros?].
- Dokeianos, Ioannes (John). *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὸν Βασιλέα Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 221–231.
- . *Ἐπιστολὴ Κωνσταντίνῳ τῷ Παλαιολόγῳ*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 241–246.
- . *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὸν Βασιλέα Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον*. N. B. Tomadakes, ed. *Συλλάβιον Βυζαντινῶν Μελετῶν καὶ Κειμένων*. Athens, 1964/66. Pp. 76–82.
- Dorotheos. Cf. (Pseudo-) Dorotheos.
- Doukas, [Michael?]. *Michaelis Ducae nepotis, Historia byzantina*. Bullialdus [Ismael Boulliau], ed. and trans. Paris, 1649.
- . *Ducae Michaelis Ducae nepotis historia Byzantina*. I. Bekker, ed. *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*. Bonn, 1834.
- . *Istoria Turco-Byzantina (1341–1461)*. V. Grecu, ed. Bucharest, 1958.
- . *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks by Doukas: An Annotated Translation of “Historia Turco-Byzantina”*. H. J. Magoulias, trans. Detroit, 1975.
- . *Ducas. Historia Turco-Bizantina*. J. Ortolá Salas and F. Alconchel Pérez, trans. *Papeles del tiempo* 8. Madrid, 2006.
- Eugenicus, Ioannes (John). *Εἰς τὸν Βασιλέα Κῶρ Κωνσταντῖνον τὸν Παλαιολόγον*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 123–131.
- . *Τῷ Δεσπότη Παράμυθητικόν*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 56–61.
- . *Ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Κοινότητος τῶν Ὀρθοδόξων Ἀπολογία πρὸς τὸν Βασιλέα τοῦ Νομοφύλακος Ἰωάννου Διακόνου τοῦ Εὐγενικοῦ*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 151–153.
- , and Mark(os). *Ἐπιστολαί*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 15–43.
- Eustratios, Leontios. *Das Patriarchat von Konstantinopel im ausgehenden 16. Jahrhundert. Der Bericht des Leontios Eustratios im Cod. Tyb. MB 10. Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*. O. Kresten, ed. and trans. into German. Vienna, 1970.
- Evliya Çelebi. *Σελίδες ἀπὸ τὴν Ζωὴ τῆς Παλιᾶς Γενιτσαρικῆς Τουρκίας κατὰ τὴν Περιγραφή τοῦ Τούρκου Περιηγητῆ τοῦ 17 Αἰ. Ἐβλιᾶ Τσελεμπῆ*. A. A. Pallis trans. into Modern Greek. Athens, 1941; repr. Athens, 1990. Selections.
- , and A. A. Pallis. *In the Days of the Janissaries: Old Turkish Life as Depicted in the “Travel-Book” of Evliyâ Çelebi*. London, New York, Melbourne, Sydney, and Cape Town, 1951.
- Gennadius II [Scholarius, George]. *Γεωργίου Σχολαρίου ἐκ Προτροπῆς τῆς Ἱερᾶς Συνάξεως καὶ τῶν τοῦ Πατρῖου καὶ Ἀληθοῦς Λόγιατος Ἀντιποιομένων [πρὸς Δημήτριον τὸν Παλαιολόγον]*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 2. Athens, 1924; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 52–77.

- . *Τοῦ Σοφωτάτου Διδασκάλου καὶ Καθολικοῦ Κριτοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων Κὺρ Γεωργίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου Ἐπιτάφιος ἐπὶ τῷ Μακαρίτῃ καὶ Αἰοδίμῳ Δεσπότη Κὺρ Θεοδώρῳ Παλαιολόγῳ τῷ Πορφυρογεννήτῳ*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 2. Athens, 1924; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 3–14.
- . *Γενναδίου Θρηῆνος Ἰουνίου κ' ἰνδικτιῶνος ὀγδόης ἐν τῷ Ὅρει τοῦ Μενουκίως ἐν τῇ Μονῇ τοῦ Τιμίου Προδρόμου*. *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*. L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, eds. Vol. 1. Paris, 1928. Pp. 283–294.
- . *Ἐπιτάφιος τῷ Μακαρίτῃ Θεοδώρῳ Σοφιανῶ, ἐν τῇ Ἱερᾷ Μονῇ τοῦ Βατοπεδίου Ταφέντι, Ὃν εἶπεν ἐξ Ὑπογείου ὁ Θεῖος Αὐτοῦ Γεννάδιος Μοναχὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Τάφῳ*. *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*. L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, eds. Vol. 1. Paris, 1928. Pp. 277–288.
- . *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*. L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, eds. 8 vols. Paris, 1929–1935.
- . *Ἐπιστολή. Ἐγγραφή Ὅτε Ἀνεχώρησε τοῦ Παλατίου καὶ τῆς Μονῆς τοῦ Παντοκράτορος, ἐν ἧι Πρῶτον Ὡκεὶ Κοσμικός, καὶ Ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ Χαρσιανεῖτου Κοινόβιον, καὶ Ἦτοιμάζετο πρὸς τὸ Μοναχικὸν Σχῆμα*. *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*. L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, eds. Vol. 4. Paris, 1935. Pp. 463–473.
- . *Γενναδίου τοῦ Πατριάρχου ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀλώσει τῆς Πόλεως καὶ τῇ Παραίτησει τῆς Ἱερωσύνης*. *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*. L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie, eds. Vol. 4. Paris, 1935. P. 211.
- . *Γενναδίου τοῦ Πατριάρχου ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀλώσει τῆς Πόλεως καὶ τῇ Παραίτησει τῆς Ἱερωσύνης*. Selections with Italian translation: *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. Vol. 1: *Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 242–253.
- Georgillas. Cf. (Pseudo-) Georgillas, Emmanuel.
- Hafiz Hüseyin Al-Ayvanrasayî. *The Garden of the Mosques: Hafiz Hüseyin Al-Ayvanrasayî's Guide to the Muslim Monuments of Ottoman Istanbul*. H. Crane trans. and annotated. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne, 2000.
- Hierax. *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*. P. A. Déthier and C. Hopf, eds. Vol. 21.1. *Sine loco* (Galata/Pera? or Budapest), *sine anno*, 1872?/75?. Pp. 354–399.
- . *Χρονικὸν περὶ τῆς τῶν Τούρκων Βασιλείας*. C. N. Sathas, ed. *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη: Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi*. Vol. 1. Venice, 1872; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 243–268.
- Hypsilantes-Komnenos, A. K. *Ἀθανασίου Κομνηνοῦ Ὑψηλάντου Ἐκκλησιαστικῶν καὶ Πολιτικῶν τῶν εἰς Δώδεκα, Βιβλίον Η', Θ' καὶ Ι', ἧτοι τὰ Μετὰ τὴν Ἀλωσιν (1453–1789) (ἐκ Χειρογράφου Ἀνεκδότου τῆς Μονῆς τοῦ Σινᾶ*. A. Germanos, ed. Constantinople, 1870.
- Ignatius of Smolensk. *Хождение Игнатия Смоленщина*. G. P. Majeska, ed. and trans. *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. *Dumbarton Oaks Studies* 19. Washington, DC, 1984. Pp. 76–114.
- Ioannes, Priest. *Μονωδία ἐπὶ τῇ Αἰοδίμῳ καὶ Εὐσεβεῖ Ἡμῶν Βασιλίσση Κυρία Κλεόπη Ποιηθεῖσα τῷ ἐν Ἱερουδὶ Ἐλαχίστῳ Ἰωάννῃ*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. P. 153.
- Isidore, Cardinal. *Ἐπιστολαί*. W. Regel, ed. *Analecta Byzantino-Russica*. St. Petersburg, 1891.
- . *Ἀνωνύμου [= Ἰσιδώρου] Πανηγυρικός εἰς Μανουὴλ καὶ Ἰωάννη τοὺς Παλαιολόγους*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 132–199.
- . “Ein Brief des Kardinals Isidor von Kiew an Kardinal Bessarion.” G. Hofmann, ed. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 14 (1948). Pp. 405–414.
- . “Duae epistulae cardinalis Isidori ineditae.” A. G. Welykyi, ed. *Analecta Ordinis Sancti Basilii* [Записки Чина Св. Василия Великого], ser. 3 1 (1950). Pp. 286–291.
- . “Quellen zu Isidor von Kiew als Kardinal und Patriarch.” G. Hofmann, ed. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 18 (1952). Pp. 146–148.

- . *Χρησμός*. “Μανουήλ ὁ Β΄ Παλαιολόγος καὶ ὁ Καρδινάλιος Ἰσίδωρος ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ.” In D. A. Zakythinis, ed. *Mélanges offerts à Octave et Melpo Merlier à l’occasion du 25^e anniversaire de leur arrivée en Grèce* [Collection de l’Institut Français d’Athènes]. Vol. 3. Athens, 1957. Pp. 45–69.
- . “Ein zweiter Brief Isidors von Kiew über die Eroberung Konstantinopels.” W. Röhl, ed. *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 69 (1976). Pp. 13–16.
- . Letters (selections). *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. Vol. 1: *Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 58–111.
- . Letters (selections). *Testi Inediti e Poco Noti sulla Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. *Il Mondo Medievale: Studi di Storia e Storiografia, Sezione di storia bizantina e slava 4 (edizione postuma a cura di A. Carile)*. Bologna, 1983. Pp. 16–21.
- Kananos, Ioannes (John). *Διήγησις περὶ τοῦ ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Γεγονότος Πολέμου. Ioannes Canani de Constantinopoli anno 1422 oppugnata narratio*. I. Bekker, ed. *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*. Bonn, 1838 [= *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 156. Cols. 151–166].
- . “Sulla Διήγησις di Giovanni Cananos.” M. E. Colonna, trans. into Italian. *Università di Napoli, Annali della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia* 7 (1957). Pp. 151–166.
- . *L’assedio di Costantinopoli*. E. Pinto, ed. Messina, 1977.
- . *Ioannis Canani de Constantinopolitana Obsidione Relatio*. A. M. Cuomo, ed. and trans. into English. *Byzantinische Archiv* 30. Boston and Berlin, 2016.
- Khalkokondyles, Laonikos (Nikolaos). *Laonici Chal[co]condylae Atheniensis de origine et rebus gestis Turcorum libri decem*. C. Clauer, ed. Basel 1556 and 1562; repr. *Corpus Historiae Byzantinae Parisium*. Paris, 1567.
- . *Laonici Chalcocondylae Atheniensis Historiarum Libri Decem*. I. Bekker, ed. *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*. Bonn, 1843.
- . *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*. E. Darkó, ed. 2 vols. Budapest, 1922–1927.
- . *The Histories*. A. Kaldellis, ed. and trans. into English. 2 vols. *Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library* 33 and 34. Cambridge, MA and London, 2014.
- Konstantin. *Lebensreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarevics*. M. Braun, trans. The Hague, 1956.
- Kritoboulos, Michael (Hermodorus?). “De rebus gestis Muhammetis II.” In C. Müller, ed. *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*. Vol. 5. Paris, 1870. Pp. 40–160. Vol. 5. Paris, 1883. Pp. 52–164.
- . *Κριτόβουλος: Βίος τοῦ Μωάμεθ Β΄*. In *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Ser. Scriptorum*. P. A. Déthier, ed. Vol. 21.1. *Sine loco*, Galata/Pera? and Budapest, *sine anno*, 1872?/75?. Pp. 1–346.
- . English translation: C. T. Riggs. *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Kritoboulos*. Princeton, 1954.
- . *Critobul din Imbros din domnia lui Mahomed al II-lea anii 1451–1467*. Grecu, ed. (with Rumanian translation). *Scriptores Byzantini* 4. Bucharest, 1963.
- . *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. Vol. 2: *L’Eco nel Mondo*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 228–252.
- . *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*. D. R. Reinsch, ed. *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 22. Berlin and New York, 1983.
- Leo the Wise. *Oracula Leonis. Tre manoscritti all’imperatore Greco-veneziani degli oratori attribuiti all’imperatore bizantino Leone il Saggio (Bodl. Baroc. 170, Marv. gr. VII. 22, Marc. Gr. 3. A. Rigo)*, ed. Venice, 1988.
- . J. Vereecken and L. and Hadermann-Misguich, eds. *Les Oracles de Léon le Sage illustrés par George Klontzas: La version Barozzi dans le Codex Bute* [Ἑλληνολατινική Ἀνατολή 7]. Venice, 2000.

- Mazaris. *Νεκρικὸς Διάλογος*. A. Ellissen, ed. *Analekten der mittel-und neugriechischen Literatur*. Vol. 4. Leipzig, 1860. Pp. 187–362.
- . *Mazaris' Journey to Hades or Interviews with Dead Men about Certain Officials of the Imperial Court*. Classics Seminar 609, ed. and trans. Arethusa Monographs 5. Buffalo, 1975.
- Melissourgos-Melissenos, Makarios. *Georgius Phrantzes. Ioannes Cananus. Ioannes Anagnostes*. I. Bekker, ed. *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*. Bonn, 1838. Pp. 3–479.
- . *Chronicon Minus. Georgios Sphrantzes, Memorii 1401–1477. In anexa Pseudo-Phrantzes. Macarie Melissenos Cronica, 1258–1481*. V. Grecu, ed. and trans. into Romanian. *Scriptores Byzantini* 5. Bucharest, 1966.
- . English translation of the siege section: M. Philippides. *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes, 1401–1477*. Amherst, 1980.
- . English translation of the siege section: M. G. *A Contemporary Greek Source for the Siege of Constantinople, 1453: The Sphrantzes Chronicle*. Amsterdam, 1985.
- Moskhos, Ioannes (John). *Ἐπιτάφιος Λόγος*. “Ἐπιτάφιος Λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐνδοξοτάτῳ καὶ Ἐκλαμπροτάτῳ Μεγάλῳ Δουκὶ Κυρῷ Λουκᾷ τῷ Νοταρᾷ, Ἰωάννου τοῦ Μόσχου.” É. Legrand, ed. *Δελτίον Ἱστορικῆς Ἐταιρείας Ἑλλάδος* 2 (1885/86). Pp. 413–424.
- Nestor-Iskander. *Повѣсть о Цареградѣ*. I. I. Sreznevskii, ed. Saint Petersburg, 1855.
- . *Сказание о Царьградѣ по Древнимъ Рукописиамъ*. V. Iakovlev, ed. St. Petersburg, 1868. Pp. 56–116.
- . *Повѣсть о Цареградѣ (его Оснований и Взятии 1453 Году), Нестора Искандера XV Вѣка*. Archimandrite Leonid, ed. *Памятники Древней Письменности и Искусства*. Saint Petersburg, 1888.
- . German translation: M. Braun, and M. Schneider. *Bericht über die Eroberung Konstantinopels nach der Nikon-Chronik über und erläutert*. Leipzig, 1943.
- . Selections in Italian translation. E. Folco. *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 267–298.
- . Modern Greek translation: M. Alexandropoulos. *Ἡ Πολιορκία καὶ ἄλωση τῆς Πόλης. Τὸ Ρωσικὸ Χρονικὸ τοῦ Νέστορα Ἰσκεντέρη*. Athens, 1978.
- . “Повесть о Взятии Царьграда Турками в 1453 Году.” In O. V. Tvorogov, ed. *Памятники Литературы Древней Руси: Вторая Половина XV Века*. Moscow, 1982. Pp. 216–267.
- . *The Tale of Constantinople (of Its Origin and Capture by the Turks in the Year 1453) by Nestor-Iskander (From the Early Sixteenth-Century Manuscript of the Troitse-Sergieva Lavra, No. 773)*. W. K. Hanak and M. Philippides, eds. and trans. *Late Byzantine and Ottoman Studies* 5. New Rochelle, Athens, Moscow, 1998.
- . French translation: P. A. Déthier. “Anonymous Moscovita.” *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Ser. Scriptores*. P. A. Déthier, ed. Vol. 21.1. *Sine loco*, Galata/Pera? and Budapest, *sine anno*, 1872?/75?. Pp. 1074–1122.
- . Spanish translation: M. Casas Olea. *Néstor Iskánder. Relato sobre la toma de Constantinopla. Estudio preliminar, traducción y notas*. Grenada, 2003.
- Notaras, Anna. “Lettre inédite d’Anne Notaras à la république de Sienna 15 juin 1474.” In É. Legrand, ed. *Cent-dix lettres grecques des François Filelfe publiées entegralment pour la premier fois d’après le codex Trivulzianus 873 avec traduction, notes, et commentaire*. Paris, 1892. P. 341.
- . Will and Testament. “Ἡ Διαθήκη τῆς Ἄννας Παλαιολογίνης Νοταρᾶ.” K. Mertzios, ed. *Ἀθηνᾶ* 53 (1953). Pp. 17–21.
- . Will and Testament. *Διαθήκη*. C. Maltezos, ed. *Ἄννα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταρᾶ: Μία Τραγικὴ Μορφή ἀνάμεσα στὸν Βυζαντινὸ καὶ τὸν Νέο Ἑλληνικὸ Κόσμο*. Βιβλιοθήκη

- Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν Βενετίας 23. Venice, 2004. Pp. 80–87.
- Notaras, Loukas. *Ἐπιστολαί*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1912; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 137–151, 159–162, 170–175, 198–203; Vol. 2. Athens, 1916; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 184–202.
- Palaeologus, Constantine XI. “Tre lettere greco-latine; una di Constantino Paleologo ultimo imperatore Bizantino e due di Demetrio Palaeologo despota del Peloponneso dirette a Borso d’Este signore di Ferrara.” E. Cavedoni, ed. *Atti memorie delle RR. Deputazioni di storia Patria per le Provinzie Modenesi e Parmensi*. Modena, 1860. Pp. 281–290.
- . Χρυσόβουλλον. “Χρυσόβουλον Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου Πρωτόγραφον καὶ Ἀνέκδοτον, δι’ οὗ Ἐπικυροῦνται Δωρεαὶ εἰς τοὺς Ὑιοὺς τοῦ Γεμιστοῦ.” S. Kougeas, ed. *Ἑλληνικά* 1 (1928). Pp. 371–400.
- . *Ἐπιστολή*. “Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Γράμμα πρὸς τὸν Μαρκίωνα Φερράρας Μπόρσον.” S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 4. Athens, 1930; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 26, 27.
- Palaeologus, Manuel II. *Ἐπιτάφιος*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 11–119.
- . *The Letters of Manuel II Palaeologus: Text, Translation, and Notes*. G. T. Dennis, ed. and trans. *Dumbarton Oaks Texts* 4; *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 8. Washington, DC, 1977.
- . *Manuel II Palaeologus: Funeral Oration on His Brother Theodore: Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes*. J. Chrysostomides, ed. and trans. Thessalonica, 1985.
- Phrantzes. Cf. Sphrantzes, George.
- Plethon [Gemistos], George. *Μονοδιά*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 266–280.
- . *Γεωργίου Γεμιστοῦ εἰς Μανουήλ Παλαιολόγον περὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Πραγμάτων*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 244–266.
- . *Συμβουλευτικὸς πρὸς τὸν Δεσπότην Θεόδωρον περὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 113–136.
- . *Πλήθωνος τοῦ Σοφωτάτου Μονοδιά ἐπὶ τῇ Αοιδίμῳ Βασιλίδι Κλεόπῃ*. S. P. Lampros, ed. *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*. Vol. 3. Athens, 1926; repr. Athens, 1972. Pp. 162–175.
- (Pseudo-) Dorotheos. *Βιβλίον Ἱστορικὸν Περιέχον ἐν Σύνόψει Διαφόρους καὶ Ἐξόχους Ἱστορίας τοῦ Κυρίου Δωροθέου*. Venice, 1631 (etc.).
- (Pseudo-) Georgillias, Emmanuel. *Θρήνος τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*. A. Ellissen, ed. and trans. into German. *Analekten der mittel-und neugriechischen Literatur*. Vol. 3. Leipzig, 1857. Pp. 106–249.
- . *Medieval Greek Texts, Being a Collection of the Earliest Compositions in Vulgar Greek, Prior to the Year 1500*. W. Wagner, ed. London, 1870. Pp. 141–170.
- . *Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*. É. Legrand, ed. *Bibliothèque grecque vulgaire*. Vol. 1. Paris, 1880. Pp. 169–202.
- (Pseudo-) Phrantzes. Cf. Melissourgios-Melissenos, Makarios.
- . Selections. *La Caduta di Costantinopoli, Vol. 2: L’Eco nel Mondo*. A. Pertusi, ed. and trans. into Italian. Verona, 1976. Pp. 282–289.
- Saguntino. Cf. Sekoundinos, Nikolaos.
- Samuel [Samile], Bishop. *Aviso. Notes et extraits pour servir à l’Histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle*. N. Iorga (Jorga), ed. Vol. 4. Bucharest, 1915. Pp. 65–68.

- . Italian translation without the original German text: *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 228–231. Scholarius. Cf. Gennadius II [Scholarius, George].
- Sphrantzes, Georgios. *Georgius Phrantzes, Ioannes Cananus, Ioannes Anagnostes*. I. Bekker, ed. *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*. Bonn, 1838.
- . *Georgii Phrantzae Chronicon*. J. B. Papadopoulos, ed. *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*. Leipzig, 1935.
- . *Classici Auctores*. A. Mai, ed. Rome, 1837. Repr. in *Patrologia Graeca* 156. Cols. 1025–1080.
- . *Georgios Sphrantzes, Memorii 1401–1477. In anexa Pseudo-Phrantzes: Macarie Melissenos Cronica, 1258–1481*. V. Grecu, ed. and trans. into Romanian. *Scriptores Byzantini* 5. Bucharest, 1966.
- . *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes 1401–1477*. M. Philippides, trans. Amherst, 1980.
- . *Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon*. R. Maisano, ed. and trans. into Italian. *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 29. Rome, 1990.
- Syropoulos, Sylvestros. *Les “Mémoires” du Grand Ecclésiarque de l’église de Constantinople Sylvestre Syropoulos sur le concile de Florence (1438–1439)*. V. Laurent, ed. and trans. into French. Paris, 1971.
- Tursun Beg. *Tarih-i abu'l-feth Sultan Mehmed Hân*. M. Arif, ed. Istanbul, 1330 [= 1912].
- . Selections in Italian translation: *La Caduta di Costantinopoli*. A. Pertusi, ed. *Vol. 1: Le Testimonianze dei Contemporanei*. Verona, 1976. Pp. 307–331.
- . *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg: Facsimile of the Ottoman Text with English Translation*. H. Inalcik and R. Murphey, trans. *Bibliotheca Islamica*. H. Inalcik and R. Murphey, trans. Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978.

IV. Modern scholarly works

- Alcock, L. *Arthur's Britain*. Harmondsworth, 1973.
- Alderson, D. *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*. Oxford, 1956.
- Alexander, D. “Pisanello's Hat. The Costume and Weapons depicted in Pisanello's Medal for John VIII Palaeologus.” *Gladius* 24 (2004). Pp. 135–186.
- Alexandrescu-Dersca, M.-M. *La Campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)*. Bucharest, 1942; rev. ed.: London, 1977.
- Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, M.-M. “L'action diplomatique et militaire de Venise pour la défense de Constantinople (1452–1453).” *Revue romaine d'histoire* 13 (1974). Pp. 247–267.
- Anastasijević, D. “Jedina vizantijska carica srpknja.” *Brastvo* 30 (1959). Pp. 28–48.
- Angold, M. “Theodore Agallianos: The Last Byzantine Autobiography.” In È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds. *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια από την Άλωση*. Vol. 1. Granada, 2006. Pp. 35–44.
- . *The Fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans: Contexts and Consequences*. Edinburgh, 2012.
- Arampatzoglou, A. *Η Φώτειος Βιβλιοθήκη*. Constantinople, 1933.
- Asutay-Effenberger, N. *Die Landmauer von Konstantinopel-Istanbul. Historisch-topographische und baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen*. Berlin and New York, 2007.
- Atiya, A. S. *The Crusade of Nicopolis*. London, 1934.
- . *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*. London, 1938.

- Babinger, F. "Quizil Elma." *Islam* 12 (1922). Pp. 109–111.
- . *Beiträge zur Frühgeschichte der Türkenshaft in Rumelien (14.–15. Jahrhundert)*. Südeuropäische Arbeiten 34. Munich, 1944.
- . "Von Amurath zu Amurath. Vor-und Nachspiel der Schlacht bei Varna." *Oriens* 3 (1950). Pp. 229–265.
- . "Ein Freibrief Mehmeds II., des Eroberers, für das Kloster Hagia Sophia zur Salonik, Eigentum der Sultanin Mara (1459)." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 44 (1951). Pp. 11–20.
- . "Ein venedischer Lageplan der Feste Rûmeli Hisây (2. Hälfte des XV. Jhdts.)." *La Bibliofilia* 58 (1955). Pp. 188–195.
- . "Nicolaos Sagoundinos, ein griechisch-venedischer Humanist des 15. Jahrhunderts." In *Χριστήριον εἰς Ἀναστάσιον Ὀρλάνδου*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1964. Pp. 198–212.
- . *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*. R. Manheim, trans. W. C. Hickman, ed., Bollingen Series 96. Princeton, 1978.
- Bakalopoulos [Vacalopoulos], A. E. "Die Frage des Glaubwürdigkeit der 'Leichenrede auf L. Notaras' von Johannes Moschos (15 Jh.)." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 52 (1959). Pp. 13–21.
- . "Les limites de l'empire byzantine depuis la fin du XIV^e siècle jusqu'à sa chute." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 55 (1962). Pp. 55–65.
- Balard, M. "Constantinople vue par les témoins du siege de 1453." In C. Mango and G. Dagron, eds. *Constantinople and its Hinterland*. Aldershot, 1995. Pp. 169–177.
- Balleto, L. ed., *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna. Studi in onor di Geo Pistarino*. Geneva, 1977.
- Barker, E. *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium*. Oxford, 1957.
- Barker, J. W. "John VII in Genoa: A Problem in Byzantine Source Confusion." *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 28 (1962). Pp. 213–218.
- . "On the Chronology of the Activities of Manuel II Palaeologus in the Morea in 1415." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 55 (1962). Pp. 39–55.
- . *Justinian and the Later Roman Empire*. Madison, 1966.
- . *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship*. New Brunswick, 1969.
- Bartusis, M. C. "The Kavallarioi of Byzantium." *Speculum* 63 (1988). Pp. 343–350.
- . *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453*. Philadelphia, 1992.
- Baynes, N. H. "The Supernatural Defenders of Constantinople." *Analecta Bollandiana* 7 (1949). Pp. 165–177.
- . *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays*. London, 1955.
- Bees, N. A. "Περὶ τοῦ Ἱστορημένου Χρησμολογίου τῆς Κρατικῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Βερολίνου (*Codex Graecus* fol. 62–297) καὶ τοῦ Θρύλου τοῦ Ἐμαρμαρωμένου Βασιλιᾶ." *Byzantinische-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 13–14 (1936/37). Pp. 203–244^{a-b}.
- Belozerskaya, M. *To Wake the Dead: A Renaissance Merchant and the Birth of Archaeology*. New York and London, 2009.
- Bendall, S. "A Coin of Constantine XI." *Numismatic Circular* 82 (1974). Pp. 188, 189.
- . "The Coinage of Constantine XI." *Revue Numismatique (VI^e série)* 33 (1991). Pp. 134–142.
- Bendall, S., and Donald, P. J. *The Later Palaeologan Coinage 1282–1453*. London, 1979.
- Benvenuti, C. B. *Gli affreschi di Benozzo Gozzoli nella cappella del Palazzo Riccardi*. Florence, 1901.
- Bernicolas-Hatzopoulos, D. "Le premier siège de Constantinople par les Ottomans (1394–1402)." Ph.D. dissertation. Université de Montréal. Montreal, 1980.

- . “The First Siege of Constantinople by the Ottomans (1394–1402) and Its Repercussions on the Civilian Population of the City.” *Byzantine Studies/Etudes byzantines* 10 (1983). Pp. 39–51.
- . *Πρώτη Πολιορκία τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἀπὸ τοὺς Ὀθωμανοὺς (1394–1402)*. Athens, *sine anno*.
- Bertelè, T. “I gioielli della corona bizantina dati in pegno alla repubblica veneta nel sec. XIV e Mastino II della Scala.” *Studi in onore Amintore Fanfani, Vol. 2: Medioevo*. Milan, 1962. Pp. 90–117.
- Bisaha, N. *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks*. Philadelphia, 2004.
- Boccabianca, G. M. *Benozzo Gozzoli*. Milan, 1957.
- Bodnar, E. W. *Cyriacus of Ancona and Athens*. Collection Latomus 33. Brussels, 1960.
- . “The Isthmian Fortifications in Oracular Prophecy.” *American Journal of Archaeology* 64 (1960). Pp. 165–171.
- Bogiatzides, I. K. “Τὸ Ζήτημα τῆς Στέψεως Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου.” *Λαογραφία* 2 (1923). Pp. 449–456.
- . “*Νέα Πηγὴ Βυζαντινῆς Ἱστορίας (1437–1450)*.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομῆμων* 18 (1924). Pp. 70–105.
- Bon, A. *La Morée Franque: Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d’Achaïe (1202–1430)*. Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome 213. 2 vols. Paris, 1969.
- Bowman, S. B. *The Jews of Byzantium, 1204–1453*. University, 1985.
- Bravo García, A. “La Constantinopla que vieron R. González de Clavijo y P. Tafur.” *Erytheia* 3 (1983). Pp. 39–47.
- Brightman, F. “Byzantine Imperial Coronations.” *Journal of Theological Studies* 2 (1901). Pp. 359–392.
- Browning, R. “A Note on the Fall of Constantinople in 1453.” *Byzantion* 22 (1953). Pp. 379–387.
- Bryer, A. “Pisanello and the Princess of Trebisonda.” *Apollo* (1961). Pp. 601–603.
- Byzantios, S. D. *Ἡ Κωνσταντινούπολις, ἡ Περιγραφή Τοπογραφικῆ Ἀρχαιολογικῆ καὶ Ἱστορικῆ τῆς Περιωνύμιον Ταύτης Μεγαλοπόλεως*. 3 vols. Athens, 1851–1869.
- Cameron, A. *Procopius and the Sixth Century*. The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 10. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985.
- Carli, E. *Il Pinturicchio*. Milan, 1960.
- Cecchini, G. “Anna Notaras Paleologa: Una Principessa greca in Italia e la politica Senese di ripopolamento delle Maremma.” *Bolletino Senese di storia patria* 9 (1938). Pp. 6–27.
- Cernovodeanu, D. “Contribution à l’étude de l’heraldique byzantine et postbyzantine.” *Jahrbuch des österreichischen Byzantinistik* 32 (1982). Pp. 409–422.
- Cerone, F. “La Politica orientale di Alfonso di Aragona.” *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane* 27 (1902). Pp. 430, 431.
- Charanis, P. “Coronation and Its Constitutional Significance in the Later Roman Empire.” *Byzantion* 15 (1940/41). Pp. 49–66.
- . “Internal Strife in Byzantium during the Fourteenth Century.” *Byzantion* 15 (1940/41). Pp. 208–230.
- . “The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370–1402.” *Byzantion* 16 (1942/43). Pp. 286–314.
- Chatzidakis, M. *Δομῆνικος Θεοτοκόπουλος Κρής: Κείμενα 1940–1994*. 2nd ed., Athens, 1995.

- Cheetham, N. *Mediaeval Greece*. New Haven and London, 1981.
- Chrysostomides, J. "Venetian Commercial Privileges under the Palaeologi." *Studi Veneziani* 12 (1970). Pp. 267–356.
- Cirac Estopañan, D. S. "Ein Chrysobullos des Kaiser Manuel II. Palaiologos für den Gegenpapst Benedikt XIII. vom 20 Juni 1402." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 44 (1951). Pp. 89–93.
- . *Bizancio y España. La Union, Manuel Paléologo y sus recuerdos en España*. Barcelona, 1953.
- . *Bizancio y España. La Caida del Imperio Bizantino y los Españoles*. Barcelona, 1954.
- Clair St., W. *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*. Oxford, 1972.
- Clement, P. A. "The Date of the Hexamilion." In *Studies in Memory of Basil Laourdas*. Thessalonica, 1975. Pp. 98–101.
- Colin, J. *Cyriàque d'Ancône: Le voyageur, le marchand, l'humaniste*. Paris, 1981.
- Concasty, M.-L. "Les 'Informations' de Jacques Tetaldi sur le siège et la prise de Constantinople." *Byzantion* 24 (1954). Pp. 95–110.
- Contamine, P. *War in the Middle Ages*. M. Jones, trans. Oxford, 1984.
- Crusius, M. *Turcograecia libri Octo à Martino Crusio, in Academia Tybigensi Graeco & Latino Professore, vtraque lingua edita. Qvibus Graecorum status sub imperio Turcico, in Politia & Ecclesia, Oeconomia, & Scholis, iam inde ab amissa Constantinopoli, ad haec usque tempora, luculenter describitur*. Basileae, sine anno [1584].
- Darkó, E. "Zum Leben des Laonikos Chalkokandyles." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 14 (1923/24). Pp. 29–39.
- Davies, M. C. "An Enigma and a Phantom: Giovanni Aretino and Giacomo Languschi." *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 37 (1988). Pp. 1–29.
- D'Elia, A. F. *Pagan Virtue in a Christian World: Sigismondo Malatesta and the Italian Renaissance*. Cambridge, MA, and London, 2016.
- Dennis, G. T. *The Reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica, 1382–1387*. *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 159. Rome, 1960.
- . "An Unknown Byzantine Emperor, Andronicus V Palaeologus (1400–1407?)." *Jahrbuch des österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 9 (1960). Pp. 157–187.
- . "The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403." *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 33 (1967). Pp. 72–88.
- . "Official Documents of Manuel II Palaeologus." *Byzantion* 41 (1971). Pp. 45–58.
- . "Some Notes on the Correspondence of Manuel II Palaeologus." *Actes du XIV^e Congrès international des Études byzantines*. Vol. 2. Bucharest, 1975. Pp. 67–73.
- . *Byzantium and the Franks, 1350–1420*. London, 1982.
- . "The Byzantines as Revealed in Their Letters." In J. Duffy and J. J. Peradotto, eds. *Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies Presented to G. L. Westerink at 75*. Buffalo, 1988. Pp. 155–165.
- Dereksen, D. Cf. Stacton, D.
- DeVries, K. "Gunpowder Weapons at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453." In Y. Lev, ed. *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries*. The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453 no. 9. Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1997. Pp. 343–362.
- Diamantopoulos, A. N. "Γεννάδιος ὁ Σχολάριος ὡς Ἱστορικὴ Πηγὴ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἄλωσιν Χρόνων." *Ἑλληνικά* 9 (1936). Pp. 285–308.
- Diller, A. "The Autographs of Georgius Gemistus Pletho." *Scriptorium* 10 (1956). Pp. 9–77.

- Dölger, F. "Ein literarischer und diplomatischer Fälscher des 16. Jahrhunderts: Metropolit Makarios von Monembasia." In *Otto Glaunig zum 60. Geburtstag, Festangabe aus Wissenschaft und Bibliothek*. Leipzig, 1936. Pp. 25–36.
- . *Byzantinische Diplomatik. 20 Aufsätze zum Urkundenwesen der Byzantiner*. Ettal, 1956.
- Ducellier, A. *L'Albanie entre Byzance et Venise (X^e-XV^e siècles)*. London, 1987.
- Dvoichenko-Markov, D. "The Origin and the Meaning of the Term 'Vlach'." *Romanian Folk Arts* 5 (New York, 1976). Pp. 7–69.
- Dzhagatspanian, E. D. "Некоторые Замечания по Поводу Австорства Большой Хроник Псевдо-Сфрандзи." *Византийский Временник* 43 (1982). Pp. 229, 230.
- . "Мировоззрение Византийского Историка XV В. Георгия Сфрандзн." *Кавказ и Византия* 3 (1982). Pp. 45–63.
- Egger, E. *L'Hellenisme en France*. Paris, 1869.
- Emellos, D. "Ο Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος και τὸ Ξύλινο Σπαθί του." In D. Emellos, ed. *Θρυλούμενα γιὰ τὴν Ἄλωση και τὴν Ἐθνική Ἀποκατάσταση*. Athens, 1991. Pp. 50–59.
- Eustratiades, S. "Πανδέκτη Νικολάου Καρατζῆ, Λογοθέτου Γενικοῦ τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ Μεγάλης Ἐκκλησίας." *Ἐκκλησιαστικός Φάρος* 6 (1910). Pp. 81–111.
- Evans, H. C., ed. *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1557)*. New Haven and London, 2004.
- Failler, A. "Les insignes et la signature du despote." *Revue des études byzantines* 40 (1982). Pp. 171–186.
- Falier-Papadopoulou, J. B. "Phrantzès est-il réellement l'auteur de grand chronique qui porte son nom?" In *Aktes du IV^e Congrès international des études byzantines. Известия на Българския Археологически Институт* 8; *Bulletin de l'Institut Archéologique Bulgare* 9–10. Vol. 1. Sofia, 1935–1936. Pp. 177–189.
- . "Η περί Ἀλώσεως τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Ἱστορία Λεονάρδου τοῦ Χίου." *Ἐπετηρίς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 15 (1939). Pp. 85–95.
- Fasanelli, J. A. "Some Notes on Pisanello and the Council of Florence." *Master Drawings* 3 (1965). Pp. 36–47.
- Ferjančić, B. *Despoti u Vizantiji juznoslovenskim zemljama*. Srpska Akademija Nauk 33. Belgrade, 1960.
- . "Još jednom oročecima titule despota." *Zbornik Radova Vizantijloškog Instituta* 14/15 (1973). Pp. 45–53.
- Fine, J. V. A. *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*. Ann Arbor, 1987.
- Fossi Todorow, M. *I disegni del Pisanello e della sua cerchia*. Florence, 1966.
- Freely, J., and Çakmak A. S., *Byzantine Monuments of Istanbul*. Cambridge, 2004.
- Galavaris, G. "East and West in an Illustrated Manuscript at Sinai." In *Ευφρόσυνον: Αφιέρωμα στον Μανόλη Χατζηδάκη*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1992. Pp. 180–192.
- . *Ελληνική Τέχνη: Ζωγραφική Βυζαντινών Χειρογράφων*. Athens, 1995.
- Ganchou, T. "Le Mésazon Démétrius Paléologue Cantacuzène a-t-il figuré parmi les défenseurs du siège de Constantinople (19 Mai 1453)?" *Revue des études byzantines* 52 (1994). Pp. 245–272.
- . "Sur quelques erreurs relatives aux dernier défenseurs Grecs de Constantinople en 1453." *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν και Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 25 (1995). Pp. 61–82.
- . "Le rachat des Notaras après la chute de Constantinople ou les relations 'étrangères' de l'élite byzantine au XV^e siècle." In M. Ballard and A. Ducellier, eds. *Migrations et*

- Diasporas Méditerranéenes (X^e–XVI^e siècles). Actes du colloque de Conques (Octobre 1999)*. Série Byzantina Sorbonensia 10. Paris, 2003. Pp. 149–229.
- Geanakoplos, D. J. *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282: A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations*. Cambridge, MA, 1959; repr. Hamden, CT, 1973.
- . “La colonia greca di Venezia e il suo significato per il Rinascimento.” In A. Pertusi, ed. *Venezia e l’Oriente fra Tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento. Civiltà Europea e Civiltà Veneziana: Aspetti e Problemi 4*. Venice, 1966. Pp. 183–204.
- . *Greek Scholars in Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from Byzantium to the West*. Cambridge, 1962 (reprinted as *Byzantium and the Renaissance*. Hamden, CT, 1972).
- . “Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453.” In H. W. Hazard, ed. *A History of the Crusades, vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. (Gen. Ed.: K. M. Setton). Madison, 1975, pp. 69–103.
- . *Interaction of the “Sibling” Byzantine and Western Cultures in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 300–1600*. New Haven and London, 1976.
- . “Italian Renaissance Thought and Learning and the Role of Byzantine Emigré Scholars in Florence, Rome, and Venice: A Reassessment.” *Rivista di studi bizantini e slavi* 3 (1984). Pp. 129–157.
- . *Constantinople and the West: Essays on the Late Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman Churches*. Madison, 1989.
- Gedeon, M. *Πατριαρχικοί Πίνακες. Ειδήσεις Ιστορικά Βιογραφικά περι τῶν Πατριαρχῶν Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἀπὸ Ἀνδρέου τοῦ Πρωτοκλήτου μέχρις Ἰωακείμ Γ’ τοῦ ἀπὸ Θεσσαλονίκης*. Constantinople, 1890.
- Gerasimou, S. “Η Επανοίκηση της Κωνσταντινούπολης μετά την Άλωση.” in T. Kiousoulou, ed., *1453: Η Άλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης και η Μετάβαση ἀπὸ τους Μεσαιωνικούς στους Νεώτερους Χρόνους*. Herakleion, 2007. Pp. 3–23.
- Gialamas, D. “Νέες Ειδήσεις γιὰ τὸ Βενετο–Κρητικὸ Λόγιο Φραγκίσκο Barozzi (1537–1604).” *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 20 (1990). Pp. 300–403.
- Gibbon, E. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. 7 vols. J. B. Bury, ed. London, 1902.
- Gibbons, H. A. *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: History of the Osmanlis up to the Death of Bayezid I, 1330–1403*. New York, 1916.
- Gidel, A. *Études sur la littérature grecque vulgaire*. Paris, 1866.
- Gill, J. “John VIII Palaeologus: A Character Study.” In *‘Silloge bizantina’ in onore S. G. Mercati*. Rome, 1957. Pp. 152–170.
- . *The Council of Florence*. Cambridge, 1958.
- . “Isidore, Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia.” *Unitas* 11 (1959; Eng. ed.). Pp. 263–275.
- . “Mark Eugenicus, Metropolitan of Ephesus.” *Unitas* 11 (1959; Eng. ed.). Pp. 120–128.
- . “The Year of the Death of Mark Eugenicus.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 52 (1959). Pp. 23–31.
- . “George Scholarius.” *Unitas* 12 (1960; Eng. ed.). Pp. 99–112.
- . *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays*. London, 1964.
- . *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198–1400*. New Brunswick, 1979.
- Grabar, A. *L’Empereur dans l’art byzantin*. Paris, 1937.
- Greco, V. “Eine Belagerung Konstantinopels in der rumanischen Kirchenmalerei.” *Byzantion* 1 (1924). Pp. 273–289.

- . “Κ вопросу о Биографии и Историческом Труде Лаоника Халкокондила.” *Византийски Временник* 13 (1958). Pp. 198–210.
- . “Das Memoirenwerk des Georgios Sphrantzes.” *Actes du XII^e Congrès international d’études byzantines* 1 (1963). Pp. 327–341.
- . “Georgios Sphrantzes. Leben und Werk. Makarios Melissenos und sein Werk. Die Ausgaben.” *Byzantinoslavica* 26 (1965). Pp. 62–73.
- Gregorovius, F. *Ιστορία τῆς Πόλεως Ἀθηνῶν κατὰ τοὺς Μέσους Αἰῶνας ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰουστινιανοῦ μέχρι τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων Κατακτῆσεως*. 3 vols. S. P. Lampros trans. into Modern Greek with corrections and additions. Athens, 1904; repr. Athens, 1977.
- Gregory, T. E. *The Hexamilion and the Fortress*. Isthmia 5. Athens and Princeton, 1993.
- Grunzweig, A. “Philippe le Bon et Constantinople.” *Byzantion* 24 (1954). Pp. 47–61.
- Guilland, R. “Αἱ πρὸς τὴν Δύσιν Ἐκκλήσεις Κωνσταντινίου ΙΑ΄ τοῦ Δράγαση πρὸς Σωτηρίαν τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.” *Ἐπετηρίς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 22 (1952). Pp. 60–74.
- . “Études sur l’histoire administrative de l’empire byzantin. Le stratopedarque.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 46 (1953). Pp. 63–90.
- . “Les Appels de Constantine XI Paléologue à Rome et à Venise pour sauveur Constantinople (1452–1453).” *Byzantinoslavica* 14 (1953). Pp. 226–244.
- . “Recherches sur l’histoire administrative de l’empire byzantin: le despote, δεσπότης.” *Revue des études byzantines* 17 (1959). Pp. 52–89.
- . “Études sur la Topographie de Constantinople byzantin.” *Ἑλληνικά* 17 (1962). Pp. 95–99.
- . *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines*. 2 vols. Amsterdam, 1967.
- Hadji-Vasiljević, J. *Dragaš i Konstantin Dejanovići*. Belgrade, 1902.
- Halecki, O. “Rome et Byzance au temps du Grand Schisme d’Orient.” *Collectanea Theologica* 18 (1937). Pp. 477–532.
- . *The Crusade of Varna: A Discussion of Controversial Problems*. New York, 1943.
- . *From Florence to Brest 1439–1596*. Rome, 1958.
- . “Angora, Florence, Varna, and the Fall of Constantinople.” In F. Dölger and H.-G Beck, eds. *Akten des XL. Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongresses*. Munich, 1960. Pp. 216–220.
- Hammer Purgstall von, J. *Geshichte des osmanischen Reiches*. 10 vols. Pest, 1827–1835.
- Hanak, W. K. “The Constantinopolitan Mesoteikhion in 1453: Its Topography, Adjacent Structures and Gates.” *Byzantine Studies/Etudes byzantines*, n. s., 4 (1999). Pp. 69–98.
- . “Pope Nicholas V and the Aborted Crusade of 1452–1453 to Rescue Constantinople from the Turks.” *Byzantinoslavica* 62 (2004). Pp. 239–250.
- . “Sultan Mehmed II Fatih and the Theodosian Walls: The Conquest of Constantinople 1453, His Strategies and Successes.” In S. Atasoy, ed. *Istanbul Üniversitesi 550. Yıl Uluslararası Bizans ve Osmanlı Sempozyumu (XV. Yüzyıl) 30–31 Mayıs 2003. 550th Anniversary of the Istanbul University. International Byzantine and Ottoman Symposium (XVth Century) 30–31 May 2003*. Istanbul, 2004. Pp. 1–13.
- Harris, J. *Greek Émigrés in the West (1400–1520)*. Camberley, Surrey, 1995.
- . “A Worthless Prince? Andreas Palaeologus in Rome: 1464–1502.” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 61 (1995). Pp. 537–554.
- . “Publicising the Crusade: English Bishops and the Jubilee Indulgence of 1455.” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 50 (1999). Pp. 35–37.
- Hasluck, F. W. “The Latin Monuments of Chios.” *The Annual of the British School of Archaeology at Athens* 16 (1909–10). Pp. 137–184.

- . “The Prophecy of the Red Apple.” In *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*. Vol. 2. Oxford, 1920. Pp. 736–744.
- Head, C. *Imperial Twilight: The Palaeologus Dynasty and the Decline of Byzantium*. Chicago, 1977.
- . *Imperial Byzantine Portraits: A Verbal and Graphic Gallery*. New Rochelle, 1982.
- Henrich, G. H. “Ποιος Έγραψε το Ποίημα Άλωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (BB 1, 177–197).” In È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, ed. *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια από την Άλωση*. Vol. 2. Granada, 2006. Pp. 405–414.
- Ιστορία του Έλληνικού Έθνους, Vol. 9: Βυζαντινός Έλληνισμός: Μεσοβυζαντινοί και Ύστεροβυζαντινοί Χρόνοι*. G. Khristopoulos and I. Bastias, gen. eds. Athens, 1979.
- Ιστορία του Έλληνικού Έθνους, Vol. 10: Ο Έλληνισμός υπό Ξένη Κυριαρχία (Περίοδος 1453–1669): Τουρκοκρατία–Λατινοκρατία*. Khristopoulos and I. Bastias, gen. eds. Athens, 1974.
- Hofmann, G. “Kirchengeschichtliches zur Ehe des Herrschers Theodor II Palaiologos (1407–1443).” *Ostkirchliche Studien* 4 (1955). Pp. 129–137.
- Hohlfelder, R. L. “Trans-Isthmian Walls in the Age of Justinian.” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 18 (1977). Pp. 173–179.
- Hookham, H. *Tamburlaine the Conqueror*. London, 1962.
- Hopf, C. *Griechenland im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1868.
- . *Les Giustiniani dynastes de Chios: étude historique*. H. Vlasto, trans. Paris, 1888.
- Hussey, J. M., ed. *Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. 4: The Byzantine Empire*. Part I: *Byzantium and Its Neighbours*; Part II: *Government, Church and Civilization*. Cambridge, 1968.
- Inalcik, H. *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkiklev ve Vesikalar, Türk Tarih Kurumu*. Ankara, 1954.
- . “Ottoman Methods of Conquest.” *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954). Pp. 103–129.
- . “Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time.” *Speculum* 35 (1960). Pp. 408–427.
- . “Byzantium and the Origins of the Crisis of 1444 under the Light of Turkish Sources.” In *Actes du XII^e Congrès International d’Études Byzantines*. Vol. 1. Ohrid, 1961. Pp. 159–163.
- . “The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City.” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23/24 (1969/70). Pp. 231–249.
- . *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*. Late Byzantine and Ottoman Studies 1. N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber, trans. New Rochelle, 1989.
- . *Essays in Ottoman History*. Istanbul, 1998.
- . “Istanbul: An Islamic City.” In H. Inalcik, ed. *Essays in Ottoman History*. Istanbul, 1998. Pp. 249–271.
- Iorga (Jorga), N. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*. 5 vols. Gotha, 1908–1913.
- . “Sur le deux prétendants Moustafa du XV^e siècle.” *Revue historique du Sud-est européen* 10 (1933). Pp. 12, 13.
- Irmscher, J. “Zeitgenössische deutsche Stimmen zum Fall von Byzanz.” *Byzantinoslavica* 19 (1953). Pp. 110–112.
- Jacobs, E. “Cyriacus von Ancona und Mehemed II.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 30 (1929). Pp. 197–202.
- Jacoby, D. “Le population de Constantinople à l’époque byzantine: un problem de démographie urbaine.” *Byzantion* 31 (1961). Pp. 81–109.
- Janin, R. *La Géographie ecclésiastique de l’empire byzantin, Vol. 1: Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarcat oecuménique*. Paris, 1969.
- Kaldellis, A. *A New Herodotos: Laonikos Chalkokondyles on the Ottoman Empire, the Fall of Byzantium, and the Emergence of the West*. Supplements to the Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 33–34. Washington, DC, 2014.

- Kalligas, H. A. *Byzantine Monemvasia: The Sources*. Monemvasia, 1990.
- . *Monemvasia: A Byzantine City State*. London and New York, 2010.
- Kampouroglous, D. G. *Οἱ Χαλκοκονδύλαι. Μονογραφία*. Athens, 1926.
- Karamanolakes V., and Stathes, P. “Ἱστορίες για την Ἀλωση στον Πρώτο Αἰώνα του Ἑλληνικοῦ Βασιλείου.” In T. Kiousoroulou, ed., *1453: Ἡ Ἀλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης και ἡ Μετάβαση ἀπὸ τοὺς Μεσαιωνικοὺς στοὺς Νεώτεροὺς Χρόνους*. Herakleion, 2007. Pp. 227–259.
- Karanika, A. “Messengers, Angels, and Laments for the Fall of Constantinople.” In M. R. Bachvarova, D. Dutch, and A. Suter, eds. *The Fall of Cities in the Mediterranean: Commemoration in Literature, Folk-Song, and Liturgy*. Cambridge, 2016. Pp. 226–251.
- Karouzou, S. *Μαρτῖνος Κρούσιος: Ὁ Πρώτος Φιλέλληνας*. Athens, 1973.
- Kastritsis, D. J. *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413*. The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage 38. Leiden and Boston, 2007.
- Kazhdan, A. *Деревня и Город в Византии, IX-X вв.* Moscow, 1974.
- . “Some Notes on the ‘Chronicle of Tocco’.” In *Bisanzio e l’Italia. Raccolta di studi in memoria di Agostino Pertusi*. Milan, 1982. Pp. 169–176.
- , et al., eds. *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*. 3 vols. New York and Oxford, 1991.
- Khadduri, M. *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Baltimore, 1955.
- Khasiotēs, I. K. *Μακάριος, Θεόδωρος καὶ Νικηφόρος οἱ Μελισσηνοὶ (Μελισσουργοὶ) (16ος – 17ος Αἰ.)*. Thessalonica, 1966.
- . “Ἐνα Ἰδιότυπο Εἰκονογραφημένο Κείμενο τοῦ Ἰωάννου Ἀγιομαύρα (1578).” *Ἑλληνικά* 19 (1966). Pp. 108–113.
- Khatzidakēs, M. “Παρατηρήσεις σὲ Ἄγνωστο Χρησιμολόγιο τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα.” *Θυμιάμα στὴ Μνήμη τῆς Λασκαρίνας Μπούρα*. Vol. 1. Athens, 1994. Pp. 51–61.
- Khourry, T. “L’Empereur Manuel II Paléologue (1350–1425). Esquisse biographique.” *Proche-Orient chrétien* 15 (1965). Pp. 127–144.
- Kinross, J. P. *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*. New York, 1977.
- Kiousoroulou, T., ed. *Ἡ Ἀλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης και ἡ Μετάβαση ἀπὸ τοὺς Μεσαιωνικοὺς στοὺς Νεώτεροὺς Χρόνους*. Herakleion, 2007.
- Klosterman, R. A. “Jagaris oder Gagarin? Zur Deutung eines griechischen und russischen Familiennames.” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 204 (1977). Pp. 221–237.
- Knös, B. *L’Histoire de la Littérature Néo-Grecque. La période jusqu’en 1821*. Uppsala, 1962.
- Kollias, G. “Ἡ Ἀνταρσία τοῦ Ἰωάννου Ζ΄ Παλαιολόγου ἐναντῖον Ἰωάννου Ε΄ Παλαιολόγου (1390).” *Ἑλληνικά* 12 (1952), pp. 34–64.
- . “Constantine Paléologue le dernier défenseur de Constantinople, 1453–1953.” In *Le cinq-centième anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople. L’Hellenisme Contemporain*, 2. série. Athens, 1953. Pp. 41–54.
- Köprülü, M. F. *Les origines de l’empire ottoman*. Paris, 1974.
- Kordatos, I. *Τὰ Τελευταῖα Χρόνια τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Αὐτοκρατορίας*. Athens, 1931.
- Kordoses, M. “The Question of Constantine Palaiologos’ Coronation.” In R. Beaton and C. Roueché, eds. *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies Dedicated to Donald M. Nicol on his Seventieth Birthday*. London, 1993, pp. 137–141.
- Kougeas, S. “Χρυσόβουλλον Κωνσταντῖνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου.” *Ἑλληνικά* 1 (1928), pp. 371–400.
- Koukoules, P. “Κυνηγετικά ἐκ τῆς Ἐποχῆς τῶν Κομνηνῶν καὶ τῶν Παλαιολόγων.” *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 9 (1932). Pp. 3–33.

- . *Βυζαντινὸν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμός*. 6 vols. in 7 pts. Athens, 1948–1957.
- Koutibas, S. A. *Oi Notarades stin Yphresia tou Ethnous*. Athens, 1968.
- Krappe, A. H. *The Science of Folklore*. New York, 1964.
- Kyriakou, K. “Οἱ Ἱστορημένοι Χρησμοὶ τοῦ Λέοντα τοῦ Σοφοῦ, Ἱστορικὴ Τοποθέτηση καὶ Εἰκονογραφικὴ Ἐξέταση. 15ος-17ος Αἰ.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Thessalonica, 1988.
- Κυρου, Α. *Βησσαρίων ὁ Ἑλληὴν*. 2 vols. Athens, 1947.
- Laiou, A. E. “The Byzantine Aristocracy in the Palaeologan Period: A Story of Arrested Development.” *Viator, Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1973). Pp. 131–151.
- Laiou-Thomadakis, A. E., ed. *Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis*. New Brunswick, 1980.
- Lamberz, E. “Das Geschenk des Kaisers Manuel II. an das Kloster Saint-Denis und der ‘Metochitenschreiber’ Michael Klostomalles.” In B. Borkopp and T. Steppan, eds. *Λιθόστροτον: Studien zur byzantinischen Kunst und Geschichte. Festschrift für Marcel Restle*. Stuttgart, 2000. Pp. 155–165.
- Lampros, S. P. “Ἐπίγραμμα τοῦ Κυριακοῦ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος περὶ τοῦ Μεσαιωνικοῦ Μυστραῶ.” *Ἐπετηρὶς τοῦ Φιλολογικοῦ Συλλόγου Παρνασσῶ* 7 (1903). Pp. 39–48.
- . “Ἄννα Καντακουζηνή, Βυζαντιακὴ Ἐπιγραφή ἐξ Αἰτωλίας.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 1 (1904). Pp. 37–42.
- . “Αἱ Βιβλιοθηκὰ Ἰωάννου Μαρμαρᾶ καὶ Ἰωάννου Δοκειανοῦ καὶ Ἀνόνημος Ἀναγραφὴ Βιβλίων.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 1 (1904). Pp. 295–312.
- . “Τὰ Τείχη τοῦ Ἰσμοῦ τῆς Κορίνθου κατὰ τοὺς Μέσους Αἰῶνας.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 2 (1905). Pp. 435–489.
- . “Αἱ Εἰκόνες Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 3 (1906). Pp. 229–243.
- . “Ἀνέκδοτος Περιγραφή Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 3 (1906). Pp. 249, 250.
- . “Εἰκόνες Ἰωάννου Η΄ τοῦ Παλαιολόγου καὶ Πατριάρχου Ἰωσήφ.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 4 (1907). Pp. 385–408.
- . “Νέαι Εἰκόνες Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 4 (1907). Pp. 238–240.
- . “Ἡ προτομή τοῦ Ἰωάννου Παλαιολόγου καὶ ἡ Ἀνακοίνωσις τοῦ κ. Μυῖoz.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 4 (1907), pp. 409–416.
- . “Ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος ὡς Σύζυγος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ καὶ τοῖς Θρύλοις.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 4 (1907). Pp. 417–466.
- . “Ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ ὡς Ἐπίσημος Γλῶσσα τῶν Σουλτάνων.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 40–79.
- . “Ἑλληνικὰ Δημόσια Γράμματα τοῦ Σουλτάνου Βαγιαζήτ Β΄.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 155–189.
- . “Κυριακὸς ὁ ἐξ Ἀγκῶνος ἐν Λακωνικῇ.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 414–423.
- . “Τὰ Ὄνόματα τοῦ Πυροβόλου, τοῦ Τυφεκίου, καὶ τῆς Πυρίτιδος παρὰ τοῖς Βυζαντινοῖς.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 5 (1908). Pp. 403–414.
- . “Σημεῖον ὁ Θυρεὸς παρὰ Βυζαντινοῖς.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 6 (1909). Pp. 104, 105.
- . “Σιγίλλιον τοῦ Πατριάρχου Σωφρονίου περὶ τῆς Μονῆς Ταξιαρχῶν παρὰ τὸ Αἶγιον, καὶ τὸ Χωρίον Δημητροπούλου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 6 (1909). Pp. 289–298.
- . “Καὶ Ἄλλαι Εἰκόνες Ἰωάννου καὶ Κωνσταντίνου τῶν Παλαιολόγων.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 6 (1909). Pp. 399–408.
- . “Ὁ Δικέφαλος Ἄετος τοῦ Βυζαντίου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 6 (1909). Pp. 431–473.

- . “Χρονικὸν Σημεῖωμα περὶ Ἰωάννου Ζ΄ καὶ Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 6 (1909). Pp. 483–485.
- . “Ἐνθυμήσεων ἤτοι Χρονικῶν Σημειωμάτων Συλλογή.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 7 (1910). Pp. 113–313.
- . *Catalogue illustré de la collection de portraits des empereurs de Byzance*. Athens, 1911.
- . “Κωνσταντῖνος ΙΒ΄ ἢ ΙΓ΄.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 9 (1912). Pp. 449–452.
- . “Ἡ ἐκ Πατρῶν εἰς Ρώμην Ἀνακομιδὴ τῆς Κάρας τοῦ Ἁγίου Ἀνδρέου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 10 (1913). Pp. 33–112.
- . “Ἡ ἐν Ρώμῃ Ἐκθεσις τῶν Εἰκόνων Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 10 (1913). Pp. 399–434.
- . “Μῦθοι ἐν Κώδικι τῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Βατικανοῦ.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 11 (1914). Pp. 182, 183.
- . “Ὁ Μαρκιανὸς Κώδιξ τοῦ Κρητὸς Γεωργίου Κλόντζα.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 12 (1915). Pp. 40–52.
- . “Συνθήκη μεταξὺ Ἰωάννου Η΄ Παλαιολόγου καὶ τοῦ Δουκὸς τῆς Βενετίας Φραγκίσκου Φόσκαρη.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 12 (1915). Pp. 152–197.
- . “Ἰωάννης Ῥωστωτῆς.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 14 (1917). P. 399.
- . “Δωροθέου Βιβλίον Ἱστορικόν.” *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 16 (1922). Pp. 137–190.
- . *Λεύκωμα τῶν Βυζαντινῶν Αὐτοκρατόρων*. Athens, 1930.
- Langlois, V. “Notice sur le sabre de Constantine XIV, dernier empereur de Constantinople, conservé à l’Armerie Reale de Turin.” *Revue archéologique* 14 (1857). Pp. 292–294.
- . “Mémoire sur le sabre de Constantine XIV Dracosès, dernier empereur grec de Constantinople.” In *Revue del’Orient et de l’Algerie et des Colonies*. Paris, 1858. Pp. 153–165.
- Laskaris, M. T. “John VIII Palaeologus in Thessalonica during the Siege of 1416.” *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης* 6 (1952). Pp. 340–344.
- Laurent, V. “Les Chrétiens sous les sultans.” *Echos d’Orient* 28 (1929). Pp. 398–404.
- . “Σφραντζῆς et non Φραντζῆς.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 44 (1951). Pp. 374–376.
- . “Sphrantzès et non Phrantzès. A nouveau!” *Revue des études byzantines* 9 (1951). Pp. 170, 171.
- . “Le Vaticanus latinus 4789. Alliances et filiations des Cantacuzènes au XV^e siècle.” *Revue des études byzantines* 9 (1952). Pp. 64–105.
- . “Isidore de Kiev et la métropole de Monembasia.” *Revue des études byzantines* 17 (1959). Pp. 150–157.
- Lazzaroni, M., and Muñoz, A. “Un buste en bronze d’Antonio Filarete représentant l’empereur Jean Paléologue.” In *Comptes rendus de l’Academie des inscriptions et belles lettres* Paris, 1907. Pp. 300–339.
- . *Filarete scultore e architetto del secolo XV*. Rome, 1908.
- Legrand, É. *Biographie hellénique ou description raisonnée des ouvrages publiés en grec par les Grecs au XI^e et XVI^e siècles*. Vol. 1. Paris, 1885.
- Lehman, P. W. “Theodosius or Justinian? A Renaissance Drawing of a Byzantine Rider.” *Art Bulletin* 41 (1959). Pp. 39–57.
- Lemerle, P. “La domination vénitienne à Thessalonique.” In *Miscellanea G. Galbiati. Fontes Ambrosiani* 27. Vol. 3. Rome, 1951. Pp. 219–225.
- . “Autour d’un prostagma inédit de Manuel II. L’aulé de Sire Gui à Thessalonique.” In *Silloge Bizantina’ in onore di Silvio Giuseppe Mercati*. Studi bizantini e neoellenici 9. Rome, 1957. Pp. 271–286.

- Littlewood, A. R. "The Symbolism of the Apple in Greek and Roman Literature." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 72 (1967). Pp. 147–181.
- . "The Symbolism of the Apple in Byzantine Literature." *Jahrbuch des österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 23 (1974). Pp. 35–59.
- Lock, P. *The Franks in the Aegean 1204–1500*. London and New York, 1995.
- Loenertz, R.-J. "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse au XIV^e siècle (1382–1404)." *Revue des études byzantines* 1 (1943). Pp. 152–196.
- . "Pour la biographie du Cardinal Bessarion." *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 10 (1944). Pp. 116–149.
- . "Autour du Chronicon Maius attribué à Georges Phrantzès." In *Miscellanea G. Mercati*. Studi e Testi 123. Vol. 2. Vatican City, 1946. Pp. 273–311.
- . "Épître de Manuel Paléologue aux moines David et Damien, 1416." In *'Silloge Bizantina' in onore di Silvio Giuseppe Mercati*. Studi bizantini e neoellenici 9. Rome, 1957. Pp. 294–296.
- Loomis, R. S., ed. *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages: A Collaborative History*. Oxford, 1969.
- Lowden, J. "The Luxury Book as Diplomatic Gift." In J. Shepard and S. Franklin, eds. *Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the 24th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies Cambridge 1990*. Aldershot, 1992. Pp. 249–260.
- Luttrell, A. *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291–1400*. London, 1982.
- MacKay, P. A. "The Epitaphios for Theodora Palaiologina, Attributed to Bessarion, MS Venice, Marciana Graeca 533, f. 48^v-49^r." In *Thirty-Sixth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference 8–10 October, 2010: Abstracts of Papers*. Philadelphia, 2010. P. 30.
- Maisano, R. "Il manoscritto Napoletano II E. 25 e la storia della tradizione dello pseudo-Sfranze." *Italoellenica: Rivista di cultura greco-moderna* 2 (1989). Pp. 103–121.
- Maksimovic, L. *The Byzantine Provincial Administration under the Palaeologi*. Amsterdam, 1988.
- Maltezou, C. A. *Ὁ Θεσμός τοῦ ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Βενετοῦ Βαΐλου (1268–1453)*. Βιβλιοθήκη Σοφίας Ν. Σαριπόλου 6. Athens, 1970.
- . *Ἄνα Παλαιολογίνα Νοταρᾶ: Μὴ Τραγικὴ Μορφή ἀνάμεσα στὸν Βυζαντινὸ καὶ τὸν Νέο Ἑλληνικὸ Κόσμο*. Βιβλιοθήκη Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν Βενετίας 23. Venice, 2004.
- Mamalakis, I. *Ὁ Γεώργιος Γεμιστὸς Πλήθων*. Athens, 1939.
- Mango, C., and Dagron, G., eds. *Constantinople and its Hinterland*. Aldershot, 1995.
- Manoussakas, M. "Les derniers défenseurs crétois de Constantinople d'après les documents vénitiens." In F. Dölger and H.-G. Beck, eds. *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistiken Kongresses*. Munich, 1958. Pp. 331–340.
- . "Ἡ Πρώτη Ἄδεια (1456) τῆς Βενετικῆς Γερουσίας γιὰ τὸ Ναὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς Βενετίας καὶ ὁ Καρδινάλιος Ἰσιδώρος." *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 1 (1962). Pp. 109–118.
- Manz, B. F. *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. Cambridge, 1989.
- Marinesco, M. "Deux Empereurs byzantins en Occident: Manuel II et Jean VIII Paléologue." In *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (January–March, 1957). Paris, 1958. Pp. 23–34.
- . "Deux Empereurs byzantins, Manuel II et Jean VIII Paléologue, vus par des artistes occidentaux." *Le Flambeau* 40 (November–December, 1957). Pp. 758–762.
- Masai, F. *Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra*. Paris, 1956.

- Mastrodemetres, P. D. *Νικόλαος Σεκουνδινός (1402–1464) Βίος καὶ Ἔργον: Συμβολὴ εἰς τὴν Μελέτην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς Διασπορᾶς*. Βιβλιοθήκη Σοφίας Ν. Σαριπόλου 9. Athens, 1970.
- . “Nicolaos Secundinòs a Napoli dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli.” *Ἱταλοελληνικά: Rivista di cultura greco-moderna* 2 (1989). Pp. 21–38.
- Matschke, K.-P. “Personengeschichte, Familiengeschichte, Sozialgeschichte. Die Notaras im späten Byzanz.” In L. Balleto, ed. *Oriente e occidente tra Medioevo et età moderna. Studi in onore di Geo Pitarino*. Geneva, 1977. Pp. 787–812.
- . *Die Schlacht bei Ankara und das Schicksal von Byzanz: Studien zur spätbyzantinischen Geschichte zwischen 1402 und 1422*. Weimar, 1981.
- . “Zum Anteil der Byzantiner und der Bergbauentwicklung Südosteuropas im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 84/85 (1991/92). Pp. 49–71.
- . “The Notaras Family and Its Italian Connections.” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995) [*Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries*]. Pp. 59–72.
- Medlin, W. V. *Moscow and East Rome: A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Moscovite Russia*. Études d’histoire économique, politique et social 1. Geneva, 1952.
- Medvedev, I. P. *Византийская Гуманизм XIV-XV вв.* Leningrad, 1976.
- Mercati, G. “Lettere di un Isidoro, arcivescovo di Monembasia e non di Kiew.” *Bessarione* 32 (1916). Pp. 200–207.
- . *Scritti d’Isidoro il cardinale Ruteno e codici a lui appartenuti che si conservano nella Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana*. Studi e Testi 46. Vatican City, 1926.
- Mertzios, K. D. “Περὶ Παλαιολόγων καὶ Ἄλλων Εὐγενῶν Κωνσταντινουπολιτῶν.” In *Ἔργα Ἀντωνίου Κεραμοπούλλου*. Athens, 1933, Pp. 335–372.
- . *Μνημεῖα Μακεδονικῆς Ἱστορίας*. Thessalonica, 1947.
- . “Ἡ Διαθήκη τῆς Ἄννας Παλαιολογίνας Νοταρᾶ.” *Ἀθηνᾶ* 53 (1949). Pp. 17–21.
- . “Περὶ τῶν ἐκ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Διαφυγόντων τὸ 1453 καὶ Ἀποβιβασθέντων εἰς Κρήτην.” In *Actes du XII^e Congrès international d’Études Byzantines, Ochride, 10–16 Septembre 1961*. Belgrade, 1964. Pp. 171–176.
- Mijatovich, C. *Constantine Palaeologus: The Last Emperor of the Greeks 1448–1453: The Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks*. Chicago, 1968; repr. 1892.
- Miller, W. “The Gattilusij of Lesbos (1355–1462).” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 22 (1913). Pp. 406–447.
- . *Essays on the Latin Orient*. Cambridge, 1921.
- . “The Last Athenian Historian: Laonikos Chalkokondyles.” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 42 (1922). Pp. 36–49.
- . “The Historians Doukas and Phrantzes.” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 46 (1926). Pp. 63–71.
- . *Trebizond: The Last Greek Empire*. Chicago, 1968; repr. 1926.
- . *The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece (1204–1566)*. New York, 1968; repr. 1908.
- Mohler, S. *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsman*. 3 vols. Paderborn, 1923–42; repr. Aalen and Paderborn, 1967.
- Mompherratos, A. *Οἱ Παλαιολόγοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*. Athens, 1913.
- Monfasani, J. “Platina, Capranica, and Perotti: Bessarion’s Latin Eulogists and His Date of Birth.” In P. Medioli Mazotti, ed. *Bartolomeo Sacchi II Platina (Piadena 1421–Roma 1481): Atti del convegno internazionale di studi per il V centenario (Cremona, 14–15 novembre 1981)*. Padua, 1986. Pp. 97–136.
- . *Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other Emigrés*. London, 1995.

- Moravcsik, G. "Византийские Императори их Посли в. Г. Буда." *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 8 (1961). Pp. 239–256.
- Mordtmann, A. D. *Belagerung und Eroberung Constantinopels durch die Türken im Jahre 1453 nach dem Originalquellen bearbeitet*. Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1858.
- . *Esquisse topographique de Constantinople*. Lille, 1892.
- Mordtmann, J. H. "Die Kapitulation von Konstantinopel im Jahre 1453." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 21 (1901). Pp. 129–144.
- Morgan, D. *The Mongols*. London, 1987.
- Morris, J. *The Age of Arthur: A History of the British Isles from 350 to 650*. New York, 1973.
- Motos Guirao, È., and Morfakidis Filactos, M., eds. *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια από την Άλωση*. 3 vols. Granada, 2006.
- Muralt von, E. *Essai de chronographie byzantine, 1057–1453*. St. Petersburg, 1871.
- Nasturel, P. S. "Témoignages roumaines sur les formes Sphrantzès et Phrantzès." *Revue des études byzantines* 19 (1961). Pp. 441–444.
- Necipoğlu, N. "Economic Conditions in Constantinople during the Siege of Bayezid I (1394–1402). In C. Mango and G. Dagron, eds. *Constantinople and its Hinterland*. Aldershot, 1995. Pp. 157–167.
- . "Social and Economic Conditions in Constantinople during Mehmed II's Siege." In T. Kiousopoulou, ed. *1453: Η Άλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης και η Μετάβαση από τους Μεσαιωνικούς στους Νεώτερους Χρόνους*. Herakleion, 2007. Pp. 75–86.
- . *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire*. Cambridge, 2009.
- Nelson, R. S. "The Italian Appreciation and Appropriation of Illuminated Byzantine Manuscripts, ca. 1200–1450." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers [Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–15th Centuries]* 49 (1995). Pp. 209–235.
- Nicol, D. M. *The Despotate of Epirus*. Oxford, 1957.
- . *Meteora: The Rock Monasteries of Thessaly*. London, 1963.
- . *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460: A Genealogical and Prosopographical Study*. *Dumbarton Oaks Studies* 11. Washington, DC, 1968.
- . "A Byzantine Emperor in England: Manuel II's Visit to London in 1400–1401." *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* 12 (1971). Pp. 104–225.
- . *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453*. New York, 1972.
- . "Kaisererbung: The Unction of Emperors in Late Byzantine Coronation Ritual." *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 2 (1976). Pp. 37–52.
- . *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium: The Birkbeck Lectures*. Cambridge, 1979.
- . *The End of the Byzantine Empire*. *Foundations of Medieval History*. London, 1979.
- . *The Despotate of Epirus 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge, 1984.
- . *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations*. Cambridge, 1988.
- . *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Last Emperor of the Romans*. Cambridge, 1992.
- . *The Byzantine Lady: Ten Portraits 1250–1500*. Cambridge, 1994.
- . *The Reluctant Emperor: A Biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and Monk, c. 1295–1383*. Cambridge, 1996.
- Nimet (Kurat), A. *Die türkische Prosopographie bei Laonikos Chalkokandyles*. Hamburg, 1933.

- Obolensky, D. *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500–1453*. New York, 1971.
- Oikonomides, D. B. “Χρονογράφου τοῦ Δωροθέου τὰ Λαογραφικά.” *Λαογραφία* 18 (1959). Pp. 113–243.
- Oikonomides, N. “La chancellerie impériale de Byzance du 13^e au 15^e siècle.” *Revue des études byzantines* 43 (1985). Pp. 167–195.
- Oligiati, G. “Angelo Giovanni Lomellino: Attività politica e mercantile dell’ultimo podestà de Pera.” *Storia di Genovesi* 9 (1989). Pp. 139–196.
- Omotos Sáenz, O. “Constantino Paleólogo, Personal del Teatro Neohelénico.” In È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds. *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια από την Άλωση*. Vol. 2. Granada, 2006. Pp. 461–477.
- Ostrogorsky, G. “The Byzantine Empire and the Hierarchical World-Order.” *Slavonic and East European Review* 35 (1956). Pp. 1–14.
- . “Byzance état tributaire de l’empire turc.” *Zbornik Radova Vizantijloškog Instituta, Srpska Akademija Nauk* 5 (1958). Pp. 49–58.
- . “Gospodin Konstantin Dragaš.” *Zbornik Filozofskog Fakulteta* 7 (1963). Pp. 287–294.
- . “The Palaeologi.” In *Cambridge Medieval History*. Vol. 4, 2nd ed. Cambridge and New York, 1966–67. Pp. 331–387.
- . *History of the Byzantine State*. J. Hussey, trans. New Brunswick, 1969.
- Ousterhout, R., Ahunbay, A., and Ahunbay, M. “Study and Reconstruction of the Zeyrek Camii in Istanbul, First Report, 1997–98.” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 54 (2000). Pp. 265–270.
- Paccagnini, G. *Pisanello*. J. Carroll, trans. London, 1973.
- Paliouras, A. D. “Η Ζωγραφική στὸν Χάνδακα ἀπὸ 1550–1600.” *Θησαυρίσματα: Περιοδικὸν Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας* 10 (1973). Pp. 101–123.
- . *Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας (ci. 1540–1608) καὶ αἱ Μικρογραφίαι τοῦ Κώδικος Αὐτοῦ*. Athens, 1977.
- . “Οἱ Μικρογραφίες τοῦ Χρησιμολογικοῦ Κώδικα 170 Barozzi.” In *Πεπραγμένα Δ’ Διεθνoῦς Κρητολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου*. Vol. 2. Herakleion, 1981. Pp. 318–328.
- . “Ὁ Ἀπόηχος τῆς Εἰκονομαχίας στὴ Ζωγραφικὴ τοῦ 16ου Αἰώνα. Ἡ Περίπτωση τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα.” In *Τιμητικὸ Ἀφιέρωμα στὸν Κωνσταντῖνο Δ. Καλοκέρη*. Thessalonica, 1985. Pp. 403–413.
- . “Ὁ Ζωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας στὸ Σινά.” In *Πεπραγμένα Ζ’ Διεθνoῦς Κρητολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου*. Vol. 2. Rethymnon, 1995. Pp. 318–328.
- . *Μεταβυζαντινὴ Ζωγραφικὴ: Συλλογὴ Ἀρθρῶν ποῦ Ἀναφέρονται στὰ Ζητήματα τῆς Ζωγραφικῆς Τέχνης μετὰ τὴν Ἄλωση (1453–1821)*. Ioannina, 2000.
- Pall, F. “Ciriaco d’Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi.” *Bulletin histoire de l’Académie roumaine* 20 (1938). Pp. 9–68.
- . “Un moment décisif de l’histoire du Sud-Est européen: la croisade de Varna.” *Balkanica* 7 (1944). Pp. 102–120.
- . “Byzance à la veille de sa chute et Janco de Hunedoara (Hunyadi).” *Byzantino-slavica* 30 (1969). Pp. 119–126.
- Pallis, A. A. “A Seventeenth Century Turkish Baedeker: The Travel Book of Evliya Cheleby.” In A. A. Pallis, ed. *Greek Miscellany: A Collection of Essays on Medieval and Modern Greece*. Athens, 1964. Pp. 84–101.
- Papademetriou, T. *Render unto the Sultan: Power, Authority, and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Early Ottoman Centuries*. Oxford, 2015.
- Papacostas, G. *George Gemistos-Plethon: A Study of his Philosophical Ideas and His Role as a Philosopher-Teacher*. New York, 1967.

- Papadopoulos, T. *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*. Brussels, 1952; repr. London, 1990.
- Papadopoulos, T. I. *Λέων Αλλάτιος (Χίος 1588–Ρώμη 1669): Σύμμεικτα Αλλατιανά*. Athens, 2007.
- Papadopulos, A. T. “Versuch einer Genealogie der Palaiologen, 1295–1453,” Inaugural Dissertation, Munich, 1938.
- Papadrianos, I. A. “Manojlo Palaeolog, Vizantijski poslanik u Srbij 1451.” *Zbornik Radova Vizantinološkog Instituta, Srpska Akademija Nauk* 7 (1954) [*Mélanges G. Ostrogorsky* 2]. Pp. 311–315.
- . “The Marriage-Arrangement between Constantine XI Palaeologus and the Serbian Mara (1451).” *Balkan Studies* 6 (1965). Pp. 131–138.
- Papagiannē, E. S. *Ο Θρήνος της Αγία Σοφίας, Θρόλος ή Πραγματικότητα*. Βυζαντινή Πραγματικότητα και Νεοελληνικές Έρμηνείες 3. Athens, 1999.
- Papaspyrou-Karademetriou, E. *Βαλκανικοί Πόλεμοι 1912–1913: Ελληνική Λαϊκή Εικονογραφία*. Athens, 1999.
- Paspates, A. G. *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται Τοπογραφικὰ καὶ Ἱστορικὰ*. Βιβλιοθήκη Ἱστορικῶν Μελετῶν 208. Constantinople, 1874; repr. Athens, 1986.
- . *Πολιορκία καὶ Ἀλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ὑπὸ τῶν Ὀθωμανῶν ἐν Ἐτει 1453*. Athens, 1890; repr. Athens, 1995.
- Pastor, L. *The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages Drawn from Secret Archives of the Vatican and Other Original Sources*. F. I. Antrobus, ed. and trans. Vol. 2. London, 1949.
- Patrinelis, C. G. “Ἕλληνες Κωδικογράφοι τῶν Χρόνων τῆς Αναγεννήσεως.” *Ἐπετηρὶς τοῦ Μεσαιωνικοῦ Ἀρχείου* 8–9 (1958/59). Pp. 63–124.
- . “Κυριακὸς ὁ Ἀγκωνίτης: Ἡ Δῆθεν Ὑπηρεσία του εἰς τὴν Αὐλὴν τοῦ Πορθητοῦ καὶ ὁ Χρόνος τοῦ Θανάτου Αὐτοῦ.” *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 16 (1968). Pp. 152–160.
- . “Mehmed II the Conqueror and his Presumed Knowledge of Greek and Latin.” *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 2 (1971). Pp. 349–355.
- . “An Unknown Discourse of Chrysoloras Addressed to Manuel II Palaeologus.” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 13 (1972). Pp. 497–502.
- Pears, E. *The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks*. New York, 1968; repr. 1903.
- Perentides, S., and Steires, G. eds. *Ιωάννης και Θεοδόσιος Ζυγομαλάς: Πατριαρχεῖο – Θεσμοὶ – Χειρόγραφα*. Athens, 2009.
- Pertusi, A., ed. *Venezia e l’Oriente fra Tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento*. Civiltà Veneziana, Aspetti e Problemi 4. Venice, 1966.
- . “In margine alla questione dall’umanesimo bizantino: il pensiero politico del cardinale Bessarione e i suoi rapporti con il pensiero di Giorgio Pletone.” *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, n. s. 5 (1968). Pp. 95–104.
- Pesce, L. “Cristoforo Garatone trevigiano, nunzio di Eugenio IV.” *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 28 (1974). Pp. 23–93.
- Petit, L. “Note sur l’exule de Marc d’Ephèse à Lemnos.” *Revue de l’Orient chrétien* 23 (1923). Pp. 414–415.
- Pétridès, S. “Le synaxaire de Marc d’Ephèse.” *Revue de l’Orient chrétien* 15 (1910). Pp. 97–107.
- Philadelphus, T. N. *Ἱστορία τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐπὶ Τουρκοκρατίας ἀπὸ τοῦ 1400 μέχρι τοῦ 1800*. 2 vols. Athens, 1902; repr. Athens, 1981.
- Philippides, M. “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonard and the Greek Accounts.” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 22 (1980). Pp. 287–300.

- . “An ‘Unknown’ Source for Book III of the *Chronicon Maius* by Pseudo-Sphrantzes.” *Byzantine Studies/Études byzantines* 10 (1983). Pp. 174–183.
- . “Σόγγρονες Ἐρευνες στὰ Κείμενα τοῦ Σφραντζῆ.” *Παρνασσός* 25 (1983). Pp. 94–99.
- . “Herodian 2.4.1 and Pertinax.” *The Classical World* 77 (1984). Pp. 295–297.
- . “Patriarchal Chronicles of the Sixteenth Century.” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 25 (1984). Pp. 87–94.
- . “Some Prosopographical Considerations in Nestor-Iskander’s Text.” *Macedonian Studies* 6 (1989). Pp. 35–50.
- . “George Sphrantzes in Ubertino Pusculo.” *Ὀνόματα: Revue onomastique* 13 (1989/90). Pp. 208–211.
- . “Loukas Notaras, the Last Grand Duke of Constantinople and His Surviving Son.” In *Seventeenth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference Abstracts of Papers*. Brookline, 1989. Pp. 18, 19.
- . “Early Post-Byzantine Historiography.” In A. S. Bernardo and S. Levin, eds. *The Classics in the Middle Ages: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies: Papers of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies*. Binghamton, 1990. Pp. 253–263.
- . “The Value of Christoforo Riccherio’s ‘Eyewitness’ Narrative of the Fall of Constantinople in 1453.” In *Sixteenth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference Abstracts of Papers*. Baltimore, 1990. Pp. 36, 37.
- . “Some Artistic Portrayals of the Last Imperial Family, 1400–1470.” *Twenty-First Annual Byzantine Studies Conference Abstracts of Papers*. New York, 1995. P. 33.
- . “*Urbs Capta*: Early ‘Sources’ on the Fall of Constantinople.” In T. S. Miller and J. Nesbitt, eds. *Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, S.J.* Washington, 1995. Pp. 209–225.
- . “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonardo and His Italian Followers.” *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 29 (1998). Pp. 189–227.
- . “Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani, the Genoese *Condottiere* of Constantinople in 1453.” *Byzantine Studies/Études byzantines*, n. s. 3 (1998). Pp. 13–54.
- . “Urban’s Bombard(s), Gunpowder, and the Fall of Constantinople (1453).” *Byzantine Studies/Études byzantines*, n. s. 4 (1999). Pp. 1–67.
- . “History Repeats Itself: Ancient Troy and Renaissance Istanbul.” In S. Atasoy, ed. *Istanbul Üniversitesi 550. Yıl Uluslararası Bizans ve Osmanlı Sempozyumu (XV. Yüzyıl) 30–31 Mayıs 2003. 550th Anniversary of the Istanbul University. International Byzantine and Ottoman Symposium (XVth Century) 30–31 May 2003*. Istanbul, 2004. Pp. 42–68.
- . “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Classical Comparisons and the Circle of Cardinal Isidore.” *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 38 (2007). Pp. 349–383.
- . “Tears of the Great Church: The Lamentation of Santa Sophia.” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 52 (2012). Pp. 714–737.
- . “Venice Genoa, and John VIII Palaeologus’ Renovation of the Fortifications of Constantinople.” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 56 (2016). Pp. 377–399.
- . “Rumors of Treason: Intelligence Activities and Clandestine Operations in the Siege of 1453.” In M. Arslan and T. Kaçar, eds. *Byzantium’dan Constantinopolis’e İstanbul Kuşatmaları*. İstanbul, 2017. Pp. 403–445.
- , and Hanak, W. K. *The Siege and Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies*. Farnham, 2011.
- . *Cardinal Isidore, c. 1390–1462: A Late Byzantine Scholar, Warlord, and Prelate*. London and New York, 2018.

- Pistarino, G. "Chio dei Genovesi." *Studi Medievali* 19 (1969). Pp. 3–68.
- Polites, A. *Το Δημοτικό Τραγούδι*. Herakleion, 2010.
- Polites, N. G. *Μελέται περί τοῦ Βίου καί τῆς Γλώσσης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ. Παραδόσεις*. Athens, 1904.
- Purdie, M. H. "An Account by John Cananus of the Siege of Constantinople in 1442," M.A. thesis. The University of Western Australia, Perth, 2009.
- Raby, J. "Cyriacus of Ancona and the Sultan Mehmed II." *Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 43 (1980). Pp. 242–246.
- . "Pride and Prejudice: Mehmed the Conqueror and the Italian Portrait Medal." In J. Graham Pollard, ed. *Italian Medals*. Washington, DC, 1987. Pp. 171–194.
- Riegraf, S. W. "From Niš to Kosovo Polje. Reflection on Murad I's Final Years." In E. Zachariadou, ed. *The Ottoman Emirate (1300–1389). Halcyon Days in Crete, Vol. 1: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon 11–13 January 1991*. Rethymnon, 1993. Pp. 169–211.
- . "Political Dimensions of Manuel II Palaiologos' 1392 Marriage and Coronation." C. Side and C. Tacács, eds. *Novum Millennium: Studies on Byzantine History and Culture Dedicated to Paul Speck, 19 December 1999*. Aldershot, 2000. Pp. 291–303.
- Reinsch, D. R. "Lieber der Turban als war? Bemerkungen zum Dictum des Lukas Notaras." In C. N. Constantinides, N. M. Panagiotakes, E. Jeffreys and A. D. Angelou, eds. *Φιλέλλην: Studies in Honor of Robert Browning*. Venice, 1996. Pp. 377–391.
- Rhodokanakes, D. *Ἰουστινιάναι-Χίος*. Syra, 1900.
- Rizzo, Padoa A. *Benozzo Gozzoli Pittore Fiorentino. Monografie e Studi a Cura dell'Instituto di Storia dell'Arte dell'Università di Firenze, sez. 1^a – Medioevo e Rinascimento*. Florence, 1972.
- Rosetti, R. "Note on the Battle of Nicopolis." *The Slavonic Review* 15 (1936/37). Pp. 629–638.
- Rossi, E. "La legenda turco-bizantina del Pomo Rosso." *Studi Bizantini e Neellenici* 5 (1939). Pp. 542–553.
- Runciman, S. *A History of the Crusades*. Vol. 3. Cambridge, 1954.
- . *Byzantine Civilization*. New York, 1956.
- . *The Fall of Constantinople 1453*. Cambridge, 1965.
- . "Lucas Notaras, 'Γαμβρός τοῦ Βασιλέως'." In P. Wirth, ed. *Polychronion: Festschrift Franz Dölger zum 75. Geburtstag*. Heidelberg, 1966. Pp. 447–450.
- . *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*. Cambridge, 1968.
- . *Byzantium and the Renaissance*. Tucson, 1970.
- . *The Last Byzantine Renaissance*. Cambridge, 1970.
- . *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese*. London, 1980.
- . "The Marriages of the Sons of the Emperor Manuel II." In *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*. Vol. 1. Bologna, 1981. Pp. 273–282.
- Sabbadini, R. "Ciriaco d'Ancona e la sua descrizione autografa del Peloponneso trasmessa da Leonardo Botta." In *Miscellanea Ceriani. Raccolta di scritti originali per onorare la memoria di A. M. Ceriani*. Milan, 1910. Pp. 180–247 [= *Classici e Umanisti da Codici Ambrosiani*. Fontes Ambrosiani 2. Florence, 1933. Pp. 1–52].
- Samuel, A. E. *Greek and Roman Chronology*. Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 1.7. Munich, 1972.
- Sathas, C. N. *Τουρκοκρατημένη Ἑλλάς: Ἱστορικὸν Δοκίμιον περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀποτίναξιν τοῦ Ὄθωμανικοῦ Ζυγοῦ Ἐπαναστάσεων τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους (1453–1821)*. Athens, 1869; repr. Athens, 1985.
- . "Ἡ Πρώτη ἐν Βενετία Ἑλληνικὴ Τυπογραφία." *Ἡ Μελέτη* 2 (1907). Pp. 470–485.

- . *Νεοελληνική Φιλολογία: Βιογραφία τῶν ἐν τοῖς Γράμμασι Διαλαμψάντων Ἑλλήνων ἀπὸ τῆς Καταλύσεως τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Ἀυτοκρατορίας μέχρι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐθνεγερσίας (1453–1821)*. Athens, 1868; repr. Athens, 1960.
- Savvides, A. G. K. “Morea and Islam 8th–15th Centuries: A Survey.” *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* 2 (1990). Pp. 47–75.
- . *Βυζαντινοτουρκικά Μελετήματα: Ἀνατύπωση Ἄρθρων 1981–1990*. Athens, 1991.
- Schlumberger, G. *Le siège, la prise et le sac de Constantinople par les Turcs en 1453*. Paris, 1914 [= *Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*. E. G. Protopsaltes, trans. Athens, *sine anno*; and *Κωνσταντῖνος Παλαιολόγος καὶ ἡ Πολιορκία καὶ Ἄλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων τῷ 1453*. S. P. Lampros, trans. Athens, 1914; repr. Thessalonica, 1991.
- . “Jean de Chateaumorand, un de principaux héros française des arrières-croisades en Orient à la fin du XIV^e et à l’aurore du XV^e siècle.” In *Byzance et Croisades: Pages médiévales*. Paris, 1927. Pp. 282–336.
- . “Un Empereur de Byzance à Paris et à Londres.” In *Byzance et Croisades: Pages médiévales*. Paris, 1927. Pp. 87–147.
- Schneider, A. M. “Die Bevölkerung Konstantinopels im XV. Jahrhundert.” *Nachrichten d. Akad. Wiss. in Göttingen, Philos.-Hist. Kl.* 9 (1949). Pp. 233–244.
- Schreiner, P. “Hochzeit und Krönung Kaiser Manuel II. im Jahre 1392.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 60 (1967). Pp. 70–85.
- . *Studien zu den Βραχέα Χρονικά*. Miscellanea Bizantina Monacensia 6. Munich, 1967.
- . “Chronologische Untersuchungen zur Familie Kaiser Manuel II.” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 63 (1970). Pp. 288–290.
- Schuyler, J. “Emperor John VIII Palaeologus: Donatello’s First Portrait Bust of a Living Person?” *Source: Notes on the History of Art* 5 (1986). Pp. 27–32.
- Schwoebel, R. *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453–1517)*. Nieuwkoop, 1967.
- Serges, M. G. *Γεώργιος Σχολάριος-Γεννάδιος Β΄: ο Πρώτος μετά την Ἄλωση Οικουμενικός Πατριάρχης: Εθνοϊστορική Μελέτη*. Μελέτες γιά τῆ Βυζαντινῆ καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῆ Ἱστορία 3. Athens.
- Setton, K. M. “The Latins in Greece and the Aegean from the First Crusade to the End of the Middle Ages.” In *The Cambridge Medieval History*. Vol. 4. 2nd ed. Cambridge, NY, 1966–67. Pp. 328–449.
- . *The Papacy and the Levant (1203–1571), Vol. 1: The Fourteenth Century, Vol. 2: The Fifteenth Century*. Philadelphia, 1976.
- . Gen. ed. *A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. Madison, 1975. Vol. 6: *The Impact of the Crusades on Europe*. Madison, 1989.
- Ševčenko, I. “Intellectual Repercussions of the Council of Florence.” *Church History* 24 (1955). Pp. 291–323.
- . “The Decline of Byzantium Seen through the Eyes of Its Intellectuals.” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 15 (1961). Pp. 169–181.
- . *Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World*. London, 1982.
- . *Society and Intellectual Life in Late Byzantium*. London, 1982.
- . “The Palaeologan Renaissance.” In W. Treadgold, ed. *Renaissances before the Renaissance Cultural Revivals of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Stanford, 1984. Pp. 144–173.
- Shaw, S. J. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808*. Cambridge, 1976.
- Siderides, X. A. “Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου Θάνατος, Τάφος, καὶ Σπάθη.” *Ἡ Μελέτη* 2 (1908). Pp. 65–78, 129–146.

- Sigonowitz, B. "Ueber das byzantinische Kaisertum nach dem vierten Kreuzzuge (1204–1205)." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 45 (1952). Pp. 346–356.
- Simon, E. *Festivals of Attica: An Archaeological Commentary*. Wisconsin Studies in Classics. Madison, 1983.
- Smith, C. "Cyriacus of Ancona's Seven Drawings of Hagia Sophia." *Art Bulletin* 69 (1987). Pp. 16–32.
- Spatharakis, I. *The Portrait in Byzantine Illuminated Manuscripts*. Leiden, 1976.
- . "An Unusual Iconographic Type of the Seated Evangelist." *Δελτίον Χριστιανικής Αρχαιολογικής Εταιρείας*, ser. 4 10 (1980/81). Pp. 137–146.
- Spremic, M. "Harac Soluna u XV veku." *Zbornik Radova Vizantijloškog Instituta* 19 (1967). Pp. 187–195.
- Stacton, D. *The World on the Last Day: The Sack of Constantinople by the Turks on May 29, 1453: Its Causes and Consequences*. London, 1965. Published in the United States under the pseudonym D. Dereksen with the title *The Crescent and the Cross: The Fall of Byzantium, May 29, 1453*. New York, 1964.
- Staikos, K. S. *Χάρτα της Ελληνικής Τυπογραφίας: Η Έκδοτική Δραστηριότητα τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἡ Συμβολή τους στήν Πνευματική Αναγέννηση τῆς Δόσης, Vol. 1: 15ος Αἰώνας*. Athens, 1989.
- Stanojevic, S. "Die Biographie Stefan Lazarevics von Konstantin dem Philosophen als Geschichtsquelle." *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 18 (1896). Pp. 409–472.
- Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York, 1958.
- Stokes, H. *Benozzo Gozzoli*. London, 1904; repr. 1976.
- Sugar, P. *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*. A History of East Central Europe 5. Seattle and London, 1977.
- Syson, L., and Gordon, D. *Pisanello: Painter to the Renaissance Court*. London, 2001.
- Taeschner, F. "Beiträge zur frühosmanischen Epigraphik und Archäologie." *Der Islam* 30 (1932). Pp. 109–186.
- , and Wittek, P. "Die Vezirfamilie der Gandarlizade (14./15. Jhd.) und ihre Denkmäler." *Der Islam* 18 (1929). Pp. 60–115.
- Tafrali, M. O. "Le siège de Constantinople dans les fresques des églises de Bucovine." In *Mélanges M. Gustave Schlumberger*. Vol. 2. Paris, 1924. Pp. 456–461.
- Tapkova-Zaimova, V. "Quelques observations sur la domination byzantine aux bouches du Danube. Le sort de Lykostomion et quelques autres villes cotières." *Studia Balcanica* 1 (1970). Pp. 79–86.
- Tatsios, T. G. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism*. Boulder and New York, 1984.
- Theocharides, I. "The Stand of the Byzantine Emperor on the Battle of Varna." *Études balkaniques* 23 (1987). Pp. 107–119.
- Thiriet, F. *Études sur la Romanie Gréco-Vénitienne (X^e-XV^e s.)*. London, 1977.
- Todorow Fossi, M. *I disegni di Pisanello e della sua cerchia*. Florence, 1966.
- Topping, P. "Greek MS 1 (The Works of Joannes Dokeianos) of the University of Pennsylvania Library." *The Library Chronicle* 29 (1963). Pp. 1–15.
- . "The Morea, 1364–1460." In *A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. Madison, 1975. Pp. 141–166.
- . "Albanian Settlements in Medieval Greece: Some Venetian Testimonies." In A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis, ed. *Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis*. New Brunswick, 1980. Pp. 261–272.
- . *Studies on Latin Greece A.D. 1205–1715*. London, 1982.
- . "Latins on Lemnos before and after 1453." In A. Bryer and H. Lowry, eds. *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: Papers Given at a*

- Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*. Birmingham and Washington, DC, 1986. Pp. 217–324.
- Toumanoff, C. “The Fifteenth-Century Bogratids and the Institution of Collegial Sovereignty in Georgia.” *Traditio* 7 (1949–51). Pp. 169–221.
- Trapp, E., Beyer, H.-V., et al. *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*. 11 vols. [+ 2 supplements], Vienna, 1976–1991.
- Tsaras, J. “La fin d’Andronic Paléologue dernier despote de Thessalonique.” *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 3 (1965). Pp. 419–432.
- . “Σφραντζῆς, Φιαλίτης ἢ Φραντζῆς.” *Βυζαντινά* 9 (1977). Pp. 123–139.
- Tsirpanles, Z. N. *Oi Μακεδόνες Σπουδαστές τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Κολλεγίου Ρώμης καὶ ἡ Δράση τους στὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ στὴν Ἰταλία (16ος Αἰ. – 1650)*. Μακεδονικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη 35. Thessalonica, 1971.
- Tuchman, B. W. *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century*. New York, 1978.
- Vacalopoulos, A. E. Also cf. Bakalopoulos [Vacalopoulos].
- . *History of Thessalonica 315 BC – 1912*. F. Carney, trans. Thessalonica, 1963.
- . “A Revolt in Western Macedonia, 1444–1449.” *Balkan Studies* 9 (1968). Pp. 375–380.
- . *Origins of the Greek Nation: The Byzantine Period, 1204–1261*. I. Moles, trans. New Brunswick, 1970.
- . *The Greek Nation, 1453–1669: The Cultural and Economic Background of Modern Greek Society*. I. Moles and P. Moles, trans. New Brunswick, 1976.
- Van Millingen, A. *Byzantine Constantinople: The Walls of the City and Adjoining Historical Sites*. London, 1899.
- . *Byzantine Churches in Constantinople, Their History and Architecture*. London, 1912.
- Vasiliev, A. A. “Путешествие Византийского Императора Мануила Палеолога по Западной Европе (1399–1403 Г.).” *Журнал Министерства Народнаго Просвещения* n.s. 39 (1912). Pp. 41–78, 260–304.
- . “Pero Tafur, A Spanish Traveller of the Fifteenth Century to Constantinople, Trebizond, and Italy.” *Byzantion* 7 (1932). Pp. 75–122.
- . “Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium?” *Speculum* 7 (1932). Pp. 358, 359.
- . *History of the Byzantine Empire 324–1453*. 2 vols. Madison, 1976.
- Vassilaki, M. ed. *Χείρ Αγγέλου: Ένας Ζωγράφος Εικόνων στη Βενετοκρατούμενη Κρήτη*. Athens, 2010.
- Vast, H. *Le Cardinal Bessarion*. Paris, 1878.
- Vaughan, R. *Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy*. London, 1970.
- Vereecken, J. “Les Oracles de Léon le Sage en serbe. Fragment d’un manuscrit du XVème siècle de la Bibliothèque Lénin à Moscou.” *Slavica Gandensia* 14 (1987). Pp. 105–127.
- , and Hadermann-Misguich, L. *Les Oracles de Léon le Sage illustrés par George Klontzas: La version Barozzi dans le Codex Bute* [Ἑλληνολατινικὴ Ἀνατολὴ 7]. Venice, 2000.
- Verpeaux, J. “Contribution à l’étude de l’administration byzantine: ho mesazon.” *Byzantinoslavica* 16 (1955). Pp. 270–296.
- Vickers, M. “Some Preparatory Drawings for Pisanello’s Medallion of John VIII Palaeologus.” *Art Bulletin* 60 (1978). Pp. 417–424.
- Vitti, M. *Storia della letteratura neogreca*. Turin, 1971 [= *Ἱστορία τῆς Νεοελληνικῆς Λογοτεχνίας*. M. Zorbas and E. I. Moskhonas, trans. Athens, 1978].
- Vlasto, E. A. *1453: Les Derniers Jours de Constantinople*. Paris, 1883.

- Votokopoulos, P. A. *Tò Θεῖον Πάθος σὲ Πίνακα τοῦ Γεωργίου Κλόντζα: The Holy Passion on a Panel by George Klontzas*. Athens, 2005.
- Vryonis, S. *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Century*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971.
- . “Evidence for Human Sacrifice among Early Ottoman Turks.” *Journal of Asian History* 5 (1971). Pp. 140–146.
- . “Byzantine Cultural Self-Consciousness in the Fifteenth Century.” In S. Ćurčić and D. Mouriki, eds. *Twilight of Byzantium: Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire*. Princeton, 1991. Pp. 5–15.
- Walter, C. “A Problem Picture of the Emperor John VIII.” *Byzantinische Forschungen* 10 (1985). Pp. 295–302.
- Walter, G. *La Ruine de Byzance, 1204–1453*. Paris, 1958.
- Weiss, R. *Pisanello's Medallion of the Emperor John VIII Palaeologus*. London, 1966.
- Werner, E. *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht – Die Osmanen (1330 bis 1481). Ein Beitrag zur Genesis der türkischen Feudalismus*. Berlin, 1966.
- Wifstrand, A. *Laonikos Chalkokondyles, der letzte Athener. Ein Vortrag*. Scripta Minora Soc. Hum. Litt. Lundensis 2. Lund, 1972.
- Williams, A. “Ottoman Military Technology: The Metallurgy of Turkish Armor.” In Y. Lev, ed. *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries*. The Medieval Mediterranean Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453 9. Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1997. Pp. 363–399.
- Wilson, N. G. *From Byzantium to Italy: Greek Studies in the Italian Renaissance*. Baltimore, 1992.
- Wirth, P. “Zum Gechichtsbild Kaiser Johannes VII. Palaiologos.” *Byzantion* 35 (1965). Pp. 592–594.
- Wiseman, J. R. “A Trans-Isthmian Fortification Wall.” *Hesperia* 32 (1963). Pp. 248–275.
- Wittek, P. *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studien zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.-15. Jhdt*. Istanbul: Mitteilungen 2. Istanbul, 1934.
- . “De la défait d’Ankara à la prise de Constantinople (une demi-siècle d’histoire ottomane).” *Revue des études islamiques* 12 (1938). Pp. 1–34.
- . *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London, 1958.
- Woodhouse, C. M. *Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes*. Oxford, 1986.
- Wright, D. G. “Funerary Iambic Lines on the Tomb of the Blessed Basilissa, Lady Kleofe Palaiologina: MS Venice, *Marciana Gr.* 553, f. 48^v, Reattribution from Bessarion to Theodoros Palaiologos.” In *Thirty-Sixth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference 8–10 October, 2010: Abstracts of Papers*. Philadelphia, 2010. P. 29.
- Zachariades, G. E. *Tübingen und Konstantinopel*. Göttingen, 1941.
- Zachariadou, E. “The Conquest of Adrianople by the Turks.” *Studi Veneziani* 12 (1970). Pp. 211–217.
- . “John VII (alias Andronicus) Palaeologus.” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 31 (1977). Pp. 339–342.
- . “Manuel II Palaeologus on the Strife between Bayezid and Kadi Burhan-al-Din Ahmad.” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 18 (1980). Pp. 471–481.
- . “Les ‘janissaires’ de l’empereur byzantin.” In *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata*. Naples, 1982. Pp. 591–597.
- . *Romania and the Turks, c. 1300–1500*. London, 1985.
- . “The Ottoman Emirate (1300–1389).” *Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon 11–13 January 1991*. Rethymnon, 1993. Pp. 169–211.

- . “Τὰ Λόγια καὶ ὁ Θάνατος τοῦ Λουκᾶ Νοταρᾶ.” In *Ροδωνιά: Τιμὴ στὸν Μ. Ι. Μανούσσακα*. Rethymnon, 1996. Pp. 135–146.
- Zakythinos, D. A. *Le despotat grec de Morée (1262–1460), Vol. 1: Histoire politique*. Paris, 1932. *Vol. 2: Vie et Institutions*. Athens 1953 [= *Edition revue et augmentée par C. Maltezou*. 2 vols. London, 1975].
- . “Μανουήλ Β΄ ὁ Παλαιολόγος καὶ ὁ Καρδινάλιος Ἰσιδώρος ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ.” *Mélanges offerts à Octave et Melpo Merlier à l’occasion de leur arrivée en Grèce*. Collection del’Institut Français d’Athènes. Vol. 3. Athens, 1957. Pp. 45–59.
- . *The Making of Modern Greece: From Byzantium to Independence*. K. R. Johnstone, trans. Oxford, 1976.
- . *Μεταβυζαντινὰ καὶ Νέα Ἑλληνικά*. Athens, 1978.
- Zimbone, A. “Ο Γεώργιος Βιζυηνός καὶ ἡ Ἀλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.” In È. Motos Guirao and M. Morfakidis Filactos, eds. *Constantinopla: 550 años de su caída/ Κωνσταντινούπολη: 550 Χρόνια ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀλωση*. Vol. 2. Granada, 2006. Pp. 435–455.
- Zeses, T. N. *Γεννάδιος Β΄ Σχολάριος. Βίος – Συγγράμματα – Διδασκαλία*. Ἀνάλεκτα Βλατάδων 30. Thessalonica, 1980.
- Zinkeisen, J. W. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*. 7 vols. Hamburg, 1840; repr. 1963.
- Zoras, G. T. *Περὶ τὴν Ἀλωσιν τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*. Athens, 1959.
- . “Ὁ Χάρος καὶ ἡ Ἀπεικόνισις Αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Στιχουργήματι Πένθος Θανάτου.” *Παρνασσός* 12 (1970). Pp. 420–438.

Index

- Agallianos, Theodoros 141, 222, 252, 253
Alfonso V of Aragon 287
Anadolu Hisar (“the castle of Anatolia”) 249–254
Anatolia 18, 27–28, 48–49, 61, 63, 65, 85–86, 121, 249, 310
Andronikos Palaeologus: appointed to govern Thessalonica 29, 33, 48; birth of 27, 32; cession of Thessalonica to Venetians 32, 88; death of 32; education of 50; portrait in Louvre manuscript *Ivoires* A53 23; in Thessalonica 60
Ankara, battle of 27–28
Ankhialos 93
Anna of Moscow 32, 53, 57
Antonio Acciajuoli of Athens 107, 135
Antonios, patriarch of Constantinople 53–54
Apostolis, Michael 274
Argyropoulos, John 274
Arthur, King 321–322
Asen, Paul 171
Asen, Theodora 171–172
Attica 180–181
- Barbaro, Marco 242
Barbaro, Nicolò 242, 270, 272, 275, 277–281, 309, 311, 315, 316
Barberini Chronicle 63–64
Barila, Trocha 119
Barker, J. W. 7
Barocius [Barozzi], Franciscus 324
Basilike Gate 141
Bayezid I Yıldırım, Ottoman sultan 18–19, 22, 27–28, 46, 48, 49, 53, 249, 288
Benvenuto 315
Bessarion, John of Trebizond, Cardinal 93, 107, 121, 177–178
Boeotia 180–181, 183
- Boniface IX, Pope 25
Boucicaut, Maréchal 25–26
Branković, George 4, 182, 213, 245
Branković, Mara 244–245, 248
- Canale, Nicolò da 240
Catholic Church 20–21, 91, 93, 214
Centurione II Zaccaria 56–57, 60, 87, 107, 117–118
Cephalonia 107
Charles VI, king of France 25, 26, 27
Chateaumorand, Jean de 25–26
Chios 29
Chrysoloras, Manuel 23
Church of Saint Savior in Khora 307
Church of the Holy Apostles 304
Church of Theotokos Pammakaristos 304
Constantine Palaeologus (Kazantzakis) 8–9
Constantine Palaeologus, the elder 27, 30, 50
Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus: accession to throne after death of John VIII 211; birth of 29–31; campaign of Hunyadi 211–212; Catalan occupation of Glarentza 119–121; celebration of union of the Churches in Constantinople 270–274; characterization by contemporaries 280–289; characterization by Kritoboulos 284; coin dated to regime of 242; construction of castle by Mehmed 249–254; cooperation with John VIII 7; coronation 221–223, 237; death of 6, 51, 280, 283, 314–317; death of Magdalena-Maddalena-Theodora Tocco 116–117; death of mother 239; depictions by Klontzas 149; depictions on chrysobull 149; diplomatic activities 237–240; education of 50–53;

- Encomium* by Dokeianos of 51–52; end of regency 151–152; eulogies on 287–288; eulogy by Kritoboulos 51–52; in fresco decorating monastery church of Moldovița in Bucovina 150; gift of sword 270; grave 317–324; imperial finances 240–244; lack of funds in the reign of 241–242; legend 306–317; as loyal follower of John VIII 60; marriage to Magdalena-Maddalena-Theodora Tocco 110; miniatures by Klontzas 324–326; offensive in summer of 1444 179–181; orders Venetian ships to stay in harbor 275–276; policy of war faction 64–65; as protagonist in *Constantine Palaeologus* 8–10; “*reconquista*” of the Morea 120–121; as regent in Constantinople 87–88, 141–146; relationship with allies 274–276; renovation of fortifications of Hexamilion 177–180, 182–183; resurrection and triumph 324–327; scholars on 4–8; search for new bride 209–211, 244–249; selection as emperor 217–223; siege of Constantinople in 1453 52, 277–283; siege of Hexamilion at Isthmus of Corinth by Murad 182–190; siege of Kokkinos 173–174; siege of Patras 52–53, 111–115; support of John VIII’s religious policy 138, 169–170; trip to Morea 171–172; visits church of Santa Sophia 307
- Constantinople: cause of fall 46–47; celebration of union of the Churches in 270–274; dissidents shipped to 55; John VII as regent in Manuel’s absence 26–29; Mehmed II in possession of 319; miracle of 1422 82–83; Ottoman conquest of 32; poetic lamentation on 285–286; return of John VIII 20, 57; return of Manuel 56; sack of 288; seven-year siege and blockade by Bayezid 54; seven-year siege and blockade by Bayezid 25; siege of 1411 53; siege of 1422 78–84; siege of 1453 52, 277–283, 308–317; sparing of churches in surrender 304–305; surrender of 304–305; tale of surrender 303–306; as target of Turkish raiders 48–49; unannounced appearance of Murad II with army in vicinity of 144–146
- Conversation with the Dead, A* (Mazaris) 106
- Corfu 88
- Corone 207
- Council of Florence 20, 91–92, 146–152
- Crusino I Sommaripa 208
- Crusius, Martinus 303–304
- Cyriacus of Ancona 179, 189, 206–209
- Davia 88
- Demetrios Palaeologus: assigned Mesembria and its territory 170–173; bid for power 86–87; death of John VIII 211–212, 213; denied formal command 93; as despot of Lemnian territory 33; education of 50; plot with Theodoros II against John VIII 176; relationship with John VIII 138–140; struggle for control of throne 216–219; war against his brother Thomas 237–238
- Deplorentz, Joseph 280
- Derkoi 90
- Diedo, Alvise 210–211
- Dokeianos, John 51–52, 107, 152
- Doria, Hilario 23, 50, 86–87
- Doukas, Michael: on accession of Constantine XI 211, 220–222; on cession of Lemnos 309; on death of Anna of Moscow 57; on death of Constantine XI 317; on death of John VIII 213–214; on education of John VIII 50; on imprisonment of ambassadors 79; on lives of young princes and circle 53; on Notaras 245–246; on offensive of Constantine XI 179–180; on peace with Mehmed II and Karaman 249–251; on relationship of John VIII and Sophia of Montferrat 64; on siege of Constantinople by Murad II 80, 84–85; on skirmishes before walls of Constantinople 48; on treaty with the Porte 90
- Dragaš, Constantine Dejanović 18–19, 22, 30
- Dragaš, Helena, empress 18–24, 90, 171–172, 216, 239
- Elis 57, 107
- Encomium* (Dokeianos) 51–52
- Eperkus, Thomas 280
- Eugenicus, John 21, 107, 117, 222, 238, 239
- Eugenicus, Markos, Metropolitan of Ephesus 214, 222
- Evrenos Beg 24
- Exswinnilwacz, Dumita 280
- Foscari, Francesco 211

- Garatone, Cristoforo 169
 Gate of Adrianople 307, 309, 310
 Gate of Saint Romanus 84, 277, 280, 307, 308, 309, 315–316
 Gate of the Assault 309
 George VIII, king of Georgia 247
 Gibbon, Edward 4–5
 Giustiniani, Longo Guglielmo Giovanni 276, 288, 306, 308–314
 Glarentza 57, 107, 117, 119–121, 134, 182
 Golden Gate 316–317, 324
 Gozzoli, Benozzo 148
 Great Wall 309–310
 Gythion 207
- Hack, Mathes 280
 Halil Çandarlı 143
 Hayr ad-Din 18, 49
 Head, C. 7
 Hellenism 5–6
 Hexamilion: renovation of fortifications by Constantine XI 177–180; renovation of fortifications by Manuel 47, 54–55, 57; siege of 1423 87–88; siege of 1431 134–135; siege of 1446 182–190, 206, 208–212; siege of 1453 276, 278, 286
 Hierax 303, 312
 Hunyadi, John Corvinus 211–212
 Hyalinas, Antonios 177
- Ibrahim Beg of Karamania 249
interregnum (*fetret devri* “Times of Trouble”) 28, 49, 64
 Isidore of Kiev, Cardinal 8, 51, 55–57, 107, 170, 243, 270–276, 282–283, 309, 315, 319
 Isthmus of Corinth 47, 54, 182–190
 Ithome 207
 Izaoul, George 86
- John VIII Palaeologus: in account given by Zosima the deacon 32–33; adoption of John VII 24; aggressive policies of 78; becomes emperor on death of Manuel 93; burial of 215–216; bust in Museo Vaticano 147; campaign against Centurione 56–57; campaign against Tocco 107–111; as co-emperor with Manuel 58–62; cooperation with Constantine XI 7; death of 31, 211, 213–216; death of Anna of Moscow 57; death of Maria of Trebizond 20, 169; determination to bring about union of Orthodox and Catholic Churches 20–21, 142; education of 50–53; entrusted to care of Theodoros I 27; excursion into countryside of Peretola 148; immortalized by painters and sculptors 146; journey to Italy and Hungary 87–92; journey to Thessalonica and Morea 56–58; as last emperor of medieval Greece 1–2; marriage to Anna of Moscow 53–54; marriage to Sophia of Montferrat 58; military campaign against Latins 56–57; participation in Council of Florence 91–92, 142–143, 146–152; plot by Theodoros and Demetrios against 176–177; policy of war faction 64–65; policy with regard to Mustafa 56, 59; portrait by Gozzoli 148; portrait by Pisanello 147; portrait in Louvre manuscript *Ivoires* A53 23; refusal to appoint patriarch 20; refusal to part with Sphrantzes 19–20; relationship with Sophia of Montferrat 22, 64, 108, 210; repair work on fortifications 141; in siege of 1422 84; transfer of power from Manuel to 61–62
 John VII Palaeologus 18, 24, 26, 28–29, 32, 47–48, 91
 John V Palaeologus 18
 Joseph II, Patriarch of Constantinople 146, 169
 Journey of the Magi (Gozzoli) 148
 Juneid of Smyrna 56
 Justinian I, Eastern Roman emperor 54, 323
- Kallipolis 62–63, 90–91, 189, 206
 Kananos, John 78, 78–84
 Kantakouzena, Helena 22
 Kantakouzene, Eirene 245
 Kantakouzenos, Demetrios 64, 78, 140
 Kantakouzenos, John 182, 209
 Karaman 249
 Kaukadenos, Theodoros 49–50
 Kazantzakis, Nikos 8–9
 Kerkoporta 310
 Khalkokondyles, George 135, 137
 Khalkokondyles, Laonikos 5–6, 47, 63–64, 80, 107, 115, 135–136, 179–180, 183, 207, 211
 Klontzas, George 149–150, 324–326
 Kokkinos 173–174
 Korax, Theologos 79
 Kosovo 211–213
 Kritoboulos 52, 222, 250–251, 284

Lamentation of Constantinople

- (anonymous) 319, 322
 Laskaris, Alexios 112
 Laskaris, Matthaios 78
 Lemnos 2, 20, 28, 33, 56, 62, 173–174, 180, 190, 309
 Leonardo Giustiniani of Chios, Latin
 Archbishop of Mytilene 169, 241–243, 245–246, 270, 274, 275, 307, 313, 315, 317
 Leontaris, Andronikos Bryennios 240
 Leontaris, Anna Laskaris 48
 Leontaris, Demetrios Laskaris 48, 56, 60–62
 Lesbos 173
 Leucas 107
 Locris 180
 Lomellino, Angelo Giovanni 311
- Malatesta, Cleopa 58, 110, 117, 134
 Malatesta, Pandolfo 110–116
 Malatesta, Sigismondo 117
 Malatesti, Malatesta dei, lord of Pesaro and Fano 58
 Mani 207
 Manuel II Palaeologus, emperor: as co-emperor with John VIII 58–62; death of 92–93; as despot of Thessalonica 18; education for children 49–53; formative years of Constantine XI under 7; funeral of 215; illegitimate children 23, 49–50; immortalized by painters and sculptors 146; initiative to renew diplomatic relations with Murad II 79; marriage to Helena 18–19, 21–22; policy of centralization 46–47; religious union of Orthodox and Catholic Churches 142; renovation of fortifications of Hexamilion 47, 54–55, 57; second coronation 18–19; suffers stroke 85; transfer of power to John VIII 61–62; trip to Morea 47; trip to Thessalonica 47–48
 Maria of Trebizond 20, 169
 Martin V, Pope 58
 Mazaris 106
 Mehmed II the Conqueror, Ottoman sultan 5, 189, 209, 244, 249–253, 274, 288, 319
 Mehmed I, Ottoman sultan 29, 48, 55, 61, 64
 Meingre [Boucicaut], Jean le 25
 Melissenos-Melissourgous, Makarios [Pseudo-Sphrantzes] 319
 Mesembria 48, 61, 90, 93, 171, 175
 Messenia 112, 207
 Metrophanes of Cyzicus 169
 Michael Palaeologus 53
 Michael VIII Palaeologus 216
 Mijatovich, C. 5
 Minotto, Girolamo 275
 Mircea of Walachia 56
 Mistra 46, 51, 88, 93, 107, 111, 117, 134, 135, 177–179, 206–209, 221
 Monemvasia 30, 111
 Mordtmann, Johannes Heinrich 319–320
 Moskhos, John 218
 Mount Athos 29
 Murad II, Ottoman sultan 319; accession to throne after death of Mehmed I 61–62; army storms Hexamilion in the Morea 87–88; attempt to mediate dispute between Demetrios and John VIII 175; campaign of Hunyadi 211–212; challenge by Mustafa 62–64; death of 240, 244; siege of Constantinople in 1422 78–84; siege of Hexamilion at Isthmus of Corinth 182–190; status of Patras 118; unannounced appearance with army in vicinity of Constantinople 144–146; utilization of Mustafa by John VIII to challenge 56
 Musa Çelebi 48
 Mustafa Çelebi 56, 61–64, 84–86
 Mycenae 209
 Mykonos 88
- Nauplia 88, 209
 Naxos 29
 Nestor-Iskander 303, 312, 316–317
 Nicholas V, Pope 253, 270, 282, 283, 313
 Nicolas Eudaimonoioannes 58
 Nicol, D. M. 6, 8
 Nicopolis 25
 Notaras, Anna 246–247
 Notaras, John 48, 53
 Notaras, Loukas 48, 90, 140, 218–219, 245–247, 308
 Notaras, Nikolaos 48
- Oitylon 207
 Orhan Çelebi 48, 249
 Orthodox Church 20–21, 91, 214
 Ostrogorsky, G. 7
- Padiates, Andronikos Laskaris 112
 Patras 52–53, 111–115, 118, 121, 134, 136–137
 Pears, E. 5

- Pempton 84, 280, 305, 307, 308, 309, 317
 Philommates, Angelos 78
 Phocis 181
 Phyliaira 112
 Pigli, Giovanni de' 148
 Pisanello 146–148
 Pius II, Pope 288
 Plethon, George Gemistus 19, 21, 107, 117, 135, 206–207
 Procopius 323
 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite 23
 Pseudo-Sphrantzes 88, 120, 237, 245, 306, 307, 313, 318–319
 Pusculo, Ubertino 251–253, 273–274, 277, 283, 311–312, 315, 317
 Pylos 112
- Red Apple Tree 323
 Rhodes 29
 Rumeli 48–49, 56, 62–63, 65, 249, 252–253
 Rumeli Hisar 249–253
 Runciman, S. 5
- Saint Andrew in Krisei 304
 Saint Demetrios Kanabou 304
 Saint George of the Cypresses 304
 Saint John at Stoudios 304
 Saint John in Trullo 304
 Santa Maria Peribleptos 304
 Santa Sophia 1, 9, 58, 82, 83, 143, 215, 221–222, 242, 272–273, 275, 280, 303, 307–308, 325–326
 Schlumberger, G. 5
 Scholarius, George 21, 51, 83, 107, 170–171, 176, 187, 217
 Sekoundinos, Nikolaos 287, 313
 Selim I Yavuz, Ottoman sultan 305
 Selybria 48, 173, 175–176, 211
 Serbia 182, 212, 245
 Serbs 19
Serenissima 54, 57, 60
 Servopoulos, Frankoulios 247
 Sigismund of Luxembourg, king of Hungary and Croatia 89–90
 Skiathos 29
 Skopelos 29
 Skyros 29
 Sophia of Montferrat 22, 58, 64, 108, 210
 Spandugino [Spandounes], Theodoro 318
 Sparta 107, 207, 208
 Sphrantzes, George: appointed governor 112; attempts for settlement on status of Patras 115–116; on birth of Constantine XI 31–32; births of princes in imperial dynasty summarized by 29–32; complaints on finances 242; on Council of Florence 91; on death of Cleopa Malatesta 134; death of Constantine XI 315–316; on death of John VII 47; on death of John VIII 24; on death of Magdalena-Maddalena-Theodora Tocco 117; on education for children of Manuel II 50–53; on imprisonment of ambassadors 78–79; on John VIII's participation in Council of Florence 90–91, 142–143; on journey of Mustafa Çelebi 56; journey to Athens 135–136; journey to Selybria 176; mention peace between Murad Beg and John VIII 90–91; miracle of 1422 82–83; in Mistra 107, 177–179; receipt of present from emperor 22–23; on renovation of fortifications of Hexamilion 54; report of incident of friendly cooperation between Manuel and Mehmed I 59–60; on return of John VIII to Constantinople 57; search of new bride for Constantine XI 209–211, 244–249; siege of Patras 53; taken prisoner 114; view of Constantine XI 4; wish to leave John's circle 20
- Stacton, D. 5
 Süleyman Çelebi 28–29, 48
 Syropoulos, Sylvestros 86–88, 139–142, 145, 174
- Tafur, Pero 82–83, 140, 143–145
 Tainaron 207
 Talbot, A.-M. 7
 Tetaldi 315
 Theodoros II Palaeologus: attempt to recruit Sphrantzes to his service 176–177; death of 211–212; death of Cleopa Malatesta 134; death of Manuel 93; education of 50, 52; entrusted to care of Theodoros I 27, 46; marriage to Cleopa Malatesta 58, 210; military campaign against Latins 56–57; military campaigns in Morea 87, 106–107; plot with Demetrios against John VIII 176; portrait in Louvre manuscript *Ivoires* A53 23; position in succession 137–140; ruler of Morea 32, 33, 60; siege of Patras 110–112; surrender of Selybria 176; yields position of regent to Constantine XI 170
 Theodoros I Palaeologus 22, 24, 26, 46

- Theozeptos I, Patriarch of Constantinople 305–306
- Thessalonica 18, 29, 47–48, 56, 88–89, 118
- Thessaly 180, 183
- Thomas Palaeologus: arrival in Constantinople 216; besieging Khalandritza 117–118; birth of 32; in Constantinople 33; control of Glarentza and of all lands around Androusa 134; death of Manuel 93; education of 50; honored with title of despot 118; marriage to Caterina-Aikaterine-Catherine Zaccaria 117–118; sent to Morea 57–58; support of John VIII's religious policy 138; territory of 206; travel to Serbia for wedding of daughter 182; war against his brother Demetrios 237–238
- Timur-i-lenk (Tamburlaine) 27
- Timurtaş Beg 25
- Tocco, Carlo 107–111, 180, 209
- Tocco, Leonardo 209
- Tocco, Magdalena-Maddalena-Theodora 110, 116–117
- Tocco, Torno/Turnus 109
- Toscanelli, Paolo dal Pozzo 206
- treaty of Kallipolis 48
- Trevix(i)an, Gabriel 275
- Turahan, Ottoman warlord 25, 87–88, 93, 115–116, 134, 136–137, 183
- Vacalopoulos, A. E. 5, 8
- Varna 181, 182, 212, 319
- Vasiliev, A. A. 6–7
- Vasilii I Dmitrijevich, Grand Prince of Moscow 53–54
- Vefa Meidan 319–320
- Vlasto, E. A. 5
- Yakub Pasha 25
- Yusuf-Demetrios Çelebi 53
- Zaccaria, Caterina-Aikaterine-Catherine 117
- Zampia Palaeologus 23, 49–50, 86–87
- Zosima the deacon 32–33
- Zygomalas, Theodosios 303–304